ARISTOTLE'S POETICS
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ARISTOTLE

ON THE ART OF POETRY

A REVISED TEXT
WITH CRITICAL INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION
AND COMMENTARY

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PREFACE

The Translation, which faces the text in the present volume, is added in compliance with what seems to be now almost the rule with Greek texts of this description. The custom is perhaps one more honoured in the breach than the observance; but there is something to be said for it in the instance of the Poetics, because they are read by many whose study of Aristotle begins and ends with this one work of his. And there are certainly difficulties of a special kind throughout the book, which require a version or even a paraphrase to explain them. Aristotle's mode of statement here is often elliptical, allusive, and overcharged with meaning; and he not unfrequently omits to indicate the connexion of ideas in his sentences and paragraphs, so that the logical relation between them is left for us to perceive as best we can. Under these circumstances the freedom of a paraphrase may be at times the only means of making his statement intelligible to the modern reader. If Bernays thought it necessary to adopt this method of interpretation in a rendering of the Politics, there is still more reason for its adoption in one of a book like the Poetics. I have accordingly not scrupled to recast many of Aristotle's sentences, and also to insert here and there words or short clauses, in order to make the sense and sequence of ideas clearer—as I suppose he would have done himself, if
he had foreseen the modern reader, and the difficulties and obscurities he might find in his writings.

The Commentary has extended to a greater length than was originally contemplated owing to the accumulation of passages to be quoted from Aristotle or other writers in illustration of the language and terminology of the Poetics. It is hoped that they may prove of use to those who approach the text without previous study of Isocrates or the Rhetoric and other Aristotelian treatises. I venture to think, too, that some of the quotations will be seen to settle the meaning of certain passages which are not always rightly interpreted, and that others may serve to confirm the traditional text, and vindicate it from some of the doubts and suspicions which have been so freely cast on it. If the language of a passage is found from parallels elsewhere to be in accordance with the usage of Aristotle or other Greek writers, it is evident that corrections based on the assumption of its faultiness may be at once put out of court.

The Introduction is mainly on the two questions which divide the critics of the text at the present moment, the relation between the MS. known as A° and the Renaissance MSS., and the value of the Greek readings which are, or are believed to be, recoverable from the Arabic Version. I have endeavoured to show that the new light we think to get from this Oriental quarter is often that of a mere ignis fatuus, and that the utmost caution is to be used before we allow ourselves to follow its guidance, when the Arabic text diverges in any serious degree from that of our Greek authority.

Aristotle's theory of epic and tragic poetry, as put before us in the Poetics, is presented with such ad-
mirable brevity that I have not deemed it necessary to go over the ground in a preliminary survey of the contents of the book. Nor have I ventured on a discussion of the problem of his general theory of Poetry and Art, as it would require a volume by itself to deal with a matter of such extreme complexity, and we should be taken away at times in the course of the inquiry into regions of thought remote from the avowed subject of the Poetics. The statements and hints in the book would have to be eked out by the aid of others in other writings, wherever passages are to be discovered which have, or seem to have, some sort of aesthetic import; and the data thus collected would have to be made to hold together as parts of a consistent theory. Aristotelian Theories of Art constructed in this way are not unlike the Aristotelian systems of Logic, of which we have seen so many; the parts are Aristotle's, but the synthesis is always to some extent our work, not his. And I cannot repress a suspicion that if he could come back to life again, he would be surprised to find how large a meaning we are able to read into some of his more incidental utterances. We must not forget, too, that the very idea of a Theory of Art is modern, and that our present use of this term 'Art' does not go further back than the age of Winckelmann and Goethe. Aristotle recognizes various analogies between the plastic arts and certain forms of poetry and music; he sees in them, for instance, a common element, 'imitation', by which he generally means the portrayal of humanity and life, 'what men do or suffer'—though the term has no doubt a wider sense in places even in the Poetics. And there are other ideas also in his writings which we should regard as coming under Aesthetics. But they were most of them already
current in his time; and there is very little to show that he had ever thought them out sufficiently to reduce them to system even in his own mind.

The book taken as it is, with perhaps an occasional side-light from some of his other works, is intelligible enough; after a brief introduction he gives us in outline all that he has to say on the subject immediately before him, the technique of the Drama and the Epic. He tells one in fact how to construct a good play and a good epic, just as in the Rhetoric he tells one how to make a good speech. And in doing this he has succeeded in formulating once for all the great first principles of dramatic art, the canons of dramatic logic which even the most adventurous of modern dramatists can only at his peril forget or set at naught.

It is but right to remember, however, that Tragedy, as Aristotle himself conceives it, is still in many important points and characteristics the Greek form of that art, and that it is limited in various ways by the conditions and conventions of the Greek theatre, not only in the accidents of its stage presentation, but also in its form and structure, its motives and its subjects; so that even as literature Aristotle's ideal play would have been an essentially Greek play. But if I am not mistaken, his theory has some further limitations. His ideal play would seem to be in many respects a compromise between the play of the great era and that of his own day; he was writing for men of a generation living some seventy years after the death of Euripides, and there is the mark of the age on a good deal of what his theory lays down or assumes. The diction of the tragic dialogue, he thinks, should approximate to that of conversation, the choice of words being like that in the stylistic prose of oratory—as we
may presume it was with Theodectes and some of his contemporaries. Though he disapproves in a well-known passage of the intercalary chorica of the Drama of the time, this is a merely academical expression of opinion and a counsel of perfection; it is clear that he has practically come to regard the Chorus as a sort of negligible quantity, and that that is the ultimate explanation of his persistent silence about it. Even in his theory of the Plot, which he has worked out with so much thought, he is ready to make concessions to the weakness of the audiences in an age which had become too humanitarian to accept the strong situations allowed in the older Tragedy. I mention this because one is apt to forget that in the seventy years before Aristotle Tragedy must have undergone many changes, though perhaps not for the better, and that we cannot always expect to reconcile the practice of the older poets with his rules, or his rules with the practice of the older poets. If his theory of Comedy had come down to us, we should probably find it more applicable to the New Comedy than to that of Aristophanes.

An editor in these days can hardly hope to do much to advance the interpretation of a book which has been so carefully studied and re-studied by a long succession of editors and translators, many of them among the more illustrious names in the history of classical learning. And apart from editions and translations, we have now an incalculable number of contributions to the criticism and illustration of the book, scattered about partly in special articles and monographs, and partly in other writings, which have often no direct or overt relation to the Poetics themselves. The references in the Adnotatio Critica and Commentary will show the extent to which I have been able to use this sporadic literature.
My first and chief debt is to Vahlen, whose Beiträge mark, as all know, an epoch in the modern history of the Poetics, and whose edition has done so much to put the criticism of the text on its true basis, and to keep it within the limits of philological reason. If I have not always found it possible to accept his views on doubtful points or passages, it was assuredly not through any lack of regard for them, or in forgetfulness on my part of his very great services to Aristotelian learning. Speaking of predecessors, an English editor may be permitted to render his tribute of recognition to his English predecessors, Gouyston, Tyrwhitt, and Twining. Gouyston’s paraphrase, with the marginal commentary which accompanies it, is in a sense the most helpful of the earlier versions, since it is a definite attempt to explain the logical sequence of Aristotle’s ideas, and thus to deal with difficulties of a kind of which the sixteenth-century interpreters would seem to have been unconscious. Tyrwhitt needs no eulogy; his Poetics, both in the translation and in the notes—the one fault of which is that they are so few—show a combination of originality and scholarship which puts him in the first rank among the scholars of the period between Bentley and Porson. And as to Twining, whatever one may think of his translation, his commentary must always have a value as the work of a remarkably well-read man—one familiar, as few are now, with all the best literature, whether ancient or modern.

It is difficult for me to say how much this book owes to the kind assistance of my old friend, Mr. A. O. Prickard, late Fellow of New College, who besides consenting to read the proofs gave me throughout on countless doubtful points the benefit of his own very accurate
knowledge and long study of the Poetics. In the Translation, I think, there is hardly a page to be found without amendments due to his insight and fine sense of language.

I have to thank Mr. R. W. Chapman of Oriel for much timely help in the last stage of the preparation of this volume. It is perhaps needless to add that the present, like so many other Oxford books, is not a little indebted to the attention it has received from the vigilant Corrector of the Clarendon Press.

I. B.
INTRODUCTION

I

The form and structure of the existing Poetics.

The text of the Poetics has been supposed to have suffered more seriously than most prose Greek texts in the process of transmission; and many scholars accordingly have allowed themselves a very free hand in dealing with its difficulties. One cannot help suspecting, however, that not a few of their doubts and suspicions start from a certain preconceived idea, inherited from the Middle Ages, of the general character of the Aristotelian writings—that the 'master of them that know' could never for a moment forget his logic; that his mind worked with all the sureness of a machine; and that a treatise of his must not only have been written throughout on the straightest lines, but also have left his hands as free from oversights and inconsistencies as a modern published work is expected to be. The untenableness of these assumptions, as thus stated, is obvious, and no one, I imagine, would confess to them in so many words. But it is impossible to read much of the current criticism on the Poetics without seeing that its working hypothesis is in many instances what I have said.

Aristotle, with all his scientific formalism, is even as a thinker much more human than we are apt to suppose; his writing, too, is marked by great inequalities, passages of admirable lucidity and finish being often followed by a stretch of text in a style so curt and crabbed as to be the despair of his interpreters, ancient as well as modern. The Poetics begin fairly well, but as the work advances there are signs of failing attention to form, and the statement becomes in places little better than a series of notes. The continuity also of the exposition is frequently broken by
parentheses, sometimes on matters of very minor importance for the immediate argument. The digression on the λίτες ἀπὸ μηχανῆς in chap. 15 is a clear instance of matter out of place. We may explain it psychologically, as arising by a natural association of ideas out of the preceding context (15, 1454a 33-6); but its logical place was assuredly not in a chapter devoted to the ἔθη. Hermann went so far as to take it out of its present setting, and insert it after τέλος in 18, 1455b 32, not seeing that in thus removing one difficulty he was only creating another.

Judged by our modern standards of literary correctness the Poetics are perpetually open to criticism; but the anomalies and informalities, if I may use the word, are too numerous to be removed by the ordinary emendatorial artifices. Among these anomalies of language or thought the following may be noted:—

(1) The anticipatory use of technical terms, which are defined afterwards; e. g.

ἀπλοῖς μεθος: its meaning is assumed in 9, 1451b 33; and it is defined later on, in chap. 10.

λόγος (as a term of grammar or logic): defined in 20, 1457a 24; but the term had appeared before this in the same sense in 20, 1457a 6.

λύσις: used without explanation in 15, 1454a 37, and defined in 18, 1455b 26.

περιπτεία and ἀναγρώφυς: used in 6, 1450a 34, and explained afterwards in chap. 11.

To account for this kind of procedure I have suggested elsewhere (Festschrift für Th. Gomperz p. 164) that most of these and similar technical terms may have been already sufficiently recognized and established in the language of the period, and that Aristotle only defines them for a special reason, in the interest of scholastic precision or clearness. This postponement of explanation, however, is not peculiar to the Poetics. We have an instance in the Nicomachean Ethics, where προαιρέσθαι, προαιρέσις, and προαιρετική are assumed in Bk. II and explained afterwards in Bk. III. Another instance is the use of κάθαρσις in Pol. 8. 6, the term being in the next chapter (8. 7, 1341b 38) regarded as one requiring explanation.
(2) Variations of terminology. Aristotle does not always adhere to the same terms even when dealing with the same technical ideas. Thus in chap. 1 he has two terms for the musical element in poetry, μέλος and ἀρμονία; and two for the literary element also, μέτρον and λόγος. In the same way in chap. 18 the intrigue in a play is termed δέσις in one place and πλοκή in another.

(3) Inconsistency in the use of terms. The following are some of the instances of it:

άπλοος μύθος: the opposite of the πεπλεγμένος μύθος in 10, 1452 a 12, and that of the διπλοος μύθος in 13, 1453 a 13.

ἐπεισόδιον: sometimes a dramatic 'act', sometimes an 'insertion'.

ἐπιείκης: in 15, 1454 b 13 it is said that the tragic hero should be, and in 13, 1452 b 34 that he should not be, ἐπιείκης.

μιμεῖται: in 3, 1448 a 20 and elsewhere it includes the narrative form of imitation; in 24, 1460 a 8 it excludes it.

ὁμοιος, said of a dramatic personage, has one sense in 2, 1448 a 6 and another in 15, 1454 a 24, b 10.

πάθος, though generally used in the theatrical sense defined in 11, 1452 b 11, has in two passages (17, 1455 a 31; 19, 1456 a 38) another sense, that of 'feeling' or 'emotion'.

ἀυλλαβή: its use in 21, 1458 a 2, though recognized in common parlance, is not in accordance with the definition in 20, 1456 b 35.

These and similar inconsistencies of language are obviously mere accidents of expression, which mislead no one; and it would have been easy to remove them on revision, if the Poetics had ever undergone that process. But, if I am not mistaken, there is evidence, at any rate here and there, of a more serious kind of inconsistency, actual inconsistency of thought.

(4) Inconsistency of thought. The following seem to be instances of this:

In 2, 1448 a 4 we are told that the tragic personage is not ὁμοιος but βελτιῶν ἡ καθ' ἣμᾶς, and in 13, 1453 a 5 that he must be ὁμοιος, one like ourselves. The discrepancy is not difficult of explanation. In chap. 2 Aristotle is thinking only of the distinction between Tragedy and Comedy. In chap. 13, on the other hand, where the question before him is the motional effect of Tragedy, he has come to see that, if we
are to 'fear' for the tragic hero, he must be ὀμοίος, more or less like ourselves—that being the condition of our human sympathy with him. Aristotle appears to have been not unconscious of the change of view, since in the summary in 13, 1453 a 16 he modifies his second formula, and writes ἡ οὖν εἴρηται [i.e. ὀμοίος] ἡ βελτίωνος μᾶλλον ἡ χείρονος, where the alternative ἡ βελτίωνος is obviously intended to bring the statement into line, as far as can be, with that in chap. 2.

In 13, 1453 a 22 he approves of a drama with an unhappy ending even when kinsmen are concerned, and declares it to be the theoretically best form of tragedy, ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία. But in the following chapter (14, 1454 a 4) he tells us that there is something better than this: when kinsmen are concerned it is best for the unhappy ending to be evaded by means of a timely Discovery. It is clear that he has become aware of there being something μικρότερος in the ordinary tragic situations, and feels that it is to be avoided or reduced to a minimum.

In 23, 1459 b 1 the superior Unity in the two Homeric poems as compared with the later epics is distinctly asserted on the ground that the action in the latter is at best only a μία πράξις πολυμερής. In 26, 1462 b 8, however, a different view is taken of the Iliad and Odyssey, which are said to be each made up of several actions or parts; in other words, the action in them is conceived as being what Aristotle had previously described as a μία πράξις πολυμερής. The exigencies of the argument in chap. 26 have betrayed him into a statement at variance with that in chap. 23; and he has omitted to bring them into formal concordance by modifying one or the other.

In 24, 1459 b 8 in his desire to find points of agreement between epic poetry and Tragedy he tells us that the species of the Epic correspond with those of Tragedy, i.e. with those enumerated in 18, 1455 b 32. But with the text as it stands in the tradition the correspondence cannot be made out. The only possible way of bringing the two statements into harmony is that adopted by Vahlen, who has to assume a lacuna in 18, 1455 b 34 and also to accept a very arbitrary and improbable conjecture, τερατώδες, in 18, 1456 a 2.
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(5) Lapses of memory. That his memory was sometimes at fault is the only explanation of his misleading account of the Peripety of the Oedipus in 11, 1452 a 24, and of his misquotations from the Iliad in 25, 1461 a 16. But there are also, I think, signs of haste and inexactitude even in some of his references to matters within the Poetics themselves—at any rate in the following instances:—

6, 1450 b 13 ἡστερ πρώτερον εἰρηται. The reference is to 5, 1449 b 34—where a different definition is given.
18, 1455 b 32 τοσαύτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔλεγθη.
18, 1456 a 11 ὅπερ πολλάκις εἰρηται.

The second and third of these three references are clearly inexact, and have even created a doubt as to the soundness of the text. At the same time one cannot but see that the first reference, that in 1450 b 13, is equally open to criticism, though no one seems to have thought it necessary to suggest an alteration of text in that passage.

Difficulties and anomalies of this description, i.e. in isolated passages, are not peculiar to the Poetics; they are certainly to be found from time to time in other Aristotelian writings, e.g. in the De Anima, the Rhetoric, and perhaps even the Nicomachean Ethics. I may now leave them, and pass on to larger question, the difficulties in the general plan and structure of the whole. The scheme of the work as a whole is admirably simple and logical, comprising five main parts or sections:—

1. A preliminary discourse on Tragedy, epic poetry, and comedy, as the chief forms of imitative poetry, and the subject of the inquiry that is to follow (chaps. 1–5).
2. Definition of a tragedy, and the rules for its construction (chaps. 6–22).
3. Rules for the construction of an epic (chaps. 23–4).
4. Enumeration of the criticisms to which an epic or tragedy may be subjected, and of the various possible replies to them (chap. 25).
5. A comparison of epic poetry and Tragedy, showing the aesthetic superiority of the latter (chap. 26).

POETICS
The chief difficulties usually found in the book are in the contents and arrangement of the second section, that dealing with the rules for the construction of a tragedy. Read as it stands, with its matter in the traditional order, the main points in it may be said to be in brief as follows:

1. Definition of a tragedy (6, 1449 b 24).

2. Analysis of a tragedy into its qualitative parts, νίθος, ἡθος, διάνοια, λέξις, μελοποιία, δψίς; the two last being set aside as not coming within an Art of Poetry (chap. 6).

3. The νίθος: the general rules for the construction of a νίθος, and the Unity of action required in every form of it (chaps. 7–11).

4. A note or postscript on the quantitative parts of a tragedy (chap. 12).

5. The special rules for the tragic νίθος viewed as a means of producing the emotional effect of Tragedy (chaps. 13–14).

6. Rules for the ἡθος of the tragic personages, with a parenthetic note on the use of the μηχανή in Drama (chap. 15).

7. Appendix to the foregoing: i. the various forms of Discovery; ii. certain additional rules to be remembered in practice in the construction of a play (chaps. 16–18).

8. The διάνοια of the tragic personages (chap. 19).

9. The λέξις in Tragedy: i. the ultimate constituents of language; ii. the different kinds of terms; iii. the characteristics of the language of poetry, and the limits to be observed in the use of poetical words and forms (chaps. 20–22).

The above is a synopsis of this section as it might be read by any one prepared to accept the text in the form in which it has come down to us. The doubts which have been thrown on it are of two kinds: (1) the genuineness of certain chapters is questioned; and (2) the order in which the materials now appear is thought to deviate more or less from that of Aristotle himself.

1. The chapters which so many scholars reject as interpolations are chap. 12 and chap. 20. The argument on the other side I must reserve for the Commentary (on 12, 1452 b 14 and 20, 1456 b 20), as the question is too complex to be dealt with in an Introduction.
2. The difficulties in the traditional order of the matter have been met by a free use of transposition. Hermann, for instance, transfers the paragraph on the λόγις ἀπὸ μηχανῆς from chap. 15 (1454 a 37 b 8) to chap. 18, inserting it there after μέχρι τοῦ τέλους in 1455 b 32. Susmihl goes further: he lifts the whole of chap. 15 out of its place, in order to make it come immediately after chap. 18. They were both only following haud passibus aequis in the steps of Daniel Heinsius, who went to much greater lengths in this direction. The following comparative table may give an idea of the liberties Heinsius took in his rearrangement of the text:—

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<tr>
<th>Heinsius, c. vii</th>
<th>= chap. 12.</th>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; c. xiii</td>
<td>= chap. 16.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; c. xiv</td>
<td>= 11, 1452 b 9-13 + 13, 1452 b 30 sqq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; c. xv</td>
<td>= chap. 14.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; c. xvi</td>
<td>= 13, 1452 b 28-30 + chap. 17.</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; c. xvii</td>
<td>= chap. 18.</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; c. xviii</td>
<td>= chap. 15.</td>
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The changes Heinsius冒险ed were never wholly motiveless, but the section as thus reformed by him is almost a reductio ad absurdum of this mode of critical procedure. The underlying assumption is that Aristotle, having planned out his work from beginning to end with careful prevision and in accordance with a severely logical scheme, must have thought of everything he had to say in its predestined logical place, and was incapable of saying anything except in its logical place. We have no right to assume this of Aristotle; he was not writing, like Isocrates, for the great world, or with the responsibilities of publication ever before his eyes. But the chief objection to the procedure of the transpositionists is that no vera causa can be assigned for the structural disorder it presupposes. Our ordinary experience of MSS. and the textual faults they sometimes present supplies nothing analogous, nothing that will serve to explain the phenomena. The only conceivable hypothesis is that the Aristotelian materials survived at first simply on loose tablets, or sheets, as we should say; that each one of these contained a definite piece of text of varying
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length, sometimes that of a chapter, and sometimes that of one of the sections or paragraphs of a modern edition; and that the whole was put into its present shape by an early editor. All this, however, is mere surmise. And if there ever was an early editor with a free hand to arrange the materials as he thought fit, the presumption is that his logical instinct would have led him to the same view of the position of chap. 15, for instance, as Heinsius, Susemihl, and others have taken in modern times.

II

The lost Second Book.

Victorius was the first to see that the treatise now known as the Poetics is only the surviving portion of a larger work. The fact is sufficiently assured by the note in the index of Aristotelian writings in Diogenes Laertius (5, 21), who describes the work as being in two Books:

πραγματείας τέχνης ποιητικῆς ἄ β.

We have no further direct testimony to the existence of a Second Book. The additional evidence which is sometimes quoted, that of the Arabic version of the index ascribed to Ptolemaeus ‘the Philosopher’ (v. Berlin Aristotle 1470 b), may be set aside without discussion, as having little or nothing to do with our present Poetics (Rose, Aristotelis Fragmenta ed. Teubn. p. 20; Littig, Andronikos von Rhodos 1 p. 38).

Our present Poetics, if we may take the work at its face value, as a fairly complete and consecutive whole so far as it goes, may be regarded as Bk. I of the original treatise. There are certainly indications of there being more to follow; and its concluding paragraph also is in form exactly like the summaries which Aristotle so constantly introduces in other writings, to mark a transition from one section of his general subject to another. That there was even in the latest Aristotelian schools some faint tradition of another
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Book is shown by the reference in Eustratius on the Ethics (p. 320 Heylbut) to Poet. 4, 1448 b 30, who speaks of the passage as being ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ποιητικῆς [i.e. ἐν τῷ ἂ περὶ ποιητικῆς]. As for Bk. II, one thing is quite clear, that it was wanting in the common archetype of Σ, the MS. before the eighth century Syriac translator, and Αε, our oldest Greek MS. We cannot fix the date of its disappearance; it is practically certain, however, that the loss must have occurred during the papyrus period of the text, when Bk. II was still on a separate roll, so as to be easily detached from Bk. I, which was on another roll. The view of Bernays (Zwei Abhandlungen p. 48) is that it survived into the fifth century, and that the statement in Proclus [v. Fr. V note] of the Aristotelian Catharsis theory was based on a first-hand knowledge of Aristotle's text. The actual words of Proclus hardly justify such a conclusion:—

τὸ τοῦτο τὸν πολλὴν καὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλεων παρασχέων αἰτιάσεως ἀφορμὴν καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτων ἀγωνιστάι τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα λόγων . . .

It will be observed that Proclus refers not only to Aristotle but also to other apologists for the Drama; it is quite possible, therefore, that it was from one of the latter rather than Aristotle himself that he derived his knowledge of the Aristotelian idea of catharsis. And in the context in place of the Aristotelian term he substitutes as synonyms ἀφοσίωσις and ἀπέραιοι—neither of these words being found either in this or in any other sense in the extant writings of Aristotle.

In Byzantine times Bk. II was so completely forgotten that the inscription of the existing Poetics in Αε is simply Περὶ ποιητικῆς, and not Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἂ, as it would have been if the memory of Bk. II had survived. There is no evidence to show that the later Grammarians knew of Bk. II, or of the theory of Comedy which must have formed part of it. But there is evidence showing it to have been unknown to them. The so-called Tractatus Coislinianus (Kaibel, C.G.F. 1 p. 50–3) preserves a definition of Comedy, which has no doubt a certain Aristotelian look; any one can see, however, by simple inspection that it is nothing more than
an adaptation, or rather, as Bernays calls it, a travesty, of the well-known definition of Tragedy in the existing Poetics (6, 1449 b 24):—

**TRACT. COISL.**

κωμῳδία ἐστὶ μύρησις πράξεως γελοίου καὶ ἀμοίρου μεγέθους τελείου χωρίς ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων ἐν τοῖς εἰδεσι, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι’ ἀπαγγελίας, δι’ ἡδονῆς καὶ γέλωτος περαίνοντα τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

**ARISTOTLE.**

ἐστίν οὖν τραγῳδία μύρησις πράξεως στοιχείαις καὶ τελεῖας μέγεθος ἔχουσης, ἡδονὴν λόγῳ χωρίς ἐκάστου [50 Λε] τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι’ ἀπαγγελίας, δι’ ἑλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνοντα τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

It is evident that neither the compiler of the Tractatus nor the older writer from whom he may have been borrowing had the genuine Aristotelian definition of Comedy before him, and that the gap in knowledge had to be filled up by means of the above sorry fabrication. The same marks of origin are observable in what the Tractatus says of the ‘matter’ of Comedy:—

κωμῳδίας ἦλη, μῦθος ἥθος διάνοια λέξις μέλος ὠψις (comp. Poet. 6, 1450a 9);

and of the parts into which Comedy is divided:—


The date of this rechauffé cannot be determined; but an approximation to that of its ‘source’ may perhaps be hazarded, as the same enumeration of the ‘parts’ of Comedy appears in Tzetzes (Kaibel, C G F. 1 p. 21; comp. p. 28), who quotes it as that of a certain Euclides—a grammarian of doubtful date but apparently of the classical period. It would seem, therefore, that even at the time of this Euclides Bk. II of the Poetics was lost or inaccessible. It is difficult to believe that, in the course of a comparatively short treatise, Aristotle repeated himself in the purely mechanical fashion of these later compilations on Comedy.
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Although Bk. II is now lost, there are indications in Aristotle himself which may give us some idea of the ground it must have covered. It may be taken to have comprised (1) the discussion on Comedy promised in Poet. 6, 1449 b 21, and (2) the Catharsis theory to which reference is made in Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32 (v. Fr. V). What we are told in more than one passage in the Rhetoric (v. Fr. III) is enough to show that τὰ γελοῖα, the appointed subject of Comedy, must have been considered and examined with the same analytical care as in the treatment of τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ ἐλεεινὰ in the surviving theory of Tragedy. And if his theory of Comedy was on much the same lines as that of Tragedy, Aristotle must have had something to say on the μῦθοι of Comedy, and also on the ἔθος and λεξίς of the comic personages. The strange expression in Fr. IV, τὸ δὲ πάντων κυντότατον, may perhaps have been in its original setting an illustration of the possibilities in the way of diction in Comedy. As for the Catharsis theory, the only place we can imagine for it would be, as Vahlen (Aristotelische Aufsätze 3 p. 10) has seen, at the end of Bk. II. In such a position it would come in naturally enough, as a final word on the whole subject of the Drama, justifying the existence of both Tragedy and Comedy in reply to the polemic of Plato in the Republic. The subject itself can hardly have been a brief one. The subject was too large and too controversial to be disposed of in some one or two short chapters.

III

History of the Poetics.

The history of the book in the classical period is obscure. Much of its teaching and terminology survives in the later literature of compilation, but the book itself seems to have been after a time either ignored or but little studied. There are no traces of an ancient commentary on it, and comparatively few citations, acknowledged or unacknowledged, in ancient writers. Several of the citations, too, are manifestly
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second-hand. This may be said also even of the reminiscences of Aristotelian ideas in Polybius, and in the Ars Poetica of Horace; for there is reason to think that Polybius was only following Eratosthenes, and Horace his Greek authority, Neoptolemus of Parium. The more important of the ‘Testimonia’ are noted in their place in the Commentary. Many other more latent references are to be found in the Grammarians, as may be seen from the texts collected in the following monographs:—

Trendelenburg: Grammaticorum graecorum de arte tragica judiciorum reliquiae (Bonn 1867).
Westphal: Prolegomena zu Aeschylus Tragödien (Leipz. 1869).
Kaibel: Die Prolegomena ΠΕΡΙ ΚΩΜΩΙΔΙΑΣ (Berl. 1898).
Adam: Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos (Wiesb. 1889).
Carroll: Aristotle’s Poetics, c. xxv, in the light of the Homeric Scholia (Baltimore 1895).

Apart from the fact of our oldest Greek MS. (Aε) having been written somewhere about the year 1000, there is little or no indication of any interest in the book among the Greeks of the Middle Ages. It is clear, however, that it found readers in the East, as it was translated into Syriac in the eighth century, and from the Syriac into Arabic in the eleventh. The Commentary of Averroes, which was based on this Arabic version, was rendered before long into Hebrew, and also, under the title of Aristotelis Poetria (Jourdain, Recherches Critiques ² p. 141), by Hermannus Alemannus into Latin. Roger Bacon (Op. Mai. 1 p. 101 Bridges) knew the work of Hermannus, but not the Greek Poetics or any Latin version made directly from the Greek. The Poetics were not among the many Aristotelian and other philosophic Greek books which found translators in the thirteenth century, when the Latin occupation opened up the Byzantine world to the Westerns. The Rhetoric was translated at this time, but its fellow treatise was left out in the cold.

The modern history of the book begins in the second half of the fifteenth century. The Greek text itself now became known among the learned in Italy; and at the end of the century (1498) the first translation from it, that by
G. Valla, was given to the world. It is difficult to see why
the Poetics were not included in the great Aldine Aristotle of
1495–8. The many Renaissance MSS. which we still have
are enough to show that the book must have been accessible
and in the hands of not a few of the earlier humanists.
Valla certainly had a MS. to work on. Politian is known to
have been a former possessor of one of the Laurentian MSS.
(LX. 14); and his acquaintance with the book is proved by
his reference to a well-known passage (Poet. 1, 1447b 21) in his
Panepistemon (1483): Tum illa obscuriora poematum genera,
thyphallicum, manerus [i.e. maneros] borinus, lytierces [from
Athenaeus]. Et item qualis centaurus ille Chaeremonis: quae
communi vocabulo poemata dicuntur.

