Pan-Germanism

Its plans for German expansion in the World

by

CH. ANDLER
Professor at the University of Paris

Translated by J. S.

Cette brochure est en vente à la

LIBRAIRIE ARMAND COLIN
103, Boulevard Saint-Michel, PARIS, 5e
au prix de 0 fr. 50
STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE WAR
PUBLISHING COMMITTEE

MM. Ernest Lavisse, of the « Académie française », President.

Charles Andler, professor of German literature and language in the University of Paris.

Joseph Bédier, professor at the « Collège de France ».

Henri Bergson, of the « Académie française ».

Émile Boutroux, of the « Académie française ».

Ernest Denis, professor of history in the University of Paris.

Émile Durkheim, professor in the University of Paris.

Jacques Hadamard, of the « Académie des Sciences ».

Gustave Lanson, professor of French literature in the University of Paris.

Charles Seignobos, professor of history in the University of Paris.

André Weiss, of the « Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques ».

All communications to be addressed to the Secretary of the Committee:

M. Émile Durkheim, 4, Avenue d'Orléans, Paris, 14e.
Pan-Germanism

Its plans for German expansion in the World

by

CH. ANDLER
Professor at the University of Paris

Translated by J. S.

LIBRAIRIE ARMAND COLIN
103, Boulevard Saint-Michel, PARIS, 5e

1915
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE .......................................................... 5

I. — FIRST SYMPTOMS OF AGGRESSIVE PAN-GERMANISM ............. 5
Symptoms of Pan-Germanism in the "Neuer Kurs" as far back as the accession of William II .... 3
Germany wishes to found a Customs Union as well as a military Union of the Central European States . 6
Bismarck dreamed of including France in the Austro-German Customs Union .... 9

II. — CONTINENTAL PAN-GERMANISM .................................... 11
Germany, by her project of a Central European Customs Union, was paving the way for her own political hegemony in Europe .... 11
a) Germany's Western Policy .................................. 15
Germany's main preoccupation, Holland and Belgium .... 14
b) The Policy of Germany on her Eastern Frontier ......... 20
Ancient anti-Russian currents .... 20
The propaganda of pure Germanism (Reines Deutschtum) .... 22
The continental plan of the Pan-German League .... 26
German science to the rescue .... 29

III. — COLONIAL PAN-GERMANISM ...................................... 50
i) German projects of penetration ...................... 52
Designs upon the South American Republics .... 5
Germany stakes out claims in the United States and in Oceania .... 36
ii) Projects of Dismemberment .................................. 58
Some Germans demand Crete and Armenia .... 58
Designs upon Mesopotamia .... 59
Designs upon the Mediterranean .... 41
Designs upon Morocco .... 45
a) Major Plan .... 43
b) Minimum Plan .... 44
c) The Colossal Plan .... 45
Designs upon Central Africa .... 46

IV. — DEFINITION AND METHODS OF PAN-GERMANISM .... 32
Complicity of the German Government in Pan-Germanism .... 55

APPENDIX

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN COMPLICITY .................................. 66
I. — Pan-Magyarism an auxiliary of Pan-Germanism .... 66
II. — Austrian Pan-Germanism .................................. 69
III. — "Trialist" Imperialism et Colonial Imperialism in Austria .... 72
IV. — A final chance for peace. The pacific forms of Austrian Imperialism .... 76
PAN-GERMANISM

ITS PLANS FOR GERMAN EXPANSION IN THE WORLD

PREFACE

The German intellectuals seek to exculpate Germany by insisting on the various proofs William II has given of his desire for peace during the twenty-five years of his reign. We will not here question the sincerity of the pacific assurances it has been German Emperor's pleasure to make from time to time. We do not deny that, in exchange for Alsace-Lorraine, William II has more than once sent us memorial wreaths, sheaves of flowers and telegrams of condolence on such occasions as the death of a Marshal of France, the loss of a submarine, or an accident to a dirigible balloon. It was customary for the French Government to acknowledge these Imperial courtesies in suitable terms. William II even gave us a more practical token of sympathy by sending a band of rescuers at the time of the explosion of fire-damp at Courrières. In return, we sacrificed the lives of several French soldiers during the fire at the Summer Palace of Pekin, to save the precious existence of Field Marshal von Waldsee. We can believe that for some considerable time German diplomacy did not desire war with France, or at least that it did not wish war with France to be its first war. But did it desire no war? That is another question. And did it not hope to see us on its side in some of these wars? What would have been our fate later on if when
Germany attacked our Allies or friends one by one we had allowed them to be crushed alone? and how could we have offered even a passive resistance to some of Germany's most daring ambitions? These are the things that inevitably weighed with enlightened French opinion, when it unanimously supported the Government of the Republic in its determination to be faithful to its alliances. To understand this state of French opinion, it is essential to define the principles which underlie these German ambitions. They are very varied in their origins. They are revivals of ancient ideas. Many have worked obscurely in the dreams or the calculations of scholars; others have been noisily preached at public meetings; they have become the programme of fanatical Leagues, whose essays in agitation or "regeneration" have never ceased for the last twenty-five years. Ambitious suggestions have thus been perpetually bandied about in an atmosphere of visionary megalomania. Did the German authorities lend a willing ear to these suggestions? At a time when all Germany was bent on doing things "in the grand manner", when life at Berlin in particular had become monstrous in its proportions, did not the Government itself encourage the calculations of a frenzied ambition? History will hold decisive proofs of this later on; diplomacy already has some of them, and public opinion may even now fasten upon infallible indication. I have tried to demonstrate some of these in the following pages.
FIRST SYMPTOMS OF AGGRESSIVE PAN-GERMANISM

Symptoms of Pan-Germanism in the Neuer Kurs as far back as the accession of William II. — What was the programme of the German Government at the accession of William II? In what did the Neuer Kurs, the « New Course », differ from the Bismarckian régime? Official professions of faith are formal and open to suspicion. We will take one of a semi official character. We will borrow it from an anonymous book, inspired by the Wilhelmstrasse, in which the Neuer Kurs seeks to justify itself. This work, Berlin-Wien-Rom, Betrachtungen über den neuen Kurs und die europäische Lage (1892) is by a distinguished National-Liberal publicist, Julius von Eckardt. We knew the author as a man of great refinement and intellectual distinction and of strong religious feeling. He loved France, and regretted the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany as a grave error. It would be impossible to find a more temperate apologist of the Neuer Kurs than this publicist, who for many years superintended the Press Bureau at the German Foreign Office. If we cannot listen without uneasiness to this sincere Christian, when he sets forth his conception of the German mission semi-officially, according to his instructions, what are we to expect from vulgarly ambitious aspirants, bent on flattering either the opinion of the masses, or the mania of a master greedy for popularity? (1).

(1) It should be mentioned that Julius von Eckardt was a native of the Baltic Provinces, and that since his migration, he had lived in hope of a war between Germany and Russia, which should avenge the Germans of the Baltic for a somewhat drastic system of Russiannization. It is significant that the Press Bureau of the Wilhelmstrasse should have been for years in such hands. It tends to explain the
Let us see how Julius von Eckart describes the ambitions of the new Imperial regime:

Germany wishes to found a Customs Union as well as a military Union of the Central European States (1).

Because during the last years of the preceding régime (i.e. the reign of William I), there had been no quarrel with Russia, it was believed in Germany that no cause of dispute would ever arise in the future; and because it had been possible to allow Austria-Hungary to manage her Eastern affairs herself, it was supposed that this state of things would go on for ever (2).

Average educated opinion in Germany accepted as a programme and as a limitation of German action in the East:

1. The open door in the markets of the Balkan peninsula, and guarantees against Russian encroachment.

2° As an extreme measure, pressure brought to bear upon Serbia, to induce her to enter into the sphere of influence of Austrian power and economy.

Beyond these limits, it was not thought advisable to involve the Empire. It was supposed that changes in the map of Bulgaria and of Southern Rumelia had nothing to do with us Germans (3).

Now, says von Eckardt, we must uproot this old Liberal prejudice:

1. *Old Prussia*, which was fighting for her very existence, might look upon Russia as a natural ally, because she was surrounded by enmities and jealousies, and because the rising Empire of the Tsar offered her a suitable support against the arrogant monarchy of the Hapsburgs... The interests of the German Empire must be weighed by a different and a loftier standard (4).

1. *Noblesse oblige*, and the great position, both German and recent pronouncements of Professors Adolf von Harnack and Ostwald, and the diffuse and venomous propaganda, for which Professor Schiemann is responsible. They too are Baltic Germans.

(1) This head-line is our own. It is not in von Eckardt's text, but it exactly expresses his thought.

(2) *Berlin-Wien-Rom*, p. 38.


European, which we have won, imposes on us German and European duties, which did not exist for old Prussia, inasmuch as she was only a second rate Power. A German policy, based mainly on a Russian alliance, would be no better than the present policy of France, who is ready to give up all Europe to Russia, in exchange for the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine » (1).

Europe, he continues, was divided by rival ambitions: by the Balkan policy of Russia which ran counter to the designs of Austria, and by the incurable resentment of France. Further, France and Russia had entrenched themselves economically behind high protective tariffs. The MacKinley bill confronted all Europe with a North America armed against European industrial competition. It was therefore necessary, thought von Eckardt, to organise Europe.

« But what remained of Europe, if Russia and France pursued their separate paths, and if England began to rely only on her own resources and the markets of her vast colonial dominions? The Central European States alone remained, and only on condition that they formed an economic unit large enough to be able to adopt an independent Customs policy...

« If it were possible to give the Triple Alliance a basis other than that of immediate political and military exigencies; if the object were to give it a durable character, this could only be done by providing the allied nations with an economic interest in the maintenance of the system politically followed by their governments... This would open up a prospect which might be of immense importance to the future of our entire policy, and of our European position » (2).

« The establishment for a long series of years of an alliance at once political and economic between the three Central European Powers, might become the starting-point of a new European system. If the three leading States combined to form a rampart which would permanently repel invasion of Central Europe from East or West, the adhesion of the other Powers might be counted upon as almost a certainty. Germany moreover was now in a position to disarm the dislike and distrust of her neighbours

(1) Berlin-Wien-Rom, p. 89.
(2) Ibid., p. 109.
FIRST SYMPTOMS OF PAN-GERMANISM.

by a great civilising entreprise (Kulturveranstaltung). A great Customs Union, created on the initiative of Germany, would prove to the world irrefutably that the foundation of the German Empire had been a necessity and a benefit for Europe. If we could effectively demonstrate that the concentration of our national forces had made us capable of solving great problems of civilisation (Kulturaufgaben), it could no longer be cast in our teeth that the great German undertaking of 1870 had resulted merely in universal armaments, universal military service, and an elaboration of militarism, which is sucking out the marrow from the bones of all the nations” (1).

“The Triple Alliance, created with a view to war, would become an instrument to serve the interests of peace. This transformation would be no less advantageous to the immediate ends of the Triple Alliance than to its European position. No method could be more profitably employed to effect this transformation than the establishment of a Customs organisation open to all friendly nations. Nothing could better prove the mission and importance of a unified Germany than the initiation of an undertaking so essential to the progress of civilisation” (2).

“This project of transforming the purely political alliance founded by Prince Bismarck into an alliance at once political and economic, which would keep the door open for an entente embracing the whole of Central Europe obviously, exceeds the programme of the founder of the Empire. Yet the idea is not antagonistic but complementary to the first conception” (3).

What the theorist of the Neuer Kurs in his semi-official capacity, and through him the Wilhelmstrasse, proposes, is in fact an industrial trust of the Central European States, strong enough in itself to resist American competition. The attraction of this trust to neighbouring States would be so potent that they would of their own accord ask to enter it in order to avoid impoverishment. Would the entente be confined to Customs? Our theorist prudently abstains from raising this delicate question. He pretends to forget Friedrich List’s old axiom which affirms as a truth proved by

(2) Ibid., p. 113-115.
(3) Ibid., p. 111.
experience that commercial union and political union are twins, and that "the one cannot be born without the other". Nor does he remember, apparently, that States united by a Zollverein readily enter into military conventions. Between Germany, Austria and Italy the military convention had preceded the proposed Customs Union. But if the Scandinavian States, Belgium and Holland, could be so fascinated by the commercial splendour of Germany as to join the Triple Alliance, would military conventions with these States be long delayed? The history of the German Zollverein gives the answer. A military and commercial organisation of Europe on the initiative, or, in other words, under the hegemony, of Germany was the "new European system" aimed at from the beginning by the Neuer Kurs. It is certain that neither Serbia nor Bulgaria, nor any other Balkan State, could remain outside its sphere of influence. But would France, in the long run, have been able to withstand an attraction so powerful in its commercial and military aspects? An early offer of Bismarck's points to the conclusion that Germany proposed to capture her by persuasion, before bringing more active pressure to bear on her.

**Bismarck dreamed of including France in the Austro-German Customs Union.** — In order to prove this, it will be sufficient to refer to the anonymous, but inspired, compilation: *Bismarck: Zwölf Jahre deutscher Politik* (1871-1885), published in 1884, which records a famous conversation between Bismarck and the Comte de Saint-Vallier, the French Ambassador. The Chancellor, in an expansive mood, confessed that the traditional Prussian policy of an *entente* with Russia, which he had himself adopted, gave him many melancholy moments. It was the danger on the Rhine which had caused the German States to seek to protect themselves on the Russian side and "to subordinate themselves to Muscovite policy".

"They had been obliged to look on with their hands tied,
said Bismarck, at the destruction of Poland by the Russians, and by the partition of this kingdom, to form unnatural ties with Russia, who had thus been permitted to make an important territorial advance in Europe. During the Crimean War Prussia lay like a vigilant watch-dog before the Polish gates of Russia, and at the time of the Polish insurrection in 1863 she concluded a convention with Russia, by which she rendered the latter an immense service..... Austria, who by a series of bloody wars, had checked the advance of the Turks .... had to look on, without intervening, at the conquest of Turkey by the Russians. The irresistible pressure and even violence, by which the Russian political organism was forcing its way towards the light and warmth of the Mediterranean, not only threatened the existence of Austria, but deprived French influence and interests of any possible future in the East” (1).

(1) Zwölf Jahre deutscher Politik, 1884, p. 275.
II

CONTINENTAL PAN-GERMANISM

Germany, by her project of a Central European Customs Union, was paving the way for her own political hegemony in Europe. — Bismarck, with his unerring eye for facts which saved him from any illusions as to the opposition of hostile forces or as to his own strength, had abandoned the idea of a Customs Union for Central Europe. When the Transylvanian deputy, von Baussnern, submitted a plan on these lines to him on March 5, 1880, he replied: "I, too, look upon a Customs Entente embracing the two Empires as the ideal end which should dictate the direction in which we should develop all our politico-commercial activities". Beyond this he did not go.

Publicists, however, never ceased to work upon public opinion. Paul Dehn, in two works Deutschland und der Orient, 1884, and Deutschland nach Osten, 1888, was one of the most prominent of those Bismarckian publicists who, by means of this plan of an economic organisation of Europe, sought to allay the bitterness — the peevish discontent — of the old partisans of a "great Germany" which Bismarck had destroyed by excluding Austria from the federation of Northern Germany and from the New Empire.