The editio princeps of the Greek text appeared at length in
1508 in what is usually reckoned as Vol. I of the Aldine
Rhetores Graeci. It was no little misfortune to learning
that, instead of following one of the better apographs, the
editor, Demetrius Ducas, sent the text forth in a form which
is an almost ideal instance of what a first edition should not
be. Who was responsible for the systematic corruptions in
the Aldine we cannot now say; one may suspect, however,
that the chief offender was no other than Ducas himself—
more especially as he claims credit in his preface for the pains
he had taken in the correction of the texts in the new
volume: ταύτην τὴν βίβλων, he says, πολλα πονήσαντες καὶ
μοχθόσαντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις ὡς ἐνετίχομεν τοῖς φιλολόγωις
dωρθώσαμεν. The general characteristics of this Aldine text
will be examined further on. Here it may be enough to note
that the prestige of an Aldine caused it to hold its ground
for more than three centuries as a sort of textus receptus;
it was, in fact, with some few minor improvements, accepted
by editor after editor, and scholar after scholar. In 1555 an
effort was made to dislodge it from this position by Gu. Morel,
whose recension was based on the MS. now known as
Parisinus 2040, a fairly faithful apograph of Aε. Morel’s
edition, however, notwithstanding his great name among his
contemporaries, left little or no mark on the general criticism of
the book; its readings are all but ignored in the Variæ
lectiones in Sylburg’s edition (1584). Several of the sixteenth
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century editors (Paccius, Madius, Robortellus, Victorius) had access to MSS.; but they did little more than turn to them from time to time for a new reading in some particular passage; it does not seem to have occurred to them to raise the larger question of the value and credentials of the Aldine text. Even Victorius, who had had Ae in his hands before it left Florence, and was fully aware of its great antiquity, failed to see its superiority as a basis for the text to the Aldine vulgate. Writing in 1560 he says: Videram ipse olim ac diligenter tractaram volumen quoddam antiquissimum in quo ... hic etiam liber esset, nihil ac illic ille multis locis quam pervulgatus quilibet typisque excusus erat. Quare desperavi aliquid boni inde posse expectari. And as late as 1831 Bekker, with a fairly complete collation of Ae before him, retained nevertheless not a few of the Aldine emble mata. This illusory idea of the value of the Aldine lasted on until 1839, when Ritter at last raised his voice against it, and set it aside as based on a MS. 'Non solum multis vitis librariorum culpa depravatum, sed etiam ab Aldo alisque eruditis Italiae viris modo correctum modo interpolatum et corruptum.' It remained for Spengel (1865–6) and Vahlen (1867) to carry Ritter's theory a step further by recognizing the unique authority of Ae as the one record of the Greek textual tradition, and the ultimate parent of all our Renaissance texts. There is no doubt a tendency just at present to question this conclusion owing to the effect on opinion of the recently published Arabic Version, which is found to confirm some of the better readings in the Renaissance MSS.; the fact is supposed to imply the survival into Renaissance times of some memory of a text independent of that in Ae. The point will have to be considered at length in a later section of this Introduction.

IV

The existing data for the constitution of the Text.

If we may disregard for the present the testimony of the Renaissance MSS., as being all of them apographs of the MS. known as Ae, our authorities for the textual tradition
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of the Poetics are reduced to two, (1) A⁰, and (2) in a less definite way, the traces and indications of another Greek text recoverable from the Arabic Version and the surviving fragment of the lost Syriac Version.

A⁰.

A⁰, i.e. Parisinus 1741, is part of a volume which contains not only the Poetics but also the Rhetoric and several post-Aristotelian works on Rhetoric. In the sixteenth century it was examined by Victorius, while it was still in Florence. Since then it has been repeatedly collated; first by an unnamed friend of Burgess (perhaps Coray) for the critical Appendix to Tyrwhitt's edition (1794); then by Bekker for the Berlin Aristotle (1831); and lastly by Vahlen and others. A description of it, with a full account of its history, will be found in M. H. Omont's Introduction to the facsimile edition of the text published in 1891 by M. F. Allègre. The date of this fine specimen of Byzantine calligraphy is saec. x–xi.

It is hardly possible to overrate the critical value of the texts in the volume. For the non-Aristotelian writings preserved in it it is our first, if not our only, textual authority. In the case of Demetrius Περὶ ἔρμηνειας it is acknowledged to be the archetype of the later MSS., which 'are all derived from P. 1741, the better readings they present pointing rather to individual emendation than to difference of descent' (Rhys Roberts, after Usener). Usener recognizes it as our one great authority for the text of the various treatises of Dionysius included in the volume, and puts aside the later MSS. as being all of them 'apographa exempli Parisini'. Though it cannot be shown to be of such unique importance for Aristotle's Rhetoric, it is confessedly our best source for the text, and a more faithful representative of the common archetype than any of the later MSS. or the version of William of Morbeka (v. Roemer, Praef. p. xxv).

In the Poetics A⁰ must always claim the premier place, even if the Arabic Version now and then supplies a better reading or corrects some of its more patent scribal errors. Its general
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credibility as a fairly faithful record of a much older text is sufficiently obvious. (1) It retains errors which go back to the uncial stage of the text; e.g. Διάμενα for 'Αλειμενα in 1456 a 28, Λειαο for Λειάς in 1462 b 3, Μαθημάτων for Παθημάτων in 1449 b 28. (2) It retains in places traces of an antique spelling1; e.g. πάμικρον and παμέγεθες in 1450 b 37-9, ενεα in 1461 a 2, πλέω in 1461 a 26. (3) Although the text of the ancient archetype was constantly misunderstood by the scribe responsible for accents and breathings, there are but few signs of an attempt to alter the actual letter of the original scriptura continua in order to accommodate it to his misconceptions of its meaning.

The following synopsis of errors in Aε may incidentally serve to indicate the kinds of assumption on which the more convincing corrections of the text are based. An asterisk is added when the amended reading is known to be confirmed by the Arabic Version or the Syriac fragment.

1. Confusions through similarity of letters:—
Διδόμενα = 'Αλειμενα* 1456 a 28; Δειλίαν = 'Αει, λίαν 1461 b 28; iΔίους = λίας 1462 b 3; Μαθημάτων = Παθημάτων* 1449 b 28; εΠεί = εΤι 1455 b 19; Πρωιάδες = Τρωιάδες 1459 b 7; οΗσ = οψις 1456 a 2 and 1458 a 5.

2. Confusions through similarity of pronunciation; a few typical instances must suffice:—
e and ai: ταί = τε 1454 b 4, 1458 a 28; σκεπταίαν 1461 b 25.—κε = και 1457 b 14; φαγάδενα 1458 b 23.
η and ei: όν = ενη = ηνη 1448 b 18; τιλέμαχον 1461 b 5.—σαλμίνη 1459 a 25; μηγνύη 1460 a 2.
η and ei: ἄν = ειη = ηηη 1455 a 27; ειδεί = ηδεί 1460 b 31; — δη = δει 1459 b 8, 1460 a 23; η or Ἰ = ει 1460 b 16 (etc.).
η and oi: τῆσ = τοίς 1455 a 1; εἰπη = ειποί 1458 b 32; μηγνύη = μγνύοι 1460 a 2.
l and ei: πειθανόν (passim); εἰδεόν 1456 b 3, 1458 b 18.—οψις = οψεις 1450 a 13; ιαμβίον (passim).
o and o: τό = το (passim); τούτο = τούτω 1451 b 4; γλοττών 1458 a 26. —οψ = ου = ου* 1451 a 36; χροοί = χροον 1452 b 19; ἐπιτιμᾶ τοῖ = ἐπετιμᾶτοι 1455 a 26.

1 Comp. Meisterhans, Gr.3 p. 112, and Crönert, Memoria graeca Herculanensis p. 57.
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3. Omission of ἵστα mutum, a frequent phenomenon not only in τραγῳδία, κωμῳδία, ὀδεῖν, etc., but also in the inflexions of nouns and verbs:—

κοινή = κοινῆ 1447 b 15; ἀρετή = ἀρετῆ 1448 a 3; ἡ πλεῖστη = ἡ πλεῖστη 1454 b 20; ἦττηθη = ἦττηθη 1456 a 23.

4. Omission of final N:—

οῦ = οὖν 1447 b 28, 1461 a 1; ἐπισεόδιον = ἐπισεόδιον 1455 b 1; νιπτρω = Νιπτρων 1460 a 26; οἰνοχοεῖς = οἰνοχοεῖν 1461 a 30; αὐτό = αὔ τῶν 1453 a 1; ὀρώντα = ὀρώντ᾽ ἂν 1455 a 27.

5. Confusions through general resemblance:—

σατυριακὸν = σατυρικὸν 1446 a 20; κίνησις = μίμησις 1459 b 37; ἀνάλογον = ἄλογον 1460 a 13; ἀναγνωρίσει = ἀναγνώσει 1462 a 17.

6. Errors through assimilation of terminations:—

πλειώνων συνδέσμων = πλειώνων συνδέσμῳ 1457 a 29; ἐν τῷ ἀνώματος σημαίνοντος = ἐν τῷ ἀνώματι σημαίνοντος* 1457 a 33; ἄλλο δὲ τούτου ὄντος = ἄλλο δὲ τούτου ὄντος 1460 a 23; τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν = τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν 1460 b 9.

7. Errors in accents and breathings, these being often added on mechanically and without regard to rule or sense:—

μέγαθουν 1451 a 15; περιπέτειαι 1452 a 33; ἀμφιβολία (= ἀμφιβολία) 1461 a 25; θίασα 1458 b 24.—Μεροπῆ 1454 a 5; Ἀγαθῶν 1454 b 14; κυκλωπίας, ἡκ. κύκλῳ πᾶς (=Κύκλωσας) 1448 a 15; ἐνα λείψει (= ἐναλείψει) 1450 b 1; πάν μικρῶν (= πάνμικρων) 1450 b 37; ὥσ τοῦ (= ὦτο ὦ) 1451 b 23; ἀλλ᾽ ὡς γε (= ἄλλωσ τε) 1456 a 4; ἀφήρη μὲν ὄντι (= ἀφαρη-μένον τι 1458 a 3; οὐδενά ἤθη (= οὐδὲν᾿ ἤθη) 1460 a 11; τότε νομίζον (= τότε ἐνόμιζον) 1461 a 3.

8. Haplographia:—

προσημαίνει 1457 a 17; συμβάλλεται 1458 b 1; κόμι 1458 a 15; πανύχιοι 1461 a 17.

9. Omission of letters or syllables:—

<ἐκ>πληξεῖσωσ 1455 a 17; <ἡ>μαρτηθαι 1460 b 28; τί (= ἄτι) 1461 b 1;<α>φίσινον 1462 b 2; χ(ἰ)φιδίσσο* 1448 a 34; ὀτε (= οὖ τε) 1452 b 12; Δυ<γ>κείσ* 1455 b 29; <ἄ>θρον 1456 b 21; καυνίστα<ε> 1461 b 30; ἣδονη (= ἤδειον ἦ) 1462 b 1.

10. Omission of words:—

τοιαίτε* 1447 a 25; ἀφώμισσο* 1447 b 9; λύσις* 1455 b 31; ἦ 1460 b 11, 1461 a 9; οὖ οὐ ποιω* 1450 a 30, 1455 b 17; οὐδέν* 1456 a 28; ὀ 1448 a 12, 1451 a 6; τό 1456 b 26; τοῦ 1461 a 19; οὐ 1462 a 3; καὶ ἀ 1448 a 25; καὶ Σ* 1458 a 9; ἦ μι 1460 b 27.
11. Transposition, more especially of little words liable to omission:—

τὴν κατὰ = κατὰ τὴν 1447 b 15; τὸ κατὰ = κατὰ τὸ 1457 a 19; ἡ μία = μία ἡ 1462 b 3; καὶ ταύτης = ταύτης καὶ 1451 a 32; ἀν οἰ = οἰ ἀν 1453 a 37.

12. Dittography:—

tοῦτονος = τούς 1455 a 34; ἐπειτα τὰ = ἐπεί τὰ 1460 a 14; ἐτι δὲ ἐτι δὲ 1459 b 7; θεὶ θεὶ 1462 b 2.

13. Repetition of words from the context:—

ὅτι 1448 b 35; ἀν 1458 a 24, 1460 b 7; δὲ 1456 a 12, 1462 a 1; ὅσοι 1459 a 13; ἡμαρτήσατε 1460 b 28; οὔτε 1460 b 36; ἐστὶ 1462 a 7.

14. Marginalia in the body of the text. The following would seem to be instances of the intrusion of such adscripts:—

ἐποποιά 1447 a 28; πέντε 1450 b 16; παράδειγμα σκληρότητος 1454 b 14; ἐκ τοῦ καθόλου 1455 b 7.

15. Double readings in the text:—

ηνα 1449 a 8 κρίνεται ἡ ναί: it may be supposed to represent κρίνεται, i. e. κρίνεται and κρίναι (= κρίναι).

λλικα 1449 a 11 φαυλλίκα = φαυλα, i. e. φαυλα (which is implied in the Arabic Version) and φαλλικα.

1452 a 3 καὶ μᾶλιστα καὶ μᾶλλον, i. e. μᾶλιστα and μᾶλλον.

1457 b 14 ἀρέσασ = ἀρύσας, i. e. ἀρύσας and ἀρύσας.

1461 a 33 σημαίνε = σημαίνοι, i. e. σημαίνοι and σημαίνει.

16. Errors due to an attempt to emend:—

1450 b 39 παμμέγεθες = παν μέγαθος Ας—the compound having been misread as two words.

1451 a 28 οίαν λέγομεν οίαν λέγομεν Ας—apparently through οΙΑΝ having been misread as οὶ ὄν.


1455 a 16 ποίησαι παραλογισμὸς* ποίησαι παραλογισμὸν Ας.

1455 a 26 ἐπετιμᾶτο ἐπιτιμᾶ τοῦ Ας.

1457 a 17 τὸ δὲ βαδίζει] τὸ δὲ βαδίζειν Ας.

1457 a 22 βαδίζε] βαδίζειν Ας—to make it harmonize with the preceding βαδίζειν.

1457 b 27 τὸ βαδίζει] τὸ βαδίζειν Ας.

1461 b 2 εἰρήκωτοι] εἰρήκοτες Ας—to accommodate it to the preceding καταψηφισάμενοι.
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This last kind of error is assuredly a very serious one, because it implies a corrector who, instead of emending the text, left it worse than he found it. But corruptions like the above are not numerous; the general impression the MS. must produce is that it is a faithful record of a genuine textual tradition. A large proportion even of its mistakes have the stamp of antiquity upon them, since they often carry one back to the papyrus period of the text, before the accents and breathings were superimposed on the uncial *scriptura continua*. One of its more obvious faults is its tendency—which it shares with its fellow MS. of the Rhetoric—to omit words or little groups of words. The Arabic Version, which occasionally supplies the missing word or words, shows that the fault must have been in certain passages of comparatively late origin. There are other passages, however, in which the text underlying the Version seems to have been equally defective; in which case the common omissions point to omissions in the common archetype.

*The Arabic Version.*

Though the Arabic Version (A. V.) seems to have been long known to the French Orientalists, it was reserved for one of our own countrymen, Dr. D. S. Margoliouth, to face the manifold difficulties of the Arabic text, and give it to the world in a printed form in his 'Analecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam' in 1887. All students of the Poetics owe him a debt of gratitude for making the chief results of the Version accessible to them from the first by translating a series of select extracts into Latin, and by indicating in his notes the use that may be made of the Arabic renderings for the confirmation or criticism of the Greek text.

In the absence of a complete translation our estimate of the A. V. must be based on Dr. Margoliouth’s notes and extracts; we may, however, supplement them to some extent from an article in Philologus LV. by O. Immisch, who had before him a German translation (by Socin) of a longer and more consecutive specimen (1449 a 9-31) of the Arabic Version. The interpretation of the text (which survives in
a single MS.) is, I understand, beset with difficulties. Even in the thirteenth century it was felt to be no easy matter by Hermannus Alemannus, an experienced translator from the Arabic, who gave the following as his excuse for evading the work of translation: *Postquam cum non modico labore consumnaueram translationem rhetoricae Aristotelis ex Arabico in Latinum, volens manum mittere ad eius poëtriam tantam inveni difficultatem propter disconvenientiam modi metrificandi in Graeco cum modo metrificandi in Arabico et propter vocabulorum obscuritatem et plures alias causas, quod non sum confusis me posse sane et integre illius operis translationem studiis tradere Latinorum* (Aristot. Rhet. lat. Ven. 1481 f. 1).

The use of the A.V. for us is that we are often able to look beyond it, so as to recover the readings of a Greek MS. which was at least three centuries anterior to A.D. But it must always be remembered that it was not made directly from the Greek, but from a now lost Syriac translation of the Greek; it is, therefore, the version of a version, and we have thus to discern the original text as best we can, through the distorting medium of two Oriental translations. In such a work, too, one must not always expect the close literalness we find in medieval Latin translations of Greek writings; nor need we assume a very exact knowledge of Greek on the part of the Syriac interpreter. And in the instance of the Poetics some allowance has to be made for the misconceptions of an Oriental without an idea of the nature of the subject-matter of the treatise. The possibilities of Oriental ignorance may be seen writ large in the Paraphrase of Averroes, which was based on the A.V. Averroes is fairly at home in the more philosophical and grammatical parts of the book; but its meaning, as a theory of Greek Tragedy, was from first to last a hopeless enigma to the great Aristotelian of Cordova.

A word or two must be said here on one of the more marked characteristics of the A.V., its tendency to amplify the text by alternative renderings. Thus in 1449 a 16 ἅπαξ τῶν is represented by ‘the hypocrites and dissemblers’ (‘Heuchler und Versteller’, Socin), and χοροῦ in the following line by ‘chori et cordacis’ (Margoliouth), or ‘the dance and the
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roundel’ (Socin). In 1449ᵃ 19 τὸ μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μῦθων becomes ‘primus creavit ex parvis fabulis magnitudinem sermonis et vociferationem et tumultum in sermone’, i. e. with three alternative renderings for μέγεθος. Again in 1453ᵇ 36 ἣ γὰρ πράξας ἀνάγκη ἢ μῆ καὶ εἰσότας ἢ μῆ εἰσότας is expanded into ‘necessa est enim aut faciat aut non faciat, cum faciat autem ut faciat sciens aut inscius sed scire destinans, praetera aut scientibus aut insciis’; this plethora of words being primarily due to the translator’s inability to make up his mind about the accusatives εἰσότας ἢ μῆ εἰσότας—whether they were to be taken as appositional to the subject, or as the object, of πράξας. It is clear that amplifications like these may be put down to the Syrian, the original translator—more especially as such alternative renderings are said to be not uncommon in Syriac translations from the Greek (v. Ryssel, Ueber den textkritischen Wert der syrischen Uebersetzungen griechischer Klassiker, II. p. 49).

In any use we may make of the A. V., two facts must always be borne in mind: (1) that the existing text, as it stands in the one MS. which preserves it, is disfigured by corruptions; and (2) that the Arabic translator was not incapable of misunderstanding the Syriac original. This Syriac original is no longer extant, but we need not suppose it to have been free from faults of its own; it is quite possible that its text was at times faulty, as also that the Syrian himself may have either misread or misinterpreted the Greek text before him. This last suspicion seems to be confirmed by the one fragment that survives of the Syriac Version, an excerpt from Poet. 6, 1449ᵇ 24–1450ᵃ 9. I give it as rendered into Latin by Dr. Margoliouth (A.O. p. 54), with the Greek of Aᵉ en regard for purposes of comparison.

Tragoedia est imitatio actionis eximiae perfectae cui est magnitudo sermonem iucundo absque una quaque specierum quae in partibus agunt; neque per pollizationem sed per misericordiam et metum temperans pas-

**FOETICS**

„Εστιν οὖν πραγματικὴ μῦθος πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἔχοντας, ἣνυσμένος λόγῳ χωρὶς έκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοίς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι’ ἀπαγ. 5 γελίας, δι’ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαι-

C
siones et faciens purgationem eorum qui patiuntur. Facitque hoc quidem sermo incundus cui est magnitudo [\textit{l. rhythmus}] et harmonia et melos; illud vero quod sine speciebus quod propter metra perficiuntur partes nonnullae; rursus alias quod per melos dum recitant, efficiunt imitationem actionum. Necessario erit pars tragoeidiae decor personae; tum inter hae opus musicum et elocutio; his enim faciunt imitationem. Dico autem elocutionem quidem ipsam compositionem metrorum: opus musicum vim apertam quam tota possidet. Quoniam imitatio actionem agitur vero ab hominibus agentibus iis quos necessitas cogat ut quales homines sint consuetudinibus suis et ingeniiis; per enim haec etiam narrationem esse dicimus quales; [et] natura aptae quae existant duae causae ipsarum narrationum, ingenium et consuetudo sunt; secundum enim haec eae quoque inveniuntur scopum attingentes omnes per haec et a scopo aberrantes. Est autem fabula narrationis imitatio. Dico autem fabulam compositionem actionum; consuetudines vero, quals quisque eorum qui narrant sit et dicatur; qui se tales esse ostendunt ingenii suis, et talem esse opinionem suam appareat. Necesse est ergo ut sint unicumque tragoeidiae partes sex, quas supra diximus; secundum vim ipsam Tragoediae.
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It will be seen that in l. 7 the difficult word τοιούτως is ignored. In l. 5 the translator must have misconstrued the passage, taking δρόντων with the preceding εἰδῶν. He represents πράττοντες in l. 13 by ‘dum recitant’; πράττεις in l. 26 by ‘narrationes’; and τούς πράττοντας in l. 35 by ‘qui narrant’. He expands εἰναι φαμεν in l. 35 into ‘sit et dicatur’; in l. 14 he adds ‘actionum’, and in l. 40 ‘quas supra diximus’. And in l. 20, and again in II. 36–8, his translation is obviously very wide of the mark. If the above, therefore, is a fair specimen of it, the Syriac Version cannot have been an accurate piece of work. This criticism, however, only applies to the translation as a translation. Our problem is to look beyond all this, so as to recover the Greek text—we may for short call it Σ—which the Syriac renderings would seem to presuppose. The following Σ readings recovered in this way deserve especial attention:

l. 4. χωρὶς ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν Σ, as also Λο.

l. 5. οὐ δὲ ἐπαγγελίας, δὲ εἴλεον] οὐ δὲ ἐπαγγελίας ἄλλα δὲ εἴλεον Σ—anticipating thus the twofold corruption in Pa (Parisinus 2038) and the Aldine.

l. 7. παθημάτων Σ—confirming the corrector’s reading in Pa against Λο’s μαθημάτων.

l. 11. χωρὶς τοῖς εἰδεσι] χωρὶς τῶν εἰδῶν Σ—anticipating the corruption in Pa Aldine.

l. 29. καὶ κατὰ ταύτας] κατὰ γὰρ ταύτα καὶ αὕτα Σ.

If the language of the fragment will bear the pressure thus put on it as a means of recovering the Σ readings, it is clear that the Σ text must have been at times faulty enough and vitiated by corruptions of a kind from which Λο is comparatively speaking exempt. The Σ readings, therefore, so far as they can be ascertained, must be considered on their individual merits, without any general assumption of their antecedent superiority to those of Λο. The greater antiquity of Σ is no decisive mark of superiority. In Plato an editor may have to follow an eleventh century MS. (T) in preference to the Clarkianus. For Strabo the eighth century Grotta Ferrata palimpsest is ‘nullius pretii’ according to Cobet (Misc. Crit. p. 87) by comparison with the Paris MS. of the eleventh century.
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The fallibility, however, of the Σ text may be seen on a larger scale in some of the readings recovered from the A.V. The following instances will show that Σ must have had errors of its own, and in many passages errors of a very arbitrary description, which would sadly mislead us, or defy emendation, if we had not Aο to set things right.

1447 a 27 ὄρχηστων] ὄρχηστρῶν Σ.
1448 b 13 παραθίας] τραγοθίας Σ.
— a 21 ἀπαγγέλλουτα] ἐπαγγέλλουτα Σ. Similarly in 1449b 26 the Syriac (v. supra) presupposes ἐπαγγελίας, not ἀπαγγελίας.
— b 19 χροιν] χόριον Σ.
— b 27 δοσπερ ἔτεροι ὄμοιοι καὶ ἐγκώμια] The A.V., 'postea panegyricum et laudem aliorum' implies ὑστερον ἔτερον ὄμοιοι καὶ ἐγκώμια as the reading of Σ.
1449 a 11 φαλλικά] φαύλα Σ. The Aο reading φαναλικά is a conflation of φαέλα and φαλλικα.
— b 16 ἐπεσιν] ἀπασιν ἐπεσιν Σ—a conflation of two readings.
1450 b 12 καθόλου τι] καθότι Σ.
— b 34 ἐπεί] ἐπί Σ (and again in 1451 a 31 and 1453 b 11).
1451 b 7 οὖ] ο Σ.
— ἐκατόν] ἐκαστον Σ.
— b 21 ἐν τῷ Ἀγάθωνος Ἀνθέωι] ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῶν ὅς ἂν θῇ Σ.
— b 26 ὀλίγους γνώριμα om. Σ, through the homoeoteleuton.
1452 b 8 ἀμβράς] Ἀμβρέας Σ.
— b 4 ἔτερον] ἔταφον Σ.
— b 34 δει] δεί Σ (also elsewhere).
1453 b 14 οὖν] οῦ Σ.
1455 a 2 ἀπολόγων] ἀπὸ λόγων Σ (with Aο).
— a 33 εὐπλαστοῦ] The rendering in A.V., 'simplices,' implies ἐπλαστοῦ in Σ—an instance of the confusion of a and εὐ common in the minuscule script.
— b 25 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν—δέσιν om. Σ.
— b 34 οἷον—ἡδική om. Σ, through the homoeoteleuton.
1456 b 25 ἔνα δεῖ] ἐν ἀδῆ Σ.
1459 b 23 ἐποιεῖ] ἐπεισι Σ.
1460 a 2 μυγνῶν] μὴ γνοῖ Σ. The reading of the archetype of Σ and Aο was perhaps μηγνῶν; the Σ reading arose through a confusion of οἱ and ν, which is of comparatively late date.
— a 11 οὐδέν' ἄφθη] The A.V. rendering 'non introducens rem non assuetam' seems to imply οὐδὲν ἄφθες—which would anticipate the corruption in Пα Aldine.
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1460 * 13 ἀλογον] ἀνάλογον Σ (with Αe).
1461 * 18 ἄφρησειν] ἄφροισειν Σ—an instance of the confusion of η and ο, which points to the Byzantine period.

It is clear, from the above series of readings recovered from the A. V., that the Σ text was not free from corruptions, and also that some of its errors were of recent date, of the Byzantine rather than the classical period. There are a few instances, too, of glosses intruded into the text. Thus in 1454 a 31 Σκύλλη is represented in the A. V. by 'Scylla maritima', and in 1454 b 27 οὐλῆς by 'pustula quae fuit in pede eius'. And in 1461 a 17 we find Σ adding ἰπποκορυσταί, to make the quotation agree with the passage in Homer.

These indications of the Σ text, as known from the A. V., may be combined with those already observed in the Syriac Fragment, as leading to the general conclusion that, even if Σ were before us in its integrity, its readings would still have to be considered one by one on their merits. Its antiquity, as dating from the eighth century, would be only one element in the critical situation; we should still have to submit its readings to the usual tests; to judge of each by reference to the sense, the context, and the various criteria, internal and external, of philological probability. And we must never for an instant lose sight of the fact that after all Σ is not quite the same thing as an actual Greek MS. A Greek text recovered by art and inference from a version of a version—each of them in an Oriental language—is exposed at times to doubts and suspicions of a kind from which that of Αe is free.

Now that the first surprise of discovery is over, we may view the new readings, which seem to be implied in the A. V., with equanimity. Only a few of them need be accepted as of positive critical value; many of them are obviously either no improvement on the traditional text, or so illusive or misleading as to be almost a libel on the memory of Aristotle. The chief result of the A. V., in our present state of knowledge of it, is that it is seen to confirm a certain number of the emendations already suggested by Renaissance or modern scholars. It gives the sanction of tradition to φυτικόν (for μουσικόν) in 1447 b 16; to ἀπόπλουν or ἀνάπλουν (for
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ἀπλοῦν) in 1454 b 2; to παραλογισμὸς in 1455 a 16; to κρατεῖσθαι in 1456 a 10; to κεκράσθαι in 1458 a 31. It confirms the excision of ἐποτοῦα in 1447 a 28; of ὅτι in 1448 b 35; and of πέντε in 1450 b 16. It confirms some of the additions also that have been made in the Αε text; e.g. that of a negative in 1450 a 30 and 1455 b 17; that of τοιαύται in 1447 a 25; that of ἀνώνυμος in 1447 b 2; that of λύσις in 1455 b 31; that of καὶ Σ in 1458 a 9; and that of καὶ ἐλ ἀδύνατον (or something equivalent) in 1461 b 12. And besides all this it preserves in two instances traces of an orthography which, whether Aristotle’s or not, was certainly antique, Κλυταμῆστρα in 1453 b 23, and Μενέλεως in 1454 a 29.

The better and more convincing of the readings recovered from the A.V. have all one noteworthy characteristic in common: they fall quite naturally into their place in the Αε text, and imply directly or indirectly the existing context; so that the area of disturbance in each instance is of the most limited extent. I am aware that the A.V. is often supposed to reveal in places indications of more extensive textual divergences, and to throw doubt on the soundness of larger portions of our existing Greek text. The only answer is that the evidence, such as it is, of the A.V. may be taken sometimes too seriously. One must never forget that its text is not always certain; that it is the version of a version; that the Arabian may have misunderstood the Syriac, and the Syrian the Greek text; and lastly, that they were both working in the dark, and dealing with matters wholly outside their own literary experience. However we may explain it, the fact itself is indisputable, that in a considerable number of passages, in which the existing Greek text is perfectly sound and satisfactory, the renderings in the A.V. have little or no recognizable relation to it. Many of these renderings we may safely disregard, as representing not a different form of Greek text, but the aberrations of one or other of the two Orientals. In cases of doubt, the antecedent probability must always be on the side of the readings of Αε. The A.V. suggests or confirms a certain number of minor and occasional improvements; but that is for the present at any rate the practical limit of its service. For anything beyond
that its evidence is insufficient—not clear enough to enable us to reconstruct the Σ text, and not certain enough to justify any considerable departure from that in Αο.

V

The Apographa.

The Renaissance MSS. of the Greek text, now usually known as the 'Apographa', require discussion because the whole question of their value and position has been recently reopened. Instead of acquiescing in Spengel and Vahlen's view of the unique importance of Αο as the ultimate source of the texts of the 'Apographa', many seem more than half inclined to think that some at any rate of the better readings in them, more especially those confirmed by the Arabic Version, point to the survival in the fifteenth century of another textual authority, a now lost Greek MS. independent of Αο and free from certain of its errors. The evidence, however, in favour of this remote possibility is as nothing compared with that which tells against it.

Our knowledge of these MSS. is not so complete as one could wish. For Urbinas 47 (Bο) we have a collation in Bekker's Aristotle, and for Riccardianus 46 one by Landi in the Studi Italiani 3 p. 68; I have also collations of my own of two Paris MSS., Parisinus 2038 (Pα) and Parisinus 2040 (Pβ). But for the rest we have still to rely on the Variae lectiones at the end of Tyrwhitt and in Susemihl, and the occasional record of the readings of individual Apographa in Vahlen's notes.

The first and most obvious fact to be noticed in the Apographa is their textual divergence. Whereas in some of them the text is but one remove from that in Αο, in others it is seen to be constantly deviating from that, and moreover in a very marked degree. But there is one thing that must be said of them all, that their deviations from Αο are manifestly due in a large proportion of instances to a desire to amend the older text, or present it in an easier form. Many of the simpler among the amended readings we may put
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down to copyists of the better class, since the scribe of a Renaissance MS. was often a scholar by profession and quite capable of improvising a simple correction of an ordinary clerical error. But this was certainly not the only cause of the appearance of amended readings in the MSS. of this period. As the Renaissance scholar annotated his books just as we do, one may well suppose that some of the textual suggestions thus made on the Poetics have survived and found a place in the text of later transcripts.