"In the economic life of the Old World", wrote Paul Dehn in 1884, "Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy must maintain a close union defensively against the superior and overpowering competition of the English, the French and the Russians who are now in the ascendancy; and to recapture their rightful share in the exchange of wealth between Europe and the East. From this point of view Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, bound together by common economic interests in Central Europe, form a great domain which would be very happily
rounded off by the adhesion of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland in the West, and of Poland and Lithuania in the East. If the States of Central Europe wish to ensure their commercial vitality, and consequently their political life and independence, they must unite with a full consciousness of their intentions; they must seek new forms within which this great domain of common interests might be realised without violence to national sentiment or to existing conditions which have the sanction of political rights. Germany, by virtue of her situation in the heart of Europe and the economic importance of this situation, is called upon to play the leading part in the centre of this domain of interests”.

Paul Dehn does not explain how Poland, Lithuania, or even Holland and Switzerland, are to be brought into the commercial Triple Alliance without a war. In vain does he suggest a variety of very elastic combinations: a Customs Parliament and a Customs Federal Council to deliberate on the Customs business of the whole Confederation: or a narrow confederation, to which the States not as yet reduced to complete economic dependence should be attached by simple but permanent treaties of commerce. The precedent of the German Zollverein is too recent; none will fail to see under these projects a deliberate and aggravated attempt to repeat the programme of 1866.

It is easy to see what Germany would gain by such a re-adjustment of the economic frontiers of Europe. Paul Dehn does not conceal the fact that a Customs alliance with nations, who have remained more agricultural than Germany, would give Germany extended outlets for her manufactured products, additional markets in which to buy raw materials (wood etc.) and cereals; stable guarantees for the price of food stuffs, and in general, “an appreciable reinforcement of Germany’s economic power.” (Deutschlands Machtstellung würde in wirtschaftspolitischer Hinsicht beträchtlich gestärkt werden) (1).

(1) Paul Dehn, Deutschland nach Osten, III, p. 183.
It is also obvious that the more modest members of the Association would profit. Austro-Hungarian agriculture would be enabled to dispose of her surplus crops among the growing industrial population of Germany. Austria's infant industry would find support, says Paul Dehn, in the powerful industry of Germany. This union would give it courage, self-confidence and guidance (Muth, Selbstvertrauen und Führung) (1).

But would Austro-Hungarian manufacturers prove as anxious as Paul Dehn believes to accept "the guidance" of German industry? We are not in a position to say. Other countries have perhaps already regretted their confidence in this aggressive collaboration. It is not our business to bid Austria-Hungary beware.

But even should Austria be won over by these promises of prosperity, would they induce Russia to detach Poland and Lithuania from her economic system, and allow them to join the Austro-German Customs Union? Or rather, would the Russians accept this modification without war? Dehn is firmly convinced that the radiating force of the military and economic Alliance of the Central Empires would extend to Rumania and Turkey:

"And even France would find it advantageous to enter the Union. Within it she might form friendships that would be of service to her against Trans-Oceanic competition, from which she suffers as much as Germany and Austria-Hungary" (2).

Germany's Western Policy.

Accordingly we are right in saying that Germany's policy and opinion with regard to continental France was distinctly pacific about 1888, provided France raised no objections to the projects of commercial absorption cherished by Germany in respect to all the small adjacent States from the Baltic

(1) Paul Dehn, ibid., III, 186.
(2) Ibid., III, 184.
and the Rhine to the Hellespont. With regard to colonial France, the rapid growth of which under the Republic had been watched with admiration by Germany, her ideas, which we shall consider presently, were perhaps of a different order. For the moment, France was left to herself. Certain advances were made to her in the form of floral offerings, pending the time when the pressure of economic life, and the efforts of publicists should induce her to enter the Austro-Italo-German Customs Union, there to seek courage and "guidance" in her commercial enterprises.

Germany main preoccupation, Holland and Belgium.— The Pan-German agitation, from 1897 onwards, was mainly directed at Holland and Belgium. This was the moment when two organisations were started, one modest and scholarly, directed by professors, the publication of Der Kampf um das Deutschtum; the other a noisy propaganda which inflamed public opinion by meetings, pamphlets and a party review, the Pan-German League (Allddeutscher Verband). A Low-German publicist poorly equipped but fanatical and notorious, Fritz Bley, published a little book, Die Weltstellung des Deutschtums (Germany's position in the World, 1897), and in the Kampf um das Deutschtum, a study, Die alldeutsche Bewegung und die Niederlande (The Pan-German Movement and the Netherlands, 1897). This exordium was couched in the boastful strain that has ceased to amaze us:

"We are indubitably the most martial nation in the world. For two centuries German vigour upheld the decadent Roman Empire. Only Germans were able to combat the primitive might of Germans (Deutsche Urkraft). In seven battles of the nations, in the forest of Teutoburg, in the Catalaunian plains, at Tours and at Poitiers, on the Lechfeld near Liegnitz, before Vienna against the Turks, and at Waterloo we saved the civilisation (Gesittung) of Europe.

"We are the most gifted of nations in all the domains of science and art. We are the best colonists, the best sailors.
DESIGNS UPON THE FRENCH FLANDERS.

and even the best traders! And yet we have not up to now secured our due share in the heritage of the world, because we will not learn to draw salutary lessons from history..... That the German Empire is not the end but the beginning of our national development is an obvious truth which is by no means the common property of Germans as yet. It is recognised only by a few cultivated men ” (1).

The Pan-Germanists form this small body of cultivated men; and they exhibit a frenzied activity in propagating the "obvious truth" that the German nation, the "most martial nation in the world" must seize its share of the heritage due to it. They point out the predestined morsels:

1. French Flanders.

"The Flemings of the North-West are on a level greatly superior to that of the remainder of the French rural population, and their fusion with the French race (Franzosenlum), physically and intellectually their inferiors (minderwertig) would entail the degeneration of their species. But when, sooner or later, maritime Flanders is re-united to West-Flanders, and when what was wrested from the Flemings by Turenne’s ignoble rapine has been righteously taken from the French, what a clamour will arise throughout France! ” (2).

France will not submit tamely to spoliation; and it is hardly probable that Belgium will be able to capture Lille and Calais single-handed; but she will have an ally; we can guess who this will be. Germany is the great redresser of the ancient wrongs of history. But has not she herself inflicted wrongs of more recent date than the reign of Louis XIV? Will not a clamour, not of protest in this case but of jubilation, arise in Poland, Schleswig and Alsace-Lorraine, when the Germans are made to give up what Poles, Danes, Alsatians and Lorrains consider the fruits of "ignoble rapine"? This is a question which no German will entertain.

(1) FRITZ BLEY, Die Weltstellung des Deutschtums, 1897, p. 21-22.
(2) FRITZ BLEY, Die alldeutsche Bewegung und die Niederlande, 1897, p. 61.
Walloon Belgium itself is German territory to the Germans. Take the names Luig, Waremme, Bassenge, Ordange, Roulange and Fouron; are they not perversions of Ludeke, Borgworm, Bitsingen, Ordingen, Rukkelingen and Foeren? Do not urge that these names are obviously Frankish. They are Saxon, say the Pan-Germans. Charlemagne did not exterminate all the Saxons in his wars of conquest. He deported bands of them, whose descendants are now to be found in Belgium (1).

From the Ardennes to the Meuse there is a Saxon Irredenta to which Germany will some day assert its rights.

2. Holland.

Fritz Bley continues:

"We require these new Dutch territories, already fertilised by German blood, for the indispensable expansion of our economic dominions. On a Rhine that has become German to the mouth, we need the free traffic which the silent resistance of Holland now hampers.

"A Customs Union, a common organisation of naval and military defence — the language of command being High German in the army and Low German in the fleet — a joint management of our possessions beyond the seas, carried on in the spirit of Dutch prudence and practical utility; these would be the objects of a Germano-Dutch alliance.

"If Holland were merely a Continental Power, this alliance would not be consummated until the day when Germany would impose her just claims by force. But as the vast trans-Oceanic possessions of Holland are daily crumbling away under a growing menace, the merchant princes of the Amstel and the Meuse are impelled by considerations of personal interest to make common cause with us " (2).

The argument is easy to follow. The Dutch will certainly be linked to Germany. Germany is strength subserving justice; and it is unjust that a Holland so quietly stubborn

(1) E. Seelmann, Die Wiederauffindung der von Karl dem Grossen verschickten Sachsen, 1895. — Other Germans, as is well known, have found these elusive Saxons in Hungary.

(2) Fritz Bley, ibid., p. 7.
as to retain the mouths of the Rhine should exist. The fate of the Dutch is sealed, if their underhand resistance continues. Willingly or unwillingly, they are invited to amalgamate their colonies, which are precious, with the infinitely less valuable possessions of Germany. They are told that their colonies are threatened by Japan. And Holland, afraid of Japanese aggression, will put herself voluntarily into the grasp of Germany.

Germany hopes to soothe Holland by offering her military support in a domain where as a fact she will no longer be sole mistress. Her destiny, she is told, will be no worse than that of other Powers of the Customs Union established in Central Europe:

"Consider our history and contemporary world-economics. Such a consideration will lead to an urgent demand that Germany, Austria, Italy, the Balkan States, the two Netherlands, Switzerland, and finally, if possible, the Scandinavian countries should, with their colonies, combine in a common Customs Union, adopting a system of Free Trade or graduated tariffs internally, but rigorously Protectionist externally. By no other means will they be able to maintain their right to existence, and ensure the food supply of their populations as against the vast territories of Russia, England and North and South America.

"Similarly with the Dutch we desire only an international alliance. We do not wish to form a single State with them" (1).

The Dutch may not unreasonably object that these same Pan-Germans did not ask the Italians and the Balkan States to share their fleet and their colonies with them. They will be made uneasy by the designs indicated in such passages as this:

"From the Emperor to the simple agricultural labourer and the simple mason each will work for the systematic building up of the Pan-German State, as soon as we recognise what has been the source of all our sufferings in our lamentable past — the

(1) Fritz Bley, Die Weltstellung des Deutschtums, p. 18; 40.
lack of the necessary will-power. This has been our sole deficiency. This alone could save us, an iron national will, inflexible, adamantine, and proof against all allurements." (1)

Among the German errors of this lamentable past Bley includes the signature by the German states of the treaties of 1815, which created an independent Holland. Far-sighted English diplomacy perceived the danger of "the re-union of Holland with Germany". It put a stopper on this possibility.

"Why were we so mad as to consent to its proposals?" (2).

If all that is necessary is to recognise the source of past evils, and to possess "a will of iron" for their reparation, the political line of Germany is clearly marked out, and is sure of a successful issue. The Dutch will know what is offered them, of course "for their own advantage". For it is of course to the advantage of others not to oppose "the iron will" of Germany.

These pamphlets must not be looked upon as isolated manifestations. The economist Ernst von Halle is almost a celebrity (5).

He does not consider the existence of Holland compatible with the safety of the German Empire:

"Germany has on various sides military and political, national and economic frontiers which in course of time will be untenable, in view of the exigencies of modern national life. It is monstrous from the economic and commercial-geographic standpoint, that the mouths of two of her greatest rivers, the Danube and the Rhine, especially the latter, the most important artery

(2) Ibid., p. 14.
(3) Ernst von Halle has collected various important studies in the two volumes called: Volks und Seewirtschaft, 8th, 1902. Cf. in vol. II, p. 1-60, Die volks- und seewirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Holland (The economic and naval relations between Germany and Holland) and on p. 75-83: England als Beschützer Hollands (England as the protector of Holland).
of national traffic, as well as a series of the leading ports for
German international exchange, should be in the hands of forei-
gners...

"A little coast nation is in a position to influence traffic on the
Lower Rhine, and to take measures there which are solely to its
own interest, and not to that of the Hinterland. In the future,
the German Empire must be able to establish and support her
lines of defence on the most favourable positions. A Holland too
weak on land is a permanent danger to Ger-
man's most important industrial regions" (1).

It is generally known that Germany made the canal from
the Ems to the Jahde, and the canal, which connects the
mouth of the Ruhr to the Ems near Dortmund, in order to
divert the greater bulk of the goods which came down the
Rhine into Holland. The operation did not produce quite
the desired results. It is even more difficult to deflect quite
from the shorter line of the Rhine the Dutch transports which
take the reverse route by the old Rhine or the Waal. The
situation invites either blandishment or coercion.

The important review Die Grenzboten, in one of those ano-
ymous articles generally contributed by highly placed Ger-
man officials, resorted mainly to blandishment in 1901. It
sought to inspire fear of an English landing in Holland.

"The strength of Germany is also the support of Holland.
But all the assurances given by England, in which she promises
to respect the neutrality and the territorial integrity of Bel-
gium, do not deceive the Dutch for a moment. They know that they
must have more solid guarantees of their complete security
than those of treaties even when sanctioned by the most solemn
oaths" (2).

Belgium was able to judge in 1914 which was the better
guarantee, the word given by Great Britain or that given by
Germany and sanctioned "by the most solemn oaths".

(2) Holland und Deutschland (Grenzboten, 60th year, 1901, p. 146).
The Policy of Germany on her eastern Frontier.

Ancient anti-Russian currents. — Bismarck had reason to fear that the traditional Prussian policy, followed prudently, though with some regret, by himself, and consisting in looking to Russia for support, might be abandoned by William II.

The treaty by which Germany and Austria-Hungary promised each other mutual support in case of Russian aggression upon one or the other, was supplemented by a treaty of re-assurance concluded between Germany and Russia in 1884. Bismarck had obtained from the Tsar a convention covering a period of six years, which guaranteed Russian neutrality in case of a French attack on Germany, and German neutrality, in case of an Austrian attack upon Russia. Caprivi did not renew this treaty in 1890. Hohenlohe and Marschall von Bieberstein explained to the Reichstag, on November 16, 1896, why German diplomacy had decided against its renewal. In the sudden explosion of a war-crisis, it is difficult to decide at once who is the aggressor. In the event of an Austro-Russian conflict would it be possible to decide instantly whether the casus foederis with Austria or the treaty of neutrality with Russia should prevail? Germany wished to be free to act in accordance with her interest.

Strong currents of opinion set in the direction of war with Russia. Moltke's successor on the General Staff, Count von Waldersee, a brilliant and ambitious General, had long been at work on a plan of campaign against Russia. He was the real master of William II in strategy. There had been a close friendship between the impetuous Kronprinz William, and this general athirst for glory. In February, 1889, Bismarck learned, and stated in the Hamburger Nachrichten, that Waldersee had been thought of as his successor. Throughout the spring, the Kreuzzeitung had been full of warlike articles against Russia. Bismarck denounced them on June 19,
ANCIENT ANTI-RUSSIAN CURRENTS.

1889, in an article in the Hamburger Nachrichten entitled Zur Kriegstreiberei (Incitements to war). He also denounced their source; he referred them to the general Staff, the military camarilla, which was pursuing an irresponsible individual policy, supported by the pietistic Junker newspapers, and was trying to compromise the Emperor himself.

William II formally dissociated himself from these intrigues of the anti-Russian general Staff. But he had grown up under the influence of that general Staff. It was a matter of common knowledge that general von Waldersee was one of those very religious Prussian Conservatives who still clung to the idea of «Great Germany». In their eyes, the Germany founded by Bismarck, with Austria excluded, was too small. Doubtless, it was necessary to make it small at first, in order to crystallise it firmly round the Prussian core. But later, this Prussianised Germany should have been welded together with Austria-Hungary, which would have been Prussianised in its turn. Then this Austro-German mass would have advanced upon East Poland and the Balkan East. These ideas were not novel. Friedrich List in 1841, and, after 1870 various eloquent and indefatigable pamphleteers, such as Paul de Lagarde and Constantin Frantz, had engaged in a similar propaganda. Obviously, this Gross Deutschum was no longer that of the Diet of Frankfort or of the belated Guelfs who still sat in the Centre. It no longer assigned a leading part to Austria. It looked upon her as a prospective vassal, and a bulwark against Slavism. Germany, and within Germany Prussia, was the only «master-people».

"We must create a Central Europe", wrote Paul de Lagarde in 1881, "which will guarantee the peace of the entire continent from the moment when it shall have driven the Russians from the Black Sea and the Slavs from the South, and shall have conquered large tracts to the east of our frontiers for German colonisation. We cannot let loose ex abrupto the war which will create this Central Europe. All we
can do is to accustom our people to the thought that this war must come" (1).

Constantin Frantz in his turn had proposed the plan of a great confederation of the central European states. A central core would be made up of the west German states, rounded off by Prussia and Austria; and these states would be united by a close offensive and defensive military alliance sanctioned by their Constitutions. A belt of smaller states, Holland, Belgium, Flanders, Lorraine, Switzerland, Franche-Comté, Savoy, and in the East, all the Balkan states together with others to be carved out of Russian Poland, would complete a prodigious circumvallation. But in order to construct it, it would be necessary to thrust back Russia beyond the Pruth to the Dniester. The reconstituted Russo-German frontier would be set back to the line Brest-Litowsk, Bialystock and Grodno. Anti-Bismarckian though he was, Constantin Frantz urged that Bismarck should be given all the military votes of credit he asked of the Reichstag.

"One thing is certain... and this is that at the very beginning of operations, Prussia should march with three great armies simultaneously on Warsaw, Wilna and Riga, and should occupy the whole territory up to the Dwina, with a view to demanding its cession... Prussia would be lost at the outset if she elected to remain on the defensive... She must be able to undertake an offensive war in the grand style" (2).

These ideas obtained in Berlin in 1888 in pious Conservative circles, among persons who thought they could do better and greater things than Bismarck.

The propaganda of pure Germanism (Reines Deutchtum). — The Franco-Russian alliance sobered this warlike fervour for a while. William II set himself to play his part of « the Prince of Peace ». Waldersee was sent to command an army corps at Kiel, — a dignified disgrace. Russo-

phobia died down for a few years. It was suddenly revived in various organisations where the feverish ambition of a new generation, saturated with declamations on victory, proud of a growing prosperity and eager for new achievements, found expression in a sort of rapture of megalomaniac discontent.

Among these organisations in 1894 was the Deutscher Bund, which, as the result of a party split, gave birth to two important newspapers, both Pangeman, the Deutsche Tageszeitung and the Deutsche Zeitung of Berlin. Friedrich Lange was long the noisy choragus of this "pure Germanism", which holds, in this case, on the authority of a racial philosophy remote enough from Christianity, that "the victorious strength of the blood" ensures the domination of the Germans.

"Bismarck", he says, "merely led us to the threshold of German regeneration" (1).

In the opinion of these men, between 1894 and 1904, the future of Germany lay in a violent set-back to Russia.

"This nation is like a sleeping lake... on its low Sarmatian plains. It is to day what it has always been: a confused flock, without movement and hence without history; veneer on the surface, and dense darkness beneath... This inundation is certainly a peril for our civilisation as for all other civilisations, but only if we ourselves pierce out dykes, as we are light-heartedly doing at present. Otherwise there would be no danger. On the contrary, every vigorous German act which should advance our dykes in this lacustrine region would conquer fresh territory for Germany and soon make this territory German soil. This is the only lesson we can draw from the history of our struggles against the Slavs".

In this struggle Austria, which was to be a bulwark against Slavism, is becoming more and more Slav herself. This is a betrayal of "Deutschtum". Austria must be colo-

nised with pure Germans, as Russian Poland and all the conquered Lithuanian territory will be colonised. This emigration should be organised, administered, enjoined and insisted on by Government. Long before this, Friedrich List had planned the intensive colonisation of Hungary and of the riparian regions of the Danube.

"The right and left banks of the Danube, from Presburg to its mouth, the northern provinces of Turkey, and the Eastern coast of the Black Sea offer large tracts of land, naturally fertile and as yet unexploited, to German emigrants" (1).

He dreamed of a vast Germano-Magyar Empire, stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. Lagarde revived the project. This vast plan offered opening to the overnumerous German princes; to the German country gentlemen living in idleness, and consequently vulnerable to intrigue; to the overgrown German proletariat.

"The lands we shall demand from Russia must be extensive enough to maintain permanently all Rumanians, even those of Austria and Turkey, in Bessarabia and to the north-east of Bessarabia, as subjects of King Charles" (2).

Constantin Frantz also favoured projects of this kind.

All these plans have become the heritage of "pure Germanism". It has received them from these famous predecessors. Austria, "that political abortion, the petrified residuum of the Babylonian confusion of tongues" will perish if they are realised, says Friedrich Lange. But Germanism will triumph, if it will but show the same tenacity in assimilating the conquered provinces as in conquering them.

"If we take, we must also keep. A foreign territory is not incorporated until the day when the rights of property of Germans are rooted in its soil. With all necessary prudence, but also with inflexible determination, a process of expropriation should be inaugurated, by which the Poles and the Alsatians

(1) F. List, Sämtliche Schriften, vol. II, 209. — This was written in 1842.
(2) Paul de Lagarde, Deutsche Schriften, p. 591.
and Lorrains would be gradually transported to the interior of the Empire, while Germans would replace them on the frontiers.”

Are these the ravings of a madman? Unhappily the mania is shared by many. The readers of the Deustche Zeitung revel in his delirious contributions. He has had notable predecessors. Paul de Lagarde was the founder of this line of monomaniacs

“Hungary is a bundle of impossibilities. It does not follow that she is a political possibility. Now if we must admit this, must we not also admit that it is our duty to help these tribes to disappear? The Jablunka must never hear any language but German, and the [German] wave must spread thence towards the South until nothing remains of all the lamentable nationalities of the Imperial State [Austria].”

Was it not Paul de Lagarde who proposed to shut up the Slovaks, the Slovenians und the Czechs in “reserves”, like the Red Indians of America, and forbid them to come out of the enclosures? This extravagant dream has since made good progress. One borrows it from the other. It is passed from hand to hand, from book to book, with approving laughter.

A brilliantly written book with the brief and caustic title: War, was published in 1906 by Klaus Wagner. It caused an explosion.

“Let us bravely organise great forced migrations of the inferior peoples. Posterity will be grateful to us. Coercion will be necessary. Such tasks are also war-tasks. Superiority of creative power is but a means... Those adversaries who succumb, as they try to bar our passage, must be driven into "reserves" where we shall keep them segregated that we may obtain the space necessary for our expansion.”

---

(1) F. Lange, Reines Deutschtum, p. 207.
(2) Paul de Lagarde. Deutsche Schriften, p. 112.
(3) Klaus Wagner, Krieg, 1906. (Quoted by Ernst Hasse, Deutsche ölitik.)
The Pan-German League of course adopted this crazy doctrine at once.

The continental plan of the Pan-German League. — This League has always endeavoured to turn men and ideas to account. It has thrust audacious men and daring ideas into prominence. When it was founded in 1891, it had at its head the notorious Dr Peters, whose name is associated with African exploration combined with massacres. He was succeeded in 1894 by Professor Ernst Hasse, a deputy of the Reichstag, and Director of the Statistical Department at Leipzig, a scholar in whom it was natural to look for a dispassionate calculator, but who proved a noisy agitator. In the Reichstag he gave Prince von Bülow no respite until he had hurried him into serious decisions. In his solitary meditations, and in his bulky book, Deutsche Politik, where he formulates the doctrine of the Pan-German League, the "nebulous dreams of the future" for which Prince von Bülow rebuked him, naturally found expression in threats of spoliation and war.

On all the frontiers of Germany, on the West, the South and the North, Hasse wishes to delimit a military "glacis", the width of a day's march, where only pure-bred Germans may live, picked men, prompt to obey the war-chief's word of command, like the Cossaks. They would be chosen from among former non-commissioned officers to whom the State would assign lands at minimum rents in payment of their services (1).

Military boundaries like those which protected the Russians and the Austrians against the Tartars, would form a closely guarded girdle round Germany, where no foreigner would be allowed to own landed property or investments,

(1) This project of the organisation of a military frontier first appeared in the Alldeutsche Blätter of October 7, 1894. It will be found again in Deutsche Politik, 1906, vol. I, part 3. Besiedlung des deutschen Bodens, p. 147 et seq.
and where none would be allowed to spend any length of time save by permission, and then at most only a few months. Thus in Alsace-Lorraine, after the expulsion of the last of those who had elected to remain in the country after 1870, in Schleswig and in Poland the State would buy, by public expropriation, the lands of the peasantry, which it would distribute to its military colonists. Von Bülow's policy had already adopted and set in motion this process of expropriation in Poland. In twenty years, 60,000 German colonists had been established on the dismembered estates of the great Polish landowners — a negligible percentage, according to Hasse. On the Polish frontier alone, some million portions of land should have been allotted to the surplus German population (1).

The Pan-German League is occupied in finding the means to effect this.

It may be said that this policy of germanisation though repellant to the public feeling of Europe, is all the same a question of German domestic policy. The Germans propose to despoil and deport Alsatians and Lorrains, the Danes of Schleswig, and the Poles. What does this matter to other nations? It is, of course, painful to the French, the Danes, and the Poles to know that their former compatriots are being forcibly expelled. But what has sentiment to do with a question of international law? The trouble really is that it is impossible to say where the Germans may elect to place their military confines to-morrow.

"When the colonised territory and the limits of the State cannot coincide, solid national egotism counsels us to plant our boundary post preferably in foreign territory, as we did at Melz" (2).

It need hardly be said that Hasse demands the return of the Netherlandish countries (Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg) to the Germanic confederation, and that to him, Lille

(1) HASSE, Besiedlung des deutschen Bodens, p. 146.
(2) Ibid., p. 166.
and Dunkirk are Netherlandish towns. He regrets that Belfort and Montbéliard were left to the French in 1870; and asks why the kingdom of Arles, Burgundy, the rest of Lorraine, all that belonged to the Holy Roman Empire, should be allowed to remain in French hands.

"We should obviously seize every opportunity of re-uniting to the German Empire at least those intermediate countries, which during the Middle Ages, and in some cases after the Peace of Westphalia, were political dependencies of the German Empire" (1).

Austria should have been made to give up Bohemia and Moravia in 1866.

"Here again we must seek new forms to achieve the ancient ends. Perhaps we shall find them in the framework of greater Germany" (2).

Russia herself ought to restore all the territory lost to Prussia by the treaties of 1815, from Cracow to Grodno, including Warsaw, and Austria could be compensated by Salonica (3).

"But the moment will inevitably come when Germany will lay hands on the ruins of the Hapsburg State; and we must be prepared for it" (4).

So it is for Germany that the Pan-Germans covet Salonica, when they incite Austria to take it, Austria, upon whose dismemberment they are reckoning! That "Greater Germany" which William II and Bülow were seeking "upon the sea" in 1900, they hope to establish in Central Europe. They aspire to extend it on every frontier:

"We want territory, and not merely colonies. We want territory, even if it be inhabited by foreigners, that we may mark out its future in accordance with our needs" (5).

(1) Hasse, Deutsche Grenzpolitik, pp. 53, 74.
(2) Ibid., p. 123.
(3) Ibid., p. 105.
(4) Ibid., p. 164.
(5) Hasse, Weltpolitik, p. 67
**German Science to the rescue.** — The Pan-German League has a crowd of professors in its ranks, and even those, who do not belong to it, applaud and support it in crowds. The German Universities and technical schools have rendered many services to science. But they are occupied, even more ardently than in the service of science, in forming the ruling classes of their country, and rendering them no doubt highly competent, but at the same time full of a proud and aggressive ambition. Albrecht Wirth has not yet attained that rank in the university hierarchy to which his influence upon the young might entitle him (1).

His profession of faith is noteworthy:

"It cannot be denied that ideas of aggression are by no means foreign to Pan-Germanism. If Germany "is to become a hammer", she must strike" (2).

"In order to live, and to lead a healthy and joyous life, we need a vast extent of fresh arable land. This is what Imperialism must give us. Germany may reap the fruits of Russian policy, if she has sufficient courage... What would be the use of a Germanism flourishing in Brazil or in South Africa? It would further the expansion of the German race very greatly, but it would contribute very little to the might of the German Empire. On the other hand, the continental expansion of German territory, the multiplication on the continent of the German peasantry, whose activities and capacities are so immeasurably superior to the obtuse nonchalance of the moujiks, would form a sure barrier against the advance of our enemies, and a secure basis for our growing power" (3).

(1) Albrecht Wirth, Privat-Docent at the Higher Technical School of Munich, is a specialist in Asiatic and Turkish matters. He collaborated in the recently published Handbuch der Politik, a work of National-Liberal and Imperialist inspiration, 1912-1913.

(2) An allusion to Prince von Bülow's formula in a speech on December 11, 1899: "In the 20th century, Germany will be either the hammer or the anvil." (Bülow, Reden, vol. I, p.96.)

II

COLONIAL PAN-GERMANISM

These continental projects of Pan-Germanism are coupled with Colonial projects no less vast and aggressive. They threaten all the unoccupied territories of the world. They reveal an insatiable appetite. Since the time when Spain had cause to complain of Bismarck, who had filched the Carolines without a word of warning, there has been no nation in the Old or the New World which has not suffered from the brutal proximity or the bold intrusion of the Germans. For these Germans are no longer the modest democrats, who fled from the reactionary regime between 1815 and 1858, nor the ragged peasants who some twenty years ago arrived with their too numerous offspring from an overcrowded fatherland; they are impatient prospectors and engineers whom German Polytechnics turn out in unmeasured numbers, determined to elbow their way at the expense of the established population.

It is usual to say that Germany requires new territories for her surplus population. But, as a fact, it is no longer the German masses who emigrate. The emigrants number barely 20,000 men a year. They are an intellectual proletariat, rich in diplomas and light in pocket. German industry is capable of absorbing the million surplus men who are born each year. It cannot absorb the 20,000 surplus technicians manufactured by its schools of arts and crafts. Germany is not suffering from a plethora of men, but from an excess of certificated students, clerks, doctors without patients, engineers without employment. It is not that her population is over-crowded, but that her division of
labour is ill devised. Suffering at home from this curse of innumerable déclassés, too ambitions to work with their hands, she exports them, and inflicts them on the world at large. She gains by getting rid of them herself, and by increasing her sphere of influence abroad through them. But it is the greed of these adventurers which feeds the Pan-German press with its dreams.

Let us not be misunderstood. We do not call every German colonial policy Pan-German. Who can object to Admiral Werner's dictum that "the German colonies have another and a greater destiny than to offer an easy refuge to men who are weary of Europe, and to the derelicts of our nation", and that "the maximum return must be secured for German capital"(1)? No European Power will quarrel with the aims which Herr Dernburg, the former Colonial Minister of the German Empire, assigns to German colonial policy. Germany's ambitions are perfectly legitimate if she seeks safe outlets for a rapidly increasing population in a restricted territory; if she requires arable lands to provide cheap food for her people, and regions where she can procure her raw materials without let or hindrance; if she desires productive districts, to prevent monopolies in the markets of certain food-stuffs; if she endeavours to consolidate her money market by buying in her own colonies food stuffs, which, if bought from foreigners, would deplete her store of gold (2).

Her colonial possessions are vast. They are far from yielding their maximum returns. She may find yet others. But she is mistaken if she thinks she can ousted the great Powers already in possession and that they will offer no resistance. It is here that her inordinate ambitions must be noted.