The sporadic origin of many of the improved readings scattered up and down the long series of Renaissance MSS. is easily shown. Several of them are not an original part of the text of any known MS.; e.g. παθημάτων in 1449 b 28, in which the π is due to correction in P a and Laurentianus LX. 21; and ἐπεισάματο in 1455 a 26, and Αἰγὲς in 1461 b 21, which are both of them from the margin, not the text, of Riccardianus 16. Others again are found in the text of only one or at most two MSS.; e.g.

1448 b 35 ἀλλὰ καὶ Riccard. 46. 1451 a 17 τῷ ἐνὶ Guelferbytanus and Riccard. 46. 1455 a 16 παραλογισμὸς Riccard. 46.—a 27 ἀντί Guelferbytanus (and marg. P b).—a 34 ἑκστασικοί Riccard. 46.—b 19 ἐτί Riccard. 16. 1457 a 22 βάδιζε Riccard. 16.—a 29 σωνδέωμοι Riccard. 16. 1458 a 9 καὶ Ἐ add. Riccard. 16.—a 31 κεκράσθει Riccard. 46.—b 25 ἀείκης Riccard. 46. 1460 a 30 Δώος Riccard. 16.—b 1 πονησειε Riccard. 46.

The Apographa, as I have said, fall into two main classes, according as they deviate but slightly, or in a more marked degree, from the text in A a. It may be shown of each, with such probability at any rate as this kind of matter allows, that their texts presuppose that in A a, and that the better lections they occasionally supply were originally due to conjecture. In order to simplify the inquiry, one may take B b (Urbinas 47) and P b (Parisinus 2040) as types of the first class, and P a (Parisinus 2038) and the Aldine as types of the second.

(1) B b P b supply a certain number of very simple and necessary corrections of the A a text; e.g.

1447 b 28 οὐν, for οὐ. 1448 b 38 ὡ, for τῶ. 1453 b 22 δρῆ, for δρῶν. 1455 b 1 ἐπεισοδιοῦν, for ἐπεισοδίων. 1456 a 12 λέγω, for λέγω δὲ.
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1459 b 37 μήνηςις, for κίνησις. 1460 a 14 ἐπεί, for ἐπειτα.— b 32 η ει, for η η (sic). 1461 a 19 ἄρτι (τού). 1462 a 8 ὁ ὀπούστιος, for ὁ πούστιος.

These readings, however, do not stand alone; they are only a few out of a large number of alterations, the general quality and character of which may be inferred from the following specimens:—

1448 a 10 πάσας, for ταύτας.— b 35 δραματικῶς, for δραματικός.— b 37 ὑπήρξεν, for ὑπέθεξεν. 1451 a 8 κλεψύδραν, for κλεψύδρας.— a 35 ἐπίδηξων (ὡς). 1455 b 30 δὲ, for μεῖν. 1456 b 17 μὴ (ποείν). 1457 a 3 ἢν μὴ ἁρμόττῃ, for ἢν μὴ ἁρμόττει.— a 19 σημαίνουσα, for σημαίνον. 1458 b 4 λεγόμενον, for γιγνόμενον. 1460 b 17 αὕτη, for αὕτης. 1461 a 34 ὄδικῶς or ὄδικωσ, for Αεί's ωδινως (i.e. ὁδι ὢς).— b 21 αἰγεύσῃ, for Αεί's αἰγεύσῃ (i.e. Αἰγεῖ ἡ τῇ).

If one compares the two sets of readings, one cannot but see that they are all on the same lines, and inspired apparently by the same motive; the only visible difference between them is that the first group represents the successes, and the second the failures of a Renaissance corrector. But after all the deviations in Bc Pb from the Ae text are few and far between, and of no great moment. The two MSS. are as a whole faithful reproductions of the Ae text, following it even in its accidental faults and errors with an exactness which admits of but one explanation, namely that they are really and truly Apographa, copies of the text of the older MS. we still have, made either from the MS. itself or from some direct transcript of it.

(2) The type of text represented by Pa Aldine reveals the same tendencies in a more pronounced form, as the corrector here has allowed himself to go to far greater lengths. It is to be observed that in several places the Pa text was, as originally written, in agreement with Ae, and that it was then altered (apparently by the same hand) to bring it into closer conformity with that now represented by the Aldine. As an explanation of this one may perhaps suppose that the Aldine additions appeared at first as mar-

1 This portentous corruption originated in a mere misreading of the text of Ae, the tenth century η being read as a κ (comp. Bast, Comm. Pal. p. 716).
ginalia, and were thus neglected by the scribe of Pa, who had to work them in afterwards, when he came to revise his transcript. This point of difference, however, need not be taken into account, since the general agreement between the two texts is so marked that they may very well serve as representatives of one and the same recension.

One thing is quite clear, that the immediate basis of the Pa Aldine was an Apograph with a distinct textual affinity to Be Pb. The following omissions will show this:

1456 a 2 ὄησιν: a lacuna here in Be Pb and in Pa: om. Ald.
1457 a 33 πλήν—ἀσήμου: om. Pa Ald. with Be Pb.

Several of the actual readings also in Pa Aldine point to the same conclusion:

1451 a 6 τοῦ Αε: τοῦ δὲ Pa Ald. with Be Pb.
1454 b 37 ἡτοι τῆι Αε: τρίτη ἦ Pa Ald. with Pb.
1456 a 31 ἡ εὶ Αο: ἠ Pa Ald. with Pb.
1458 a 10 ἐκ τούτου Αο: ἐκ τούτου ἄφωνον Be: ἐκ τού τῶν ἄφωνων Pa Ald.
1460 a 11 οὐδὲν ἀνθη] οὐδένα ήθη Αο: οὐδὲν ἄνθη Be Pb: οὐδὲν ἄθης Pa Ald.
1461 a 33 σημαίνοιν Αο: σημαίνειε Ald. with Be Pb: σημάνεε Πα.
—— 34 ὁδεγὼν Αο: ὁδεγός (or ὁδικός) Be Pb: ὁδί πῶς Pa Ald.

The above instances of agreement may suffice as a proof of the dependence of the Pa Aldine text on that represented by Be Pb; I pass on, therefore, to consider the differences between the two texts. The note of the Pa Aldine text is its utter disregard of the textual tradition. Every page of it betrays the hand of a reviser; we can almost see him at work, adding or omitting words, altering forms, and often rewriting clauses or sentences, so as to smooth away every sign of difficulty in the older text. All this was said long ago by Ritter, but for reasons already mentioned one cannot even now take the point for granted. The modern apparatus criticus, which gives only the better lections of the Apographa, is often a snare to the unwary reader, who sees their successes, and does not see their failures. It may be worth while, therefore, to look into the
P\textsuperscript{a} Aldine text more closely, in order to realize what sort of thing it is, and how it has come to be what it is.

(1) P\textsuperscript{a} Ald. add words freely; e. g.

1447\textsuperscript{a} 25 οὐσαι (τοιαίτα).
— \textsuperscript{b} 22 οὐκ ἦδη καὶ ποιητὴν.
1448\textsuperscript{a} 25 (καὶ ἄ) καὶ ὄς.
1449\textsuperscript{a} 3 οἱ (δὲ), to disguise the omission (with P\textsuperscript{b}) of the preceding clause παραφανείας—κωμῳδίας.

1449\textsuperscript{a} 29 (περί μὲν οὐν τούτων τοσαῦτα) ἔστω, to fill up a lacuna in P\textsuperscript{b}.
— \textsuperscript{b} 27 (ἄλλα) δὲ εἶλεν.
1450\textsuperscript{a} 30 (οὐ) ποίησε.
1452\textsuperscript{a} 3 καὶ μάλιστα] μάλιστα (τοιαίτα).
1453\textsuperscript{b} 18 μέλλων (δεικνυσί).
1454\textsuperscript{a} 19 προαιρεῖσθαι τινα (φαίλων μὲν εὰν φαίλην).
— \textsuperscript{b} 34 Α’ lacuna after ἐκείνους δὲ, and then (ταῦτα οὖν) αὐτὸς λέγει.
1455\textsuperscript{a} 30 συναπεργαζόμενον (ποιεῖν).
— \textsuperscript{b} 13 ἐπεισόδια (σκοπεῖν).
1459\textsuperscript{b} 9 παθητικὴν (δεὶ ἐίναι).
1460\textsuperscript{b} 21 ὁποίαν οὖν Α\textsuperscript{e} (ταῦτ’ οὖν) ὁποία ἄν ἡ.
1461\textsuperscript{a} 34 (τὸ δὲ) ποσαχῶς.
— \textsuperscript{b} 13 ἄλλα (καὶ πρὸς τὸ) βεβλιον.
1462\textsuperscript{b} 6 (ἀνάγκη) ἡ βραχεως.
— \textsuperscript{b} 7 (εὰν δὲ πλείους) λέγω.
— \textsuperscript{b} 8 συγκειμένη (οὐ μίαν, οὐ ποιεῖ).

Some few of these insertions we may accept, as filling up real defects in the traditional text. But it must be seen that, as they appear in P\textsuperscript{a} Ald., they are only part of a series of similar additions, and may be presumed to have had a similar origin and motive. The fact of the reviser having been able to supply the missing word in some three or four instances is no proof that he must have found it in a then existing MS.

(2) Here and there the words thus added dispossess a portion of the original text. Thus in 1448\textsuperscript{a} 5, where ἀνάγκη μυμεύσθαι is added, the preceding ἡ καὶ τοιούτους is omitted. The same thing has happened in 1455\textsuperscript{b} 31, where the added word λύσις has usurped the place of καὶ πάλιν ἡ αὐτῶν. The phenomenon is easily explained if we may suppose a scribe, with a revised text before him, to have taken some of the reviser’s marginal or interlinear additions not as addenda but as corrections of the text.
(3) Pa Ald. are apt to ignore words in cases of difficulty. Thus they omit τουούτους οίντας in 1454 b 13, ὡς ηρητοι (i.e. ὡς ἦ τοι) in 1461 a 12, and δειλαν (i.e. αἴει, λαν) in 1461 b 28. In this way the reviser has also removed most of the ditto-graphics which disfigure the Ae text.

(4) The Pa Ald. text embodies a long array of textual deprivations. The following specimens may perhaps give some idea of their general character and motive:—

1449 a 28 ἐπεισδοίων πλήθη καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡς ἐκάστα] ἐπεισδοίων πλήθει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκάστα Pa Ald.
1449 b 29 χωρίς τοῖς εἴδεσι] χωρίς τῶν εἴδων Pa Ald.
1450 a 17 κακοδαιμονία] εὐδαιμονία Pa Ald.
1453 b 33 ὁ Ἀλκμαῖος ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος] ὁ Ἀλκμαῖον ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος Ae: ὁ Ἀλκμαῖον ὁ τοῦτος Ἀστυδάμας Pa Ald.
1454 b 13 ἐπεικείας τοιῶν παράδειγμα σκληρότητος Ae: ἐπεικείας τοιῶν παραδειγμα ἡ σκληρότητος δει Pa Ald.

In some instances Pa Ald. no doubt supply readings which we accept as improvements on those in Ae; e.g. ὡν for ὡς in 1452 b 28; ἐκπληξεως in 1455 a 17; ἐκάστου in 1456 a 6; ἐγ for ἦ in 1456 b 4. Readings of this kind, however, do not, all told, constitute a tithe of the peculiar readings in Pa Ald.; and there is nothing to mark them off from the rest except the fact that they happen to be successes. As the reviser, whoever he may have been, was evidently a man of some learning, and also of no little ingenuity of a certain rough-and-ready order, one need not be surprised to find in the multitude of his conjectures at any rate some few that have hit the mark.

Looking, therefore, at the actual texts of the Apographa, as seen in these typical instances, and the tendencies which they reveal, I think the facts point very clearly to the con-jectural origin of all the improved readings in the later manuscripts. The doubt now thrown upon this view is largely resolvable into a feeling that some at any rate of these textual improvements are too good and too un-expected to be regarded as the suggestions of Renaissance scholars. The underlying assumption here is an injustice
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To these early scholars. Their weakness in dealing with texts was want of critical caution and method; apart from that they had many of the gifts required for the work of textual emendation. They were often men of great natural ability, of surprising learning, and if anything, more completely at home in the classical languages than the moderns. We all know that in Latin the 'Itali' have left a permanent mark on many of our Latin texts. But there is no reason to suppose that the learned Greeks of that age, or their Italian pupils and followers, were as scholars on a much lower level, or that in the correction of Greek texts their limit was reached when some of the more patent clerical errors in them were cleared away. One has only to reflect what Chalcondyles did for the Homeric Hymns (v. Allen and Sikes, Introd. p. xxxiii) and Musurus for Hesychius. In the case of the Poetics, however, the work of revision cannot be connected with any one name. The book was even in the fifteenth century in the hands of many; so that the more striking of the amended readings, which we now gather up from various Apographa—a few from one, and a few from another—may very well have been the happier efforts at emendation of various acute and scholarly readers in the early Renaissance period of the study of the text.

The doubt as to the truth of Spengel and Vahlen's view of the Apographa has had new life put into it through the publication of the readings implied in the Arabic Version, which is found to confirm a certain proportion of the better readings in these manuscripts. A suspicion, accordingly, has arisen that some of these better readings may perhaps have survived in some now lost Greek MS., independent of Aε, and have found their way into the Renaissance manuscripts from that source. All that a coincidence, however, of this kind can be said to prove is the goodness of the readings; for it is no uncommon thing for a good conjecture to be confirmed by a newly-discovered document. In the Poetics the Arabic Version confirms several of Vahlen's emendations, as also many that were made in earlier days by Madius, Victorius Heinsius, and others. It confirms the (οῆ) μακρός
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of Vulcanius in 1455 b 17 just as much as the \(\phi\) \(\tauο\nu\sigma\varepsilonι\) of Pa Ald. in 1450 a 30. And in the latter instance the insertion of the negative would be no great feat, if one happened to remember the parallel in the Rhetoric, \(\sigma\nu\tau\iota\varepsilonι \tauο\nu \varepsilon\rho\gamma\nu\) (3, 2, 1404 b 3). Another Pa Ald. reading confirmed by the Arabic Version is \(\omega\tau\sigma\tau\iota\ \langle\tauο\nu\iota\tau\alpha\iota\rangle\) in 1447 a 25, but it loses its significance when one sees the reviser restoring \(\mu\alpha\lambda\omega\sigma\tau\alpha\ \langle\tauο\nu\iota\tau\alpha\iota\rangle\) in 1452 a 3, and observes his predilection for such stop-gaps. In 1454 b 2, where Aε has \(\pi\varepsilon\iota \tauο\nu \alpha\pi\lambda\omega\nu\), the rendering in the Arabic Version is \(de\ \varepsilon\varepsilon\omega\nu\iota\nu\ \varepsilon\nu\iota\nu\iota\nu\), which supports in equal measure both the \(\alpha\nu\\alpha\pi\lambda\omega\nu\) of Pa and the \(\alpha\pi\o\pi\lambda\o\nu\nu\) of Riccardianus 16. Which of the two, then, is to be supposed to have got into the text from the hypothetic lost Greek MS.? The question may be dismissed at once, when one reflects how easily \(\alpha\pi\o\pi\lambda\o\nu\nu\) or \(\alpha\nu\\alpha\pi\lambda\omega\nu\) might occur to any one familiar with the Second Book of the Iliad.

The truth is that not a few of the more striking of the Apograph readings may be accounted for without difficulty, if one is at liberty to assume some critical ingenuity and a fair acquaintance with literature on the part of the early correctors. \(\Lambda\alpha\omega\nu\), for instance, in 1460 a 30 implies nothing more than a knowledge of the Oedipus Tyrannus; and \(\Lambda\iota\nu\varepsilon\iota\) in 1461 b 21 could hardly be missed by a reader who remembered the story of the Medea. \(\omicron\nu\delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\omega\ \varepsilon\iota\) in 1457 a 30 is immediately suggested, not only by the context, but also by several parallels in other Aristotelian writings. In 1451 a 17 \(\alpha\pi\varepsilon\iota\a i\ \tauο\nu\ \varepsilon\iota\) (for \(\gamma\nu\varepsilon\iota\)) \(\sigma\nu\mu\beta\alpha\iota\varepsilon\iota\) stares one in the face, if one happens to have in mind the \(\alpha\pi\varepsilon\iota\a i\ \gamma\nu\rho \ \alpha\iota\nu\ \tauο\nu\ \varepsilon\iota\) \(\sigma\nu\mu\beta\alpha\iota\gamma\iota\) of the Physics. \(\pi\alpha\theta\iota\mu\mu\alpha\tau\o\nu\iota\) in 1449 b 28 may very well have been suggested by the parallel in the Politics; \(\epsilon\kappa\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\iota\iota\) in 1453 a 34 by that in the Problems; and \(\alpha\nu\κ\iota\iota\) in 1458 b 25 by the passage in the Homeric Scholia, in which it was independently discovered many years afterwards by Gu. Morel. Some of the amended readings, no doubt, show a higher degree of critical insight; e.g. \(\beta\alpha\iota\chi\varepsilon\) (for \(\beta\alpha\iota\chi\varepsilon\iota\)) in 1457 a 22, \(\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\lambda\o\gamma\theta\alpha\nu\sigma\o\nu\sigma\o\nu\) in 1455 a 16, \(\alpha\nu\gamma\theta\iota\) in 1455 a 27, \(\alpha\rho\o\nu\sigma\iota\) in 1457 b 14, and \(\mu\iota\nu\sigma\iota\) (for \(\kappa\iota\nu\iota\sigma\iota\)) in 1459 b 37. The provenance of these five instances is to be noted. The first is from Riccar-
dianus 16; the second from the margin of the Guelferbytanus; the third from Riccardianus 46 (and marg. Pb); the fourth from the Leidensis and ex emendatione Vaticanus 1400; and the fifth from BcPb. If they had ever existed together in the text of some one older and better MS., it is difficult to imagine how they came to be preserved in this separate way, one in one MS. and another in another.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ
ΠΕΡΙ
ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ

SIGLA

A" = cod. Parisinus 1741
* = littera in codice deleta
Ar. = interpretatio Arabica, vel ex ea eruta
scriptura Graeca
apogr. = apographa quaedam.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ

1447a Περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἴδων αὐτῆς, ἢν των δύναμιν ἐκαστὸν ἔχει, καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς μοθοὺς 10 εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ἔξεσθαι ή ποίησις, ἐτί δὲ ἓκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἢ στὶ μορίων, ὁμολογεῖ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσα τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ στὶ μεθόδου, λέγουμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πράττων ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. ἔποποια δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἐτί δὲ κομψία καὶ ἡ διαθραμβοποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς 15 αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλεῖστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον διαφέρονσι δὲ ἄλληλων τρισώ, ἡ γὰρ τῷ γενεῖ ἐτέρως μιμεῖσθαι ἡ τῷ ἐτέρα ἡ τῷ ἐτέρως καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων. ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχῆμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνται τινες ἀπεικάζοντες (οἱ μὲν 20 διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνθήεις), ἐτέροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις ἀπασαὶ μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ὑμβάμῳ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δὲ ἡ χώρις ἡ μεμιγμένως οἷον ἀρμονία μὲν καὶ ὑμβάμῳ χρώ- μεναι μόνον ἡ τε αὐλητική καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ καὶ εἰ τιγνὲς 25 ἐτέραι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι (τοιαῦτα) τίνω δύναμιν, οἷον ἡ τῶν συρίγγων αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ὑμβάμῳ μιμοῦνται χωρίς ἀρμονίας αἱ

1447b 12 λέγομεν Αε (utramque scripturam agnoscit Ar.) 13 τραγῳδίας Αε (in 1449b 37 τραγῳδίας. ceteris in locis ἐν αὐτὸ mutum deest in hoc similibus vocabulis) 17 γενεῖ] ἐν Forchhammer 21 καὶ Parisinus 2038: καὶ Αε 25 τυγχάνονται Αε τοιαῦτα add. apogr. (confirm. Ar.) 26 αἱ Reiz: οἱ Αε: οἱ ἑπολλοὶ Heinsius
ARISTOTLE'S POETICS

Our subject being Poetry, I propose to speak not only of the art in general but also of its species and their respective capacities; of the structure of plot required for a good poem; of the number and nature of the constituent parts of a poem; and likewise of any other matters in the same line of inquiry. Let us follow the natural order and begin with the primary facts.

Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways, either by a difference of kind in their means, or by differences in the objects, or in the manner of their imitations.

1. Just as form and colour are used as means by some, who (whether by art or constant practice) imitate and portray many things by their aid, and the voice is used by others; so also in the above-mentioned group of arts, the means with them as a whole are rhythm, language, and harmony—used, however, either singly or in certain combinations. A combination of rhythm and harmony alone is the means in flute-playing and lyre-playing, and any other arts there may be of the same description, e.g. imitative piping. Rhythm alone, without harmony, is the means in the dancer's imita-


I. 1447ᵃ 27—1447ᵇ 29

tὸν ὀρχηστὸν, καὶ γὰρ οὕτω διὰ τῶν σχηματιζόμενων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἦθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις. ἦ δὲ [ἐποποιία]

1 μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψυλλοῖς ἡ τοῖς μέτροις καὶ τούτοις εἴτε 1447ᵇ μεγνύσα μετ’ ἀλλήλων εἰθ’ ἐνὶ τυί γένει χρωματίζει τῶν μέτρων (ἀνώνυμος) τυγχάνει οὕσα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν
10 ἔχομεν ὁνομάζει κοινοῦ τοῖς Σάφφονοι καὶ Ξενάρχον μέσον καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικοῖς λόγους οὐδὲ εἰ τίς διὰ τριμέτρου ἡ ἠλεγεῖσα ἡ τῶν ἄλλων τιωτὸν τῶν τοιοῦτων ποιοτό τιν λίμησιν—πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποι γε συνάπτοντες ὑπὸ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἠλεγεῖσονοι τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιοῦσιν ὁνομάζοντοι, οὐχ ὡς
15 κατὰ τὴν λίμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῆς κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες· καὶ γὰρ ἄν ἰατρικῶν ὁ φυσικῶν τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέροντο, οὔτω καλεῖν εἰλοθάσανοι οὐδὲν δὲ κοινῆς ἔστιν Ὀμήρου καὶ Ἐπιπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τῶν μὲν ποιητῆς δύκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἐγνηθή
20 τὴν. ὁμοίως δὲ κάν εἰ τις ἀπαντᾷ τὰ μέτρα μιγνύων ποιοτὸ τὴν λίμησιν καθαρὰ Χαιρήμων ἐποίησε Κένταυρον μικτὴν ῥαψῳδίαν ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν μέτρων, καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορεύτην. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διωρίθθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰσὶ δὲ τυχεῖ αἰ πάσι χρωτάνι τοῖς εἰδήν.

15 μένων, λέγω δὲ οὖν ῥυθμῷ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὡστερ ἦ τε τῶν διαφοραμβικῶν ποίησις καὶ ἡ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἦ τε τραγῳδία καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία: διαφοροῦσι δὲ ὅτι αἴ μὲν ἀμα πᾶσιν αἰ δὲ κατά μέρος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν λέγω τόσ διαφοράς τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν οἴς ποιοῦνται τὴν λίμησιν.

28 ἐποποιία seclusit Ueberweg (om. Ar.) 1447ᵇ 9 ἀνώνυμος add. Bernays (confirm. Ar.) τυγχάνει οὕσα Suckow: τυγχάνοισα Α’
29 αἰ Victorius: αἰσ Α’
tions; for even he, by the rhythms of his attitudes, may
represent men's characters, as well as what they do and
suffer. There is further an art which imitates by language
alone, without harmony, in prose or in verse, and if in verse,
either in some one or in a plurality of metres. This form of
imitation is to this day without a name. We have no
common name for a mime of Sophron or Xenarchus and
a Socratic Conversation; and we should still be without one
even if the imitation in the two instances were in trimeters
or elegiacs or some other kind of verse—though it is the way
with people to tack on 'poet' to the name of a metre, and
talk of elegiac-poets and epic-poets, thinking that they call
them poets not by reason of the imitative nature of their
work, but indiscriminately by reason of the metre they write
in. Even if a theory of medicine or physical philosophy be
put forth in a metrical form, it is usual to describe the writer
in this way; Homer and Empedocles, however, have really
nothing in common apart from their metre; so that, if the
one is to be called a poet, the other should be termed a
physicist rather than a poet. We should be in the same
position also, if the imitation in these instances were in all
the metres, like the Centaur (a rhapsody in a medley of all
metres) of Chaeremon; and Chaeremon one has to recognize
as a poet. So much, then, as to these arts. There are,
lastly, certain other arts, which combine all the means
enumerated, rhythm, melody, and verse, e.g. Dithyrambic
and Nomic poetry, Tragedy and Comedy; with this difference,
however, that the three kinds of means are in some of them
all employed together, and in others brought in separately,
one after the other. These elements of difference in the
above arts I term the means of their imitation.
2. 1448a 1—3. 1448a 23

1448a  'Epeī dé μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμοῦμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτος ἢ σπουδαίοις ἢ φαύλοις εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἡθ ἱχθῶν ἂει τοῦτος ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις, κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετή τὰ ἡθ ἱχθῶν διαφέρουσι πάντες), ἦτοι βελτίωσα ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἡ χείρονας δὲ καὶ τοιούτους, ὡσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς' Πολύγυρωτος μὲν γὰρ κρέιττους, Παῦσων δὲ χείρονας, Διονύσιος δὲ ὀμοίους εἴκασεν. ὁμοίων δὲ ὧτι καὶ τῶν λεχθεσσάν ἐκάστη μιμήσεων ἐξει ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ ἕσται ἐτέρα τῷ ἐτερά μιμεῖσθαι τούτον τὸν τρόπον, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ 10 κιθαρίστης ἕστι γενέσθαι ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας, καὶ τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυλλομετρίαν, οἷον ὁμηρὸς μὲν βελτίων, Κλεοφὸν δὲ ὀμοίως, Ἡγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος (ὁ) τὰς παρθενίας ποιήσας πρῶτος καὶ Νικοχάρης ὁ τῶν Δειλίαδα χείρον: ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς διθυράμβους καὶ περὶ τοὺς 15 νόμους, ὡσπερ * * γάς, Κύκλωπας Τιμάθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος, μιμήσατο ἂν τις. ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ τραγῳδία πρὸς τὴν κωμῳδίαν διέστηκεν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ χείρον ἢ δὲ βελτίως μιμεῖσθαι βουλέται τῶν νῦν.

'Ετι δὲ τοῦτον τρίτη διαφορὰ τὸ ὦς ἐκαστα τοῦτων 20 μιμήσατο ἂν τις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἕστων ὡτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ἢ ἢ ἢ ἐπερῶν τι γιγνόμενον ὡσπερ ὁμηρὸς ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντα ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς

II. The objects the imitator represents are actions, with agents who are necessarily either good men or bad—the diversities of human character being nearly always derivative from this primary distinction, since the line between virtue and vice is one dividing the whole of mankind. It follows therefore, that the agents represented must be either above our own level of goodness, or beneath it, or just such as we are; in the same way as, with the painters, the personages of Polygnotus are better than we are, those of Pauson worse, and those of Dionysius just like ourselves. It is clear that each of the above-mentioned arts will admit of these differences, and that it will become a separate art by representing objects with this point of difference. Even in dancing, flute-playing, and lyre-playing such diversities are possible; and they are also possible in the nameless art that uses language, prose or verse without harmony, as its means; Homer's personages, for instance, are better than we are; Cleophon's are on our own level; and those of Hegemon of Thasos, the first writer of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the Diliad, are beneath it. The same is true of the Dithyramb and the Nome: the personages may be presented in them with the difference exemplified in the... of... and Argas, and in the Cyclopses of Timotheus and Philoxenus. This difference it is that distinguishes Tragedy and Comedy also; the one would make its personages worse, and the other better, than the men of the present day.

III. A third difference in these arts is in the manner in which each kind of object is represented. Given both the same means and the same kind of object for imitation, one may either (1) speak at one moment in narrative and at another in an assumed character, as Homer does; or (2) one may remain the same throughout, without any such change; or (3) the imitators may represent the whole story dramatically, as though they were actually doing the things described.
μυμομένους. ἐν τρισὶ ὁκαὶ ταῦτας διαφορὰς ἢ μὴ μησίς ἐστιν,
25 ὡς εἶπομεν κατ' ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς τε (καὶ ὤ) καὶ ὤσ. ὡστε τῇ
μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἀν εἰη μημητῆς Ὄμηρος Σοφοκλῆς, μυμοῦνται
gὰρ ἀμφοὶ σπουδαῖοι, τῇ δὲ Ἀριστοφάνει, πράττοντας γὰρ
μυμοῦνται καὶ δρώντας ἀμφοὶ. ὃθεν καὶ δράματα καλεί-
σθαι τινες αὐτὰ φασιν, ὃτι μυμοῦνται δρώντας. διὸ καὶ
30 ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τε τραγῳδίας καὶ τῆς κωμῳδίας οἱ Δω-
ρεῖς (τῆς μὲν γὰρ κωμῳδίας οἱ Μεγαρεῖς οἴ τε ἑνταῦθα ὅσ
ἐπὶ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας γενομένης καὶ οἱ οἴ Σι-
κελίας, ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἐπίχραμος ὁ ποιητὴς πολλῷ πρῶ-
τερος ὃν Χιουνίδον καὶ Μάγγητον' καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἐνοι
35 τῶν ἐν Πελοποιηνήσῳ) ποιούμενοι τὰ ὁνόματα σημείων· αὐτοὶ
μὲν γὰρ κώμας τὰς περιουκίδας καλεῖν φασιν, Ἀθηναίοις
de θύμως, ὡς κωμῳδοῦς οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμάζειν λεχθέντας
ἀλλὰ τῇ κατὰ κώμας πλάγῃ ὀτιμαζόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ ἁστεως·
1448 b καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτοῦ μὲν ὄραν, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ πράττειν προσ-
αγορεύειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ πόσαι καὶ
τινες τῆς μμήστεως εἰρήσθω ταύτα.

Ἐσολκαὶ δὲ γευνήσαται μὲν ὃλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν
5 ὧν τινὲς καὶ αὐταί φυσικαί· τὸ τε γὰρ μμείσθαι σύμφωτον
tois ἀνθρώπωις ἐκ πάθων ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο διαφέρουσι
tῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὧν ἡ μμητικίκτατον ἐστί καὶ τὰς μμαθ-
σεις ποιεῖται διὰ μμήστεως τὰς πρῶτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν
toīs μμήσμασι πάντας. σημείων δὲ τοῦτον τὸ συμβαίνου
10 ἔπι τῶν θρόνον· ὃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρώμει, τοῦτοι τὰς
εἰκόνας τὰς μᾶλλον ἡμιμιμενεὶς χαϊρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἶον

25 καὶ ἀ add. apogr. 32 δημοκρατεῖας Αο 34 Χιουνίδου
Robortellus (confirm. Ar.): χιουνίδου Αο fort. τραγῳδίας (8')
35 αὐτοὶ Spengel: αὐτοὶ Αο 36 Ἀθηναίος Spengel (occupavat
Anonymus in minore ed. Oxon. a. 1760): ἀθηναίος Αο 1448 b 5
αὐταί Parisinus 2038: αὐταί Αο 6 τοῦτοι Αο
As we said at the beginning, therefore, the differences in
the imitation of these arts come under three heads, their
means, their objects, and their manner.