"Without colonies", says Baron von Stengel, "the German Empire may be a great European Power, but it can never be a World-Power. Now Germany must be a World-Power, if she

(1) Admiral Werner, Die deutsche Kolonialfrage, 1895.
(2) Dernburg, Zielpunkte des deutschen Kolonialwesens, 1907, p. 49-51.
would not be crushed by such World-Powers as Russia and America” (1).

All nations cannot hope to dispose of such vast surfaces as the Russian Empire and the United States of America. If not to equal them is a degradation, and if this degradation must be avoided by reducing all territories distributed among non Russian and non American countries to a Germanic agglomeration, the menace to England, France, and two or three other nations is evident. Which will be the first to be attacked? Vosberg-Rekow, although he records all the economic defeats of the England, and the complaints of the colonial governments of the British Empire, affects not to understand the uneasiness of the English.

“As to us, let us preserve our coolness, and our calm manner of taking things, and we shall gain a still greater advantage over our rivals whose irritation at the sight of our growing greatness is going to their heads... I should not be a good German if I did not feel assured that our national aptitudes are at least equal, and probably superior to those of the English” (2).

In this colonial struggle, in which the Germans reckon on beating the English themselves, we note 1. projects of penetration. 2. projects of dismemberment. These are always Machiavellian projects of spoliation. These are the projects we call Pan-German.

**German Projects of Penetration.**

It is hardly necessary to say that here we at once find busy all the worthy scientists of the *Kampf um das Deutschtum*, all the geographers and explorers who swarm through the world in quest of places to take, and of nests in which to deposit the eggs and broods of Germanism.

(2) Vosberg-Rekow, *Das britische Weltreich und der deutsche Weltbewerb*, 1898.
GERMAN PROJECTS OF PENETRATION.

Scarcely have they returned when the Pan-German League receives them to get information with which to feed its programme of rapine.

**Designs upon the South American Republics.** — Here we have Professor Johannes Unold of Munich, railing at his country, insulting the Reichstag, and reproving high officials, just as he disciplines his class in the School of Commerce. He finds fault with everyone, people, Parliament and rulers, for their effeminacy. He has just come back from Argentina, from Paraguay, from that Chile which is proud to call itself « the Prussia of South America ». He has found innumerable traces of Germanism in these countries. Woe to a land when a German professor can prove that Germans once sejourned in it, even centuries ago! German cupidity will never relax its hold on it again! A great Augsburg merchant of the Welser family received Venezuela as a fief from Charles V, and yet Venezuela is no longer German! The youthful Barthel Welser was beheaded in the plain of Tocuyó, in 1546, by the leader of some Spanish marauders. Shameful and ignominious as it may seem, this young native of Augsburg is still unavenged! The Fuggers of Augsburg obtained charters granting them the territories north of the Straits of Magellan. Shame and ignominy that this charter is now a mere scrap of paper! A German lansquenet, Ulrich Schmidel, helped to found Buenos-Ayres and Assuncion de Paraguay. It is sad to reflect that neither Paraguay nor Argentina belong, even in part, to Germany to-day. In Chile, though Blum, called Florès, built the first windmill in 1541 at Santiago, and Valdivia was known as « Little Germany ». the Germans are not yet masters. They are merely numerous and « sympathetic ». All this is weakness. No time must be lost in eliminating Yankee influence, English influence, and finally, the happily already declining influence of the French, who, as is their custom, are going under in the general corruption that prevails.

CH. ANDLER. II. — Angl.
"The Germans seem marked out by their labours and their aptitudes to be the teachers, and the intellectual, economic, and political leaders of these peoples [the Spanish and Portuguese Americans]. If they fail in their mission, sooner or later these countries will fall, as a result of political or financial bankruptcy, under the domination and exploitation of the United States" (1).

What then is necessary in addition to a permanent hold established by German universities, the German language, and German manners upon the young generations that will be born of the German colonists already established? The rule is always the same: emigration must be organised. The German Empire must direct it. Continental Pan-Germanism aims at colonising the marches of the Empire, Lorraine, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, the Balkans. Colonial Pan-Germanism aspires to invade the new World.

"We must learn to turn to practical account the ideal privilege of collaborating in the great human task of colonising the earth and spreading the light of civilisation. Are we incapable of understanding and deploring the immense loss human development will suffer, if so distinguished a civilised race [as the Germans] should limit its growth unnaturally by immorality or artificial means?"

Alfred Funke is more attracted by Brazil, and in particular by Rio-Grande do Sul, where the Germans are in an overwhelming majority (2).

He advises them to grasp at political influence.

"The government has contrived, by all sorts of electoral devices, to deprive the Germans of the political influence to which they are clearly entitled by their numbers. A German name is rarely found in the electoral lists. Yet their numbers give them an incontestable right to figure on these, and to express their will and their convictions in the Parliament and the Senate, through the medium of national representatives" (3).

(3) Ibid., pp. 46, 64.
This is as if the Germans established in France and naturalised (with or without the benefit of the Delbrück law, which allows them to retain their German nationality in spite of naturalisation), demanded "national" representatives in our municipal and departmental councils and in Parliament. Funke is moderate, however. He warns the Germans "not to be carried away by improper political aspirations" (1).

Others are less discreet. Friedrich Lange, the apostle of Reines Deutschtum, insisted on an extension of the duties of the State in the organisation of emigration.

"A far-seeing policy is required, ruthlessly applying all the resources of its power in concluding treaties with foreign States, which are eager to receive our emigrants, and so would in the end accept the conditions accounted necessary by our Government. The Argentine and Brazilian Republics, and in a greater less degree, all these needy Republics of South America, would accept advice and listen to reason, voluntarily or under coercion" (2).

What Germany means when she produces the draft of a treaty and supports it with all the resources of her power we have seen several times since Tangiers.

Another theorist no less confident, Josef-Ludwig Reimer, goes so far as to indicate the enemy against whom the power of the German Empire would be mobilised in return for a good emigration treaty, with territorial concessions and the promise of national representation for Germans in the public bodies of the Republics of Latin America.

"It must not be supposed that such an accession of German forces and German money would be unwelcome in these States [South America]. The most enlightened would not only accept this material and moral assistance, but would accept it willingly. They would see in it an efficacious re-inforcement against their natural enemy, the United States of the North, an

(1) Ibid., p. 64.
(2) FRIEDRICH LANGE, Reines Deutschtum, p. 208.
enemy who will not only exact commercial concessions from them, but territorial concessions, and even the relinquishment of their nationality, as soon as it is powerful enough” (1).

Reimer does not disguise the fact that this “material and moral support” might be military. There are therefore two solutions between which Pan-Germanism invites the Republics of Latin-America to choose: 1. to permit the “peaceful penetration” of German population, industry and capital; to allow themselves to be gradually directed, protected and finally governed by Germans; and to receive the support of the Empire; or 2. “to be made to listen to reason by force”.

Germany stakes out claims in the United States and in Oceania. — The policy of hostility to the United States is not the only policy that might be adopted. Sometimes the Pan-Germanists prefer an (interim) friendly policy. Germany has a more immediate enemy than the great American Republic; this is England. A Yankee alliance against Great Britain must be held in reserve. This we learn from the Frankforter Julius Göbel, a Goethean scholar, but a militant Pan-German, and a Professor at the University of University of Illinois:

“Benjamin Franklin’s dread of seeing America germanised was not unreasonable; and if American life has a very different aspect now from that which it wore in his time, it must be attributed mainly to the influence of Germanism.

“Not to England, but to the German and the American nations, united by ties of blood as well as by the lofty intellectual aspirations which they share in common, is the progress of civilisation entrusted. And the guardians of this sacred friendship are the Germans in America” (2).

Thus we see that neither England, France, Italy, nor any

(1) J.-L. Reimer, Ein pan-germanisches Deutschland, p. 95.
(2) Julius Göbel, Das Deutschtum in den Vereinigten Staaten, 1904, p. 77.
other people, great or small, contributes to "the progress of civilisation". The Americans are its sole exponents, but above all, the German-Americans.

It is true that in the past the German character showed a certain weakness; the German population readily assimilated the language and the manners of its Anglo-Saxon surroundings. The Austrian publicist Emil Jung notes the fact with sorrow (1).

This was more especially the case when the German emigrants were the poor democrats of the period between 1818 and 1864, voluntary exiles from a fatherland that had failed to fulfil any of the promises of 1815. These people were numerous in Australia and the Oceanic islands. When Bismarck came, they did what many democrats who remained in Germany did, they "threw their tattered caps of liberty away". Now that German pride has awakened among these Germans beyond the seas, a constant efflux of new emigrants will suffice to stimulate it.

"Humanity has not yet finished its life. The beginning of a new century presents fresh problems to every people. The fifth continent will bring its problems too. May the whole German nation then be at its post! God grant it!" (2).

The fifth continent is Australia; it is not certain that England will always be mistress there. Hankerings after independence may arise in more than one of her colonies. English power may be held in check in the Pacific by other powers. If the commonwealth of Australia and its dependencies should be disintegrated, "the whole German people", that is to say, the people backed by all the forces of the Empire, must be at its post.

(1) Emil Jung, Das Deutschum in Australien und Ozeanien, 1912.
(2) Ibid., p. 85.
II. — *Projects of Dismemberment.*

These Australian dreams are remote; there are Empires in more imminent peril of dissolution than the English Empire; Turkey, in the first place. And so the Germans are protecting her. It is a bad omen for a country to be protected by Germany! It means that partition is at hand. When the German Emperor promised independence to the Sultan of Morocco, one might feel pretty sure that he would claim Moroccan ports and a portion of the Moroccan coast. The *Pan-German League*, which is strongly Turkophile, makes no secret of its appetite for the Ottoman Empire:

"As soon as events shall have brought about the dissolution of Turkey, no power will make any serious objections if the German Empire claims her share of it. This is her right as a World-Power, and she needs such a share far more than the other Great Powers because of the hundreds of thousands of her subjects who emigrate, and whose nationality and economic subsistence she must preserve" (1).

Germany has hardly any emigrants now, but she has not lowered her claims.

**Some Germans demand Crete and Armenia.** — For a century, Crete had been in a state of insurrection every twenty years. She was in revolt as usual towards the year 1900, and Armenia was the same. Certain Germans at once declared that the possession of Crete and Armenia was "a vital matter for Germany". They maintained that a "healthy national egotism" (*ein gesunder nationaler Egoismus*) could ask nothing less (2).

Not for the world would a German be unhealthy, like a

---

(2) *Amicus Patriae, Armenien und Kreta. Eine Lebensfrage für Deutschland*, 1896.
decadent Latin. Now the foundation of a "New Germany" is "healthily egotistic".

"There must be a renewal of the spectacle that presented itself to the world 800 years ago, beyond the Elbe. The German peasant with his heavy plough, his sturdy labour, his fear of God and his sobriety drove back the Slav, or, to speak more exactly, he subdued, absorbed, and assimilated him. In this nineteenth century, when Germany has become the first Power in the world, are we incapable of doing what our ancestors did? Germany must lay her mighty grasp upon Asia Minor" (1).

Turkey will perhaps resist:

"The Turk has lost his rights, not only from the moral, but also from the strictly legal point of view. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, he gave undertakings, not one of which he has kept. His claims are nullified."

All Europe may be set ablaze:

"But if the health and life of Germany require this mortal and terrible remedy, let us not hesitate to apply it, so be it! God is the Judge. I accept the awful responsibility... God never forsakes a good German" (2).

Thus some strange belief in biological necessities, which are treated as fatalities, and a superstitious piety which mobilises God himself in the service of Germany, develops, from the top to the bottom of the intellectual scale in Germany that formidable state of mind which accepts and invokes an European war, as a trial sent by the Lord to his chosen people to bless them.

Designs upon Mesopotamia. — Moreover, even if the Turkish provinces are not in a state of revolt, they are nevertheless promised to the German people by quasi-divine apportionment. For a long time past German explorers have not been able to travel in Babylonia and Assyria

(1) Ibid., pp. 15, 15.
(2) Ibid., pp. 15, 16.
without thinking: "How is it that the ancient Eden, the terrestrial Paradise now so desolate, the old Irak-Arabi, is not German?" Anton Sprenger, a professional Arabist, has had no other dream for the last thirty years.

"The East is the only territory in the world which has not passed under the control of one of the ambitious nations of the globe. Yet it offers the most magnificent field for colonisation; and it Germany does not allow this opportunity to escape her, if she seizes this domain before the Cossaks lay hands upon it, she will have secured the best share in the partition of the earth. The German Emperor would have the destinies of Nearer Asia in his power, if some hundreds of thousands of armed colonists were cultivating these splendid plains; he might and would be the guardian of peace for all Asia" (1).

And lest Babylonia should not suffice for that "best share in the partition of the earth", which Germany demands, Sprenger would not be disinclined to throw in Syria.

Karl Kaerger, traveller and economist, writing in 1892, advises that a Commercial Union with Turkey should be combined with this colonising policy.

"If the German Empire, while preserving the friendship of Austria and Italy, which the political situation of Europe makes it essential to safeguard under any circumstances, should succeed in directing her current of emigration to the rich territories of Turkey, and in forming a close commercial Union with the latter, all the economic future, and hence all the political future of Germany would rest on a broader and a firmer basis" (2).

Kaerger's chief anxiety was lest Russia or England should forestall Germany. How can the Turks misunderstand Germany's sudden friendship for them? It is not for want of very definite pronouncements on the part of the Pan-Germans. It is true that this friendship goes very far; it goes as far as complicity in Armenian or Macedonian massacres.

(1) A. Sprenger, Babylonien das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und das lohnendste Kolonisationsfeld für die Gegenwart, 1886.
(2) Karl Kaerger, Klein-Asien ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld, 1892.
It reckons upon future compensation for this bloody complicity.

Tranquillity of the National-Socialist Party in respect of the massacres of Christians in Armenia. — Designs upon the Mediterranean. — In 1898 William II made his pilgrimage to Palestine, in the guise of a Crusader. His Crusade, however, was of a novel kind. He visited the Holy Sepulchre; but, in his speech at Damascus, he declared that he took all Mussulmans under his protection. At this time, the massacres of Christians in Armenia were in progress. There was not the slightest suggestion that they should be granted this German protection, which was so freely extended to the Padishah and his subjects. This is comprehensible enough when we take German policy in Turkey into account. German diplomacy has been silent as to the motives that inspired it; it has confined itself to picking serious quarrels with England, France and the United States, who have intervened now for Macedonia and now for martyred Armenia. But the Pan-Germans betray the secret of the diplomats. Among the acolytes of William II, who hastened to Jerusalem to be present at the Emperor's triumphal entry, one of the most zealous was Pastor Naumann. This minister of the Gospel has always had a horror of pacifism. He cares only for the greatness of Germany. His heart bleeds when Christians are massacred; but policy and Christianity are different things. We must be guided by the highest moral duty. This duty is "to realise Greatest Germany". The reader shall judge whether we are exaggerating.

"All weakening of German national energy by pacifist associations or analogous activities re-inforces the formidably increasing power of those who rule to day from the Cape to Cairo, from Ceylon to the Polar Sea... No truce with England! Let our policy be a national policy!

"This must be the mainspring of our action in the Eastern question. This is the fundamental reason which necessitates our political indifference to the sufferings of Christians in the Tur-
kish Empire, painful as these must be to our private feelings... If Turkey were disintegrated to-day, the fragments of her Empire would become the sport of the great Powers, and we should be left with nothing, as has happened so often in the past. We must retard the catastrophe. Let Turkey have any Constitution she likes, so long as she can keep herself afloat a while longer.