So that as an imitator Sophocles will be on one side akin
to Homer, both portraying good men; and on another to
Aristophanes, since both present their personages as acting
and doing. This in fact, according to some, is the reason for
plays being termed dramas, because in a play the personages
act the story. Hence too both Tragedy and Comedy are
claimed by the Dori ans as their discoveries; Comedy by the
Megarians—by those in Greece as having arisen when Megara
became a democracy, and by the Sicilian Megarians on the
ground that the poet Epicharmus was of their country, and
a good deal earlier than Chionides and Magnes; even Tragedy
also is claimed by certain of the Peloponnesian Dorians. In
support of this claim they point to the words ‘comedy’ and
‘drama.’ Their word for the outlying hamlets, they say, is
comae, whereas Athenians call them demes—thus assuming
that comedians got the name not from their comoe or revels,
but from their strolling from hamlet to hamlet, lack of apprecia-
tion keeping them out of the city. Their word also for ‘to
act,’ they say, is dran, whereas Athenians use pratein.

So much, then, as to the number and nature of the points
difference in the imitation of these arts.

It is clear that the general origin of poetry was due to two
causes, each of them part of human nature. Imitation
is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over
the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative
creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it
is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation. The
truth of this second point is shown by experience: though
the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to
view the most realistic representations of them in art, the
θηρίων τε μορφάς τῶν ἀτιμωτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἰτίαν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἤδιεστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦ. 15 συν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τούτῳ χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζονται τὶ ἐκα-
στον, οἶνον ὅτι ὀνόματος ἔκεινος ἐπεὶ ἔαν μὴ τύχῃ προσωρικῶς, ὅχι ἦ μέριμμα ποιήσει τὴν ἤδιον ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπερ-
γασίαν ἢ τὴν χροίαν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτης τιμᾶ ἄλλην αἰτίαν. 20 κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ (τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἵστι φαινόν) ἐξ ἀρχῆς πεφυκότες καὶ αὐτὰ μάλιστα κατὰ μικρὸν προάγουτες ἐγένητεν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοχθ.

dioσμάτων. διεσπάσθη δὲ κατὰ τὰ οἰκεία ἦθη ἢ ποιήσις: 25 οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμμούσιον πράξεως καὶ 

τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, 

πρῶτον ψύχους ποιούντες, ὥσπερ ἑτεροί ὑμνοὺς καὶ ἐγκώμια. 

tῶν μὲν οὖν πρὸ Ὄμηρον οὐδενὸς ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τοιούτων 

ποίημα, εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλοῦς, ἀπὸ δὲ Ὄμηρον ἀρξαμένου 

30 ἐστώ, οἴον ἐκεῖνον ὁ Μαργήτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐν οἷς κατὰ 

tὸ ἁρμόττον λαμβεῖον ἦθελε μέτρων—διὸ καὶ λαμβεῖον κα-

λεῖται νῦν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μέτρῳ τούτῳ ἱαμβεῖζον ἄλληλους. καὶ 

ἐγένυτο τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἱρώκως οἱ δὲ ἱαμβικῶς ποι-

ταῖ. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαία μάλιστα ποιήσεως "Ὅμηρος 

35 ἦν (μόνος γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι εὐ ἄλλα καὶ μυάλεις δραμα-

τικὰς ἐποίησεν), οὖτος καὶ τὰ τῆς κωμῳδίας σχῆμα 

πρῶτος ὑπεδείξειν οὐ ψύχον ἄλλα τὸ γελοῖον δραματο-

ποιήσαι: ὁ γὰρ Μαργήτης ἄναλογον ἔχει, ὥσπερ Ἰλιάσ

12 ἀτιμωτάτων Α½ 13 τοῦτον vel τοιῶν apogr. 18 οὐχ ἦ

Hermann: οὐχὶ Α½ 27 ἄφεσιν SpengeI 30 μαργαῖτος Α½

31 λαμβεῖον (bis) Α½ 35 ἄλλα Riccardianus 46, Bonitz (confirm.

Ar.): ἀλλ' ὅτι Α½ 36 οὗτῳ apogr. 38 οὗ] τὸ Α½ fort. (ἡ) Ἰλιάσ
forms for example of the lowest animals and of dead bodies. The explanation is to be found in a further fact: to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it; the reason of the delight in seeing the picture is that one is at the same time learning—gathering the meaning of things, e.g. that the man there is so-and-so; for if one has not seen the thing before, one's pleasure will not be in the picture as an imitation of it, but will be due to the execution or colouring or some similar cause. Imitation, then, being natural to us—as also the sense of harmony and rhythm, the metres being obviously species of rhythms— it was through their original aptitude, and by a series of improvements for the most part gradual on their first efforts, that they created poetry out of their improvisations.

Poetry, however, soon broke up into two kinds according to the differences of character in the individual poets; for the graver among them would represent noble actions, and those of noble personages; and the meaner sort the actions of the ignoble. The latter class produced invectives at first, just as others did hymns and panegyrics. We know of no such poem by any of the pre-Homeric poets, though there were probably many such writers among them; instances, however, may be found from Homer downwards, e.g. his Margites, and the similar poems of others. In this poetry of invective its natural fitness brought an iambic metre into use: hence our present term 'iambic,' because it was the metre of their 'iambs' or invectives against one another. The result was that the old poets became some of them writers of heroic and others of iambic verse. Homer's position, however, is peculiar: just as he was in the serious style the poet of poets, standing alone not only through the literary excellence, but also through the dramatic character of his imitations, so too he was the first to outline for us the general forms of Comedy by producing not a dramatic invective, but a dramatic picture of the Ridiculous; his Margites
1449α καὶ ἡ 'Οδύσσεια πρὸς τὰς τραγῳδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὕτως πρὸς τὰς κωμῳδίας. παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγῳδίας καὶ κω-
μῳδίας οἱ ἐφ’ ἐκατέραν τήν πούησιν ὀρμῶντες κατὰ τὴν
οἰκεῖαν φύσιν οἱ μὲν αὐτὶ τῶν λάμβων κωμῳδοτοι ἐγέ-
νοντο, οἱ δὲ αὐτὴ τῶν ἔπων τραγῳδοδιδάσκαλοι, διὰ τὸ
μείζονα καὶ εὐτυμότερα τὰ σχῆματα εἶναι ταῦτα ἐκείνων.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἂρι ἔχει ἠδὴ τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ τοῦς
εἴδεσιν ἱκανῶς ἢ οὐ, αὐτὸ τε καθ’ αὐτὸ κρίναι καὶ πρὸς
τὰ θέατρα, ἄλλος λόγος. γενομένης (ὁ) οὖν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς αὐτο-
10 σχεδιαστικῆς—καὶ αὐτῇ καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ
tῶν ἐξαρχῶντων τῶν διωραμβοῦν, ἢ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλ-
lικὰ ἢ ἢτι καὶ υἱὸν εἰν πολλάς τῶν πόλεως διαμένει νο-
μιζόμενα—κατὰ μικρὸν ἡμζήθη προαγώντων ὅσον ἐγίνετο
φανερῶν αὐτῆς καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα ἡ
15 τραγῳδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἐσχὲ τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν. καὶ τὸ
tε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλήθος ἐξ ἐνός εἰς ὄσον πρῶτος Ἀλσχύ-
λος ἡγαγε καὶ τὰ τοῦ χροοῦ ἠλάττωσε καὶ τῶν λόγων
πρωτοχωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασε τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφιάν
Σοφοκλῆς. ἐτὶ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος’ ἐκ μικρὸν μύθων καὶ λέ-
20 ξείως γελοίας διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεὶς ὅψε ἀπε-
σιμνύθη, τὸ τε μέτρον ἐκ τετραμέτρου λαμβεῖον ἐγένετο.
tὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρώντω διὰ τὸ σατυρικῶν
καὶ ὀρχηστικῶτεραν εἶναι τὴν πούησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης
αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις τὸ ὀικεῖον μέτρον εὕρετ' μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτι-
25 κον τῶν μέτρων τὸ λαμβεῖον ἐστών σημεῖον δὲ τούτων,
πλείοτα γὰρ λαμβεία λέγομεν εν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς

1449α 6 μεῖζον apogr.: μείζον Α° 7 ἢρ’ ἦλθα Vahlen: παρέχει Α°:
8 η' ἦλθα Parisinus 2038: ἦλθα ἦλθα Riccardianus 46 8 κρίναι
Forchhammer: κρίνεται ἢ ναι Α° 9 γενομένη apogr. δ° add.
Riccardianus 46, Bekker "σχεδιαστικὴ" apogr. 11 φαυλικά
Α°: φαύλα (ut videtur) Ar. 12 διαμένειν Α° 15 ἐαυτῆς apogr.:
αὐτῆς Α° 20 σατυρικοῦ Α° 21 et 25 λαμβείον Α° 26 λαμβία Α°
in fact stands in the same relation to our comedies as the
Iliad and Odyssey to our tragedies. As soon, however, as
Tragedy and Comedy appeared in the field, those naturally
drawn to the one line of poetry became writers of comedies
instead of iambbs, and those naturally drawn to the other,
writers of tragedies instead of epics, because these new modes
of art were grander and of more esteem than the old.

If it be asked whether Tragedy is now all that it need be
in its formative elements, to consider that, and decide it
theoretically and in relation to the theatres, is a matter for
another inquiry.

It certainly began in improvisations—as did also Comedy;
the one originating with the authors of the Dithyramb, the
other with those of the phallic songs, which still survive as
institutions in many of our cities. And its advance after that
was little by little, through their improving on whatever they
had before them at each stage. It was in fact only after
a long series of changes that the movement of Tragedy
stopped on its attaining to its natural form. (1) The number
of actors was first increased to two by Aeschylus, who
curtailed the business of the Chorus, and made the dialogue,
or spoken portion, take the leading part in the play. (2)
A third actor and scenery were due to Sophocles. (3) Tragedy
acquired also its magnitude. Discarding short stories and
a ludicrous diction, through its passing out of its satyric
stage, it assumed, though only at a late point in its progress,
a tone of dignity; and its metre changed then from trochaic
to iambic. The reason for their original use of the trochaic
tetramer was that their poetry was satyric and more con-
ected with dancing than it now is. As soon, however, as
a spoken part came in, nature herself found the appropriate
metre. The iambic, we know, is the most speakable of
metres, as is shown by the fact that we very often fall into it
Διένεμεν ἀρχής καὶ ἀρχής ἔκδιναι τῆς λέ- 
κης ἀρμονίας. ἢ ἐπεισόδων πλήθη. καὶ τὰ ἀλλ' 
ernetes κοσμηθῶν λέγεται ἐστῶ ἦμῖν εἰρημένα· πολὺ 
γὰρ ἃν ἴσως ἔργον εὑ̇ρὶ διεξεῖναι καθ' ἐκαστον.

Ἡ δὲ κωμοφώλα ἐστίν ὧσπερ εἰπομεν μήμης 
λοιπῶν μὲν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πάσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 
αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοίου μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστὶν ἀμάρ-

τηρα τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φαρτικόν, οὗν 
eιδῆς τὸ γελοίου πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον 
ἀνευ ὀδύνης. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς τραγῳδίας μεταβάσεις καὶ 
δὲ ἄν ἐγένοντο ὦν λελήθασιν, ἡ δὲ κωμοφώλα διὰ τὸ μὴ 
σπονδάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχής ἐλαθεν' καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμοφώλων 
ὑφε ποτε ὁ ἄρχων ἐδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐθελονται ἦσαν. ἦδη δὲ 
σκηματά των αὐτῆς ἐχουσης οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηται 
μυπονδυόνται. τὸς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἡ προλόγους ἡ 
5 πλήθη ὑποκρίτων καὶ οὐκα τοιαύτα, ἦγινοται. τὸ δὲ μυ-

ποσον ποιειν Ἡ Επίκαρμος καὶ Φώμις] τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχης ἐκ 
Σικελίας ἦλθε * *, τῶν δὲ Ἁθηνής Κράτης πρώτος ἤρξεν 
ἀφέμενος τῆς ιαμβικῆς ἱδεάς καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ 
μύθους. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποτοία τῇ τραγῳδία μέχρι μὲν τοῦ 
10 (διὰ) μέτρου μεγάλου μήμης εἰναι σπονδαίων ἱκολούθησεν 
tῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν εἰναι, ταύτη 
διαφέρουσιν· ἢ τῷ δὲ τῷ μήκει·—ἡ μὲν ὦτι μαλίστα πειράται 
ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἥλιον εἰναι ἣ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττων, ἡ δὲ 
ἐποτοία ἀφροτος τῷ χρόνῳ—καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει, καὶ τοιά 

28 ἀλλὰ ὡς απογρ. (confirm. Ar.): ἄλλως Αε 
(bis) Αε 14491 κωμῳδός scripseram: κωμῳδός coni. Bernhardy 
6 Ἠ Ἐπίκαρμος καὶ Φώμις seclusit Susemihl 
7 lacunam indicavi; intercidisse videntur ἢ ἔστω ἐπίκαρμος καὶ Φώμις ἐκεῖνε 
8 εἰδέας Αε 9 μὲν τοῦ Tyrwhitt: μόνον Αε 
10 διὰ add. Ueberweg 11 τῷ] τὸ Αε 
12 μὲν] μὲν γὰρ απογρ. 14 
τοῦτο pr. Αε
in conversation, whereas we rarely talk hexameters, and only when we depart from the speaking tone of voice. (4) Another change was a plurality of episodes or acts. As for the remaining matters, the superadded embellishments and the account of their introduction, these must be taken as said, as it would probably be a long piece of work to go through the details.

As for Comedy, it is (as has been observed) an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the Ridiculous, which is a species of the Ugly. The Ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for instance, that excites laughter, is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.

Though the successive changes in Tragedy and their authors are not unknown, we cannot say the same of Comedy; its early stages passed unnoticed, because it was not as yet taken up in a serious way. It was only at a late point in its progress that a chorus of comedians was officially granted by the archon; they used to be mere volunteers. It had also already certain definite forms at the time when the record of those termed comic poets begins. Who it was who supplied it with masks, or prologues, or a plurality of actors and the like, has remained unknown. The invented Fable, or Plot, however, originated in Sicily, with Epicharmus and Phormis; of Athenian poets Crates was the first to drop the Comedy of inventive and frame stories of a general and non-personal nature, in other words, Fables or Plots.

Epic poetry, then, has been seen to agree with Tragedy to this extent, that of being an imitation of serious subjects in a grand kind of verse. It differs from it, however, (1) in that it is in one kind of verse and in narrative form; and (2) in its length—which is due to its action having no fixed limit of time, whereas Tragedy endeavours to keep as far as possible within a single circuit of the sun, or something near that. This, I say, is another point of difference between them, though at first the practice in this respect was just the
15 τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τοῦτο ἐποίησι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν. μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ ἱδιὰ τῆς τραγῳδίας—διότι οὕτως περὶ τραγῳδίας οἴδε σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἴδε καὶ περὶ ἐπών. ἂ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποίησε ἕξει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα ἐν τῇ ἐποποίησι.

Περὶ (μετὰ) οὖν τῆς ἐν ἔξαμετροις μμητικής καὶ περὶ 6 κωμῳδίας ὑστερον ἔρούμεν περὶ δὲ τραγῳδίας λέγωμεν ἀναλαβόντες αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γνώμενον ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας. ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησι πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχουσίας, ἡδονομένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἐκάστω τῶν εἶδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, ὀρῶντων καὶ οὐ δὲ ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαιροῦσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων καθαρσίας. λέγω δὲ ἡδονομένῳ μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἀρμονίαν καὶ κέλος, τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τούτων 30 εἴδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἐνια μόνον περαιρεθαι καὶ πάλιν ἐτερα διὰ μέλους. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεως ποιοῦται τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀνάγκης αὖ εἰ ὑπο τῷ μόριον τραγῳδίᾳ ὁ τῆς ὑψίου κόσμος, εἰτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξις: ἐν τούτων γὰρ ποιοῦται τὴν μίμησιν. λέγω δὲ λέξις μὲν ταύτην, τὴν τῶν 35 μέτρων σύνθεσιν, μελοποιίαν δὲ ὁ τῆς δύσαμεν φανερὰν ἔχει πᾶσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεως ἀστὶ μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πραττόντων, οὕτως ἀνάγκη ποιοῦ τινας εἶναι κατὰ τε τὸ ἱθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, διὰ γὰρ τοιοῦτων καὶ τᾶς πράξεως εἶναι φαμεν ποιάς τινας, πέφυκεν αὕτη δὲ τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, διάνοιαν καὶ ἱθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ 1450 a πράξεως εἶναι φαμεν ποιάς τινας, πέφυκεν αὕτη δὲ τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, διάνοιαν καὶ ἱθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ

same in tragedies as in epic poems. They differ also (3) in
their constituents, some being common to both and others
peculiar to Tragedy—hence a judge of good and bad in
Tragedy is a judge of that in epic poetry also. All the parts
of an epic are included in Tragedy; but those of Tragedy
are not all of them to be found in the Epic.

Reserving hexameter poetry and Comedy for consideration
hereafter, let us proceed now to the discussion of Tragedy;
before doing so, however, we must gather up the definition
resulting from what has been said. A tragedy, then, is the
imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having
magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable
accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of
the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with
incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish
its catharsis of such emotions. Here by 'language with
pleasurable accessories' I mean that with rhythm and
harmony or song superadded; and by 'the kinds separately'
I mean that some portions are worked out with verse only,
and others in turn with song.

I. As they act the stories, it follows that in the first place
the Spectacle (or stage-appearance of the actors) must be
some part of the whole; and in the second Melody and
Diction, these two being the means of their imitation.
Here by 'Diction' I mean merely this, the composition of
the verses; and by 'Melody,' what is too completely un-
derstood to require explanation. But further: the subject
represented also is an action; and the action involves
agents, who must necessarily have their distinctive qualities
both of character and thought, since it is from these that we
ascribe certain qualities to their actions. There are in the
natural order of things, therefore, two causes, (Character) and

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τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες. ἔστιν δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μύθος η ἡμέρας· λέγω γάρ μύθου τούτου, τὴν 5 σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἡμέρας, καθ' ὁ ποιοῦσ τινα εἶναι φαμέν τοὺς πράπτοντας, διάκοναι δὲ, ἐν ὦ οὕς λέγοντες ἀποδεικνύσασίν τι ἢ ἔλλειφαν. ἀνάγκη ὅπως τὰς τραγῳδίας μέρη εἶναι ἔξω, καθ' ὁ ποιά τις ἔστι ἡ τραγῳδία· ταῦτα δ᾿ ἔστι μύθος καὶ ἡμέρα καὶ λέξεις καθ' 10 διάνοια καὶ ὦς καὶ μελοποιία. οἷς μὲν γὰρ μιμοῦται, ὁδὸν μέρη ἔστιν, ὡς δὲ μιμοῦται, ἐν, ὁ δὲ μιμοῦται, τρία, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν. τούτους μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὅλιγοι αὐτῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν κέρχησιν τοὺς εἴδεσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὰφείς ἔχει πᾶν καὶ ἱθὸς καὶ μῦθον καὶ λέξιν καὶ μέλος καὶ διάνοιαν ὡς ἑπτα 15 τῶν. μέγιστον δὲ τούτου ἔστιν ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύντασις· ἡ γὰρ τραγῳδία μίμησις ἔστιν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίου καὶ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ κακοδαιμονίας ἐν πράξεi ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξεις τις ἐστιν, οὖ ποιοτης· εἰσίν δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἡμέρα ποιοὶ τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς 20 πράξεις εὐδαιμονεῖ η τοῦναιτόν. οὗκοι δὲ οὕς τὰ ἡμέρας με- μήσονται πράπτοντως, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἡμέρας συμπεριλαμβάνοντως διὰ τὰς πράξεις· ὡστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ οἱ μύθοι τέλος τῆς τραγῳδίας, τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἀπάτων. ἐτι άνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἀν γένειτο τραγῳδία, άνευ δὲ ἡμέρων γέ- 25 νός. οἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείοστων άήθεις τραγῳδίας εἰσίν, καὶ ὄλως ποιηται πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, οὖν καὶ τῶν γρα- φεον Ζεύξις πρὸς Πολύγυρτον πέποθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πο- λύγυρτος ἀγαθὸς ἡθογράφος, ὃς Ζεύξιδος γραφή οὔδεν 3 ἔστιν δὴ conieceram 12 ὡς εἰπεῖν fortasse post οὕς ἔχει πάν collocandum 13 οὕς A 17 intercidisse καὶ κακοδαιμονίας, ἢ δὲ εὐδαιμονία coni. Vahlen 21 συμπεριλαμβάνουσι Guelferby- tanus (m. 1), Spengel 27 πολύγυρτον et polýγυρτον A 10
Thought, of their actions, and consequently of their success or failure in their lives. Now the action (that which was done) is represented in the play by the Fable or Plot. The Fable, in our present sense of the term, is simply this, the combination of the incidents, or things done in the story; whereas Character is what makes us ascribe certain moral qualities to the agents; and Thought is shown in all they say when proving a particular point or, it may be, enunciating a general truth. There are six parts consequently of every tragedy, as a whole, that is, of such or such quality, viz. a Fable or Plot, Characters, Diction, Thought, Spectacle and Melody; two of them arising from the means, one from the manner, and three from the objects of the dramatic imitation; and there is nothing else besides these six. Of these, its formative elements, then, not a few of the dramatists have made due use, as every play, one may say, admits of Spectacle, Character, Fable, Diction, Melody, and Thought.

II. The most important of the six is the combination of the incidents of the story. Tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a quality. Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions—what we do—that we are happy or the reverse. In a play accordingly they do not act in order to portray the Characters; they include the Characters for the sake of the action. So that it is the action in it, i.e. its Fable or Plot, that is the end and purpose of the tragedy; and the end is everywhere the chief thing. Besides this, a tragedy is impossible without action, but there may be one without Character. The tragedies of most of the moderns are characterless—a defect common among poets of all kinds, and with its counterpart in painting in Zeuxis as compared with Polygnotus; for whereas the latter is strong in character, the work of Zeuxis is devoid of it. And
6. 1450a 29—1450b 15

ἐχει ἃδος. ἐτι ἐὰν τις ἐφεξῆς ὅιθαν τῆς μέγας καὶ λέξει 30 καὶ διανοίᾳ εὐ πεποιημένας, (ὡπω) ποιήσει ὁ ἕπ τις τραγῳ-
δίας ἔργον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ καταθέτερος τούτοις κεχρημενή τραγῳδία, ἔχουσα δὲ μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πρα-
γάτων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ τραγῳ-
δία τοῦ μῦθου μέρη ἑστὶν, αἰ τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀνα-
35 γνωρίσεις. ἐτι σημείων ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐγχειροῦντες ποιεῖν πρό-
τερον δύνανται τῇ λέξει καὶ τούς ἥθεσιν ἀκριβῶς ἢ τὰ πράγματα συνήστασθαι, οἷον καὶ οἱ πρώτοι ποιηταὶ σχέδων ἀπαντεῖς. ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μύθος τῆς τρα-
γῳδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἥθη (παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἑστὶν καὶ
1450b ἐπὶ τῆς γραφικῆς· εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλέψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις
φαρμάκοις χύῳν, οὐκ ἂν ὡμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκo-
γραφήσεις εἰκόνα) ἐστὶν τε μέρης πράξεως καὶ διὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τῶν πραττόσων. τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια· τούτο δὲ
5 ἐστὶν τὸ λέγειν δύνανται τὰ ἑστὶν καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ μητορικῆς ἔργων ἑστὶν οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχαίοι πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγονται, οἱ
δὲ νῦν μητορικῶς. ἐστὶν δὲ ἡδος μὲν τὸ τοιούτον ὁ ἀρχο
ῥεῖται ἢ φεύγει—διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἥθος τῶν λόγων ἐν
10 οἷς μηδ' ὅλως ἐστὶν ὃ τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων—
διάνοια δὲ ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσι τι ὡς ἑστὶν ἢ ως οὐκ ἑστὶν ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνεται. τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ
λέξεις· λέγω ὅτι, ὥσπερ πρότερον εἰρηταί, λέξει εἰναι τῆν
dία τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμημενεύαν, ὁ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔμμετρων καὶ
15 ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἐχει τῆν αὐτὴν δύναμιν. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν

29 λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ Vahlen: λέξεισι καὶ διανοίασι A c 30 οὕς
(mi fallor) add. Ar.: οὗ add. apogr. 31 ᾧ ἢ A c 1450b 10
τὶ τις A c 12 ἐν λόγῳ scripsi: μὲν λόγων A c
again: one may string together a series of characteristic speeches of the utmost finish as regards Diction and Thought, and yet fail to produce the true tragic effect; but one will have much better success with a tragedy which, however inferior in these respects, has a Plot, a combination of incidents, in it. And again: the most powerful elements of attraction in Tragedy, the Peripeties and Discoveries, are parts of the Plot. A further proof is in the fact that beginners succeed earlier with the Diction and Characters than with the construction of a story; and the same may be said of nearly all the early dramatists. We maintain, therefore, that the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of Tragedy is the Plot; and that the Characters come second—compare the parallel in painting, where the most beautiful colours laid on without order will not give one the same pleasure as a simple black-and-white sketch of a portrait. We maintain that Tragedy is primarily an imitation of action, and that it is mainly for the sake of the action that it imitates the personal agents. Third comes the element of Thought, i.e. the power of saying whatever can be said, or what is appropriate to the occasion. This is what, in the speeches in Tragedy, falls under the arts of Politics and Rhetoric; for the older poets make their personages discourse like statesmen, and the moderns like rhetoricians. One must not confuse it with Character. Character in a play is that which reveals the moral purpose of the agents, i.e. the sort of thing they seek or avoid, where that is not obvious—hence there is no room for Character in a speech on a purely indifferent subject. Thought, on the other hand, is shown in all they say when proving or disproving some particular point, or enunciating some universal proposition. Fourth among the literary elements is the Diction of the personages, i.e. as before explained, the expression of their thoughts in words, which is practically the same thing with verse as with prose. As for the two remaining parts, the Melody
[pente] ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἱσομάτων, ἢ δὲ όψις
ψυχαγωγικῶν μὲν, ἀτεχνώτατον δὲ καὶ ἡκίστα οἰκείον τῆς
ποιητικῆς· ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὄνειμα καὶ ἀνευ ἀγώνος
καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἔστω, ἐτί δὲ κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν
20 τῶν ὑψεων ἢ τοῦ σκενοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἔστω.

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταύτα ποιαν 7
tωά δεῖ τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπειδὴ τούτο
cαὶ πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον τῆς τραγῳδίας ἐστίν. κεῖται δὴ
ἡ ἤμιν τὴν τραγῳδίαν τελείαν καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μὲ-
25 μησων ἔχουσης τι μέγεθος· ἐστίν γὰρ ὅλων καὶ μηδέν ἔχου
μέγεθος. ὅλων δὲ ἐστὶν τὸ ἔχων ἀρχήν καὶ μέσων καὶ τε-
λευτήν. ἀρχή δὲ ἐστίν ὁ αὐτῷ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ'
ἐλλο ἐστίν, μετ' ἐκείνῳ ὁ ἑτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἡ γίνεσθαι
τελευτὴ δὲ τούπαστον ὁ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἡ
30 ἡ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, μετὰ δὲ τούτο ἄλλο οὐδὲν
μέσων δὲ ὁ καὶ αὐτῷ μετ' ἄλλο καὶ μετ' ἐκείνῳ ἑτερον.
δεὶ ἄρα τοὺς συνεστῶτας εὐ μῆθοι μὴ' ὅποθεν ἔτυχεν
ἀρχεῖσθαι μὴ' ὅπου ἔτυχε τελευτᾶν, ἀλλὰ κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς
eἰρημέναις ἱδέαις. ἐτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἀπαν
35 πράγμα ὁ συνεστηκεν ἐκ των οὐ μόνον ταύτα τεταγμένα
dεὶ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχών· τὸ
γάρ καλὸν ἐν μεγεθεί καὶ τάξει ἔστω, διό ὡστε πάρμικρον
ἀν τι γένοιτο καλὸν ζῷον (συγχεῖται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἐγγὺς
tού ἀνασθήτου χρόνου γνωμενί) οὔτε παμμέγεθε (οὐ γὰρ
45 ἂμα ἡ θεωρία γίνεται ἀλλὰ οἴχεται τοῖς θεωροῦσι τὸ ἐν
καὶ τὸ ὅλων ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας) οἷων εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἶν

16 πέντε induxit Spengel (om. Ar.).: pέμπτων apogr. 17 ἀπεχρώ-
tatov Aق 18 ἡ apogr.: όσο Aق: ἱσοι Meiser 23 δὴ scripsi:
8' Αε 34 εἰδέασι Aο 37 πάρμικρον Riccardianus 16
(fere exignium Averroes): τὰν μικρῶν Aο 39 παμμέγεθε Riccardi-
anus 16: πάν μέγεθος Aο
is the greatest of the pleasurable accessories of Tragedy. The Spectacle, though an attraction, is the least artistic of all the parts, and has least to do with the art of poetry. The tragic effect is quite possible without a public performance and actors; and besides, the getting-up of the Spectacle is more a matter for the costumier than the poet.

Having thus distinguished the parts, let us now consider the proper construction of the Fable or Plot, as that is at once the first and the most important thing in Tragedy. We have laid it down that a tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude; for a whole may be of no magnitude to speak of. Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that which is not itself necessarily after anything else, and which has naturally something else after it; an end is that which is naturally after something itself, either as its necessary or usual consequent, and with nothing else after it; and a middle, that which is by nature after one thing and has also another after it. A well-constructed Plot, therefore, cannot either begin or end at any point one likes; beginning and end in it must be of the forms just described. Again: to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain definite magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order, and therefore impossible either (1) in a very minute creature, since our perception becomes indistinct as it approaches instantaneity; or (2) in a creature of vast size—one, say, 1000 miles long—as in that case, instead of
Μέθοδος δ’ ἐστὶν εἰς οὐχ ὁσπερ τω̣ς οἰνοταί ἐν

περὶ ἐνα ἥ: πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρα τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει, εἴς ὅν ἐνίων οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τὸ ὄντως δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἐνὸς πολλαὶ εἰσιν, 

εἴς ὅν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πράξεις. διὸ πάντες ἐοίκαις

ἀμαρτάνειν ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἰρακληίδα Θησηίδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήματα πεποίηκασαι· οἰνοταί γὰρ, ἐπεὶ εἰς ἦν ὁ Ἰρακλής, ἕνα καὶ τὸν μῦθον εἰσὶν προσήκειν. ὁ δ’ ἢ Ὁμήρος ὁσπερ καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ διαφέρει καὶ τοῦτο ἔοικεν καλῶς Θεία, ὦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἦ διὰ φύσιν. Ὄδύσσειαν

ἐγὼ ποιῶν ὕψω ἐποίησεν ἀπαύγα ὁσα αὐτῷ συνεβή, οἰνὸς πληγήμας μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανήμας δὲ προσποιητάσθαι ἐν τῷ ἄγρεμφ, ὄν οὔδε βατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μίαν πράξιν οἰαν λέγομεν τὴν Ὄδύσσειαν συνεοιθήσεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιανᾶν.
the object being seen all at once, the unity and wholeness of it is lost to the beholder. Just in the same way, then, as a beautiful whole made up of parts, or a beautiful living creature, must be of some size, a size to be taken in by the eye, so a story or Plot must be of some length, but of a length to be taken in by the memory. As for the limit of its length, so far as that is relative to public performances and spectators, it does not fall within the theory of poetry. If they had to perform a hundred tragedies, they would be timed by water-clocks, as they are said to have been at one period. The limit, however, set by the actual nature of the thing is this: the longer the story, consistently with its being comprehensible as a whole, the finer it is by reason of its magnitude. As a rough general formula, 'a length which allows of the hero passing by a series of probable or necessary stages from misfortune to happiness, or from happiness to misfortune,' may suffice as a limit for the magnitude of the story.