"Bismarck taught us to make a distinction between our foreign policy and our domestic policy. The same thing applies to the Christian missions. As Christians we desire the propagation of the faith by which we are saved. But it is not the task of our policy to concern itself with Christian missions.

" The truth here, as elsewhere, is that we must find out which is the greatest and morally the most important task. When the choice has been made, there must be no tergiversation. William II has made his choice; he is the friend of the Padishah, because he believes in a greater Germany" (1).

This greater Germany must, it seems, be sought in Turkey. As far back as 1846, Moltke planned out a principality in Palestine; Naumann longs to see the whole of Asia Minor in German hands,

" Imagine a few firm, rigid, incorruptible officials at the head of a territory like Palestine, scouring the country on horseback with European promptitude. They would be as much abused as Satan, but as useful as angels" (2).

And all these angels would wear Prussian caps! They would carry out military reform, financial reform, and agrarian reform.

" A sort of amicable dictatorship would be set up, which would often address Turkey as the bird of the proverb was addressed: "Eat or die".... Meanwhile Germans would be settling upon all the shores of the Mediterranean. Good luck to you, my brethren! Work hard! Bestir yourselves. This old sea will yet behold many things! You hold in your hands a morsel of Germany's future life" (3).

(1) Friedrich Naumann, Asia, 1889, pp. 145, 148.
(2) Ibid., p. 163.
(3) Ibid., p. 162.
DESIGNS UPON MOROCCO.

There is no doubt that the old Mediterranean will see a great many things yet. But the dream of Pastor Naumann, supported by all the readers of *Die Hilfe* and the National Socialist party it directs, was of the Mediterranean transformed into a German lake, and Asia Minor colonised and administered by the Germans down to the Persian Gulf. Only Turks could think this aspiration disinterested!

Designs upon Morocco. — German pretentions to Morocco are as old as the first German explorations in that country. Rohlfs, Jannasch and Lenz, great pioneers of science, were nevertheless as much interested in "applied geography" (angewandte Geographie) as in geology or ethnography. Among Germans, the study of "applied geography" consists in enquiring how any country can be made to subservie German interests. The latest of these explorers, Theobald Fischer, competed a fine and impartial account of his travels in 1886. Eighteen years after, in 1903, he hurried to the newspapers of the Pan-German League to demand the entire West coast of Morocco with the Hinterland as far as the Atlas mountains for Germany (1).

This happened some time before the Agadir incident. But even before Agadir the Pan-Germans had in reserve a series of projects of varying calibre, one minor, one major, one immense. More than once our diplomats have had to reckon with the inventive fertility in rapacity which German explorers place at the disposal of their government.

a) Major Plan. — A pamphlet by Herr Class, the new President of the Pan-German-League, attracted much attention in 1911. It appeared under the title of *Westmarokko deutsch*, and puts forwards a project identical with that of the explorer Theobald Fischer. This scheme is careful not to offend the susceptibilities of distrustful England, and refrains

from suggestions as to the creation of naval stations or military ports; but it dwells on the mineral wealth of Morocco, on its soil, which would yield rich crops of cotton and grain, and on its climate, which would be favourable to a colonist population. In the event of a delimitation of simple spheres of influence, Germany would require the whole of Sus as far as cape Juby opposite the Canaries, as far as, and inclusive of Marrakesh in the North, and the whole Hinterland above the Atlas Mountains as far as the desert. In the event of partition, she would further require: the entire coast as far as Cape Sebu, including Rabat; a commanding strategic position, a wide base, which would threaten Algeria on the West flank in time of war.

b) Minimum Plan. — "The Pan-German party is perfectly right in desiring a settlers' colony for our surplus population". This is the dictum of Joachim von Bülow (1), another authority on colonial questions. But, he adds, the Pan-Germans urge their demands too insistently. The matter must be more astutely taken in hand. France is decadent, say these shrewder colonisers, but she is not impotent. If she were allowed to keep the barren mountain, without the plain, the only fertile district, would she not maintain order in those turbulent highlands from which the invaders descend periodically to harry the plain? France cannot give up more than Sus without a loss of dignity. Let the Germans make Agadir into a huge fortress, capable of existing in isolation for weeks in case of siege; and for the rest of Morocco, let her be content with the commercial "open door" and jurisdiction over the protégés of Germany. A nucleus of vigorous German cow-boys, of peasant-soldiers, rough-riders who will work with a gun near the plough, will prepare the soil for cultivation. With these restrictions, France might be allowed to gratify her vanity by the conquest of Northern Morocco; this would be all to the good.

"It is impossible that France should keep Morocco, even for a decade or so. If her population continues to dwindle as it has done of late, it will be easy to calculate the exact moment when she will be obliged to ask her neighbours for men. Before this, she will be ready to give up her colonies to the strongest among the nations" (1).

What Joachim von Bülow reprobates in the Pan-German League is its impatience. If the conquest of Morocco should entail an European war, it would cost Germany more than it is worth. And by asking only for Sus, the moderate Pan-Germans hope to gain the whole of Morocco by the slow but, in their opinion, the inevitable decline of French energy.

c) The colossal Plan. — The major and the minor plan, entailing risks of very unequal magnitude for Germany, had the drawback of bringing dishonour in their wake. Had not the Emperor and three successive Chancellors declared that Germany laid claim to no territorial possessions in Morocco? If she should now take the smallest fragment of the land, three Chancellors and the Sovereign would stand convicted of gross hypocrisy. The only course worthy of Germany was more momentous. It was that urged by Max Harden in the Zukunft of July 29, 1911.

"We might say that the hostile arrogance of the Western Powers releases us from all our treaty obligations, throws open the doors of our verbal prison-house, and forces the German Empire, resolutely defending her vital rights, to revive the ancient Prussian policy of conquest.

"All Morocco in the hands of Germany; German cannon on the routes to Egypt and India; German troop on the Algerian frontier; this would be a goal worthy of great sacrifices.

"When we can put five million German soldiers into the field, we shall be able to dictate to France the conditions upon which she may preserve the Empire of Northern Africa — "New France" — with her brown Algerian troops... We do not desire

(1) Joachim von Bülow, ibid., p. 25.
"compensation" either in Sus or on the Congo. We have entered upon a struggle in which the stake is the power and future of the German Empire" (1).

He who runs may read. There are conditions, failing which France shall keep neither Algeria nor her African troops. And those conditions are to be prescribed by Germany, lying defiantly in wait upon the two principal maritime routes of England.

Designs upon Central Africa. — One of the reasons of the "jealous hatred", which the Pan-Germans ascribe to England, is held to be that German East Africa cuts through the long strip of land, which would have linked the Cape to Cairo by way of Rhodesia and English Uganda. These men forget the brutal threats they have never ceased to make against English power in Africa.

Pastor Naumann, at the time when he was claiming the protectorate of the Turkish Empire as part of the heritage of Napoleon III, which had devolved upon Germany after Sedan, carried his aspirations further than this:

"There is one place, unhappily, where we have been unable to inherit from the French; this is Suez... The English require the Suez Canal to maintain and ensure their ascendency in the world. The who in the next war should succeed in sinking two old vessels in the Suez Canal, would make the first breach in the formidable power of England" (2).

Paul Rohrbach, a traveller famous for his accounts of his peregrinations in Asia Minor, a highly placed official in the German Colonial Office, and one of those Imperialists who allure the mob by fantastic programmes of democratic administrative reform, has been, of late years, one of the most popular lecturers in Berlin, and the most indefatigable

(1) Max Harden, Zukunft, July 29, 1911.
(2) F. Naumann, Asia, p. 143.
of those propagandist writers in reviews who propose to gain the friendship of England by threats (1).

"The era of Germany's colonial acquisitions cannot be considered at an end"); he says... "The German possessions in Africa are capable of great expansion; and this expansion ought to and will take place at the propitious moment, which is perhaps not very far off....

"One need not be a prophet to foretell that the definitive re-adjustment between the colonial powers is still to come, and that it will be our task to create an African Germany vastly more extensive than our present possessions in Africa" (2).

In what direction will this expansion of African Germany be made? Rohrbach thinks above all of the high plateaux of Southern and Central Africa where the white man can live. English Rhodesia? This is hardly to be hoped for. Then only Mozambique and, even more, the higher districts of Angola and the southern parts of the Belgian Congo can be in question. When we have got so far, it is not difficult to guess that the Imperialists of the German Colonial office have the spoliation of Belgium and Portugal in view. Would England defend her ancient ally, Portugal, and neutral Belgium? The Germans think that she would prefer a felony against her protégés, the small states, to the constant uneasiness caused her by a powerful neighbour; and, supposing this to be the case, threats are legitimate weapons:

"When England occupied Egypt in 1882, the statesmen who were responsible for English policy were perfectly aware that they were creating a strategic position which was vulnerable by the land route, by Asia Minor and Syria... Egypt is the keystone of English ascendancy in the Indian Ocean; the whole of the Soudan, up to the sources of the Nile, depends upon its possession" (3).

(1) Paul Rohrbach is a regular contributor to Delbrück's Preussische Jahrbücher. He has collected his theses into two principal works: Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern, 5th ed., 1911; Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt, 50th thousand, 1912.

(2) Paul Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt, p. 134.

(3) Ibid., p. 166.
The whole strategic position of England in Africa might be taken in flank by attacking her in Egypt. Rohrbach does not disguise that this was the consideration which caused the German engineers to adopt a track for the Baghdad Railway, which renders possible rapid concentration of Turkish troops in Syria. After this England would be ready enough to make concessions.

It seems well-established that certain conversations took place before the war between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London. We know nothing of their tenor, unless perhaps that they appear to have been at the expense of Portugal. The territorial integrity of her colonies was probably guaranteed, but Germany no doubt would have stipulated for very extensive commercial privileges. Anxiety had been reawakened among the Belgians when the Franco-German treaty of 1911 had allowed the Cameroons to stretch out two claws towards the Congo. The German traveller Emil Zimmerman, who explored the Congo for ten months of the year 1913, found that Belgian engineers, merchants and planters were incessantly reverting to the question: « What is the meaning of those two eagle-claws seizing the Belgian Congo near Boyo and on the Ubanghi? » (1).

What, indeed, did these pacific Belgians want, who had achieved the prosperity of their colony after twenty years of labour? They would to make Boma and Matadi on the Congo into flourishing ports. Dreading a German attack from East Africa and the Cameroons, their suspicions made them hesitate to link up the Belgian railways with the German. Criminal blindness, say the Germans, for such a country as Belgium to dream of rivalry with Dar-es-Salam, which Germany wishes to make her great port in East Africa.

"When it is a question which of the two can create the best equipped and the most favorably situated African ports, does

(1) Emil Zimmerman, Was ist uns Central-Afrika? 1914, p. 35.
she really delude herself with the idea that she can out-strip her German neighbour?... If on the Belgian side there is a disinclination to make a compact with our Central African Railway, our cargoes must be shipped according to a special tariff from Hamburg and Antwerp to the mouth of the Lukuga (1), more cheaply than Belgium can bring hers to Stanley Pool” (2).

We may judge by this example what Germany calls the policy of the “open door”. She brings all her military or diplomatic weight to bear on the weakest countries, to prevent them from setting up a barrier of tariffs. Then, having obtained a regime of equality, she destroys it with her own hand by a system of bounties, or by differential tariffs, until she brings about the commercial annihilation of her rivals.

How far ought the economic sphere of German influence to extend in Central Africa? We learn this from a very brilliant pamphlet, greatly lauded in its day by the Preussische Jahrbücher, Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg, ***, Berlin, 1912. Though the author is anonymous, he is evidently an important personage. He is as pacific as a German could be before 1914. He knows that a German colonial policy necessarily implies the consent of England and the neutrality of Russia. A pacific German policy would have most chance of success in Central Africa, for there it would not threaten both England and Russia at once, like the policy that aims at the conquest of Mesopotamia. No one can suppose that this African policy is not, in its turn, a policy of eviction. But there are different methods of eviction. It may really be true that the Belgian Congo needs capital; that Mozambique is insecure because of the lack of railways; that Angola, which has excellent ports, cannot profit by them because its Hinterland is so uncultivated and so deficient in roads. Capital is scarce there; German finance could supply it. German industry would provide rails for railroads, which

(1) The Lukuga is a tributary which flows into the Congo from Lake Tanganyika.

(2) EMIL ZIMMERMANN, loc. cit., pp. 9, 38.

CH. ANDLER. II. — Angl.
would release the labour absorbed in the primitive system of porterage, and make it available for agriculture. Central Africa would become a single economic domaine intercepted by a unified railway system. And would not Germany, who would have created this domain and imported her colonists, end by gaining political ascendency here? The unknown but highly placed economist, who writes, felt confident that a German trade of a billion a year might be created in ten years. A vast plan, the greatness of which, however, made it worth discussing. England had already begun to discuss it. Her neutrality would have been assured, if this discussion had been continued in peace. Russian hostility was not to be feared. German diplomacy might have made a notable advance on this road. An immense African Empire might have been acquired for Germany by peaceful effort and patient negotiation. Criminal indeed are the men who preferred the bloody adventure of a general European war to the vast and glorious future that lay open to them in Central Africa.

The responsibility of the Pan-German agitators will be a terrible one for all time. A "world-policy" on the part of Germany was possible in peace, and was already shaping itself in active conferences (1).

A liberal autonomy granted to all the European colonies of Central Africa would have enabled them to form a federation, and have spared the vanity of all the parent countries, even the smallest. A calculation of frenzied brutality preferred a violent solution (2).

(1) It will be seen in the Appendices that the responsibility of the Austro-Hungarian agitators was equally great. A peaceful extension of Austria-Hungary was conceivable by means of a Balkan confederation, into which the various nationalities would have entered of their free will, and with complete independence. The Pan-German project might perhaps have been fully realised in peace. The Powers of the Triple Entente and the small nationalities threatened by it could only have circumvented it by a peaceful propaganda of Western ideas and by a strenuous commercial struggle. Austria-Hungary lost patience.

(2) The German plan is clearly outlined in the Kaiserzeitung des
This calculation, in spite of its minute prevision of detail, will prove erroneous as a whole. For it was inspired by an idea so monstrously tyrannous and so blindly attached to methods of force, that it threw itself, as of necessity, into undertakings against which the whole world rose in revolt.

*Ostheeres*, officially published by the press administration of the German *Kommandantur* of Lodz on the occasion of William II's birthday (January 27, 1915):

“A victorious war... would give us the Belgian Congo, the French Congo, and, if Portugal continues to translate her hostile intentions towards us into actions, would also give us the Portuguese colonies on the East and West coasts of Africa. We should then have a colonial Empire of which our fathers, who used to smile slily at our first essays in colonisation, could never have dreamt. But the most important factor in this probable partition of the African world is, that we should thereby have put an end to the English attempts at domination from the Cape to Cairo. Between Egypt, which is still English, and Anglo-Boer South Africa would stretch the immense band of our vast colonial possessions, extending from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic. Still English, we say advisedly of North-East and South Africa. For who can tell what may happen when the words of the poet are realised: “One day Germanism will be the salvation of the world.” (Quoted in *J'accuse, von EINEM DEUTSCHEN*. Lausanne, 1915, p. 315).
V

DEFINITION AND METHODS OF PAN-GERMANISM

We have seen Pan-Germanism as an avidity omnipresent at all points of the globe. It attacks Chile, corrodes Brazil, eats into all the South American Republics from within, and dreams of a future in the United States. It proposes to attack England in Egypt and in India, and to absorb Central Africa. It covets Mesopotamia and all Asia Minor. Over Europe it is spreading a stain of infamy.