The Unity of a Plot does not consist, as some suppose, in its having one man as its subject. An infinity of things befall that one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to unity; and in like manner there are many actions of one man which cannot be made to form one action. One sees, therefore, the mistake of all the poets who have written a *Heracleid*, a *Theseid*, or similar poems; they suppose that, because Heracles was one man, the story also of Heracles must be one story. Homer, however, evidently understood this point quite well, whether by art or instinct, just in the same way as he excels the rest in every other respect. In writing an *Odyssey*, he did not make the poem cover all that ever befell his hero—it befell him, for instance, to get wounded on Parnassus and also to feign madness at the time of the call to arms, but the two incidents had no probable or necessary connexion with one another—instead of doing that, he took an action with a Unity of the kind we are describing as the subject of the *Odyssey*, as also of the *Iliad*. The truth is
30 δα. Χρῆ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς ἡ μία μύμησις ἐνός ἐστιν, οὔτω καὶ τῶν μύδων, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησις ἐστι, μᾶς τε εἶναι ταύτης καὶ ὀλής, καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτως ὡστε μετατιθεμένοι τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὠλον· ὦ γὰρ προσον
35 ἢ µὴ προσὸν µὴδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπιθηλον, οὔδεν µόριον τὸν ὠλὸν ἐστίν.

Φανερῶν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόµενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ ὄντα κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὦ γὰρ

1451 ιστορικός καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὖ τῷ ἢ ἐξομετρὰ λέγειν ἢ ἀμετα διαφέρουσιν (ἐἰ ἢ ἄρα ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότον εἰς μέτρα τεθὺναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἤτον ἡ ἐφικτία τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων) ἀλλὰ τοῦτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τῶν µέν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τούτῳ οὐ οὖ ν ἄν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφότερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἰστορικά ἐστίν· ἢ µὲν γὰρ ποίησις µᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἰστορία τὰ καθ' ἐκαστὸν λέγει. ἐστιν δὲ καθόλου µέν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποία ἀττά συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράστευσαν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ στο-
10 χάζεται ἢ ποίησις ὑπώματα ἐπιτιθεμένην τὸ δὲ καθ' ἐκαστον, τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπραξεν ἢ τὸ ἐπαθειν. ἐπὶ µὲν οὖν τῆς κωμῳδίας ὅτι τοῦτο ὤηλον γέγονεν συστησάτες γὰρ τὸν μύθον διὰ τῶν εἰκότων οὔτω τὰ τυχόντα ὑπόματα ὑποτιθέασε, καὶ οὐχ ὄσπερ οἱ ἰαμβοποιοὶ περὶ τοῦ καθ' ἐκαστον
15 ποιοῦντο· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τραγῳδίας τῶν γενόμενων ὑμοράτων ἀντέχονται. αὐτὸν δ' ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι τὸ ὄντα τὰ μὲν οὖν µὴ γενόμενα οὔτω πιστεύομεν εἶναι ὄντα, τὰ δὲ γε-

32 ταῖτης καὶ Susemihl (ed. 1); καὶ ταύτης Aε 36 οὐ τὸ ἀπογρ. (confirm. Ar.): οὔτω Aε γενόμενα Riccardianus 16: γενόμενα Aε 1451b 4 τούτο Aε, Spengel τῷ τὸ Spengel 10 τῷ τὸν Aε 13 οὔτω] οὔτω (ni fallor) Ar. 14 περὶ τῶν ἀπογρ. 16 πείδαινῳ Aε
that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transpositional or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole.

From what we have said it will be seen that the poet's function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable or necessary. The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse—you might put the work of Herodotus into verse, and it would still be a species of history; it consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do—which is the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the characters; by a singular statement, one as to what, say, Alcibiades did or had done to him. In Comedy this has become clear by this time; it is only when their plot is already made up of probable incidents that they give it a basis of proper names, choosing for the purpose any names that may occur to them, instead of writing like the old iambic poets about particular persons. In Tragedy, however, they still adhere to the historic names; and for this reason: what convinces is the possible; now whereas we are not yet sure as to the possibility of that which has not hap-
νόμενα φανερὸν ὅτι δυνατὰ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ ἤν ἄδυ- 
νατα. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἐνίας μὲν ἐν

20 ἦ δύο τῶν γνωρίμων ἐστὶν ὄνομάτων, τὰ δὲ ἀλλα πεποι-

μένα, ἐν ἐνίας δὲ οὐδέν, οἷον ἐν τῷ 'Ἄγαθωνος 'Ἀνδρέι' ὀμοίως

γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ τὰ τε πράγματα καὶ τὰ ὄνοματα πεποίηται,

καὶ οὐδὲν ἢτον εὑφραίνει. ὡστ' οὐ πάντως ἂν εἴη ἐντείον

tῶν παραδομένων μύθων, περὶ οὗς αἱ τραγῳδίαι εἰσίν, ἀντέ-

25 χεσθαί. καὶ γὰρ γελοίων τούτο ἠτείνει, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γνώ-

ριμα ὀλγοις γνώριμα ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὀμοίως εὑφραίνει πάντας.

ἡλον οὐν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων

εἶναι δεί ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσω ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μι-

μησίν ἐστί, μιμεῖται δὲ τός πράξεις. κἂν ἄρα συμβῆ γενό-

30 μενα ποιεῖν, οὐδέν ἢτον ποιητῆς ἐστὶ τῶν γὰρ γενομένων

ἐνα οὐδέν καλύπτες οὐαίναι ὅτι ἂν εἰκός γενέσθαι καὶ

δυνατὰ γενέσθαι, καθ' ὁ ἐκεῖνος αὐτῶν ποιητῆς ἐστιν.

τῶν δὲ ἄπλων μύθων καὶ πράξεων αἱ ἐπεισοδώδεις

eἰσιν χείρισται: λέγω ὅ εἰπεισοδώδη μύθον ἐν ὃ τὰ ἐπεισ-

35 ρία μετ' ἄλληλα οὔτε εἰκός οὔτε ἀνάγκη εἶναι. τοιαῦτα

de ποιοῦνται ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ψαυλῶν ποιητῶν δὲ αὐτούς, ὑπὸ
de τῶν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τῶν ὑποκρίτας· ἀγωνίσματα γὰρ

ποιοῦντες καὶ παρὰ τὴν ὄνωμαι παρατείνωντες μύθον πολ-

1452 a λάκις διαστρέφεις ἀναγκάζονται τὸ ἑφεξῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ

μόνον τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἡ μίμησις ἀλλὰ καὶ φαβερῶν

καὶ ἑλεειωῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα [καὶ μᾶλλον]

ὄταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δὲ ἄλληλα· τὸ γὰρ θαυ-

5 μαστὸν οὕτως ἔξει μᾶλλον ἡ εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ

τῆς τύχης, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης ταῦτα θαυμασιώτατο

19 ἐνίας] ἐν ἐνίας apogr. 21 οὔθ' ἐν Αε 'Ἀνδρέι Welcker:

ἀνθεί Αε 23 ὡστ' οὐ] ὡσ τοῦ Αε ἀν εἰη M. Schmidt:

ἐνιαί Αε 33 ἀπλῶν] ἀλλων Tyrwhitt 37 κριτάς apogr.

38 παρατείνωντες apogr. 1452 a 3 καὶ μᾶλλον induxit Spenge
pened, that which has happened is manifestly possible, else it would not have come to pass. Nevertheless even in Tragedy there are some plays with but one or two known names in them, the rest being inventions; and there are some without a single known name, e.g. Agathon's *Antheus*, in which both incidents and names are of the poet's invention; and it is no less delightful on that account. So that one must not aim at a rigid adherence to the traditional stories on which tragedies are based. It would be absurd, in fact, to do so, as even the known stories are only known to a few, though they are a delight none the less to all.

It is evident from the above that the poet must be more the poet of his stories or Plots than of his verses, inasmuch as he is a poet by virtue of the imitative element in his work, and it is actions that he imitates. And if he should come to take a subject from actual history, he is none the less a poet for that; since some historic occurrences may very well be in the probable and possible order of things; and it is in that aspect of them that he is their poet.

Of simple Plots and actions the episodic are the worst. I call a Plot episodic when there is neither probability nor necessity in the sequence of its episodes. Actions of this sort bad poets construct through their own fault, and good ones on account of the players. His work being for public performance, a good poet often stretches out a Plot beyond its capabilities, and is thus obliged to twist the sequence of incident.

Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete action, but also of incidents arousing pity and fear. Such incidents have the very greatest effect on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of one another; there is more of the marvellous in them then than if they happened of themselves or by mere chance. Even matters of chance seem most marvellous if there is
δοκεῖ ὁσα ὦσπερ ἐπιτήδεος φαίνεται γεγονέναι, οἷον ὡς ὁ ἀνδριάς ὁ τοῦ Μίτνου ἐν 'Αρχεὶ ἀπέκτεινεν τὸν αἰτίαν τοῦ θανάτου τῷ Μίτνῳ, θεωροῦτι ἐμπεσόν· ἔουε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα 10 οὖκ εἰκή γεγένησαν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοῦς τοιούτους εἶναι καλλίους μύθους.

Εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἀπλοὶ οἱ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι. 10 καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις δὲν μιμὴσεις οἱ μύθοι εἰσὶν ὑπάρχον- σων εὑρός οὐσία τοιαῦτα. λέγω δὲ ἀπλὴν μὲν πράξιν ἢς 15 γνωμένης ὦσπερ ὀρισταὶ συνεχοῦς καὶ μᾶς ἄνεν πεπι- τειας ἡ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἡ μετάβασις γίνεται, πεπλεγμένη δὲ ἠλέξις ἡ μετά ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἡ πεπιτείας ἡ ἀμφοῦ ἡ 20 μετάβασις ἡ. ταύτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἡ δυνατή τῆς συν- στάσεως τοῦ μύθου, ὡστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν 25 ἡ ἡ ἀνάγκης ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι ταύτα· διαφέρει γὰρ πολὺ τὸ γίγνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἡ μετά τάδε.

'Εστι δὲ πεπιτειαὶ μὲν ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναιτίον τῶν πρατ- 30 τομέων μεταβολὴ καθάπερ εἰρηταί, καὶ τούτο δὲ ὦσπερ λέγομεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἡ ἀναγκαῖον, ὦσπερ ἐν τῷ Οἰδί- 25 ποι ἔλθων ὡς εὐφραίνων τὸν Οἰδίποον καὶ ἀπαλλάξων τοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φόβου, δηλώσας ὡς ἢν, τουναντίον ἐποίησεν· καὶ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ ὁ μὲν ἄγομενος ὡς ἀποθανοῦμενος, ὁ δὲ Δαναὸς ἀκολουθῶν ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, τὸν μὲν συνεβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀποθανεῖν, τὸν δὲ σωθῆναι. ἀναγνώρις 35 δὲ, ὦσπερ καὶ τούνομα σημαίνει, ἡ ἡ ἀναγκαία εἰς γνώσις 30 μεταβολῇ, ἡ εἰς φιλίαν ἡ εἰς ἔχθραν, τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἡ 30 δυστυχίαν ὀρισμένων καλλιστή δὲ ἀναγνώρισις, ὅταν ἀμα πεπιτείαι γίνονται, οἴον ἔχει ἡ εἰν τῷ Οἰδίποδι. εἰσὶν

an appearance of design as if were in them; as for instance the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the author of Mitys' death by falling down on him when a looker-on at a public spectacle; for incidents like that we think to be not without a meaning. A Plot, therefore, of this sort is necessarily finer than others.

Plots are either simple or complex, since the actions they represent are naturally of this twofold description. The action, proceeding in the way defined, as one continuous whole, I call simple, when the change in the hero's fortunes takes place without Peripety or Discovery; and complex, when it involves one or the other, or both. These should each of them arise out of the structure of the Plot itself, so as to be the consequence, necessary or probable, of the antecedents. There is a great difference between a thing happening propter hoc and post hoc.

A Peripety is the change from one state of things within the play to its opposite of the kind described, and that too in the way we are saying, in the probable or necessary sequence of events; as it is for instance in Oedipus: here the opposite state of things is produced by the Messenger, who, coming to gladden Oedipus and to remove his fears as to his mother, reveals the secret of his birth. And in Lyceus: just as he is being led off for execution, with Danaus at his side to put him to death, the incidents preceding this bring it about that he is saved and Danaus put to death. A Discovery is, as the very word implies, a change from ignorance to knowledge, and thus to either love or hate, in the personages marked for good or evil fortune. The finest form of Discovery is one attended by Peripeties, like that which goes with the Discovery in Oedipus. There are
II. 1452ᵃ 34—II. 1452ᵇ 22

μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι ἀναγνωρίσεις· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ
35 τὰ τυχόντα ἔστων ὃς ὅπερ εἰρήται συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ πέ-
προγε τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἔστων ἀναγνωρίσαι. ἀλλὰ ἡ μᾶ-
λιστα τοῦ μύθου καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως ἡ εἰρημένη ἔστιν· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισις καὶ περιπέτεια ἡ ἔλεον

1452ᵇ ἔξει ἡ φόβον, οὖν πράξεων ἡ τραγῳδία μέμησις ὑπόκειται·
ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων
συμβήσεται. ἐπεὶ δὴ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις τυιῶν ἔστων ἀναγνωρίσις,
aὶ μὲν θατέρου πρὸς τὸν ἔτερον μόνον, ὅταν ἢ ὄνομος ἂτερος
5 τὸς ἔστων, ὅτε δὲ ἀμφοτέρους δεῖ ἀναγνωρίσαι, οἶον ἢ
μὲν Ἰφιγένεια τῷ Ὀρέστη ἀνεγνωρίσθη ἐκ τῆς πέμψεως
tῆς ἑπιστολῆς, ἐκεῖνον δὲ πρὸς τῷ Ἰφιγένειαν ἄλλης ἔθει ἀναγνωρίσεως.

ὁμὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μύθου μέρη περὶ ταῦτα ἔστι, περιπέτεια
10 καὶ ἀναγνώρισις· τρίτου δὲ πάθος. τοῦτω δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν
καὶ ἀναγνώρισις εἰρήται, πάθος δὲ ἔστι πράξεως φθαρτικὴ ἡ
ὁδυναρά, οἶον οἶ έν τῷ φανερῷ θάνατοι καὶ οἳ περιο-
δυνάει καὶ τρόφεις καὶ ὅσα τοιαύτα.

Μέρη δὲ τραγῳδίας οἰς μὲν ὃς εἰδέναι δεὶ ἀριστάθαι 12
15 πρότερον εἰπομεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσῶν καὶ εἰς ὃ διαμερίσαι
ekεχωρισμένα τάδε ἔστιν, πρόλογοι ἐπεισοδίων ἔχον τοὺς
χορικῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μὲν πάροδος τὸ δὲ στάσιμον, κανὼ μὲν
ἀπάντων ταῦτα, ὅια δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ κόμμωι.
ἔστω δὲ πρόλογος μὲν μέρος ὅλων τραγῳδίας τὸ πρὸ χοροῦ
20 παρόδου, ἐπεισοδίων δὲ μέρος ὅλων τραγῳδίας τὸ μεταξὺ
ὅλων χορικῶν μελῶν, ἔχοδος δὲ μέρος ὅλων τραγῳδίας
μεθ’ ὦ οὐκ ἔστι χοροῦ μέλος· χορικὸς δὲ πάροδος μὲν ἢ

35 ὡς ὅπερ Spengel: ὄπερ Aᵇ 36 ἢ] εἰ Aᵇ 1452ᵇ 1 οἶον
Aᵇ 3 ἐπεὶ ὄν Parisinus 2038: ἐπειδὴ Aᵇ 4 ἂτερος ἄπογρ.: ἔτερος Aᵇ 7 εἰκείνου scripsi: ἐκείνω Aᵇ 9 περὶ om.
Riccardianus 46 12 οἶ τε] ὅτε Aᵇ 19 προχωροῦ Aᵇ
no doubt other forms of it; what we have said may happen
in a way in reference to inanimate things, even things of
a very casual kind; and it is also possible to discover
whether some one has done or not done something. But
the form most directly connected with the Plot and the
action of the piece is the first-mentioned. This, with a
Peripety, will arouse either pity or fear—actions of that
nature being what Tragedy is assumed to represent; and it
will also serve to bring about the happy or unhappy ending.
The Discovery, then, being of persons, it may be that of one
party only to the other, the latter being already known; or
both the parties may have to discover themselves. Iphigenia,
for instance, was discovered to Orestes by sending the
letter; and another Discovery was required to reveal him
to Iphigenia.

Two parts of the Plot, then, Peripety and Discovery, are
on matters of this sort. A third part is Suffering; which
we may define as an action of a destructive or painful
nature, such as murders on the stage, tortures, woundings,
and the like. The other two have been already explained.

The parts of Tragedy to be treated as formative elements in
the whole were mentioned in a previous Chapter. From the
point of view, however, of its quantity, i.e. the separate
sections into which it is divided, a tragedy has the following
parts: Prologue, Episode, Exode, and a choral portion, distin-
tinguished into Parode and Stasimon; these two are common
to all tragedies, whereas songs from the stage and Commoe
are only found in some. The Prologue is all that precedes
the Parode of the chorus; an Episode all that comes in
between two whole choral songs; the Exode all that follows
after the last choral song. In the choral portion the Parode
is the whole first statement of the chorus; a Stasimon,
πρώτῃ λέξις ὀλὴ χρονὶ, στάσιμον δὲ μέλος χρονὶ τὸ ἀνευ ἀναπαίστον καὶ τροχαίον, κόμμοι δὲ θηνός κοινὸς χρονὶ καὶ 

25 ἀπὸ σκηνῆς. μέρη δὲ τραγῳδίας οἷς μὲν ἢς εἰδεσί δὲ 

χρῆσθαι πρότερον εἴπαιμεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς δ 

διαρείτας κεχώρισμένα ταῦτ᾽ ἔστων.

Ως δὲ δεῖ στοχαξεθᾶσαι καὶ δὲι εὐλαβεῖσθαι συν— 

στάτας τοὺς μύθους καὶ πόθεν ἔσται τὸ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔρ— 

30 γον, ἐφεξῆς ἄν εἰὶ λεκτέον τοὺς νῦν εἰρημένοις. ἐπειδῆ οὖ \n
δεῖ τὴν σύνθεσιν εἶναι τῆς καλλιστῆς τραγῳδίας μὴ ἀπλῆι 

ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην καὶ ταύτῃ φοβερῶν καὶ ἑλευσών εἶναι 

μμμμεικὴν (τοῦτο γὰρ οἴον τῆς τοιαύτης μμμμεῖσώς ἔστων, 

πρῶτον μὲν δὴλον ὃτι ὄστε τοὺς εἰςκεκεῖς ἄνδρας δεῖ μετα— 

35 βάλλοντας φαίνεσθαι εἴς εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίας, οὐ γὰρ 

φοβερῶν οὐδὲ ἑλευσῶν τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μμμεῖσων ἔστων. ὄστε 

τοὺς μο— 

χθηροὺς εἰς ἄτυχίας εἰς εὐτυχίας, ἀτραγῳδότατον γὰρ τοῦτ' 

ἐστὶ τάντων, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὃν δεῖ, ὄστε γὰρ ἡμᾶν 

φιλανθρωπον

1453 εἰς ἑλευσῶν ὄστε φοβερῶν ἔστων. οὖδ' αὐ τὸν σφόδρα ποιηρὼν 

εἰς εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίας μεταπέπτειν τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλ- 

ἀνθρωπον ἔχοι ἄν ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις ἀλλ' ὄστε ἔλεον ὄστε 

φόβου, ο µὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον ἔστων δυστυχοῦστα, ο δὲ 

5 περὶ τῶν ὁμοιον, ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τῶν ἀνάξιων, φόβος δὲ 

περὶ τῶν ὁμοιον, ὡστε ὄστε ἑλευσών ὄστε φοβερῶν ἔσται τὸ 

συμβαῦν. ὁ μεταξὺ δρα τούτων λοιπός. ἐστὶ δὲ τοιοῦτος 

ὁ µῆτε ἀρετῆ διαφέρον καὶ δικαιοσύνη µῆτε διὰ κακίαν 

καὶ µουχθρίαν μεταβάλλων εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἀλλὰ δι' 

10 ἀµαρτίαν τινὰ τῶν ἐν µεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄστων καὶ εὐτυχία, 

οἶνον ὦδής ὑμῶν καὶ Ὁνεστῆς καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τουτών γενῶν

23 ὁλὴ Susemihl, Westphal: ὀλὸν Αε 25 ὃς εἰδεσι add. apogr. 

28 ὧν Parisinum 2038: ὃς Αε δεὶ -έι in litura Αε 1453 ι 1 

αὐ τὸν Parisinum 2038: αὐτὸ Αε 11 ὦδής apogr. (confirm. 

Ar.): δίπους Αε
a song of the chorus without anapaests or trochees; a
Commus, a lamentation sung by chorus and actor in concert.
The parts of Tragedy to be used as formative elements in
the whole we have already mentioned; the above are its
parts from the point of view of its quantity, or the separate
sections into which it is divided.

The next points after what we have said above will be these: (1) What is the poet to aim at, and what is he to
avoid, in constructing his Plots? and (2) What are the
conditions on which the tragic effect depends?

We assume that, for the finest form of Tragedy, the
Plot must be not simple but complex; and further, that it
must imitate actions arousing pity and fear, since that is the
distinctive function of this kind of imitation. It follows,
therefore, that there are three forms of Plot to be avoided.
(1) A good man must not be seen passing from happiness
to misery, or (2) a bad man from misery to happiness. The
first situation is not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply
odious to us. The second is the most untragic that can
be; it has no one of the requisites of Tragedy; it does
not appeal either to the human feeling in us, or to our
pity, or to our fears. Nor on the other hand should (3) an
extremely bad man be seen falling from happiness into
misery. Such a story may arouse the human feeling in
us, but it will not move us to either pity or fear; pity is
occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of
one like ourselves; so that there will be nothing either
piteous or fear-inspiring in the situation. There remains, then,
the intermediate kind of personage, a man not pre-eminently
virtuous and just, whose misfortune, however, is brought
upon him not by vice and depravity but by some error of
judgement, of the number of those in the enjoyment of great
reputation and prosperity; e.g. Oedipus, Thyestes, and the
men of note of similar families. The perfect Plot, accordingly,
έπιφανεῖς ἀνδρεῖς. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τῶν καλῶς ἔχονται μέθοδον ἀπλοῦν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἡ διπλοῦν, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασὶ, καὶ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἀλλὰ τούναντιον 15 ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μὴ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλλὰ δὲ ἀμαρτίαν μεγάλην ἡ ὦν εἴρηται ἡ βελτίωνος μᾶλλον ἡ χείρονος. σημειοῦ ὅτι καὶ τὸ γινόμενον πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τυχόντας μῦθους ἀπηρίθμουν, νῦν δὲ περὶ ὀλίγας οἰκίαις αἱ κάλλισται τραγῳδίαι συντίθενται, οἷον 20 περὶ Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ Οἰδίπου καὶ Ὄρεστην καὶ Μελέαγρον καὶ Θυέστην καὶ Τήλεφον καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι συμβεβηκέν ἢ παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλιστὴ τραγῳδία ἐκ ταύτης τῆς συντάσσεσος ἔστιν, διὸ καὶ οἱ Εὐριπίδης ἐγκαλοῦτες [τὸ] αὐτὸ ἀμαρτάνουσιν ὅτι τοῦτο 25 δρᾶ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις καὶ πολλαὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστιν ὥσπερ εἴρηται ὥρθον σημείον δὲ μέγιστον ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων τραγικῶταται αἱ τοιαύται φαινοῦται, ἂν κατορθωθῶσι, καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, ἀλλὰ τραγῳδίας γε τῶν ποιητῶν φαίνεται. δευτέρα δὴ ἡ πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐστὶν σύστασις, ἡ διπλῆ ἡ τῇ τῇ σύστασι ἐχοῦσα καθάπερ ἡ Ὄδυσσεα καὶ τελευτῶσα ἐξ ἐναυτίας τοῖς βελτίωσι καὶ χείροσιν. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρῶτη διὰ τὴν τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειον ἀκολουθοῦσι γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ κατ' 30 εὐχὴν ποιοῦσι τοῖς θεαταῖς. ἐστιν δὲ οὐχ αὐτὴ ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἵδου ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμῳδίας οἰκεῖα: ἐκεί γὰρ οἱ ἐκ ἐχθριστοῦ ὄσιν ἐν τῷ μέθῃ, οἶον Ὄρεστης καὶ Αἴγινος, φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἀποθνήσκει οὔδείς ὑπ’ οὐδενός.

20 Ἀλκμέωνα scripsi: ἀλκμαίωνΑς 24 τὸ seclusi 31 ἢ
33 βελτίωσι καὶ χείροσιν Άς 34 θεατῶν Riccardianus 16
35 ἐστὶ Άς 37 οἱ ἐν Bonitz: ἄν οἱ Άς 39 ἀποθνήσκει Άς
must have a single, and not (as some tell us) a double issue; the change in the hero's fortunes must be not from misery to happiness, but on the contrary from happiness to misery; and the cause of it must lie not in any depravity, but in some great error on his part; the man himself being either such as we have described, or better, not worse, than that. Fact also confirms our theory. Though the poets began by accepting any tragic story that came to hand, in these days the finest tragedies are always on the story of some few houses, on that of Alcmeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, or any others that may have been involved, as either agents or sufferers, in some deed of horror. The theoretically best tragedy, then, has a Plot of this description. The critics, therefore, are wrong, who blame Euripides for taking this line in his tragedies, and giving many of them an unhappy ending. It is, as we have said, the right line to take. The best proof is this: on the stage, and in the public performances, such plays, properly worked out, are seen to be the most truly tragic; and Euripides, even if his execution be faulty in every other point, is seen to be nevertheless the most tragic certainly of the dramatists. After this comes the construction of Plot which some rank first, one with a double story (like the Odyssey) and an opposite issue for the good and the bad personages. It is ranked as first only through the weakness of the audiences; the poets merely follow their public, writing as its wishes dictate. But the pleasure here is not that of Tragedy. It belongs rather to Comedy, where the bitterest enemies in the piece (e.g. Orestes and Aegisthus) walk off good friends at the end, with no slaying of any one by any one.
38

14. 1453 b I-27

1453 b ἦ Ἑστίν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἑλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὁψεως γλυκεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὃπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμείνονος. δει γὰρ καὶ ἀνευ τοῦ ὅραν οὕτω συνεστάναι τῶν μύθων ἥστε τῶν ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γυνόμενα καὶ φρίττευς καὶ ἑλεείν ἐκ τῶν συμβαίνοντων ἕπερ ἄν πάθοι τίς ἀκούων τῶν τοῦ Οἰδίπου μύθων. τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὁψεως τούτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνώτερον καὶ χρηγίας δεομενῶν ἔστιν. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερὸν διὰ τῆς ὁψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατώδες μόνον παρασκευάζουσε νοθευ τραγῳδία κοινωνοῦσιν οὐ γὰρ πάσαν δει χητείων ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μοιμήσεως δει ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζει τῶν ποιητῆς, φανερῶν ὥς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιητέον. ποιά οὖν δεινὰ η τοῖς οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται τῶν συμπεπτούντων, λάβομεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ ἡ φίλων εἰναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις ἡ ἔχθρων ἡ μηθέτερον. ἄν μὲν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρῶν, οὐδὲν ἑλεεινὸν οὔτε ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλων, πλὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος. οὐδ' ἂν μηθέτεροι ἔχοντες ὅταν δ' ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγχένηται τὰ πάθη, οὗτοι ἤ ἀδελφοὶ ἀδελφῶν ἡ νῖος πατέρα ἡ μήτηρ νῖον ἤ νῖος μητέρα ἀποκτείνη ἢ μέλλῃ ἢ τ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ὄρα, ταῦτα ξητήτεον. τοὺς μὲν οὖν παρειλημμέονοι μῦθους λύειν οὐκ ἔστιν, λέγω δὲ οὗτο τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν ἀποθανοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀρέσσου καὶ τὴν Ἐρυθύλην ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκμέων οὖν, αὐτῶν δὲ εὐρίσκειν δεί καὶ τοῖς παραδεδομένοις χρησθαί καλῶς. τὸ δὲ καλῶς τ' ἑγόμεν, εἶπομέν σαφέστερον. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτω γύνεσθαι τὴν πράξειν, ὀσπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ

1453 b 8 ἀτεχνώτερον Αε 15 δὴ Spengel: δὲ Αε 20 οἶον εἰ Sylburgius 21 ἀποκτείνει ἡ μέλλει Αε 22 δρᾶν Αε 23 Κλυταιμνήστραν Ατ. 24 ἀλκμαίωνα Αε 26 εἶπομέν Αε
The tragic fear and pity may be aroused by the Spectacle; but they may also be aroused by the very structure and incidents of the play—which is the better way and shows the better poet. The Plot in fact should be so framed that, even without seeing the things take place, he who simply hears the account of them shall be filled with horror and pity at the incidents; which is just the effect that the mere recital of the story in Oedipus would have on one. To produce this same effect by means of the Spectacle is less artistic, and requires extraneous aid. Those, however, who make use of the Spectacle to put before us that which is merely monstrous and not productive of fear, are wholly out of touch with Tragedy; not every kind of pleasure should be required of a tragedy, but only its own proper pleasure.

The tragic pleasure is that of pity and fear, and the poet has to produce it by a work of imitation; it is clear, therefore, that the causes should be included in the incidents of his story. Let us see, then, what kinds of incident strike one as horrible, or rather as piteous. In a deed of this description the parties must necessarily be either friends, or enemies, or indifferent to one another. Now when enemy does it on enemy, there is nothing to move us to pity either in his doing or in his meditating the deed, except so far as the actual pain of the sufferer is concerned; and the same is true when the parties are indifferent to one another. Whenever the tragic deed, however, is done within the family—when murder or the like is done or meditated by brother on brother, by son on father, by mother on son, or son on mother—these are the situations the poet should seek after. The traditional stories, accordingly, must be kept as they are, e.g. the murder of Clytaemnestra by Orestes and of Eriphyle by Alcmeon. At the same time even with these there is something left to the poet himself; it is for him to devise the right way of treating them. Let us explain more clearly what we mean by 'the right way.' The deed of horror may be done by the doer knowingly and consciously, as in the old poets, and in Medea's murder
ἐποίουν εἰδότας καὶ γιγανόσκοιτας, καθάπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐποίησεν ἀποκτείνουσαι τοὺς παῖδας τὴν Μήδειαν· ἔστω δὲ 30 πράξαι μὲν, ἀγνοοῦντας δὲ πράξαι τὸ δεινόν, εἰδ' ύστερον ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, ὦσπερ ὁ Σωφοκλέους Οἰδίποιοι· τοῦτο μὲν ὦν ἐξω τοῦ δράματος, ἐν δ' αὐτῇ τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ οἶον ὁ 'Αλκμέως ὁ Ἀστυδάμαιτος ἢ ὁ Τηλέγονος ὃν ἐν τῷ τραγῳδίᾳ 'Οδυσσεί. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον παρὰ ταῦτα; τὸ μέλλον·

35 τὰ ποιεῖ τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων δὲ ἀγνοοῦσαν ἀναγνωρίσαι πρὶν ποιῆσαι. καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὦκ ἔστων ἀλλώς. ὡς γὰρ πράξαι ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ καὶ εἰδότας ἢ μὴ εἰδότας. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν γιγανόσκοιτα μελλήσαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι χείριστον· τὸ τε γὰρ μιαρὸν ἔχει, καὶ οὐ τραγικοὶ ἀπαθὲς γάρ. διὸ περί οὔδεις

I454a ποιεῖ ὁμοίως, εἰ μὴ ὀλυγάκις, οἶον ἐν 'Αντιγόνῃ τὸν Κρέοντα ὁ Αἴμων. τὸ δὲ πράξαι δεύτερον. βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα μὲν πράξαι, πράξαιτα δὲ ἀναγνωρίσαι τὸ τε γὰρ μιαρὸν οὐ πρόσεστιν καὶ ἢ ἀναγνωρίσεις ἑκπληκτικῶν. κράτιστον δὲ 5 τὸ τελευταῖον, λέγω δὲ οἶον ἐν τῷ Κρεσφῶντῃ ἢ Μερόπῃ μέλλει τὸν νῦν ἀποκτείνωσαι, ἀποκτείνῃ δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισε, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἢ ἀδελφῇ τῶν ἄδελφῶν, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἐλλη ὁ νῦς τὴν μητέρα ἐκδοθήσει μελλῶν ἀνεγνώρισεν. διὰ γὰρ τούτο, ὅπερ πάλαι εἴρηται, οὐ περὶ πολλά 10 γένη αἱ τραγῳδίαι εἰσίν. ὑποτείνετε γὰρ οὖκ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης εὗρον τὸ τοιοῦτον παρασκευάζειν ἐν τοῖς μύθοις· ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὰς οἰκίας ἀπαντᾶν ὁσαὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβεβήκηκε πάθη. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσεως καὶ ποιοῦ τινὰς εἶναι δὲι τοὺς μῦθος εἴρηται ἱκανῶς.

Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἦθη τέτταρά ἔστων ὄν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἐν Ι

I454a 6 ἀνεγνωρισες Αc

33 'Αλκμαίων ὁ Victorius: ἀλκμαίωνος Αc 34 τὸ Bonitz: τῶν Αc
of her children in Euripides. Or he may do it, but in ignorance of his relationship, and discover that afterwards, as does the Oedipus in Sophocles. Here the deed is outside the play; but it may be within it, like the act of the Alcmeon in Astydamas, or that of the Telegonus in *Ulysses Wounded*. A third possibility is for one meditating some deadly injury to another, in ignorance of his relationship, to make the discovery in time to draw back. These exhaust the possibilities, since the deed must necessarily be either done or not done, and either knowingly or unknowingly.

The worst situation is when the personage is with full knowledge on the point of doing the deed, and leaves it undone. It is odious and also (through the absence of suffering) untragic; hence it is that no one is made to act thus except in some few instances, e.g. Haemon and Creon in *Antigone*. Next after this comes the actual perpetration of the deed meditated. A better situation than that, however, is for the deed to be done in ignorance, and the relationship discovered afterwards, since there is nothing odious in it, and the Discovery will serve to astound us. But the best of all is the last; what we have in *Cresphontes*, for example, where Merope, on the point of slaying her son, recognizes him in time; in *Iphigenia*, where sister and brother are in a like position; and in *Helle*, where the son recognizes his mother, when on the point of giving her up to her enemy.

This will explain why our tragedies are restricted (as we said just now) to such a small number of families. It was accident rather than art that led the poets in quest of subjects to embody this kind of incident in their Plots. They are still obliged, accordingly, to have recourse to the families in which such horrors have occurred.

On the construction of the Plot, and the kind of Plot required for Tragedy, enough has now been said.
μὲν καὶ πρῶτον, ὅπως χρηστὰ ἦ. ἔξει δὲ ἥδος μὲν ἔαν ὡσπερ ἑλέχθη τούτῳ φανερὸν ὁ λόγος ἡ ἦ πράξει προαιρεσίν των [ἡ], χρηστῶν δὲ ἔαν χρηστὴν. ἔστω δὲ εἰ: 20 ἐκάστῳ γένει καὶ γὰρ γυνὴ ἔστων χρηστῇ καὶ δοῖλος, καίτοι γε ὅπως τούτων τὸ μὲν χείρον, τὸ δὲ ὅλος φαῦλον ἔστω. δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀρμόττοντα ἔστων γὰρ ἀνθρείον μὲν τὸ ἥδος, ἀλλὰ οὗτος ἄρμοττον γυναίκεια τὸ ἀνθρείαι ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι. τρῦτον δὲ τὸ ὁμοιον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτερον τοῦ 25 χρηστῶν τὸ ἥδος καὶ ἄρμοττον ποῦμαται ὡσπερ εἴρηται. τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλόν. κἂν γὰρ ἀνόμαλον τίς ἢ ὁ τίνι μίμησιν παρέχων καὶ τοιούτων ἥδος ὑποτεθείς; ὅμως ὁμαλὸς ἄνωμαλον δεῖ εἶναι. ἔστω δὲ παραδειγμα ποιημάς μὲν ἥδους μὴ ἀναγκαίον οἰνὸν ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὄρεστῃ, τοῦ 30 δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἄρμοττουτος ὁ τε βρῆμος (ὁ τοῦ) Ὀδυσσέως ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ καὶ ἡ τῆς Μελανίπης ῥήσις, τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμάλου ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι Ἰφιγένεια: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔσκεν ἡ ἱκετεύουσα τῇ ὑστέρᾳ. χρῆ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠδεσιν ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συντάσσει· ἀεὶ ἥσειν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαίον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, 35 ἀστε τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ τουαίτα λέγειν ἡ πράττειν ἡ ἀναγκαίον ἡ εἰκός καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαίον ἢ εἰκός. φανερὸν οὐν ὁτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μυθῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ μύθου συμβαίνειν, καὶ μὴ ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ 'Ιλιάδι τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀπότολων. ἀλλὰ μηχανὴ χρηστέων ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ὄραματος, ἢ ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ γέγονεν ἢ οὐχ οἴον τε ἀνθρωπον εἰδέναι, ἢ ὅσα ὑστερον ἢ

18 τού ἦ in litura Α° 19 ἦ om. Parisinus 2038 22 τὸ Riccardianus 46, Vahlen (ed. 1): τα Α° 23 γυναικείω τὸ scripsi: γυναικί**τωι Α°: γυνακί το apogr. 29 ἀναγκαίον Marcianus 215: ἀναγκαίον Α° μὲν ἔλεος (i.e. Μενέλεως) Ἀτ. 30 ὁ τοῦ addidi 35 ετ 36 ἦ ἄναγκα οίνου Hermann 1454 b 2 ἀπόπλουν Riccardianus 16: ἀπόπλου Parisinus 2038 (Ar. de conversatione passiunis): ἀπόπλουν Α° 3 ἐπι τα apogr. (confirm. At.): ἐπιτα Α° 4 οἴονται Α°
In the Characters there are four points to aim at. First and foremost, that they shall be good. There will be an element of character in the play, if (as has been observed) what a personage says or does reveals a certain moral purpose; and a good element of character, if the purpose so revealed is good. Such goodness is possible in every type of personage, even in a woman or a slave, though the one is perhaps an inferior, and the other a wholly worthless being. The second point is to make them appropriate. The Character before us may be, say, manly; but it is not appropriate in a female Character to be manly, or clever. The third is to make them like the reality, which is not the same as their being good and appropriate, in our sense of the term. The fourth is to make them consistent and the same throughout; even if inconsistency be part of the man before one for imitation as presenting that form of character, he should still be consistently inconsistent. We have an instance of baseness of character, not required for the story, in the Menelaus in Orestes; of the incongruous and unbefitting in the lamentation of Ulysses in Scylla, and in the (clever) speech of Melanippe; and of inconsistency in Iphigenia at Aulis, where Iphigenia the suppliant is utterly unlike the later Iphigenia. The right thing, however, is in the Characters just as in the incidents of the play to endeavour always after the necessary or the probable; so that whenever such-and-such a personage says or does such-and-such a thing, it shall be the probable or necessary outcome of his character; and whenever this incident follows on that, it shall be either the necessary or the probable consequence of it. From this one sees (to digress for a moment) that the Dénouement also should arise out of the plot itself, and not depend on a stage-artifice, as in Medea, or in the story of the (arrested) departure of the Greeks in the Iliad. The artifice must be reserved for matters outside the play—for past events beyond human knowledge, or events yet to come, which require to be
5 δεῖται προαγορεύσεως καὶ ἀγγελίας. ἀπαντά γὰρ ἀποδίδομεν τοῖς θεοῖς ὁρᾶν. ἀλογον δὲ μηδέν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, εἶ δὲ μή, ἐξο τῆς τραγῳδίας, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι τῷ Σοφόκλεους. ἐπει δὲ μίμησις ἐστώ ἡ τραγῳδία βελτιώνων, ήμᾶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ἁγάθους εἰκονογράφοντες καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ἵδιαν μορφὴν ὁμοίως ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφονσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μμούμενον καὶ ὄργιλους καὶ ῥαθύμους καὶ τιλλάντα τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν] τοιούτους ὡστα ἐπιεικείς ποιεῖν [παράδειγμα σκληρότητος], οἷον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα Ἑλλάδος καὶ Ἑμερος. ταῦτα δὴ διατηρεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ παρά τὰς εἰς ἀνάγκης ἀκολούθουσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὰς ἔστω ἀμαρτάνειν πολλάκις· εἰρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδηδομένως λόγοις ἴκανως.

'Αναγνώρισις δὲ τί μεν ἔστω, εἰρηται πρότερον εἶδην 16 20 δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεως, πρότη μὲν ἡ ἀτεχνιστήτατη καὶ ἡ πλείστη χρώνται δὲ ἀπορίαι, ἡ διὰ τῶν σημείων. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν σύμφωνα, οἷον "λόγχην ἥν φοροῦσι Γηγενείς" ἡ ἀστέρας οἷον ἐν τῷ Ὀυέστῃ Καρκύνος, τὰ δὲ ἐπίκτητα, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἷον οὐλαί, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, τὰ περι-25 δέραια καὶ οἷον ἐν τῇ Ἰταλία διὰ τῆς σκάφης. ἔστω δὲ καὶ τούτων χρῆσθαι ἡ βέλτιον ἡ χείρον, οἷον (δ') Ὀδυσσεύς διὰ τῆς οὐλῆς ἄλλως ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ τῶν συστάτων· εἰ ὡστ' ἂν μὲν πίστεως ἐνεκα ἀτεχνώτεραι, καὶ αἱ τουαύταί πᾶσαι, αἱ δὲ ἐκ περὶπτερείς, ὡσ-30 περ ἡ ἐν τοῖς Νήπτροις, βελτίους. δεύτεραι δὲ αἱ πεποι-

7 τῷ τῷ πρ. Αο 14 παράδειγμα σκληρότητος seclusit Ritter 'Αγάθων apogr.: ἀγάθων Αο 15 δὴ Αο: δεῖ vel ἢ δεῖ apogr. τὰ παρὰ τὰς vel τάς παρά τὰ apogr.: τὰς παρὰ τὰς Αο 20 ἡ πλείστῃ Αο 22 φοροῦσιν Αο 24 περιδέραιa Parisinus 2038: περιδέραιa Αο 25 οἷον apogr. (confirm. Ar.): οἰ Αο 26 ὁ addidi
foretold or announced; since it is the privilege of the Gods to know everything. There should be nothing improbable among the actual incidents. If it be unavoidable, however, it should be outside the tragedy, like the improbability in the Oedipus of Sophocles. But to return to the Characters. As Tragedy is an imitation of personages better than the ordinary man, we in our way should follow the example of good portrait-painters, who reproduce the distinctive features of a man, and at the same time, without losing the likeness, make him handsomer than he is. The poet in like manner, in portraying men quick or slow to anger, or with similar infirmities of character, must know how to represent them as such, and at the same time as good men, as Agathon and Homer have represented Achilles.

All these rules one must keep in mind throughout, and further, those also for such points of stage-effect as directly depend on the art of the poet, since in these too one may often make mistakes. Enough, however, has been said on the subject in one of our published writings.

Discovery in general has been explained already. As for the species of Discovery, the first to be noted is (1) the least artistic form of it, of which the poets make most use through mere lack of invention, Discovery by signs or marks. Of these signs some are congenital, like the 'lance-head which the Earth-born have on them,' or 'stars,' such as Carcinus brings in in his Thyestes; others acquired after birth—these latter being either marks on the body, e.g. scars, or external tokens, like necklaces, or to take another sort of instance, the ark in the Discovery in Tyro. Even these, however, admit of two uses, a better and a worse; the scar of Ulysses is an instance; the Discovery of him through it is made in one way by the nurse and in another by the swineherds. A Discovery using signs as a means of assurance is less artistic, as indeed are all such as imply reflexion; whereas one bringing them in all of a sudden, as in the Bath-story, is of a better order. Next after these are (2)
16. 1454 b 31—1455 a 17

ημέναι υπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, διὸ ἄτεχνου. οὗν (δ) Ὀρέστης ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὀρέστης· ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ αὐτὸς λέγει ἄ βουλεται ὁ ποιητὴς ἀλλ' 35 οὕς ὁ μόδος· διὸ τι ἐγγὺς τῆς εἰρημένης ἀμαρτίας ἐστὶν, ἐξήν γὰρ ἂν ἐνια καὶ ἐνεγκείν. καὶ εἰ τῷ Σοφοκλέους Τηρεὶ ἡ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή. ἡ τρίτη δὲ ἡ ἑμή, τῷ αἰσθάνεται

1455 a τι ἱδούτα, ὡσπερ ἢ ἐν Κυπρίωι τοῖς Δικασύνενοι, ἱδὼν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν ἐκλαυσεν, καὶ ἢ ἐν Ἀλκινοῦ ἀπολογῷ, ἀκούων γὰρ τοῦ κυθαριστοῦ καὶ μανθαίνων Ἄ�άκρυσεν, οἷον ἀνεγνωρίσθησαν. τετάρτῃ δὲ ἢ ἐκ συναγωγῆς, οἷον ἐν Χοιρόφοις, 5 ὁτι ὁμοίως τις ἐλὴλυθεν, ὁμοίως δὲ οὕθεις ἀλλ' ἡ Ὁρέστης, οὕτος ἄρα ἐλήλυθεν. καὶ ἡ Πολυδῶν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ περὶ τῆς Ἰφιγενείας· ἐκὸς γὰρ τοῦ Ὁρέστην συναγωγόσθαι ὅτι ἡ τ' ἀδελφὴ ἑτύθη καὶ αὐτῷ συμβαίνει θύεσθαι. καὶ ἐν τῷ Θεοδέκτου Τυνδί, ὁτι ἐλθὼν ἡς εἰρήνης νῦν αὐτὸς ἀπόλιτοι λυταί. καὶ ἢ ἐν τοῖς Φυγείασι· ἱδούσαν γὰρ τὸν τόπον συνελογίσατο τὴν εἰμαρμενήν ὅτι εἰ τοῦτο ἔξαιρο ἀποθανεῖν αὐταῖς, καὶ γὰρ ἐξετάθησαν ἑιναιδά. ἐστίν δὲ τις καὶ συνεθέτῃ ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θατέρου, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ὁδυσσεί τῷ ψευδαγγέλῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ [τὸ] τόξον ἐφθα λεγόσθαι ὁ οὐχ 15 ἐωράκει, τὸ δὲ ὡς δὴ ἐκεῖνω ἀναγνωρισώτως διὰ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι παραλογισμός· παλαιῶς δὲ βελτίωτη ἀναγνώρισις ἡ ἔξαιρὲς τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐκπλήξεως γενομένης δὲ εἰκό-

31 ὁ addidi 35 διὸ τι ἐγγὺς scripsi: δὲ ὅτι ἐγγὺς Αὐρήν τι Vahlen 37 ἢ τρίτη Spengel: ήτοι τῆς Αὐρήν αἰσθήσατι Αὐρήν

Discoveries made directly by the poet; which are inartistic for that very reason; e.g. Orestes' Discovery of himself in *Iphigenia*: whereas his sister reveals who she is by the letter, Orestes is made to say himself what the poet rather than the story demands. This, therefore, is not far removed from the first-mentioned fault, since he might have presented certain tokens as well. Another instance is the 'shuttle's voice' in the Tereus of Sophocles. (3) A third species is Discovery through memory, from a man's consciousness being awakened by something seen or heard. Thus in *The Cyprioe* of Dicaeogenes, the sight of the picture makes the man burst into tears; and in the *Tale of Alcinous*, hearing the harper Ulysses is reminded of the past and weeps; the Discovery of them being the result. (4) A fourth kind is Discovery through reasoning; e.g. in *The Choephoroe*: 'One like me is here; there is no one like me but Orestes; he, therefore, must be here.' Or that which Polyidus the Sophist suggested for *Iphigenia*; since it was natural for Orestes to reflect: 'My sister was sacrificed, and I am to be sacrificed like her.' Or that in the Tydeus of Theodectes: 'I came to find a son, and am to die myself.' Or that in *The Phinidae*: on seeing the place the women inferred their fate, that they were to die there, since they had also been exposed there. (5) There is, too, a composite Discovery arising from bad reasoning on the side of the other party. An instance of it is in *Ulysses the False Messenger*: he said he should know the bow—which he had not seen; but to suppose from that that he would know it again (as though he had once seen it) was bad reasoning. (6) The best of all Discoveries, however, is that arising from the
tov, oin to ev to Sophokleous Oidipodi kai to 'Iphigenia:

16. 1455a 18—17. 1455b 6

tov, oin to ev to Sophokleous Oidipodi kai to 'Iphigenia: eikos gar bouleseba epitheina grafmatata. ai gar toisaitai 20 monai anev toon pepoymenon semeion kai deeraion. deuterai de ai ek sullogismou.

Dei de toous muthous sunostai kai to legei sunaperegamma en garde to pro ommata tothepeon. ou to gar an evargestata [o] oron oster par autois xignomeven tois 25 prastoomenos euriskoi to propon kai hikstai an laubanoi [to] ta upenanti. semeion de toouton o epetimato Karikyn. o gar 'Amphiaraos eix ierou anhie, o mi orount an ton thetyn elanbavei, etpi de tis skhyn eixepean evnheymantov touto ton thetwn. osta de dunaton kai tois skh

30 mason sunapeergaomou tevtheivatou gar apote tis auties fyuoseis ois ev tois pathein eiswn, kai xheinai o xeimaoimenos kai xalepainei o xerikomeinon alsbibwstata. idi eurypois e poikithi ethn e manikov touton gar oi mev eupilastoi ois de ekstatikoi eiswn. toous te logous kai toous pepoymenous 1455b deai kai auton poouitn ektheivat kadoilou, eidoous epeisiodoiou kai parateinein. lew o de ouwos an thewreivai to kadoilou, oin tis Iphigenias: tutheias tisv koris kai afanisteias adilos tois thetasin, idrntheis de eis alla

5 chora, en y nimosyn en toous eixevas theu evi thei, tausine eisxe tis ierwvn tin, chwroo de vsteron to adelpho symbeith eltheiv

18 to scrupi: o Ae: 20 deovon Ae: peri kái kai apoig. 24

enigestata Ae: o om. Parisinus 2038 25 laubanoi to Ae:

laubaineto apographa plura (to Vahleno teste deletum est in nonnullis)

26 epetimato marg. Riccardiani 16 (confirm. Ar.): epitima toi Ae

27 anhie Guelferbytanus (confirm. Ar.): an eis Ae: orount an Vahlen: orkont Ae: 31 xemaoimenos Ae: 34 ekstatikoi Riccardianus 46 (et Paccius in versione: confirmare videtur Ar.):

xeastatikoi Ae: toous te Parisinus 2038: toutous te Ae 1455b 1

epi kai kai apoig. 24

incidents themselves, when the great surprise comes about through a probable incident, like that in the *Oedipus* of Sophocles; and also in *Iphigenia*; for it was not improbable that she should wish to have a letter taken home. These last are the only Discoveries independent of the artifice of signs and necklaces. Next after them come Discoveries through reasoning.

At the time when he is constructing his Plots, and engaged on the Diction in which they are worked out, the poet should remember (1) to put the actual scenes as far as possible before his eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the vividness of an eye-witness as it were, he will devise what is appropriate, and be least likely to overlook incongruities. This is shown by what was censured in Carcinus, the return of Amphiaraurus from the sanctuary; it would have passed unnoticed, if it had not been actually seen by the audience; but on the stage his play failed, the incongruity of the incident offending the spectators. (2) As far as may be, too, the poet should even act his story with the very gestures of his personages. Given the same natural qualifications, he who feels the emotions to be described will be the most convincing; distress and anger, for instance, are portrayed most truthfully by one who is feeling them at the moment. Hence it is that poetry demands a man with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him; the former can easily assume the required mood, and the latter may be actually beside himself with emotion. (3) His story, again, whether already made or of his own making, he should first simplify and reduce to a universal form, before proceeding to lengthen it out by the insertion of episodes. The following will show how the universal element in *Iphigenia*, for instance, may be viewed: A certain maiden having been offered in sacrifice, and spirited away from her sacrificers into another land, where the custom was to sacrifice all strangers to the Goddess, she was made there the priestess of this rite. Long after that the brother
τής ἱερείας, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἀνέλευ ὁ θεὸς διὰ τῶν αἰτίαν [ἐξω τοῦ καθόλου] ἔλθειν ἐκεί καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὁ τι δὲ ἔξω τοῦ μύθου ἔλθὼν δὲ καὶ ληφθεὶς θύεσθαι μέλλων ἀνεγινώσκειν, εἴθ᾽ ὃς Εὐρί-
πὸδης εἴθ᾽ ὡς Πολύυδος ἐποίησεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκός εἰπόν ὅτι οὐκ ἀρα μόνον τὴν ἀδελφήν ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδει τυθῆναι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἦδη ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισόδιων· ὅπως δὲ ἦσται οἰκεία τὰ ἐπεισόδια, οὕν ἐν τῷ Ὄρεστῃ ἡ μανία δὲ ἣς ἔλθηθη καὶ ἡ σω-
tηρία διὰ τῆς καθάρσεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ὁμάσωσ τὰ ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ἡ δ᾽ ἐποποία τούτοις μικρῶτεται. τῆς γὰρ Ὁδύσσειας (οὐ) μακρὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν· ἀποδημοῦντός τινος ἐτή τολλά καὶ παραφιλαπτομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδώνος καὶ μόνου ἰῶτος, ἐτὶ δὲ τῶν οἰκον οὗτοι ἔχοντων ὄστε τὰ χρή-
ματα ὑπὸ μισθητῶν ἀναλίσκεσθαι καὶ τῶν οὐν ἐπιβου-
λεύσαται, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφικνεῖται χειμασθεῖς, καὶ ἀγαπηρίας ἔτι 
τινας αὐτὸς ἐπεθέμενοι αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσώθη τοὺς ὁ ἐχθροὺς 
διεφθειρε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἱδίον τοῦτο, τὰ δ᾽ ἀλλὰ ἐπεισόδια. 
Εἴστι δὲ πάσης τραγῳδίας τὸ μὲν δήσις τὸ δὲ λύσις, τὰ 
μὲν ἐξωθέν καὶ ἕνα τῶν ἐσωθέν τολλάκις ἡ δήσις, τὸ 
λοιπὸν ἡ λύσις—λέγω δὲ δήσιν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς 
μέχρι τοῦτον τοῦ μέρους ὁ ἐσχατὸν ἐστὶν εἶς ὁ μεταβαϊ-
νεω εἰς εὐτυχίαν * *, λύσιν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μετα-
βάσεως μέχρι τέλους—ὡςπερ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεὶ τῷ Θεοδέκτου 
δήσις μὲν τὰ τε προπεπραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λήψις καὶ

7 ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου seclusit Duenterz 15 
10 πολύειος Αε ἵ 
17 οὐ add. Vulcanius (confirm. 
19 ἐτὶ Riccardianus 16 (confirm. 
Ar.) : ἐπεί Αε ἵ 
22 τινᾶς] fort. ὅτι 28 εἰς εὐτυχίαν 
〈συμβαίνει ἡ εἰς δυστυχίαν〉 (ut videtur) Ar.: εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἣ 
〈εἰς δυστυχίας συμβαίνει ἡ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν〉 coni. Vahlen: 
〈εἰς δυστυχίας συμβαίνει ἡ〉 εἰς εὐτυχίαν Gomperz 29 λυκε 
apogr. (confirm. Ar.): λυκε Αε
of the priestess happened to come; the fact, however, of
the oracle having for a certain reason hidden him go thither,
and his object in going, are outside the Plot of the play.
On his coming he was arrested, and about to be sacrificed,
when he revealed who he was,—either as Euripides puts
it, or (as suggested by Polydus) by the not improbable
exclamation, 'So I too am doomed to be sacrificed, as my
sister was'; and the disclosure led to his salvation. This
done, the next thing, after the proper names have been fixed
as a basis for the story, is to work in episodes or accessory
incidents. One must mind, however, that the episodes are
appropriate, like the fit of madness in Orestes, which led
to his arrest, and the purifying, which brought about his
salvation. In plays, then, the episodes are short; in epic
poetry they serve to lengthen out the poem. The argu-
ment of the Odyssey is not a long one. A certain man has
been abroad many years; Poseidon is ever on the watch
for him, and he is all alone. Matters at home too have
come to this, that his substance is being wasted and his
son's death plotted by suitors to his wife. Then he arrives
there himself after his grievous sufferings; reveals himself,
and falls on his enemies; and the end is his salvation and
their death. This being all that is proper to the Odyssey,
everything else in it is episode. (4) There is a further point
18 to be borne in mind. Every tragedy is in part Complication
and in part Dénouement; the incidents before the opening
scene, and often certain also of those within the play,
forming the Complication; and the rest the Dénouement.
By Complication I mean all from the beginning of the story
to the point just before the change in the hero's fortunes;
by Dénouement, all from the beginning of the change to
the end. In the Lynceus of Theodectes, for instance, the
Complication includes, together with the presupposed inci-

E 2
dents, the seizure of the child and that in turn of the parents; and the Dénouement all from the indictment for the murder to the end. Now it is right, when one speaks of a tragedy as the same or not the same as another, to do so on the ground before all else of their Plot, i.e. as having the same or not the same Complication and Dénouement. Yet there are many dramatists who, after a good Complication, fail in the Dénouement. But it is necessary for both points of construction to be always duly mastered. There are four distinct species of Tragedy—that being the number of the constituents also that have been mentioned: first, the complex Tragedy, which is all Peripety and Discovery; second, the Tragedy of suffering, e.g. the Ajaxes and Ixions; third, the Tragedy of character, e.g. The Phthiotides and Peleus. The fourth constituent is that of 'Spectacle,' exemplified in The Phorcides, in Prometheus, and in all plays with the scene laid in the nether world. The poet's aim, then, should be to combine every element of interest, if possible, or else the more important and the major part of them. This is now especially necessary owing to the unfair criticism to which the poet is subjected in these days. Just because there have been poets before him strong in the several species of tragedy, the critics now expect the one man to surpass that which was the strong point of each one of his predecessors. One should also remember what has been said more than once, and not write a tragedy on an epic body of incident (i.e. one with a plurality of stories in it), by attempting to dramatize, for instance, the entire story of the Iliad. In the epic owing to its scale every part is treated at proper length; with a drama, however, on the same story the result is very disappointing. This is shown by the fact that all who have dramatized the fall of Ilium in its entirety, and not part by part, like Euripides, or the whole of the Niobe story, instead of a portion, like Aeschylus, either fail utterly or have but ill success on the stage; for that and that alone was enough
18. 1456 a 20—19. 1456 b 6

20 ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι στοχαζόντα δι' ὑι βούλουσαν θαυμαστῶς τραγικον γὰρ τούτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. ἔστιν δὲ τούτο, ὅταν ὁ σοφὸς μὲν μετὰ ποιησίας τ' ἐξαπατηθη, ὅσπερ Πλου- φος, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος μὲν ἄδικος δὲ ἡττηθη: ἔστιν δὲ τούτο εἰκὸς ὅσπερ Ἄγαθων λέγει, εἰκὸς γὰρ γίνεσθαι πολλά 25 καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς. καὶ τὸν χορὸν δὲ ἐν ἐν ὑπολα- βεῖν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ μόριον εἶναι τὸν ὄλου καὶ συναγω- νίζοντα μὴ ὅσπερ Εὐρίπιδῆς ἄλλ' ὅσπερ Σοφοκλεί. τοῖς δὲ λοιπῶς τὰ ἄδικα (οὐδὲν) μᾶλλον τοῦ μιθῶν ἢ ἄλλης τραγῳδίας ἔστιν· διὸ ἐμβόλιμα ἁδονίου πρῶτον ἀρζαίτος
20 Ἄγαθων τοῦ τοιοῦτον. καίτοι τί διαφέρει ἡ ἐμβόλιμα ἄδειν ἢ εἰ ῥήσιν εξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἀρμόττοι ἡ ἐπεισόδιον ὅλου;

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἡδὴ εἰρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως καὶ διανοίας εἰπεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν 35 τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθων τοῦτο γὰρ ἓδον ὀλίγον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου. ἐστὶ δὲ κατὰ τὴν διανοίαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι. μέρη δὲ τοῦτων τὸ τε ἀπο- δεικνύει καὶ τὸ λύει καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν (οἷον 1456 b ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα) καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα. ἴηλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἱδεῶν δεὶ χρησθαί ὅταν ἡ ἔλεεν ἢ δεινα ἢ μεγάλα ἡ εἰκότα δὲν παρασκευάζειν πλὴν τοσοῦτον δια- 5 φέρει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεὶ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγουσας παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ

22 δὲ add. Riccardianus 16 23 ἡττήθη Αε 24 (καὶ) εἰκὸς ὅσπερ Riccardianus 46 et (ut videtur) Ar. 28 ἁδονές Madius (confirm. Ar.): διδομένα Αε οὐδὲν add. Vahlen (confirm. Ar.) 33 ἡδὴ] ἡδ' Αε: εἰδὼν (ut videtur) Ar. 34 καὶ Hermann (confirm. Ar.): ἡ Αε 1456 b 2 σμικρότητα Parisinus 2038 (et fort. Ar.): μικρότητας Αε 3 εἰδεῶν Αε 4 δὲν Parisinus 2038: δ' ἡ Αε
to ruin even a play by Agathon. Yet in their Peripeties, as also in their simple plots, the poets I mean show wonderful skill in aiming at the kind of effect they desire—a tragic situation that arouses the human feeling in one, like the clever villain (e.g. Sisyphus) deceived, or the brave wrong-doer worsted. This is probable, however, only in Agathon's sense, when he speaks of the probability of even improbabilities coming to pass. (7) The Chorus too should be regarded as one of the actors; it should be an integral part of the whole, and take a share in the action—that which it has in Sophocles rather than in Euripides. With the later poets, however, the songs in a play of theirs have no more to do with the Plot of that than of any other tragedy. Hence it is that they are now singing intercalary pieces, a practice first introduced by Agathon. And yet what real difference is there between singing such intercalary pieces, and attempting to fit in a speech, or even a whole act, from one play into another?