"The future territory of German expansion, situated between the territories of the Eastern and Western powers, must absorb all the intermediate regions; it must stretch from the North Sea and the Baltic through the Netherlands, taking in Luxemburg and Switzerland, down to the lands of the Danube and the Balkan peninsula, and will include Asia Minor as far as the Persian Gulf. All foreign influence must be eliminated from this great territory" (1).

Germany could not brook a settlement of Morocco without a European conference. But when it is a question of deciding the fate of Turkey, for instance, and solving the Eastern Question, Pan-Germanism no longer admits that the Powers, who were associated at the Berlin Congress, would have a say in the matter. The aim of Pan-Germanism, according to one of the most moderate of its adherents, Paul Rohrbach, is to bring about the triumph of "the German idea in the world". Germanism aspires to become one of the forces "which determine the shape of events in the universe" present and future. But was it not already one of these forces, and one of the most incontestable?

(1) Ernst Hasse, Weltpolitik (Deutsche Politik, part V, p. 65).
And, if German civilisation has essential qualities of radiation and vigour, how could it have failed to make a place for itself in humanity?

It demands more.

"Rome, as mistress of the world, was the first to determine the forms of thought, by which the political and juridical life of those who came after her has been governed ".

To day, the Anglo-Saxons seem likely to play the part of Rome. The barbarism of Russia, and the low birth-rate of France deprive these countries of all hope of success. But Germany is not content to give up the prize.

"The German nation alone has so far kept pace with Anglo-Saxon development; it is now numerous enough and internally strong enough to demand that its national idea should have a decisive share in the prerogative of giving shape to the coming era "(1).

Heine's old dictum is justified: Germany hates even the intellect of her enemies. She is not concerned only to win a place in the sun. She aspires to extirpate French and Slav thought. Max Harden has told us, following Alexander von Peez, that in the next century there will only be three or four Great Powers in the world: the Russian Empire, China, and the Anglo-Saxon block. Will Germany resign herself to being a petty Continental Power like France? Perish the thought! Germany must have Europe to counterbalance the possessions of her three great rivals. France alone stands in the way of this consummation. She must either yield or be conquered. Why should she not yield?

"Great Britain and North America tend to form a community of interests. On the two Oceans, the Anglo-Saxons of the two continents group themselves together in unity of will. The hegemony of the white race will be theirs, if we do not make up the old quarrel. United with the French, we should be invincible on land and sea.

(1) Paul Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt, p. 7.
METHODS OF PAN-GERMANISM.

"We are in a position to offer the French more than any other Power could offer them; guarantees for a great African Empire; the possibility of reducing expenditure on the army; and devoting the surplus to ship building; safer and more remunerative investments for their capital than the stock of the Eastern States of Europe; organisers of industry and commercial agents. On the other hand, we could take a great deal from them; not only twenty milliards but ancient Carlovingian and Burgundian lands; fertile colonies, and freedom of movement in that Mediterranean which a German Gibraltar near Toulon would transform into a prison." (1).

If Germany had nothing better to offer to France, as the price of her friendship, than a present of "organisers of industry and commercial agents", it is hardly surprising that France should have taken measures to prevent all possibility of Toulon becoming a German Gibraltar, and to secure her African Empire independently of German protection.

The ends of Pan-Germanism having been defined, its methods are now presented to us. They are curiously monotonous:

"Our position in the world is happily such", says Friedrich Lange, the protagonist of Reines Deutschtum, "that if certain sacrifices must be made in the cause of peace, other nations must first be called upon to make them; they must be demanded from Germany only in the last resort" (2).

Klaus Wagner, the brilliant theorist of the book Krieg (War), says:

"Unless we choose to shut our eyes to the necessity of evolution, we must recognise the necessity of war. We must accept war, which will last as long as development and existence; we must accept eternal war" (3).

Germany in her vigorous development never ceases to wage war tacitly, because to live is to fight; and she is moreover quite ready to wage it openly, as soon as the resis-

(1) Max Harden, Zukunft, July 1 and August 19, 1911.
(2) Fr. Lange, Reines Deutschtum, p. 214.
(3) Klaus Wagner, Krieg, p. 257 et seq.
tance of an opponent seems to imply that he thinks her capable of yielding.

"France must learn once more that, should honour or interest require it, Germany would not take half a day to make up her mind to war.

"Germany's quality is massive strength; France's quality is flame. This flame may serve to light the two nations to peaceful victory. But we shall have to quench it in blood, if it is going merely to enflame the rage of our enemies. We may have to do so to morrow, for the habitation we marked out for ourselves forty years ago is becoming too small for us" (1).

General von Bernhardi, after showing that Germany requires new territories for her population, and that she must take them from others, as there are none left empty, concludes:

"It is impossible to improve the present partition of the globe in our favour by diplomatic artifices. If we wish to give our people their proper place in the world, we must trust to our sword" (2).

This is the last word of Pan-Germanism.

Complicity of the German Government in Pan-Germanism. — It may be objected that our analysis is merely a contribution to literary history. In an explanation of decisions made by the rulers of the people, what importance can be attached to doctrinaire books, political pamphlets, parliamentary speeches and the manifestations of the Pan-German League? These books, pamphlets and speeches do not explain everything; we know, and this is an old controversy. In like manner it has been asked before now, how far the French philosophers of the eighteenth century were responsible for the Revolution. Now it is certain that these philosophers were not insensible to the needs of the French people, that they often translated them into words, and that

(1) HARDEN, Zukunft, July 1 et August 19, 1911.
(2) FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI, Vom heutigen Kriege, I, p. 12.
their ideas were present to the minds of nearly all the men of action in the revolutionary drama. The men who govern are the sons of their nation, and the ideas which guide their government are those which nourish that nation and circulate in its books. These ideas often act as powerful suggestions. They are always symptoms. The historian of a great social event cannot ignore them.

We will recall certain dates to demonstrate the connection between the Pan-German agitation and the action of the German Government.

The governing idea of the Neuer Kurs, as we have seen, was a Confederation of the Central European states under German hegemony (1).

William II and Caprivi foresaw that it could not be realized without serious complications in the East. But the project, dear to the early years of the Emperor, of an immediate attack upon Russia, was deferred owing to the disgrace of general von Waldersee. The Franco-Russian alliance was no doubt a determining factor in this temporary prudence. It also put a temporary stop to that policy of "cold douches", by means of which the senile brutality of Bismarck in his last years had so often added factitious irritation to the natural and still recent resentment of France. Europe enjoyed nearly ten years of tranquillity.

This state of things underwent a sudden change in 1899 (2).

(1) See above, p. 6, et seq.
(2) This, in fact, is the date indicated by Prince von Bülow himself: "Since 1897 an important evolution has taken place, which the present generation has not always understood, but which posterity will recognise and appreciate. During these years, thanks to the construction of our fleet, we have effectually arrived at world-power. Our ascent to a world-policy has been entirely successful." (Prince von Bülow, Deutsche Politik.) The year 1897 was the date of Prince von Bülow's entry into the ministry; and it is true that, since his accession to the Chancellorship, the most serious incidents have followed one close upon the other. The underlying idea of his book is that William II and Bismarck were respectively a great monarch and a great minister; but that "hoisted on the shoulders" of these predecessors there are a greater monarch and a greater minister, William II and Bülow.
Prince von Bülow, who had been Minister for Foreign Affairs since 1897, was to become Chancellor in 1900. It was at the height of the war in the Transvaal. Had Germany designs upon the Dutch Republics of South Africa? Had she thoughts of "protecting" them, as she now wishes to "protect" Holland, and as she is already "protecting" Belgium? Be this as it may, she openly encouraged the resistance of Krüger by a telegram from the Emperor. The suspicions of England were probably aroused by this, and she simply parried the blow she foresaw by taking the initiative and annexing the Transvaal and the Orange Free State herself. This was the turning-point in contemporary history and the beginning of the new period of anxiety, which Germany has inflicted upon us ever since.

In November 1898, the German Emperor made his journey to Palestine. At Damascus he gave utterance to the strange speech in which, while another Power was undertaking the protection of Catholics in the East by international treaty, he proclaimed himself the "Protector of all Mussulmans". What did he mean by this strange phrase? Pastor Naumann, who was present, discerned in it a secret calculation of "grave and remote possibilities".

"1. It is possible that the Caliph of Constantinople may fall into the hands of the Russians. Then there would perhaps be an Arab Caliph, at Damascus or elsewhere, and it would be advantageous to be known not only as the friend of the Sultan, but as the friend of all Mahometans. The title might give the German Emperor a measure of political power, which might be used to counteract a Russophil Ottoman policy.

"2. It is possible that the world-war will break out before the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Then the Caliph of Constantinople would once more uplift the standard of a Holy War. The Sick Man would raise himself for the last time on his bed to shout to Egypt, the Soudan, East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan and India "War against England"
... It is not unimportant to know who will support him on his bed when he rises to utter this cry." (1)

(1) Friedrich Naumann. Asia, 1899, pp. 152, 153.
So Germany was already thinking in 1899 of the Holy war she forced the Sultan to proclaim in 1914. But she would have attempted to create and inflame an Arab Caliph, if the Caliph of Constantinople had not been available.

The annexation of the Transvaal by England was the first great disappointment of German diplomacy. From this time forth, von Bülow became truculent. He hastened the process of naval armament. On December 11, 1899, he spoke as follows in the Reichstag, in reference to the growth of the fleet:

"It has been said that once in every century there is a great settlement, a great liquidation, in view of a fresh distribution of influence, power and possession on the globe... Are we on the eve of such a new partition of the earth?... In any case, we cannot suffer a foreign partition, a foreign Jupiter, be he who he may, to say to us: "What is to be done? I have given the whole world to others!" (1).... We cannot and we will not stand apart, like dreamers, while others divide the cake between them.... If the English talk of a Greater Britain and the French of a New France, if Russia is opening up Asia for herself, we too have a right to a "greater Germany" (2).

He added:

"In the coming century Germany must be either the hammer or the anvil" (3).

Now, as Albert Wirth pertinently observed, if Germany is to be a hammer, how can she be expected not to strike? Furthermore, we find all the Pan-German watchwords in Prince von Bülow's mouth. On January 10, 1900, he christened the Deutschland, at that time the largest Transatlantic liner in existence:

"As this vessel claims to be superior to all other vessels that plough the seas, numerous as they are, so too may it

(1) An allusion to Schiller's poem, in which Jupiter parcels out all the earth and forgets the poet.
(2) Bülow, Reden, vol. I, pp. 90–91
(3) Ibid., t. I, p. 96.
DESIGNS UPON TRIESTE AND MOROCCO.

always be true for all Germans that "Deutschland (Germany) is above everything, above everything in the world" (1).

When inaugurating the new palace of the Chamber of Peers on January 16, 1904, he said:

"May the king be at the head of Prussia, Prussia at the head of Germany, and Germany at the head of the world" (2).

This Weltpolitik, initiated in Palestine in 1898, was continued in 1899 by conversations with France on Morocco. The Emperor frequently spoke to the French Ambassador, M.de Noailles, of common Franco-German interests in North Africa. French diplomacy at Berlin courteously asked for estimate of German interests. Berlin long evaded the issue. Suddenly, in 1902, Ernst Hasse, President of the Pan-German League, raised the question at the tribune of the Reichstag and demanded a German Protectorate on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. At the same time German diplomacy made more discreet overtures to us, bearing upon the Mediterranean. We will quote the words of the publicist, who seems to have caught the very spirit of M. de Noailles' thought:

"There was an evident attempt to connect the Moroccan question with the hypothetical events which, as the Pan-Germans hope, will agitate Austria on the death of Francis Joseph. They seemed to be hinting this: "If you are reasonable, if you agree to accept German predominance at Trieste, we Germans will not insist upon our claims in Morocco". But the Quai d'Orsay was not to be beguiled by these Artaxerxian gifts. It replied that the events in question were remote, whereas the actual situation of Morocco required an immediate solution. And taking the pretensions of Berlin diplomacy literally, the French ambassador gave a semi-official intimation that, should any change take place in the statu quo in Morocco, France, for her part, would not oppose the cession of a port on the Atlantic to Germany" (3).

(2) Ibid., vol. II, p. 34.
(3) Comment se fera le partage du Maroc. (Le Correspondant, December 25, 1905, p. 1096).
METHODS OF PAN-GERMANISM.

The reader must weigh the terms of this very moderate French reply carefully. France accepted the principle of compensation to Germany, should she herself extend her power in Morocco. All that Prince von Bülow has since said, either at the tribune or in his recent book, about the French desire to confront Germany with a fait accompli in Morocco, is pure imagination (1).

Nevertheless, the vehement and reiterated disputes on the subject date from this time. These aspirations seemed to M. Delcassé “to look too far into the future”. How was it possible in 1902 to predict what would happen to Austria-Hungary at the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph, who was not dying? How could France grant moral support to German acquisitions on the Adriatic, before Austria-Hungary and Italy had been consulted? M. Delcassé prudently allowed the conversation to drop. He informed Prince von Radolin of his conventions with England and Spain on the subject of Morocco; on the 12th and 14th of April, 1904, Prince von Bülow stated in the Reichstag that he was aware of these agreements and had nothing to say against them. It was Germany’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean that seemed to him important. Suddenly, he realised that France would resist German designs upon Trieste. And moreover, in 1904 and 1905, M. Constans entered into negotiations at Constantinople to prevent orders for Turkish military equipment from going exclusively to Germany, when it was France who had subscribed the Ottoman loan.

Prince von Bülow was determined to put a stop once for all to this French intrusion in the eastern Mediterranean which Germany considered her special preserve. He accordingly created the Morocco question in its entirety. As a finishing touch, he incited William II to land at Tangiers on March 51, 1905, and inspired the speech promising the

(1) BüLOW, Deutsche Politik.
Sultan of Morocco his independence. It was an imperious summons to France to be prepared to cede territory.

He had received the following warning from Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, German ambassador at Constantinople:

"If—in spite of Damascus and Tangiers—we give up Morocco, we shall at once lose our position in Turkey and with it all the advantages and prospects for the future which we have acquired painfully by long years of toil" (1).

Between 1904 and 1905, Bülow discovered that the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, which he had pronounced inoffensive when it was communicated to him, ran counter to the Madrid conference of 1880, and on these grounds he based his right to insist on a conference of all Europe at Algeciras. Europe was violently made aware that nothing, which concerned Morocco, could be negociated without Germany's approval. The agreements of 1909 were full of cunningly ambiguous articles, big with future disputes.

Meanwhile the Eastern question, the real question, had reappeared in 1908, when Aerenthal mobilised against Servia, and sent 30,000 rifles to the Albanians. And although the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in every respect contrary to the treaty signed by all Europe at Berlin in 1878, Bülow, who had made the conference of Algeciras a question of peace or war, refused to have any sort of conference. The moderation of the Triple Entente and, above all, the prudence of M. Fallières (who was the first to be consulted) alone prevented a European conflagration. By a curious inversion of parts, it was the blustering Chancellor von Bülow, already won over to the brutal Magyar policy of Aerenthal (2), on whom William II conferred the title of "Prince of Peace" when he dismissed him.