The Plot and Characters having been discussed, it remains to consider the Diction and Thought. As for the Thought, we may assume what is said of it in our Art of Rhetoric, as it belongs more properly to that department of inquiry. The Thought of the personages is shown in everything to be effected by their language—in every effort to prove or disprove, to arouse emotion (pity, fear, anger, and the like), or to maximize or minimize things. It is clear, also, that their mental procedure must be on the same lines in their actions likewise, whenever they wish them to arouse pity or horror, or have a look of importance or probability. The only difference is that with the act the impression has to be made without explanation; whereas with the spoken word it has to be produced by the speaker, and result from his language. What, indeed would be the good of the speaker,
τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἰπὴ τοῦ ἐγγοντος ἀργον, εἰ φαύνοιτο ἢ δέοι καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον; τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέ-
ξιν ἐν μὲν ἑστιν εἰδὸς θεωρίας τὰ σχῆματα τῆς λέξεως,
τοῦ ἑστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τῆς τουκητῆν ἔχον-
τος ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς, οἴνον τὶ ἐντολῇ καὶ τὶ εὐχῇ καὶ διή-
γγεις καὶ ἀπειλῇ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἰ τῷ
ἀλλο τουκητῶν. παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἡ ἀγνοιαν οὐδὲν
εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτύμημα φέρεται ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον στοι-
15 δήσ. τί γὰρ ἂν τὶς ὑπολάβοι ἦμαρτήσαθα ἡ Πρωταγόρας
ἔπιτυμα, ἢ τι εὐχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν "μὴν ἄει-
δὲ θεά"; τὸ γὰρ κελεύσαι, φησιν, ποιεῖν τι ἡ μὴ ἐπίταξις
ἑστιν. διὸ παρεῖσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὁν
θεώμημα.
20 Τής δὲ λέξεως ἀπάσης τάδ' ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη, στοιχείων 20
συλλαβῆ σύνδεσμως ἄρθρων ὄνομα μῆμα πτῶσις λόγος.
στοιχείων μὲν οὖν ἑστιν φωνὴ ἀδιαίρετος, οὐ πάσα δὲ
ἀλλ' ἐξ ἢς πέφυκε συνετή γίγνεσθαι φωνῆς καὶ γὰρ τῶν
θηρίων εἰς ἀδιαίρετοι φωναί, οὖν οὐδεμίαν λέγω στοι-
25 χείων. ταῦτας δὲ μέρη τὸ τε φωνῆν καὶ τὸ ἡμίφωνον καὶ
ἀφώνον. ἑστιν δὲ φωνῆν μὲν (τὸ) ἄρεν προσβολῆς ἔχον
φωνῆν ἀκοουστῆν, ἡμίφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς ἔχον
φωνῆν ἀκοουστῆν, οἴνον τὸ Σ καὶ τὸ Ρ, ἀφώνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ
προσβολῆς καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχον φωνῆν, μετὰ δὲ
30 τῶν ἔχοντων τινὰ φωνῆν γνώμενον ἀκουστῶν, οἴνον τὸ Γ καὶ
tὸ Δ. ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει σχήμασιν τοῦ στόματος καὶ
tόποις καὶ δαισύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι καὶ μήκει καὶ βραχύ-

if things appeared in the required light even apart from anything he says?

As regards the Diction, one subject for inquiry under this head is the turns given to the language when spoken; e.g. the difference between command and prayer, simple statement and threat, question and answer, and so forth. The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution and the professors of that art. Whether the poet knows these things or not, his art as a poet is never seriously criticized on that account. What fault can one see in Homer’s ‘Sing of the wrath, Goddess’?—which Protagoras has criticized as being a command where a prayer was meant, since to bid one do or not do, he tells us, is a command. Let us pass over this, then, as appertaining to another art, and not to that of poetry.

The Diction viewed as a whole is made up of the following 20 parts: the Letter (or ultimate element), the Syllable, the Conjunction, the Article, the Noun, the Verb, the Case, and the Speech. The Letter is an indivisible sound of a particular kind, one that may become a factor in an intelligible sound. Indivisible sounds are uttered by the brutes also, but no one of these is a Letter in our sense of the term. These elementary sounds are either vowels, semivowels, or mutes. A vowel is a Letter having an audible sound without the addition of another Letter. A semivowel, one having an audible sound by the addition of another Letter; e.g. S and R. A mute, one having no sound at all by itself, but becoming audible by an addition, that of one of the Letters which have a sound of some sort of their own; e.g. D and G. The Letters differ in various ways: as produced by different conformations or in different regions of the mouth; as aspirated, not aspirated, or sometimes one
τητι ἐτὶ δὲ ἀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ· περὶ ὅιν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν [ἐν] τοῖς μετρικοῖς προσήκει θεωρεῖν. συλλαβή
35 δὲ ἔστιν φωνὴ ἀσήμος συνθετὴ ἤς ἀφώνοι καὶ φωνὴν ἔχον
tos· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἄνευ τοῦ Α συλλαβὴ καὶ μετὰ τοῦ
Α, οἶνον τὸ ΓΡΑ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων θεωρήσαι τὰς διαφορὰς
τῆς μετρικῆς ἕστων. σύνδεσμος δὲ ἔστιν φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ οὐ-
1457ᵃ τε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειώνων
φωνῶν πεφυκὼν συντίθεσθαι [καὶ ἔπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
μέσου], ἦν μὴ ἀρμάττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέναι καθ’ αὐτὸν,
οἶνον μὲν δὴ τοῦ δὲ· ἡ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ ἐκ πλειώνων μὲν φω-
5 νῶν μᾶς σημαντικῶν τε ποιεῖ πέφυκεν μίαν σημαντικὴν
φωνήν, * * ἀρθρον δ’ ἔστι φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ λόγον ἀρχὴν ἢ
τέλος ἡ διορισμὸν δηλοῖ [οἶνον τὸ ἄμφι καὶ τὸ περὶ καὶ
tὰ ἄλλα. ἡ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν
μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειώνων φωνῶν] πεφυκὼν τίθεσθαι καὶ
10 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου. ὄνομα δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ
συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ἄνευ χρόνου ἢς μέρος οὐδὲν ἔστι καθ’
αὐτὸ σημαντικῶν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώμεθα ὡς καὶ
αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ σημαίνου, οἶνον ἐν τῷ Θεοδόρῳ τὸ δῶρον
οὐ σημαινεί. μῆμα δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ μετὰ χρό-
15 νοῦ ἢς οὐδέν μέρος σημαινεί καθ’ αὐτὸ, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀνομάτων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἢ λευκὸν οὐ σημαινεῖ τὸ
πότε, τὸ δὲ βαδίζει ἤ βεβάδικεν προσημαίνει τὸ μὲν τῶν
παρόντα χρόνον τὸ δὲ τῶν παρεληλυθότα. πτώσις δ’ ἐστιν

34 ἐν seclusit Spengel 1457ᵃ 2-3 καὶ—μέσου seclusi 4
σημαντικῶν Robortellus: σημαντικῶν Aᵉ 6 lacunam indicavi, huc
transferenda esse suspicatus ea quae infra leguntur, οἶνον τὸ ἄμφι καὶ
tὸ περὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα 7-9 οἶνον τὸ ἄμφι—φωνῶν seclusi 7 ἄμφι
βαδίζει apogr. (confirm. Ar.): βαδίζειν Aᵉ προσημαίνει Parisinus
203d: προσημαίνει Aᵉ
and sometimes the other; as long, short, or of variable quantity; and further as having an acute, grave, or intermediate accent. The details of these matters we must leave to the metricians. (2) A Syllable is a non-significant composite sound, made up of a mute and a Letter having a sound (a vowel or semivowel); for GR, without an A, is just as much a Syllable as GRA, with an A. The various forms of the Syllable also belong to the theory of metre. (3) A Conjunction is (a) a non-significant sound which, when one significant sound is formable out of several, neither hinders nor aids the union, and which, if the Speech thus formed stands by itself (apart from other Speeches) must not be inserted at the beginning of it; e.g. μέν, δῆ, τοι, δέ. Or (b) a non-significant sound capable of combining two or more significant sounds into one; e.g. ἀμφί, περί, etc. (4) An Article is a non-significant sound marking the beginning, end, or dividing-point of a Speech, its natural place being either at the extremities or in the middle. (5) A Noun or name is a composite significant sound not involving the idea of time, with parts which have no significance by themselves in it. It is to be remembered that in a compound we do not think of the parts as having a significance also by themselves; in the name 'Theodorus,' for instance, the δῶρον means nothing to us. (6) A Verb is a composite significant sound involving the idea of time, with parts which (just as in the Noun) have no significance by themselves in it. Whereas the word 'man' or 'white' does not imply when, 'walks' and 'has walked' involve in addition to the idea of walking that of time present or
Onomatos ή ρήματος ή μέν κατά το τούτον ή τούτων σημ. 20 μαίνον και δόσα τοιαύτα, ή δὲ κατά τὸ ἐνὶ ἡ πολλοῖς, οἶον ἄνθρωποι ή ἄνθρωπως, ή δὲ κατά τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ, οἶον κατ' ἐρώτησιν ἐπίταξιν τὸ γὰρ ἐβάδισεν; ἢ βαδίζει πτῶσις ρήματος κατά ταῦτα τὰ εἴδη ἐστὶν. λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετικὴ σημαντικὴ ἢ ἐνια μέρη καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι (οὐ γὰρ 25 ἀπαθά λόγος ἐκ ρήματων καὶ ὄνομάτων σύγκειται, οἶον ὁ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ῥήματος, ἀλλ' ἐνδεχεται ἂνε ν ῥήματων εἶναι λόγον, μέρος μέντοι αεὶ τὶ σημαίνου ἐξει) οἶον ἐν τῷ βαδίζει Κλέων ὁ Κλέων. εἰς δὲ εστὶ λόγους διχῶς, ἡ γὰρ ὁ ἐν σημαίνων, ἢ ὁ ἐκ πλειώνων συνδέσμων, οἶον ἡ Ἰλίας μὲν 30 συνδέσμῳ εἰς, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον τῷ ἐν σημαίνειν.

"Ονόματος δὲ εἴδη τὸ μὲν ἄπλοις, ἄπλοις δὲ λέγω δὲ 21 μὲ ἐκ σημαίνοντως σύγκειται, οἶον γῆ, τὸ δὲ διπλοὺς τούτον δὲ τὸ μέν ἐκ σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσίμου, πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὄνοματι σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσίμου, τὸ δὲ ἐκ σημαίνοντως σύγκειται. εἰς δ' ἀν καὶ τριπλοὺς καὶ τετραπλοὺς ὀνόμα καὶ 35 πολλαπλοὺς, οἶον τὰ πολλὰ τῶν μεγαλειωτῶν, Ἐρμοκαί.
time past. (7) A Case of a Noun or Verb is when the word means ‘of’ or ‘to’ a thing, and so forth, or for one or many (e.g. ‘man’ and ‘men’); or it may consist merely in the mode of utterance, e.g. in question, command, etc. ‘Walked?’ and ‘Walk!’ are Cases of the verb ‘to walk’ of this last kind. (8) A Speech is a composite significant sound, some of the parts of which have a certain significance by themselves. It may be observed that a Speech is not always made up of Noun and Verb; it may be without a Verb, like the definition of man; but it will always have some part with a certain significance by itself. In the Speech ‘Cleon walks,’ ‘Cleon’ is an instance of such a part. A Speech is said to be one in two ways, either as signifying one thing, or as a union of several Speeches made into one by conjunction. Thus the Iliad is one Speech by conjunction of several; and the definition of man is one through its signifying one thing.

Nouns are of two kinds, either (1) simple, i.e. made up of non-significant parts, like the word γῆ, or (2) double; in the latter case the word may be made up either of a significant and a non-significant part (a distinction which disappears in the compound), or of two significant parts. It is possible also to have triple, quadruple or higher compounds, like most of our amplified names; e.g. ‘Hermocallisanthus’ and the like.

Whatever its structure, a Noun must always be either (1) the ordinary word for the thing, or (2) a strange word, or (3) a metaphor, or (4) an ornamental word, or (5) a coined word, or (6) a word lengthened out, or (7) curtailed, or (8) altered in form. By the ordinary word I mean that in general use in a country; and by a strange word, one in use elsewhere. So that the same word may obviously be
et inu. 21. 1457 b 5-29

tav καὶ κύριον εἶναι δυνατόν τὸ αὐτό, μη τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ·
tὸ γὰρ σίγυνυν Κυπρίους μὲν κύριον, ἡμῖν δὲ γλῶττα. με-
tαφορὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὁνόματος ἀλλοτρίῳ ἐπιφορὰ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ
gένους ἐπὶ εἴδος ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰ-
dους ἐπὶ εἴδος ἡ κατὰ τὸ ανάλογον. λέγω δὲ ἀπὸ γένους μὲν
10 ἐπὶ εἴδος οἶνον "μὴ δὲ μοι ἡδ' ἑστηκεν." τὸ γὰρ ὅρμειν ἐστὶν
ἐστάναι τι. ἀπ' εἴδους δὲ εἰς γένος "ἡ δὴ μυρί' Ὀδυσ-
σεῖς ἐσθλὰ ἔργειν" τὸ γὰρ μυρίον πολὺ ἐστιν, ὃ ἰῶν ἀντί
tοῦ πολλοῦ κέχρηται. ἀπ' εἴδους δὲ ἐπὶ εἴδος οἶνον "χαλκῷ
ἀπὸ ψυχῆν ἀρύσας" καὶ "τεμὼν ἀτερφεῖ χαλκῷ" ἐντάθα
15 γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀρύσαι ταμεῖν, τὸ δὲ ταμεῖν ἀρύσαι εἰρηκεν·
ἀμφοὶ γὰρ ἀφελεὶν τί ἐστιν. τῷ δὲ ανάλογον λέγω, ὅταν
ὁμοίως ἑρχὴ τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον
πρὸς τὸ τρίτον· ἔρει γὰρ ἀντὶ του δεύτερου τὸ τέταρτον ἡ
ἀντὶ του τετάρτου τὸ δεύτερον. καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασιν ἀνθ'
20 οὐ λέγει πρὸς ὧ ἐστι. λέγω δὲ οἶνον ὁμοίως ἑχει φιάλη πρὸς
Διούνισον καὶ ἁστίας πρὸς Ἀρη· ἔρει τούτων τὴν φιάλην ἁστίδα
Διούνισον καὶ τὴν ἁστίδα φιάλην Ἀρεώς. ἡ θ' γῆρας πρὸς
βίον, καὶ ἐσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν· ἔρει τούτων τὴν ἐσπέραν γῆ-
ρας ἡμέρας ἡ ὁσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἐσπέραν βίου
25 ἡ δυσμᾶς βίου. ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ἑστὶν ὅνομα κείμενον τῶν ἀνά-
λογον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ὁμοίως λεξθήσεται· οἶνον τὸ τῶν
καρπῶν μὲν ἀφεναι σπείρων, τὸ δὲ τὴν φλόγα ἐπὶ τοῦ
ἡλίου ἀνώνυμον· ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἑχει τούτο πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ
tὸ σπείρων πρὸς τῶν καρπῶν, διὸ εἰρήται "σπείρων θεοκτισταν

6 fort. sigvus 10 ὁμῶν (--- in litura) A 11 ἱδὺ μηρὸδυσ-
sėις A 12 μύριον A 13 fort. polla 14 ἄρυσας καὶ
Tyrwhitt (ἀρύσας Leidensis et corr. Vaticanus 1400, καὶ Laurentianus
LX 21): ἄρυσακε A Τεμῶν A: ταμῶν Bekker (ed. 3)
απημει A 16 τῷ scripsi: τὸ A 27 ἐπὶ M. Schmidt:
ἀπὸ A (et Ar.)
at once strange and ordinary, though not in reference to the same people; σέριον, for instance, is an ordinary word in Cyprus, and a strange word with us. Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy. That from genus to species is exemplified in 'Here stands my ship'; for lying at anchor is the 'standing' of a particular kind of thing. That from species to genus in 'Truly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought,' where 'ten thousand,' which is a particular large number, is put in place of the generic 'a large number.' That from species to species in 'Drawing the life with the bronze,' and in 'Severing with the enduring bronze'; where the poet uses 'draw' in the sense of 'sever' and 'sever' in that of 'draw,' both words meaning to 'take away' something. That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put B in lieu of D, and D in lieu of B. Now and then, too, they qualify the metaphor by adding on to it that to which the word it supplants is relative. Thus a cup (B) is in relation to Dionysus (A) what a shield (D) is to Ares (C). The cup accordingly will be metaphorically described as the 'shield of Dionysus' (D + A), and the shield as the 'cup of Ares' (B + C). Or to take another instance: As old age (D) is to life (C), so is evening (B) to day (A). One will accordingly describe evening (B) as the 'old age of the day' (D + A)—or by the Empedoclean equivalent; and old age (D) as the 'evening' or 'sunset of life' (B + C). It may be that some of the terms thus related have no special name of their own, but for all that they will be metaphorically described in just the same way. Thus to cast forth seed-corn is called 'sowing'; but to cast forth its flame, as said of the sun, has no special name. This nameless act (B), however, stands in just the same relation to its object, sunlight (A), as sowing (D) to the seed-corn (C). Hence the expression in the poet, 'sowing around a god-created
30 ϕλόγα.” ἕστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς χρήσθαι καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγορεύσατα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν ὦκείων τι, οἶον εἰ τὴν ἀσπίδα εἶπον φιάλην μὴ Ἀρεως ἄλλα ἄοινον. * * πεποιημένον ὁ' ἐστιν ὁ ὤλος μὴ καλούμενον ύπὸ τυχών αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής, (δοκεῖ γὰρ ἔνα νειν εἶναι τοιαῦτα) 35 οἶον τὰ κέρατα ἐφώγας καὶ τὸν ἱερέα ἀρητῆρα. ἐπεκτεταμένον

1458 a δὲ ἐστιν ἡ ἀφηρημένον τὸ μὲν ἕων ϕωνήσει μακροτέρῳ κεχρημένον ἡ τοῦ ὦκείου ἡ συλλαβή ἐμβεβηλημένη, τὸ δὲ ἄν ἀφηρημένον τη ἡ αὐτοῦ, ἐπεκτεταμένον μὲν οἶον τὸ πόλεως πόλησ καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου Πηλιμάδεω, ἀφηρημένου δὲ οἶον τὸ 5 κρι καὶ τὸ δῶ καὶ "μὰ γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὅψ." ἐξηλ- λαγμένον ὁ' ἐστιν ὅταν τοῦ ὄνομαζομένου τὸ μὲν καταλείπῃ τὸ δὲ τούτῃ, οἶον τὸ "δεξιερὸν κατὰ μαζὸν" ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιῶν.

αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὄνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα τὰ δὲ θῆλεα τὰ δὲ μεταξῦ, ἄρρενα μὲν ὀσα τελευτᾶ εἰς τὸ Ν καὶ Ρ (καὶ Σ) καὶ 10 ὡτα εκ τοῦτων σύγκειται (ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστίν ὄνο, Ψ καὶ Ξ), θῆλεα δὲ ὡτα εκ τῶν ϕωνηστῶν εἰς τε τὰ δὲι μακρά, οἶον εἰς Η καὶ Ω, καὶ τῶν ἐπεκτενυμένων εἰς Α᾽ ὡστε ἵτα συμβαίνει πλήθη εἰς ὡτα τὰ ἄρρενα καὶ τὰ θῆλεα τὸ γὰρ Ψ καὶ τὸ Ξ (τῷ Σ) ταῦτα ἐστιν. εἰς δὲ ἀφωνον ὕδευ ὄνομα τελευτᾶ,
15 ὕδευ εἰς ϕωνησὶ βραχύ. εἰς δὲ τῇ Τ ἀτούν, μέλι κόμμι πέπερι. εἰς δὲ τῷ Τ πέντε. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ εἰς ταῦτα καὶ Ν (καὶ Ρ) καὶ Σ.

flame' (D+A). There is also another form of qualified metaphor. Having given the thing the alien name, one may by a negative addition deny of it one of the attributes naturally associated with its new name. An instance of this would be to call the shield not the 'cup of Ares,' as in the former case, but a 'cup that holds no wine.' * * * A coined word is a name which, being quite unknown among a people, is given by the poet himself; e.g. (for there are some words that seem to be of this origin) ἐρυγίες for horns, and ἀρητήρ for priest. A word is said to be lengthened out, when it has a short vowel made long, or an extra syllable inserted; e.g. πόλης for πόλεως, Πηλμώδω for Πηλείδω. It is said to be curtailed, when it has lost a part; e.g. κρᾶ, δῶ, and ὅψ in μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὅψ. It is an altered word, when part is left as it was and part is of the poet's making; e.g. δέξιερόν for δεξίων, in δέξιερόν κατὰ μαζόν.

The Nouns themselves (to whatever class they may belong) are either masculines, feminines, or intermediates (neuter). All ending in Ν, Ρ, Σ, or in the two compounds of this last, Ψ and Ξ, are masculines. All ending in the invariably long vowels, Η and Ω, and in Α among the vowels that may be long, are feminines. So that there is an equal number of masculine and feminine terminations, as Ψ and Ξ are the same as Σ, and need not be counted. There is no Noun, however, ending in a mute or in either of the two short vowels, Ε and Ο. Only three (μέλι, κόμμι, πέπερι) end in Ι, and five in Υ. The intermediates, or neutralns, end in the variable vowels or in Ν, Ρ, Σ.
22. 1458a 18—1458b 8

Λέξεως δὲ ἄρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. σα—22

4.20 ταπεινὴν παράδειγμα δὲ ἡ Κλεοφώντος ποίησις καὶ ἡ Σθενέλου. σεμνὴ δὲ καὶ ξεαλλάττουσα τὸ ἱδωτικὸν ἢ τοῖς ἔλεοις κεχρημένη ξενικόν δὲ λέγω γλώτταν καὶ μεταφορὰν καὶ ἐπέκτασιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον. ἀλλ' ἂν τις [ἀν] ἀπαντᾷ τοιαύτα ποιῆσῃ, ἡ αὐτίμα ἐσται ἡ βαρβα—25 ρισμὸν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αὐτίμα, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλώττῶν, βαρβαρισμὸς. αὐτίγματός τε γὰρ ἴδεις αὐτὴ ἐστι, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχουσα αὐτύνασιν συνάσαι.—κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν οὐχ οἷν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφοράν ἐνδέχεται—οἷν "ἀνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν 30 ἐπὶ ἀνέρι καλλήσσωτα," καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα. ἐκ τῶν γλώττῶν βαρβαρισμός. δεὶ ἄρα κεκρασθαὶ πως τούτοις τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἱδωτικὸν ποιῆσει μηδὲ ταπεινόν, οἷν ἡ γλώττα καὶ ἡ μεταφορά καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τὰλλα τὰ ἐφάνεια εἶδο, τὸ δὲ κύριον τὴν σαφήνειαν. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ κρίσιν 1458b συμβάλλεται εἰς τὸ σαφῆς τῆς λέξεως καὶ μὴ ἱδωτικὸν αἱ ἐπεκτάσεις καὶ ἀποκόπαι καὶ ἐξαλλαγὴ τῶν ὀνοματῶν. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄλλος ἔχειν ἡ ὡς τὸ κύριον παρὰ τὸ εἰσόδος γεγραμμένον τὸ μὴ ἱδωτικὸν ποιῆσαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ κοινοφηνεῖν τοῦ εἰσδότος τὸ σαφῆς ἐσται. ὡστε οὐκ ἄρθρος ψέγων σιν οἱ ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου καὶ διακωμφοῦντες τῶν ποιητῶν, οἷον Εὐκλείδης ὁ ἀρχαῖος, ὡς ῶφοιον ποιεῖν, εἰ τις ὁδοῖς ἕκτεῖνει ἐφ' ὁπόσον βούλεται 24 ἀν ομ. ἀπογρ. ποιῆσαι Αο 26 ἔλος τῶν Αο 27 λέγοντα] λέγον τὰ Αο 28 τῶν (ἄλλων) ὀνομάτων (ut videtur) ἄρ. οἰκοιοῦνται Αο 29 μεταφορῶν scripsi: μεταφορῶν Αο ἰδιον Αο πυρὶ χαλκὸν Victorius: πυρὶχαλκὸν Αο 31 κεκρασθαὶ Riccardianus 46 (confirm. ἄρ.): κεκρασθαὶ Αο 1458b Ι συμβάλλεται Αο: συμβάλλονται ἀπογρ. 6 ἐπιτιμῶντες Αο
The perfection of Diction is for it to be at once clear and not mean. The clearest indeed is that made up of the ordinary words for things, but it is mean, as is shown by the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. On the other hand the Diction becomes distinguished and non-prosaic by the use of unfamiliar terms, i.e. strange words, metaphors, lengthened forms, and everything that deviates from the ordinary modes of speech.—But a whole statement in such terms will be either a riddle or a barbarism, a riddle, if made up of metaphors, a barbarism, if made up of strange words. The very nature indeed of a riddle is this, to describe a fact in an impossible combination of words (which cannot be done with the real names for things, but can be with their metaphorical substitutes); e.g. 'I saw a man glue brass on another with fire,' and the like. The corresponding use of strange words results in a barbarism.—A certain admixture, accordingly, of unfamiliar terms is necessary. These, the strange word, the metaphor, the ornamental equivalent, etc., will save the language from seeming mean and prosaic, while the ordinary words in it will secure the requisite clearness. What helps most, however, to render the Diction at once clear and non-prosaic is the use of the lengthened, curtailed, and altered forms of words. Their deviation from the ordinary words will, by making the language unlike that in general use, give it a non-prosaic appearance; and their having much in common with the words in general use will give it the quality of clearness. It is not right, then, to condemn these modes of speech, and ridicule the poet for using them, as some have done; e.g. the elder Euclid, who said it was easy to make poetry if one were to be allowed to lengthen the words in the statement itself as much as one likes—a procedure he
† Ιαμβοποιήσας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει † "Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον Μαραθώνα, νάδε βαδίσωμα," καὶ "οὐκ ἂν γ' ἐράμενος † τούτον ἐκέινον ἐλέβαρον †." τὸ μὲν οὖν φαίνεσθαι πως χρώμενον τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ γελοῦν· τὸ δὲ μέτριον κοινῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν· καὶ γὰρ μεταφοράς καὶ γλώττας καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέσθαι χρώμενον ἀπρεπῶς καὶ ἐπίτηδες ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα τὸ 15 αὐτὸ ἄν ἀπεργάσαιτο. τὸ δὲ ἀρμοττόντως ὅσον διαφέρει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπώνθερεισθω ἐντεθεμένων τῶν ὑπομάτων εἰς τὸ μέτρον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταφορῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἱδεῖ μετατίθεσιν ἀν τις τὰ κύρια ὑπομάτα κατίδοι ὅτι ἀληθή λέγομεν· οἷον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσατος Ιαμβὸν Αλσχύλου καὶ Εὐριπίδου, ἐν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα μετατιθέντος, ἀντὶ κυρίου ἑωθότος γλώττας, τὸ μὲν φαίνεται καλὸν τὸ δ' εὐτέλες. Αλσχύλος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ ἐποίησε φαγέταις ἢ μου σάρκας ἐσβείει ποδός, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἐσβείει τὸ θουράται μετέθηκε. καὶ 25 νῦν δὲ μ' ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανός καὶ ἀεικής, εἰ τις λέγοι τὰ κύρια μετατίθες νῦν δὲ μ' ἐὼν μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικός καὶ ἀειδής· καὶ διφρον [τε] ἀεικέλιον καταθεῖς ὀλίγην τε τράπεζαν, διφρον μοχθηρόν καταθεῖς μικράν τε τράπεζαν·

9 fortasse mutato ordine ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει, λαμβοποιήσας. Ἐπιχάρην Bursian: ἦτε χάριν Ἁ. iδον Ἀ. μαραθώνα δε Ἁ. 10 ἀν γεράμενος Ἁ. 12 μέτριον Spengel: μέτρον Ἁ. 14 ἐπὶ τὰ] ἐπειτα Ἁ. fort. γελοιόστερα 15 ἀρμοττόντως Tucker: ἀρμότοντος Α. 18 εἶδον Α. 19 λάμβων Α. 20 μεταθέντως apogr. 23 φαγέδαιμα apogr.: φαγάδεαν Α. 25 δε μεῶν Α. ἀεικής Riccardianus 46, Morelius (confirmare videtur Ar.): ἀειδὸς Α. 27 δε μεῶν Α. μικρός τε apogr.: μικρὸς δε Α. 29 τε prius om. apogr.: τε* (nisi forte τατ fuerat) Α. τ' αἰκέλιον reposuit Vahlen
caricatured by reading Ἑπιχάρην εἴδον Μαραθώναδε βαδίζοντα, and οὐκ ἂν γ' ἐράμενος τὸν ἐκεῖνον ἐλέβορον as verses. A too apparent use of these licences has certainly a ludicrous effect, but they are not alone in that; the rule of moderation applies to all the constituents of the poetic vocabulary; even with metaphors, strange words, and the rest, the effect will be the same, if one uses them improperly and with a view to provoking laughter. The proper use of them is a very different thing. To realize the difference one should take an epic verse and see how it reads when the normal words are introduced. The same should be done too with the strange word, the metaphor, and the rest; for one has only to put the ordinary words in their place to see the truth of what we are saying. The same iambic, for instance, is found in Aeschylus and Euripides, and as it stands in the former it is a poor line; whereas Euripides, by the change of a single word, the substitution of a strange for what is by usage the ordinary word, has made it seem a fine one. Aeschylus having said in his Philoctetes:

φαγέδαινα ἦ μον σάρκας ἐσθίει ποθός,

Euripides has merely altered the ἐσθίει here into θωνάται. Or suppose

νῦν δὲ μ' ἐὼν ὀλγός τε καὶ οὔτιδανός καὶ ἄεικής

to be altered by the substitution of the ordinary words into

νῦν δὲ μ' ἐὼν μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικός καὶ ἄειδής.