(1) Bülow, Deutsche Politik.
(2) See Appendix.
Three years of tranquillity followed. But the great ideas of the reign were developing quietly. In 1910 the Crown Prince made his journey round the world. He paid a visit to India. Was there more than met the eye in this? The English army received him courteously, with festivities and hunting-parties. He was shown the most important military secrets, the defences of the Khyber Pass:

"Was it altogether agreeable to the English", a specialist in Indian affairs, Hermann von Staden, has since asked, "that the future German Emperor should know this position, the most important of all, de visu? This is another question. But could they have refused him permission to visit Khyber?"  

"However, what must have been still more annoying to the English was the effect produced by this visit to the Khyber Pass on the Indians. What was in the mind of the future Emperor of Germany? Why was he so anxious to see the invader's gate to India, which is generally so carefully hidden from European eyes? All India was asking this. And the answer whispered from Cashmere to Cap Comorin can be no secret to those who know the thoughts and the silent hopes of the Indians, of all the Indians, Hindoos as well as Mahometans" (1).

No one in Germany's seems to have been shocked at the idea that the Crown Prince accepted the chivalrous hospitality of English officers, his brothers-in-arms, while secretly resolved to act the spy, and to encourage the secret hopes of native revolt by a public demonstration.

When he returned, the harvest of conflict, that had been carefully sown in Morocco, began to ripen. The Sultan, besieged at Fez by rebels, appealed for help. German diplomacy long disputed the fact that he had appealed to anyone at all. Above all, it contested his right to appeal to the French, his protectors by virtue of the very treaty that bore the signature of Germany. It was only as chance would have it that all the Europeans in Fez had not already been

(1) Hermann von Staden, Der deutsche Kronprinz in Indien (Süddeutsche Monatshefte, April 1911).
massacred, when M. Monis' government ordered general Moinier to enter the capital. The slaughter came afterwards. Germany nevertheless maintained that France had exceeded her right to keep order by marching her troops into Fez. But on May 22, 1911, Prince von Bülow's special newspaper, the Konservative Korrespondenz, inserted an article written by one of his closest friends, which indicates pretty clearly the sort of advice Messrs Kiderlen-Waechter and Bethmann-Hollweg were to receive from the former Chancellor:

"The German Sphinx is still silent, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is still ostentatiously making holiday... The Sphinx's eyelids droop, but we need not conclude that it is asleep. The Moroccan question has come to the fore again, and it demands a solution. This will be given. On that day, it will depend upon the attitude adopted by the French whether the great terror that will pass over the world will end in a great clash of arms, or a great relief. But, even in the latter case, the relief will not be caused by a retreat on the part of Germany. In twenty-four hours, the French will be before Fez. There they will be allowed to take breath for a while. After which the clear, firm, tranquil sound of the Berlin bell will be heard: the twelfth hour! At this twelfth hour the Moroccan question may be pacifically solved, in such a manner that Germany will receive her full and complete share in the affairs of North Africa; if not, "Mars will be the master of the hour" (1).

The hour of Mars had not yet come in 1911. France ceded a portion of the Congo. The very prudence shown in her moderation was perhaps considered a sign of weakness. The German Colonial Minister, Von Lindequist, resigned dramatically, because he did not consider the French concessions sufficient. The Kronprinz uttered a noisy protest publicly in the Reichstag against the weakness of a German diplomacy which had allowed itself to be duped. 1913 was the year of formidable armaments. The

(1) Quoted by Albrecht Wirth Türkei, Oesterreich, Deutschland, 1912.
programme of competitive military expenditure, proposed by the Pan-German general von Bernhardi (1), was carried out to the letter. A milliard and a half of war taxes was voted almost unanimously by the Reichstag, and even the Socialists, yielding to one of the worst aberrations of which a great historic party was ever guilty, acquiesced. The German atmosphere was charged with a war-like intensity. French diplomatic and consular agents sent M. Stephen Pichon well-informed reports (2) which take cognizance of pacific forces in Germany, very considerable as to numbers, "the great mass of workmen, artisans and peasants, pacific by instinct; a large number of manufacturers, merchants and financiers of medium importance". But these forces, as the reports justly remark, were "counter-balancing forces, whose influence on opinion was limited, or social forces without means of expression, passive and defenceless against the impetus of a martial contagion". Opposed to these was "an organised war-party, with leaders, troops, a press itself convinced, or paid to manufacture opinion, and varied and formidable means of intimidating the government". This party included all the territorial nobility, imbued with military traditions; the great middle classes, hostile to a France they believed to be revolutionary; "the leading merchants, who demanded larger markets; all the officials who had not forgotten Bismarck; the intellectuals, fresh from the universities, where the economists prove, by an army of statistics, Germany's need of a colonial and commercial Empire corresponding to the industrial productivity of the Empire; the innumerable Kriegsvereine and Wehrvereine; the naval, maritime and colonial leagues; the diplomatists whom German public opinion accused of having bungled German affairs in the Congo Convention, and who were burning to be avenged; "the historians, philosophers,

(1) In Deutschland und der nächst Krieg.
(2) There is a remarkable summary of these reports in the French Yellow Book (Note to M. Stephen Pichon), p. 15 et seq.
political publicists and other apostles of deutsche Kultur, who desire to impose specifically German modes of thought and feeling on the world”. The reactionary social forces which centre in the military Junker caste, the great rapacious powers of high finance and commerce; the vague and ravenous appetites which had been awakened in the people, and the fury of fanatical ideologists, skilled in the exploitation of old memories, had combined in a prodigious mass of bellicose discontent. They were a minority, no doubt, but numerically they were immensely strong, and socially their supremacy was undisputed; they formed one of those “energetic minorities” which, according to Bismarck, are responsible for all wars. The rulers of Germany have followed these minorities, either from inherent tendency, or in order to safeguard their own credit with the social classes which enjoy most consideration. Prince Bülows himself has often recognised the success of the Pan-German League in “stimulating” or “keeping alive national sentiment” (1).

As if it were necessary to stimulate or keep awake a sentiment that all the education given by schools and universities, and all the habits of German Society have combined to saturate with the most aggressive arrogance for the last forty-four years! The ambitions of this arrogance, skilfully cultivated and easily directed into predatory channels, constitute Pan-Germanism. This demagogic zeal of the German ruling classes will be held accountable for much, when the day comes to apportion responsibility for the present ills.

Our demonstration would be incomplete if we took no account of public opinion in Austria-Hungary. The chief centre of Pan-Germanism is in Germany; but it has secondary centres in Austria. And in Hungary a Pan-Magyarism flourishes, which has long been in close touch with German Imperialism (1).

I. — Pan-Magyarism an auxiliary of Pan-Germanism.

Hungarian complicity might claim a special monograph. We propose merely to note its chief manifestations, not to describe them. This would require the pen of an expert. It is, however, notorious that, for a long time past, Hungarian policy has deserted the prudent paths of Koloman de Tisza, who objected to "privileged nationalities" in Austria-Hungary, even to a privileged Magyar nationality, and of Franz Déak, who strove "to make Magyarism beloved" of all other nationalities under its sway, Slav, German, or

PAN-MAGYARISM.

Rumanian. The compromise of 1867 created two dominant nationalities in Austria-Hungary: the Austrian Germans and the Magyars; side by side with each of these, a vassal nationality, which was treated with some indulgence, the Czechs in Austria, the Poles in Galicia; and beneath each, a host of small nationalities who were ruthlessly oppressed; the Slovenians in Austria; the Ruthenians, Slovaks, Croatians, Serbs and Rumanians in Hungary. We need only make a passing allusion to the Italians who had the unenviable privilege of being oppressed simultaneously by Austria and Hungary. M. Sonnino, in his message to the powers, says with reason that the Dual Monarchy strove to exterminate at the same time their race, language and civilization. However, their liberation is in good hand—in the hands of the victorious Italian Army. Among the adjoining nations there were none which felt themselves more directly menaced than the Serbian kingdom. The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, negociated by Count Jules Andrassy in 1878, was the prelude to the attempted strangulation of Serbian nationality.

"Without Bosnia and Herzegovina", said the most pacific of the Serbian ministers, M. Wladan Georgewitch, "neither Serbia nor Montenegro can exist" (1).

And yet Serbia and Montenegro have tried to exist without Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were actually the historic nucleus of ancient Serbia, and the centre from which the first liberating revolt against Turkey was started in 1876. This is not the place in which to describe the efforts that have been made to destroy Serbia economically. Wladan Georgewitch is perfectly right in his definition of the Austro-Hungarian policy:

"The provisional mission, entrusted to Austria-Hungary by Germanism, is this; Austria-Hungary tramples upon and grinds to pieces the peoples that fall under her power; she provokes conflicts between these peoples, or between sections of the

(1) Wladan Georgewitch, Die serbische Frage, 1907, p. 133.
same people; she weakens their national sentiment, and intersperses German colonists among them" (1).

The Magyars are the brutal pioneers in this process of disorganisation which prepares the way for the invasion of Germanism. We do not make this statement on the evidence of their enemies, but on that of their own leaders. These leaders have ceased to fear the Germanism of Austria; and ever since 1867, they have found it profitable to throw themselves into the arms of the Germanism of Germany. Let us turn to the enunciation of this policy in the book devoted by Count Julius Andrassy to the Austro-Hungarian compromise.

"We have no longer any reason to fear either social absorption by Germanism, or Germanisation by the power of the State... To day, the Hapsburgs no longer represent the Germanic idea in Europe. The Hohenzollerns have assumed this function...

"But the question of nationalities can only be solved by a settlement of our relations with our Southern neighbours... Nothing could make our task in connection with the nationalities [of Hungary] more difficult than a situation in which we should be on a complete equality with our neighbours in the South, and should allow them to feel that we had need of them; a situation in which it would be possible for, and, as they would think, incumbent upon them to obtain a national organisation for their brethren living in our midst. In such circumstances, our Wallachians would acquire a habit of looking beyond the frontier, of expecting support from without.

"Hungary is the natural guardian of the independent development of those Southern States (Rumania, Bulgaria, etc.). Therefore she does not threaten them. Here we have the true justification of this idea of confederation... But if this projected confederation is to last and to prove profitable to us, we must be much stronger than our confederates" (2).

This text, now nearly twenty years old, should be carefully studied. It means that the Magyars agree to be the

(1) Wladan Georgewitch, Die serbische Frage, p. 125.
(2) Julius Andrassy, the younger, Ungarns Ausgleich mit Österreich. 1897, pp. 401, 54.
friends of Rumania, Serbia, etc., provided they are not asked to grant rights to the Rumanians and Serbians of Hungary. They further agree to form an alliance with Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, on condition that the Magyars are the masters in this confederation. "In every alliance," said Bismarck cynically, "there is a horse and a rider." Hungary is willing to be the ally of all the Balkan Powers down to the Peloponnesus, on condition that they are docile mounts. The more ambitious Magyars look upon the Austrian Germans themselves as their future vassals. The strange reply given by Count Tisza the younger to Herr Dobernig on December 19, 1912, on the occasion of a banquet to the Hungarian Delagations at Buda-Pest, has often been discussed.

Dobernig had naively proposed the union of the Magyars and of Austria against the Slavs. Count Tisza replied that he too desired the union of the "Magyar nation", as the nucleus of the Empire, and of "the peoples of Austria" as its satellites. It has been this Magyar policy which, even since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, has dealt a series of brutal blows, and determined the successive mobilisations which have imperilled the peace of Europe since 1912.

II. — Austrian Pan-Germanism.

This Pan-Magyarism is opposed by an Austrian Pan-Germanism. A Teutomaniac tendency, provoked by the Bismarckian ideas of the Kulturkampf, began to manifest itself in Austria as early as 1878. It was at first a Liberal movement, and soon became anti-semitic, but it was Pan-German throughout. For a time, no doubt, these Austrian Germans had no designs upon the East. Forgetting the defeats of 1866, and dazzled by the military glory of the new German Empire, they aimed at securing a share of the glory, the power, and the prosperity of Germany for Austria by atta-
ching the German provinces of Austria to the German Empire. The more moderate members of the party did not propose the downfall of the Austrian dynasty. The famous Linz Programme signed in 1882 by the great landowner Chevalier George von Schöenerer, the historian Friedjung, and Victor Adler, who has since become the leader of Austrian Socialism, merely demanded the Austro-German alliance as a permanent institution, to be inscribed in the actual Constitutions of the two Empires. It proposed to reduce the Austro-Hungarian Compromise to a personal union, and to grant a liberal autonomy to Galicia, the Bukovina and Dalmatia. German predominance over the Austrian Slavs was thus ensured. But the extremists, of whom Schöenerer himself was one, soon began a propaganda at once furiously Bismarckian, anti-dynastic, both anti-catholic and anti-Semitic. When Lueger contrived to adopt his programme without attacking the dynasty, there was an outburst of enthusiasm in Vienna, which thrice elected the fiery Pan-German as Burgomaster.

Another frenzied wave rose and broke between 1898 and 1908. Schöenerer ventured to say in the Reichsrat, on November 8, 1898, that "he had visions of the day when a German army would enter Austria, to give the coup de grâce to the latter". On June 20, 1905, the deputy Rudolf Berger said in a speech to the Pan-German League:

"The Pan-German programme requires that all the territories, which formerly belonged to the Germanic Confederation should be re-attached to the German Empire as Confederated States... The Slav flood would break helplessly against a German nation united throughout Central Europe... We will not be intimidated even by the hostility of the Court... The transition from the ancient lamentable German particularism of the past to the German Empire of to-day was infinitely more difficult than would be the transition from the present regime to the Pan-German State, which we wish to establish".

Again, in the Reichsrat itself, the deputy Franko Stein, was able to say on May 15, 1908:
"The Austrian dynasty and the Austrian State are nothing to us. Indeed, we have but one hope and one wish: to be finally delivered from this State. The inevitable has at last come to pass, the disintegration of this State, to the end that the German people of Austria, emancipated therefrom may lead a glorious life under the protection of the Hohenzollerns.

The Socialist Daszinski, supporting the same policy, had before this (on September 25, 1903) elegantly declared: "When this old Austria gives up the ghost, we shall not drop a single tear on the monster's carcase."

The external programme of this group, which has included as many as 21 members of the Reichsrat, is not very clear. But it generally commanded the votes of the Liberals, the Socialists and the Christian Socialists. The ambition of these Austrian Teutomaniacs, at first somewhat confused, gradually became more definite as Pan-Germanism took shape. The article signed Tör in the Gegenwart of December 26, 1905 : Wird Mittel-Europa nicht deutsch sein? (Will not Central Europe be German?) (1) is indeed a semi-official programme, emanating from Austrian parliamentary and governmental circles. According to the writer, there is a real danger that the twelve million Germans of the Austro-Hungarian Empire may fail to exercise the influence due to their moral and intellectual superiority. To re-establish order in the semi-Asiatic welter (i.e. Magyars, Ruthenians, and Czechs), a "German dictator" should be set up, who would degrade "Bohemia, Hungary and Ruthenian Galicia" with an iron fist "to the rank of provinces" in a unified Austria. Severe exceptional measures, and a system of expropriation on the plan of the laws applied by Prussia to Poland, would bring the recalcitrant

(1) These ideas had been popularised in Austria from 1890 to 1900 by Alexander von Peez, a brilliant Rhenish-Prussian economist, who had settled in Vienna and become a member of the Austrian Parliament. Cf. his project of a Confederation of Central Europe in Zur neuesten Handelspolitik (Sieben Abhandlungen) Vienna, 1898.
to reason. Commercial prosperity would do the rest. There is no national pride which will not yield to wealth. The commercial Union of Austria-Hungary and Germany would ensure the solid predominance of the Germans over 24 million Slavs, 8 million Magyars and 4 million Rumanians. And neither the Dutch House of Orange, nor the Belgian Coburg princes, nor the German Hohenzollerns would refuse to enter into this economic and ethnic alliance which the "German dictator" in Austria would propose.

Thus in its visions Austrian Pan-Germanism joins hands with German Pan-Germanism.

III. — "Trialist" Imperialism and Colonial Imperialism in Austria.

Austria Pan-Germanism was not the most dangerous of the Austrian parties as long as the German Government remained indifferent to its advances. This was the attitude adopted by Bismarck. German Nationalism in Austria had, in fact, a merit: it counteracted Pan-Magyarism. But it ceased of necessity to be a restraint, and could but precipitate bellicose action from the moment when Germany herself began to make adventurous decisions. And it contributed largely to suggest in Austria the dream of a "German dictator" to which the Arch-Duke Francis Ferdinand gave temporary satisfaction by the deliberate assumption of an overbearing attitude. The Arch-Duke, together with a considerable section of conservative nobility and of the Liberal middle classes, had adopted a form of Imperialism known as "Trialism," the programme of which was an extension of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, after a definite pacification of the conflict with the Magyars, by the inclusion of a Southern Slav kingdom, autonomous like Hungary.

Leopold von Chlumecky develops the external policy of
this party very clearly in his book: *Oesterreich-Ungarn und Italien* (Austria-Hungary and Italy) 1907 (1).

In their view, there are two claims which Austrian foreign policy can never abandon: 1. Austria must retain access to the Mediterranean. 2. She must be supreme in the Western Balkans. She must therefore keep Italy out of Albania at any price, and it is equally imperative that she should keep close watch over combinations in the Balkans which might some day threaten the integrity of the monarchy, either morally or by force of arms.

"It is inadmissible that national or political combinations should be formed in the Balkans under the protection of foreign powers: such combinations, concealing within themselves numerous causes of strife, would carry the germs of dangerous unrest into Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Croatia.

"Every attempt to detach Macedonia from Turkey, outside the preponderating initiative of Austria, any construction of Macedonian autonomy other than one accomplished by and with us, and also any "Balkan Confederation" would tend to undermine the foundations of the monarchy.... Such a State would naturally seek to consolidate itself by attracting other Balkan peoples... The provinces we have occupied and the Austrian provinces of the South would be threatened by another Irredentist movement.

"This is but a negative interest. It is linked for us with a notable positive interest. The commercial route to Salonica must be kept open for us.... Salonica is destined to be the furthest postern in the South-East for Southern Austrian and Hungarian trade.

Salonica is our hope for the future. Some day, when Asia Minór is opened up to civilisation, when railways traverse Mesopotamia and connect Smyrna with the Persian Gulf, Macedonia, the highway of the vast transcontinental traffic, which...

(1) Leopold von Chlumecky, the Austrian deputy, is a son of Johannes von Chlumecky, who was a member of the Auersberg Cabinet, first as Minister of Agriculture in 1871, and then as Minister of Commerce in 1875. The Chlumecky belong to the political group which may be called the "moderate Left", mainly composed of great landowners. Chlumecky senior was President of the Austrian Chamber of Deputies in 1805; he has been in the Chamber of Peers since 1897.
will pass from Central Europe to Asia Minor, will enjoy a new prosperity, and Salonica will be a place of considerable importance (1) ".

Italy is the most dangerous opponent of this ambition because of her designs on Albania; and Chlumecky does not deny that a formidable struggle may be anticipated, if Italy continues to claim the mare nostrum, and to threaten the approaching advance of Austria-Hungary on Salonica on its flanks, from Albania, into which she (Italy) is gradually penetrating.

However, this Trialist Party was no more omnipotent than the Teutomaniac party. It was arrogant and irascible, but it did not necessarily incite to violent solutions after the manner of Pan-Magyarism. It was capable of obeying dangerous suggestions, but it could be appeased by indicating substantial prizes of another sort for Austria-Hungary. This was the policy adopted by the naval and colonial party founded by Count von Wrede and Heinrich von Bülow, of which Anton von Mörl has been an eloquent spokesman of late years. They teach that all nations have a right " to live their lives " (sich ausleben) (2).

The nations of to-day seek to do this by means of a vast universal commerce, which tops the resources of the whole world. Should Austria be fascinated like Germany by the naval mirage, peace might be ensured on the continent of Europe. These theorists pointed out how many milliards Bismarck's " continental " policy had cost Germany merely for the possession of Alsace-Lorraine. In like manner, Albania would not compensate Austria for the war it would entail with the Turks, Serbians and Montenegrins, to say nothing of war with Italy. Corfu, obtained by peaceful negotiation, would suffice to keep the Strait of Otranto open. The trade of Salonica would never have more than local

(1) LEOPOLD VON CHLUMECKY, Oesterreich-Ungarn und Italien, 1907, pp. 61-65, 255.
(2). ANTON VON MÖRL, Das Ende des Kontinentalismus, 1912.
importance, if Trieste were made the great emporium it might be, and if the Danube became the mighty artery through which all the trade of Central Europe would flow into Asia Minor. "Thus the best possible Balkan policy for Austria would be to have no Balkan policy" (1).

These partisans of a strong naval and commercial policy justly point out that Austria has at her disposal one of the most daring sea-faring populations in the world, the sailors of Dalmatia, and that the Suez Canal might have made the fortune of Trieste more readily than that of any other European port, if Austria had been able to create a suitable maritime equipment. The opportunity of ensuring this prosperity may return on the not far distant day when the New World has become industrially self-sufficing and when European trade will seek outlets in Nearer Asia, roused from its slumbers, and in the Far East thrown open to European civilisation. These would have been wise counsels, had they been free from ulterior designs. No nation in the world would have dreamt of crushing infant Austro-Hungarian industry by war. The only disquieting feature of this maritime policy was its territorial ambitions. Anton von Mörl declares that they are not to be "continental". Then they are to be colonial? The matter might perhaps be amicably settled if von Mörl were to speak plainly. Others have done so for him; first of all they want Austrian colonies on the Mediterranean shores. Herr Sylvester, the present President of the Reichsrat and the leading statesman of the German parties in Austria, in a speech made by him as the delegate of these groups in the spring of 1911, claimed "the Mediterranean for the dwellers on its coasts" (das Mittelmeer seinen Anrainern), and he enumerated these. He did not forget France; but he omitted England. If we remember that the principal negligence this maritime party casts in the teeth of Austria is that she has failed to take advantage

(1) ANTON VON MöRL, ibid., p. 146.
of the construction of the Suez Canal, the inference is easy. Egypt is the prize they have in view, and also the prize the Pan-Germans of Germany have allotted to them (1). Is it surprising that England should be taking measures to circumvent the would-be spoiler?

**IV. — A final chance for peace.**

*The pacific forms of Austrian Imperialism.*

Magyar policy is despotie, because it is inspired by fear; it is afraid that a great Serbia, a great Rumania, a great Bulgaria, rising within the Balkans, would awake ideas of independence among the Slavs and Rumanians of Austria-Hungary. This policy was strangling the Serbians, circumventing the Rumanians and keeping watch over the Bulgarians. Then a great Parliamentarian appeared, who turned over the terms of the problem, and, if his counsels had been followed, the chances of peace would at once have been greatly augmented, without any sacrifice of Austro-Hungarian ambitions. Aurel C. Popovici, a Rumanian of the Bukovina, was familiar with the sufferings of peoples crushed by Magyar brutality. In a famous book, he proposed the organisation of the *United States of Austria* (2).

The work will outlive any of those suggested by the problem of Austro-Hungarian reconstruction. With equal audacity and generosity, he suggests that a liberal autonomy might be granted to the fifteen nationalities which compose the Austro-Hungarian Empire. His plan had elements that flattered the Teutomaniacs. He proposed to borrow the actual Constitution of the German Empire; at the centre, a Parliament composed of a Reichstag and a Chamber of Peers; an Executive presided over by a Chancellor which would admi-

---

(2) Aurel Popovici, *Die Vereinigten Staaten Österreichs*, 1906. The book was suppressed in Hungary, and the author was banished from his own country.
nister all the business of the Empire, foreign affairs, war, the navy, justice; a uniform customs system and a uniform penal code, and federal finances. But in each confederate state, a freely elected Parliament would give this state the Constitution of its choice, ratified by the Empire; and, side by side with the Imperial Governor, would sit a Ministry responsible to that Parliament.

A vast perspective was here indicated. To open it up, a coup d'Etat was required, but it would have been a coup d'Etat of liberation. The Emperor might have accomplished it in a single night. It would have been the greatest experiment in benevolent despotism since the reign of Joseph II, and when internal reform had been thus achieved, a perfectly new foreign policy would have been possible. If the Rumanians and the Slavs within the State were free and happy in Austria-Hungary, the Rumanians and Slavs beyond its borders would of necessity be grateful to the Empire for the freedom and happiness vouchsafed to their compatriots. There would no longer be merely the precarious peace imposed by a great Empire on young and still growing kingdoms; but the deep and durable peace born of friendship. Better still, if the Slav and Rumanian nationalities felt themselves more at their ease in the great Austrian domain, other Balkan States would be attracted to this vast liberal federation instituted by Austria among its own peoples. All that would be necessary would be to create no more Austrian spheres of influence in the Balkans, and to make no further projects of annexation. The Balkan peoples would at once be drawn into the confederation. If it be true that Austria, the Eastern Empire (Oesterreich) must choose between penetrating to the heart of Turkey and disappearing, she will effect this conquest amicably. Greece herself would not withhold her adhesion to a confederation which would be a rampart against Russia and a centre of civilising propaganda.

This plan had the merit of being pacific. If there be a force against which there are no weapons, it is that of
mutual trust and friendship between peoples. An Austria-Hungary which should have brought the certainty of peace to the Balkan nations as an element of its Imperial Liberalism, would have secured them all for its allies, and would have encountered no hostility in any Western Power. An Austria-Hungary, versed in the art of patient waiting, and gifted with the power of gradually diffusing its civilising influence, would have been able to satisfy its ambition by this plan.

Popovici was met by the objection that his integral federalism could not be brought forth in a single night by a fiat of the Emperor’s from the chaos of Austro-Hungarian nationalities, and the objection is a serious one. But here is another plan: it was framed by the famous contributor to the Arbeiterzeitung, the Viennese Socialist, Rudolf Springer (whose real name is Karl Renner). He is not an uncompromising Socialist. The Imperialist Pastor Naumann readily accepts his articles for Die Hilfe.

“"There is an Imperial idea in the air" said this Socialist-Democrat theorist. "Could it not be seized and held"?

The idea is that of an Empire where universal suffrage should reign jointly with the Emperor; of an Empire which would be a nation of nations, and where the weak would be protected against the strong by a shelter created in common. The fiat which would call forth this confederation of nationalities, each of them considered as a whole with all its enclaves, would be the popular will, consulted in its comitia. Universal suffrage would dissolve all national prejudices, because it would oblige all Liberalisms to unite against all Conservativisms, disregarding national limits. But there would be one nationality which would predominate by virtue of its culture, and this would be the German nationality, because it would have introduced Social Democracy.

With these mitigated forms of Pan-Germanism it is possible to parley. It will no doubt be objected that regene-
ration by universal suffrage would be as slow as regeneration by Popovici's Coup d'État is utopian. Then perhaps some hope might be inspired by Richard Charmatz' Austrian neo-Liberalism. The neo-Liberals hold that, before entering upon any other reform, the industrial education of Austria-Hungary should be completed. Trieste, of course, must be retained; but no offensive policy should be admitted. "He who would make Austria an industrial State must be the champion of peace" (1).

"So hands off! No intervention in the Balkans! Wait until we and the rest are ripe for the future community." This would not be a policy of abdication; and to know that a dream is remote, and to work out its realisation pacifically, is not to abandon it. If the Latin, English, French and Russian civilisations should show themselves weaker than that of Austria in this peaceful rivalry for the industrial and social organisation of the East, they would have only themselves to blame. But to Richard Charmatz the Hungarian method, which is also that of brutal Trialism, is inadmissible; the method which violates the solemn undertakings given at the Congress of Berlin on the subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina; whose threats have caused repeated crises to hang over the whole Balkan peninsula since 1988; the method, which for the last twenty years has attempted to bring Serbia to her knees, now by slow strangulation, now by minatory mobilisations.

There are then in Austria parties disposed to draw drafts upon the future which will not fall due for a very long time. They have not gained a hearing since 1906. Since the Arenthal's accession to office the brutality of the dominant Magyars has prevailed. In Austria a new litterature of blustering nationalism has been prodigal of Teutomaniac and anti-Slav novels. A collective vanity has inclined the Austrian people to listen to these "professors of energy". Every

(1) Richard Charmatz, Deutsch-oesterreichische Politik, 1907, p. 382.
remnant of prudence has not perhaps disappeared from the Cabinet, and this explains why, after the first blunders of Count Berchtold, Austrian diplomacy seemed for a moment to promise amendment. But German diplomacy, which did not always approve the Bismarckian Teutomaniacs of Austria, has always approved without reserve the Magyar policy. It probably thought that it was strong enough to succeed. This collaboration could not fail to increase the probabilities of war. If war broke out, conflicts of vital moment to Germanism were bound to take place on the frontier of the Lower Danube. And this was enough to bring about German intervention. Any war which would take Austria to the gates of Salonica would be a gain to Austrian Germanism only, and not to the German Empire. The centre of Germanic continental activity would shift from Berlin to Vienna, an eventuality not to be tolerated by German pride. Albert Wirth expressed a deeply rooted sentiment on this point:

"Austria must increase, or she will be outstripped by Italy. She will increase, because the disintegration of the Eastern Balkan States will leave her no choice in the matter. As Pan-Germans, we may rejoice at this expansion of our tongue and at this possible influence of our German brethren towards the South. As Germans of the Empire, we cannot contemplate this aggrandizement of another territorial power with unmixed feelings. We should once more be reduced to purely industrial and commercial progress... The Hapsburgs would once more eclipse the Hohenzollerns" (1).

Now the Hohenzollerns could not consent to be eclipsed by the Hapsburgs. In the coming division of the spoils, they were determined to have their share.

As Austria-Hungary would not renounce the error of "continentalism", and her factitious desire to extend her oppressive sway over new Balkan nationalities, she would infallibly seek territorial aggrandizement. At least, Germany thought so, and Germany too was bent on aggrandizement.

(1) ALBERT WIRTH, TÜRKEI, ÖSTERREICH, DEUTSCHLAND, p. 49.
The fear of Italian expansion gave a further impetus to her impatience. This must have precipitated the fatal decision. "The triumph of Great Germany, destined one day to dominate all Europe, is the sole object of the struggle in which we are engaged" (1). These are the words of an order of the day recently issued by the Kaiser to his troops. The underlying thought that ought to have been deduced from the first steps taken by the Neuer Kurs is here openly expressed. It must never be forgotten again.

(1) Order of the day found in the possession of German prisoners taken on the Bzura in June, 1915 (reproduced from the Petrograskaya Gazette in the Information of June 20, 1915).
PARIS

IMPRIMERIE GÉNÉRALE LAHURE

9, RUE DE FLEURUS, 9
RETURN TO the circulation desk of any
University of California Library
or to the
NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
Bldg. 400, Richmond Field Station
University of California
Richmond, CA 94804-4698

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS
2-month loans may be renewed by calling
(415) 642-6753
1-year loans may be recharged by bringing books
to NRLF
Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days
prior to due date

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

OCT 21 1991