Or the line

δίφρων ἄεικέλιον καταθείς ὀλγήν τε τράπεζαν

into

δίφρων μοχθήρων καταθείς μικράν τε τράπεζαν.
καὶ τὸ ἲμῶνε βοῶσιν, ἱμάνες κράζουσιν. ἦτι δὲ Ἀριφράδης τοὺς τραγῳδοὺς ἐκωμ' δει, ὡτὶ ἀ οδείς ἀν ἔπιον ἐν τῇ δια-
λέκτῳ τοῦτοις χρώνται, οἰον τὸ δωμάτων ἀπὸ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ δωμάτων, καὶ τὸ σέθεν καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ δὲ ἵνα καὶ τὸ

Αχιλλέως περὶ ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ ὡσα ἀλλὰ
tοιαύτα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις ποιεῖ τὸ μὴ ἰδωτικὸν ἐν τῇ λέξει ἁπαντὰ τὰ τοιαύτα· ἑκείνοι δὲ τοῦτο ἦγουει. ἔστω δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων πρεπο-
tῶς χρήσθαι, καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνομασίᾳ καὶ γλώτταις, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι· μόνον γὰρ τούτῳ οὔτε παρ' ἀλλοῦ ἐστὶ λαβεῖν εὐφνίας τε σημεῖων ἐστιν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸνομον θεωρεῖν ἕστω. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τὰ
μὲν διπλὰ μάλιστα ἠρμόττει τοῖς διθυράμβοις, αἱ δὲ γλώτ-
tοι τοῖς ἠρωικοῖς, αἱ δὲ μεταφοραί τοῖς λαμβέλειοι. καὶ εἰ
μὲν τοὺς ἠρωικοῖς ἁπαντὰ χρήσμα τὰ εἰρημένα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς
λαμβέλειοι διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμεύσατο ταῦτα ἠρ-
μόττει τῶν ὀνομάτων ὅσοι καὶ ἐν [ὅσοι] λόγοις τῆς χρή-
σαις· ἐστι δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ καὶ κόσμος.

15 περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μμή̄σεως ἔστω ἡμῖν ἰκανά τὰ εἰρημένα.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μυθικῆς, 23
ὁτι δεῖ τοὺς μῦθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις συνιστάναι δραματικοὺς καὶ περὶ μίαν πράξιν ὁλην καὶ τελειῶν ἔχου-
20 σαν ἄρχην καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος, ἐν ὀσπερ ζηροῦ ἐν ὁλον
ποιῇ τῆν οἰκείαν ἢδονήν, δήλων, καὶ μὴ ὁμολας ἱστορίας τὰs

31 τὸ ἱωνεος βοῶσιν ἡ ἱωνεος Αε ἄριφράδης Αε 32 εἰση
Αε 1459a 4 τὸι Αε 6 πιολιον Αε 10 et 12
λαμβέλει Αε 13 καὶν Riccardianus 46, Harles: καὶ Αe
δωσοι om. apogr. τις apogr.: τί Αε 20 fort.
δῶν (δων) 21 ποιει Αε ἱστορίας τὰs συνθήκες [sic]
Riccardianus 46: ἱστορίας τὰs συνθήκες Dacier
Or ἑώνες βοώσιν into ἑώνες κράζοισιν. Add to this that Ariphrades used to ridicule the tragedians for introducing expressions unknown in the language of common life, δωμάτων ἀπό (for ἀπὸ δωμάτων), σέβεν, τυπὸ δὲ νυν, Ἀχιλλέως πέρι (for περὶ Ἀχιλλέως), and the like. The mere fact of their not being in ordinary speech gives the Diction a non-prosaic character; but Ariphrades was unaware of that. It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of these poetical forms, as also of compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilar s.

Of the kinds of words we have enumerated it may be observed that compounds are most in place in the dithyramb, strange words in heroic, and metaphors in iambic poetry. Heroic poetry, indeed, may avail itself of them all. But in iambic verse, which models itself as far as possible on the spoken language, only those kinds of words are in place which are allowable also in an oration, i.e. the ordinary word, the metaphor, and the ornamental equivalent.

Let this, then, suffice as an account of Tragedy, the art imitating by means of action on the stage.

As for the poetry which merely narrates, or imitates by means of versified language (without action), it is evident that it has several points in common with Tragedy.

I. The construction of its stories should clearly be like that in a drama; they should be based on a single action, one that is a complete whole in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end, so as to enable the work to produce its own proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living
23. 1459 a 22—24. 1459 b 10

συνήθεις θεύναι, ἐν αἷς ἀνάγκη οὕχι μᾶς πράξεως ποιεῖσθαι ὀήλωσιν ἀλλ' ἐνος χρόνου, ὡσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἑν ἡ πλείουν, ὥν ἐκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐχει πρὸς ἀλλήλα. ὁσπερ 25 γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἢ τ' ἐν Σαλαμώνι ἐγένετο ναυμαχία καὶ ἢ ἐν Σκελλά Καρχηδονίων μάχη οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντεύνονσαι τέλος, οὔτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆ χρόνοις ἐνῷτε γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θάτερον, ἐξ δὲν ἐν οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος. σχεδοῦ δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτο 30 δρώσι. διὸ ὁσπερ εἰπομεν ὡδή καὶ ταύτη θεσπέσιον ἃν φανεῖ "Ομήρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μηδὲ τῶν πόλεμον καῖπερ ἐχοντα ἄρχῃν καὶ τέλος ἐπιχειρήσαι ποιεῖν ὅλων· λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσυνετοῦσι ἐμέλλειν ἐσεθσαι, ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετρώζοντα καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικίλᾳ. 35 νῦν δ' ἐν μέρος ἀπολαβών ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται αὐτῶν πολλοῖς, οἶον νεὼν καταλόγῳ καὶ ἄλλος ἐπεισοδίοις [dīs] διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποίησιν. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι περὶ ἑνα ποιοῖσι 1459 b καὶ περὶ ἑνα χρόνου καὶ μίαν πράξεων πολυμερῆ, οἶον ὁ τὰ Κύπρια ποίησας καὶ τὴν μικρὰν 'Ιλιάδα. τοιγαροῦν ἐκ μὲν 'Ιλιάδος καὶ 'Οδυσσείας μία τραγῳδία ποιεῖται ἐκατέρος ἢ δῦο μόνας, ἐκ δὲ Κυπριῶν πολλά καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς 5'Ιλιάδος πλέον ὀκτώ, οἶον ὅπλων κρίσις, Φιλοκτήτης, Νεοπτόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος, πτωχεία, Λάκαινα, 'Ιλιῶν πέρσος καὶ ἀπόπλους, καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τριφάδες. ἐτι δὲ [ἐτι δὲ] 24 τὰ εἰδὴ ταύτα δεὶ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποίαι τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ, ἡ γὰρ ἄπλην ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἡ ἡδικήν ἡ παθητικὴν καὶ τὰ 10 μέρη ἐξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὄψεως ταυτά· καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν

22 θεύναι scripti: εἶναι Αε 25 σαλαμάκην Αε 26 ναύμαχον Αε 28 μετὰ βατέρου Parisinus 2038: μετὰ βατέρου Αε 31 τῷ Riccardianus 16: τῷ Αε 33 μέγα pr. Αε 36 δίο deceitum in Αε: οίς Riccardianus 16 1459 b 2 Κύπρια Kείζ: κυπρικά Αε 4 μόνας pr. Αε 7 πρωίαδεσ pr. Αε ἐτι δὲ bis Αε 8 δει] δὴ Αε
Nor should one suppose that there is anything like them in our usual histories. A history has to deal not with one action, but with one period and all that happened in that to one or more persons, however disconnected the several events may have been. Just as two events may take place at the same time, e.g. the sea-fight off Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, without converging to the same end, so too of two consecutive events one may sometimes come after the other with no one end as their common issue. Nevertheless most of our epic poets, one may say, ignore the distinction.

Herein, then, to repeat what we have said before, we have a further proof of Homer's marvellous superiority to the rest. He did not attempt to deal even with the Trojan war in its entirety, though it was a whole with a definite beginning and end—through a feeling apparently that it was too long a story to be taken in in one view, or if not that, too complicated from the variety of incident in it. As it is, he has singled out one section of the whole; many of the other incidents, however, he brings in as episodes, using the Catalogue of the Ships, for instance, and other episodes to relieve the uniformity of his narrative. As for the other epic poets, they treat of one man, or one period; or else of an action which, although one, has a multiplicity of parts in it. This last is what the authors of the Cypria and Little Iliad have done. And the result is that, whereas the Iliad or Odyssey supplies materials for only one, or at most two tragedies, the Cypria does that for several, and the Little Iliad for more than eight: for an Adjudgment of Arms, a Philoctetes, a Neoptolemus, a Ulysses as Beggar, a Laconian Women, a Fall of Ilium, and a Departure of the Fleet; as also a Sinon, and a Women of Troy.

II. Besides this, Epic poetry must divide into the same species as Tragedy; it must be either simple or complex, a story of character or one of suffering. Its parts, too,
δεὶ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων· ἐτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἐχεῖν καλῶς. οἷς ἀπασιν ὁ Ὀμήρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ Ἰκανὸς, καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἑκάτερον συνεστήκεν ἢ μὲν ἵλιας ἄπλοὺς καὶ παθητικῶν, ἢ δὲ ὁ Ὀδυσσεία πεπληγμένου (ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου) καὶ ἥθικη· πρὸς γὰρ τούτους λέξει καὶ διανοιὰ πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν.

Διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μήκος ἡ ἐποποία καὶ τὸ μέτρον. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκους ὅρος Ἰκανὸς ὁ εἰρημένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δεὶ συνοφράσθαι τὴν ἁρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος. εἰ δὲ ἂν τούτῳ, εἰ τῶν μὲν ἀρχαίων ἐλάττουσιν συστάσεις εἶναι, πρῶς δὲ τοῦ πλῆθος τραγῳδιῶν τῶν μίαν ἀκρόασιν τιθεμένων παρῆκαν. ἐξεὶ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὸ μέγεθος πολύ τι ἡ ἐποποία ὑδιὸν διὰ τὸ ἐν μὲν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ μὴ ἐνδεχεσθαι ἁμα πραττόμενα πολλὰ μέρη μιμείσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν μέρος μονὸς· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐποποία διὰ τὸ διήγησιν εἶναι ἐστὶ πολλὰ μέρη ἁμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα, ὅψ' ὁν ὀικεῖων ὄντων αὐξεῖται ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὁγκος. ὡστε τούτῳ ἐξεὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαι καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν τῶν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἐπεισοδίων ἀνομοίων ἐπεισοδίων· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίων ταχὺ πληροῦν ἐκπίπτει ποιεῖ τὰς τραγῳδίας. τὸ δὲ μέτρον τὸ ἡρωικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἡρμοκεν. εἰ γὰρ τίς ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ μέτρῳ διηγητικὴν μέρισμα ποιοῦτο ἢ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀπρεπὲς ἰν φαύνοιτο τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν στασιμότατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστὶν· διδα καὶ γλώττας καὶ με-

13 Ἰκανὸς apogr. (confirm. Ar.): Ἰκανὸς Α° ποιημάτων Α° 15 ἀναγνωρίσεως Christ ἥθικων corr. rec. Α° 16 γὰρ Α°; δὲ apogr. πάντας apogr. 21 πρὸς δὲ apogr. (confirm. Ar.): προσθε Α° 29 fort. [τὸ] ἁγαθὸν 32 ἡρμοκεν Α° 33 διηγητικὴν apogr.
with the exception of Song and Spectacle, must be the same, as it requires Peripeties, Discoveries, and scenes of suffering just like Tragedy. Lastly, the Thought and Diction in it must be good in their way. All these elements appear in Homer first; and he has made due use of them. His two poems are each examples of construction, the Iliad simple and a story of suffering, the Odyssey complex (there is Discovery throughout it) and a story of character. And they are more than this, since in Diction and Thought too they surpass all other poems.

There is, however, a difference in the Epic as compared with Tragedy, (1) in its length, and (2) in its metre. (1) As to its length, the limit already suggested will suffice: it must be possible for the beginning and end of the work to be taken in in one view—a condition which will be fulfilled if the poem be shorter than the old epics, and about as long as the series of tragedies offered for one hearing. For the extension of its length epic poetry has a special advantage, of which it makes large use. In a play one cannot represent an action with a number of parts going on simultaneously; one is limited to the part on the stage and connected with the actors. Whereas in epic poetry the narrative form makes it possible for one to describe a number of simultaneous incidents; and these, if germane to the subject, increase the body of the poem. This then is a gain to the Epic, tending to give it grandeur, and also variety of interest and room for episodes of diverse kinds. Uniformity of incident by the satiety it soon creates is apt to ruin tragedies on the stage. (2) As for its metre, the heroic has been assigned it from experience; were any one to attempt a narrative poem in some one, or in several, of the other metres, the incongruity of the thing would be apparent. The heroic in fact is the gravest and weightiest
taforas deçetai malista. perittē γὰρ καὶ * * ἢ δυγηματικῆ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ δὲ ἱαμβετόν καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικα καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. ἔτι δὲ ἀτοπώτερον εἶ μιγνοῦ τις αὐτά, ὄσσερ Χαρῆμων. διὸ οὐδεὶς μακρὰν σύστασιν ἐν ἄλλῳ πεποίηκεν ἡ τῷ ἡρῴ, ἀλλ' ὄσσερ εἴπομεν αὐτή ἢ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἄρμόττον αὐτῇ 5 αἱρεῖσθαι. "Ομηρος δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιος ἐπανείσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ μόνοι τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἁγνοεῖ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτῶν. αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν" οὐ γάρ ἐστι κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητικ. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δὲ ὄλον ἁγνοικοῦνται, μμοῦνται δὲ ὀλύγκαις ὃ δὲ ὀλύγα 
φρομισασάμενος εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἡ γυναῖκα ἡ ἄλλο τι ἤδος, καὶ οὔδεν' ἀφθῆ ἄλλ' ἔχοντα ἤθη. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ βαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐνδεχεται εἰς τῇ ἐποποιά τὸ ὀλογον, δι' ὁ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ βαυ- 
μαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄραν εἰς τὸν πράπτοντα ἐπεί τὰ περὶ 
15 τὴν "Εκτορος διώκειν ἔπει σκηνής οὐτά γελοία ἢν φανείν, οἱ 
μὲν ἑστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκουτες, ὃ δὲ ἀναίειν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπεσιν λαμβάνει. τὸ δὲ βαυμαστόν ἡδύ· σημεῖον δὲ, πάντες 
γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζόμενοι. δεδίδαχεν 
δὲ μάλιστα "Ομηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδή λέγειν ὡς δεῖ. 
20 ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμὸς. οἴονται γὰρ ἀνθρωποι, όταν
of metres—which is what makes it more tolerant than the rest of strange words and metaphors, that also being a point in which the narrative form of poetry goes beyond all others. The iambic and trochaic, on the other hand, are metres of movement, the one representing that of life and action, the other that of the dance. Still more unnatural would it appear, if one were to write an epic in a medley of metres, as Chaeremon did. Hence it is that no one has ever written a long story in any but heroic verse; nature herself, as we have said, teaches us to select the metre appropriate to such a story.

Homer, admirable as he is in every other respect, is especially so in this, that he alone among epic poets is not unaware of the part to be played by the poet himself in the poem. The poet should say very little in propria persona, as he is no imitator when doing that. Whereas the other poets are perpetually coming forward in person, and say but little, and that only here and there, as imitators, Homer after a brief preface brings in forthwith a man, a woman, or some other Character—no one of them characterless, but each with distinctive characteristics.

The marvellous is certainly required in Tragedy. The Epic, however, affords more opening for the improbable, the chief factor in the marvellous, because in it the agents are not visibly before one. The scene of the pursuit of Hector would be ridiculous on the stage—the Greeks halting instead of pursuing him, and Achilles shaking his head to stop them; but in the poem the absurdity is overlooked. The marvellous, however, is a cause of pleasure, as is shown by the fact that we all tell a story with additions, in the belief that we are doing our hearers a pleasure.

Homer more than any other has taught the rest of us the art of framing lies in the right way. I mean the use of
20. 1460a 21—25. 1460b 7

touδι ουτος τοδι ἤ ἡ γινομένου γίνεται, εἰ τὸ υστερον ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἡ γίνεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ θεοῦ. ἀιδὲ, ἄν τὸ πρῶτον θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄναγκη εἶναι ἡ γενέσθαι ἢ, προσθέοι, διὰ γὰρ τὸ τούτῳ εἰδέναι ἄλλοθες

25 ὅν παραλογίζεται ἦμων ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ὑπν. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτῳ ἐκ τῶν Νίκητρων. προαιρεῖταί τε δεὶ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἡ δυνάτα ἀπίθανα· τοὺς τέ λόγους μὴ συνισταθεῖν ἐκ μερῶν ἀλόγων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὲν μὴ δὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔξω τοῦ μνημείου, οὕσπερ

30 Οἶδίπους: τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι πῶς ὁ Λάιος ἀπέθανεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ δράματι, ὀὕσπερ ἐν Ὅλεκτροι οἱ τὰ Πύθια ἀπαγγέλλοντες ἦ τὴν Μυστικὴν ὄρκων. ὡστε τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἄνθρωπον ἄν ὁ μύθος γελοῖν· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ οὐ δει συνιστάθαι τοιούτους, ἀν δὲ θῇ καὶ φαίνεται

35 εὐλογοτέρως εἰνδέχεσθαι, καὶ ἄτοπου· ἑπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὅλυσσος-σεία ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκθέσιν ὡς οὐκ ἢν ἢν ἀνεκτὰ δήλον

1460b ἄν γένοιτο, εἰ αὐτὰ φαίλος ποιήσῃ ποιήσης· νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιήτης ἀφαιρέση ἥδινων τὸ ἄτοπον. τῇ δὲ λέξει δεὶ διαπονεῖν εἰν τοῖς ἀργοὶς μέρεσιν καὶ μήτε ἄθλοις μὴτε διανοητικοῖς· ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλιν ἢ λίαν λαμπρὰ

5 λέξεις τὰ τε ἦθη καὶ τὰς διανοιὰς.

Περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων, εἴκ πόσων τε καὶ ποίων [ἀν] εἶδον ἐστιν, ὥδ' ἄν θεωροῦσιν γένοιτ' ἄν φανερῶν.

paralogism. Whenever, if A is or happens, a consequent, B, is or happens, men's notion is that, if the B is, the A also is—but that is a false conclusion. Accordingly, if A is untrue, but there is something else, B, that on the assumption of its truth follows as its consequent, the right thing then is to add on the B. Just because we know the truth of the consequent, we are in our own minds led on to the erroneous inference of the truth of the antecedent. Here is an instance, from the Bath-story in the Odyssey.

A likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility. The story should never be made up of improbable incidents; there should be nothing of the sort in it. If, however, such incidents are unavoidable, they should be outside the piece, like the hero's ignorance in Oedipus of the circumstances of Laius' death; not within it, like the report of the Pythian games in Electra, or the man's having come to Mysia from Tegea without uttering a word on the way, in The Mysians. So that it is ridiculous to say that one's Plot would have been spoilt without them, since it is fundamentally wrong to make up such Plots. If the poet has taken such a Plot, however, and one sees that he might have put it in a more probable form, he is guilty of absurdity as well as a fault of art. Even in the Odyssey the improbabilities in the setting-ashore of Ulysses would be clearly intolerable in the hands of an inferior poet. As it is, the poet conceals them, his other excellences veiling their absurdity. Elaborate Diction, however, is required only in places where there is no action, and no Character or Thought to be revealed. Where there is Character or Thought, on the other hand, an over-ornate Diction tends to obscure them.

As regards Problems and their Solutions, one may see the number and nature of the assumptions on which they
etepi yap esti miuety's o pouitys oswperanei zoγrapfas eti allos ekounopoios, anagkhe miueithsai tremo diwv oivwv ton arith-

10 mou ev ti ane, y gar oia in y estein, y oia fasiv kai dokei, (ei) oia einai de. tauta d' exagghelletai lexei y kai glyttai kai metaforais kai polla pathe tis lexeos esti, didomev gar tausta tois pouitaix. prou de touois ovx y authe orthvthe estin tis politikis kai tis pouitevikis oudhe allas

15 tychivs kai pouitevikis. autheis de tis pouitevikis dipti amartia, y men gar kath authn, y de kata symebevdhkos. el mem gar proeleteto mihmisasthai * * adnovamian, autheis y amartia. el de tiv proelesthai mou orhvas, allas ton istoron amwv ta dezi probebhlkota, y to kath ekasth tychivn amarthma

20 (oivon to kast iatrikhein y allhn tychiv) y adovata pepoihtai opoi auv ouv, ov kath' eautht. ofste de ti etaipimhmeta ev ton probolimasswv ek touwv etipukoivnata lwev. prwtovn men tiv

25 teleno eirnetai el ouvsws ekpleshtikwteron y autou y allo poiei meros. paraideigma y tou "Ektopos dwexis. el menoton to teleno y malloin (ei mih) istoron envedexhto istorchew kai kata tivn peri touwv tychiv, [ymartithsai] ouv orhvas dei gar el envedexheta olwsw mouamh ymarteithsai. eti poterwv esti to

30 amartthma, ton kata tivn tychiv y kath' allo symebevdh-

8 ei pr. A\textsuperscript{o} 9 ton arithmov apogr.: ton arithmov A\textsuperscript{o} 11 eu add. apogr. 16 el\textsuperscript{i} y pr. A\textsuperscript{o} 17 exciderunt fort. ymarthe de di ei Riccardianus 16, corr. Parisinus 2038: y A\textsuperscript{o} 18 tiv corr. Parisinus 2038: to A\textsuperscript{o} 20 eu adovata pepoihtai indexxit Duentzer 21 opoi auv ouv scripsi: opoian ouv A\textsuperscript{o}: opoiaoun vulg.: opoiaoun Winstanley fort. epistimevata \langle\tau\rangle 22 tiv\textsuperscript{e} tiv (el superscr. m. rec.) A\textsuperscript{o} 23 eu add. Parisinus 2038, Vahlen 24 auths apogr.: authe A\textsuperscript{o} 27 eu add. Ueberweg: eu add. corr. A\textsuperscript{o}, apogr. 28 ymartithsai (martithsai pr. A\textsuperscript{o}) seclusi
proceed by viewing the matter in the following way. (1) The poet being an imitator just like the painter or other maker of likenesses, he must necessarily in all instances represent things in one or other of three aspects, either as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or as they ought to be. (2) All this he does in language, with an admixture, it may be, of strange words and metaphors, as also of the various modified forms of words, since the use of these is conceded in poetry. (3) It is to be remembered, too, that there is not the same kind of correctness in poetry as in politics, or indeed any other art. There is, however, within the limits of poetry itself a possibility of two kinds of error, the one directly, the other only accidentally connected with the art. If the poet meant to describe the thing correctly, and failed through lack of power of expression, his art itself is at fault. But if it was through his having meant to describe it in some incorrect way (e.g. to make the horse in movement have both right legs thrown forward) that the technical error (one in a matter of, say, medicine or some other special science), or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be, have got into his description, his error in that case is not in the essentials of the poetic art. These, therefore, must be the premisses of the Solutions in answer to the criticisms involved in the Problems.

I. As to the criticisms relating to the poet's art itself. Any impossibilities there may be in his descriptions of things are faults. But from another point of view they are justifiable, if they serve the end of poetry itself—if (to assume what we have said of that end) they make the effect of some portion of the work more astounding. The Pursuit of Hector is an instance in point. If, however, the poetic end might have been as well or better attained without sacrifice of technical correctness in such matters, the impossibility is not to be justified, since the description should be, if it can, entirely free from error. One may ask, too, whether the error is in a matter directly or only accidentally connected
κός; ἐλαττον γάρ εἰ μὴ ᾖδει ὅτι ἐλαφος θήλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει ἡ εἰ ἀμμήτως ἐγγαφεν. πρὸς δὲ τούτου εἰσν ἐπειτιμάται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' ἑσως δει, οἶνοι καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη αὐτός μὲν οἶνος δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἶοι εἰσύν, ταῦτη 35 λυτέον. εἰ δὲ μηδὲτέρως, ὅτι οὐτω ψατῶν, οἶνον τὰ περὶ θεῶν


1461 εἰσωπερ Ἐνουφάνει. ἀλλ' οὖν ψατ. τὰ δὲ ἑσως οὐ βέλτιον μέν, ἀλλ' οὕτως εἰχεν, οἶνον τὰ περὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν, "ἔγχεα δὲ σφυν ὅρθ' ἐπὶ σαφωτήρος." οὐτω ψαρ τὸτ' εἰνομιζοί, ὀσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλυνμοὶ. περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἡ μὴ καλῶς


5 ἡ εἰρηται τινι ἡ πέπρακτα, οὐ μόνον σκεπτέοι εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἡ εἰρημένον βλέποντα εἰ σπουδαῖον ἡ φαῦ-


λον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸν πράττοντα ἡ λέγουτα πρὸς ὅν ἡ ὅτε ἡ ὅτω ὃν ἑνεκεν, οἶνον ἡ μεῖζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γέ-


νηται, (ἢ) μεῖζονος κακοῦ, ἵνα ἀπογένηται. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν


10 λέξιν όρῳνται δεὶ διαλύειν, οἶνον γλώττη "οὐχῖμα μὲν πρῶ-


τον;" ἱσως ψαρ οὐ τοὺς ἁμίουνοι λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλα-


κας καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα, "ὅς ὃς ὃς τοι εἶδος μὲν ἐνι κακοῦς," οὐ τὸ σώμα ἀντίμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπων αὐτρῶν, τὸ ψαρ


εὐεἰδὲς οἱ Κρήτες (τὸ) εὐπρόςωπον καλοῦσι καὶ τὸ "ζωρο-


τερον ὃς θέρα" οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὃς διονυσίου ἀλλὰ τὸ θάττον. τὰ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἰρηται, οἶον "ἀλλοι μὲν


31 εἰδει πρ. Ἐ 32 ἡ] η πρ. Ἐ εἰ ἀμμητως] η ἀμμητως (corr. καμμητως) Ἐ 33 ἑσως] οὐος m. rec. in marg. Ἐ


φαβι. τὰ δὲ Σπένγελ: θαβει τάδε. Ἐ 2 ἐνχει Ἐ 3 τότε


νομίζων πρ. Ἐ 6 εἰ] ἡ Ἐ 8 οὐν ἑνεκεν] οὐν ἑκεν Ἐ 9] εἰ


απογρ. 9 ἡ add. corr. Ἐ, apogr. 12 ὡς ρ' ἡ τοι Vahlen: ὡς ρ' τοι (corr. rec. ρ') Ἐ ἐνρ] εἰ ἡ Ἐ 14 τὸ addidi


15 κεραι έου πρ. Ἐ 16 τὰ Σπένγελ: τὸ Ἐ
with the poetic art; since it is a lesser error in an artist not to know, for instance, that the hind has no horns, than to produce an unrecognizable picture of one.

II. If the poet's description be criticized as not true to fact, one may urge perhaps that the object ought to be as described—an answer like that of Sophocles, who said that he drew men as they ought to be, and Euripides as they were. If the description, however, be neither true nor of the thing as it ought to be, the answer must be then, that it is in accordance with opinion. The tales about Gods, for instance, may be as wrong as Xenophanes thinks, neither true nor the better thing to say; but they are certainly in accordance with opinion. Of other statements in poetry one may perhaps say, not that they are better than the truth, but that the fact was so at the time; e.g. the description of the arms: 'their spears stood upright, butt-end upon the ground'; for that was the usual way of fixing them then, as it is still with the Illyrians. As for the question whether something said or done in a poem is morally right or not, in dealing with that one should consider not only the intrinsic quality of the actual word or deed, but also the person who says or does it, the person to whom he says or does it, the time, the means, and the motive of the agent—whether he does it to attain a greater good, or to avoid a greater evil.

III. Other criticisms one must meet by considering the language of the poet: (1) by the assumption of a strange word in a passage like οὐρῆς μὲν πρῶτον, where by οὐρῆς Homer may perhaps mean not mules but sentinels. And in saying of Dolon, ὃς ρ' ᾧ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἐν ἄγα κακός, his meaning may perhaps be, not that Dolon's body was deformed, but that his face was ugly, as εἶδος is the Cretan word for handsome-faced. So, too, ξυρότερον δὲ κέρατε may mean not 'mix the wine stronger,' as though for topers, but 'mix it quicker.' (2) Other expressions in Homer may be explained as metaphorical; e.g. in ἀλλοι μὲν ὅπα θεοὶ τε καὶ ἀνέρες εἶδον
17 post ei{don intercidisse suspicor u{pantes panu{hio pr. A°
19 te omadon] θ' omadon Sylburgius; hand scio an integer versus
(II. 10. 13), ai{lo{ω συρίγγων τ' ενοπην ομαδων τ' ανθρωπων, sit resti-
tuendus τo{v add. apogr. 20 ón pr. A° (οίη m. rec.) 24
θυητ' Morelius: θυητα A° 25 ad{name (ei{na) Riccardianus 46
ζωρά Victorius: ζωά A° κέκριτο (i superscr. m. rec.) A°
άμφιβολα pr. A° 27 τον κεκραμένον apogr.: των κεκραμένων
A° 30 οίνοψεις A° πεινόνων pr. A° 31 ονάματι
υπεναντίωματι (fruit -iω-) δοκεί A° 33 σημαίνου Vahlen (ed. 1):
σημαίνεις A°: σημαίνειν apogr. οίνον το scrispi: οίνον το A°
35 οδι add. Riccardianus 46, Vahlen 1461b 1 δητι τι A°
(marg. m. rec. δητι) 2 ειρηκότος Riccardianus 46: ειρηκότος A°
The word ἄπαντες, 'all,' is metaphorically put for 'many,' since 'all' is a species of 'many.' So also his οὐ δὲ ἀμορφός is metaphorical, the best known standing 'alone.' (3) A change, as Hippias suggested, in the mode of reading a word will solve the difficulty in δίδωμεν δὲ οἶ, and τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθηται ὂμωρφ. (4) Other difficulties may be solved by another punctuation; e.g. in Empedocles, ἄφα δὲ θυτὶ ἐφύνοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο. Or (5) by the assumption of an equivocal term, as in παρφυκέεν δὲ πλέω νύξ, where πλέω is equivocal. Or (6) by an appeal to the custom of language. Wine-and-water we call 'wine'; and it is on the same principle that Homer speaks of a κνημίς νεοτέκτων κασσιτέρωι, a 'greave of newly wrought lin.' A worker in iron we call a 'brazier'; and it is on the same principle that Ganymede is described as the 'wine-server' of Zeus, though the Gods do not drink wine. This latter, however, may be an instance of metaphor. But whenever also a word seems to imply some contradiction, it is necessary to reflect how many ways there may be of understanding it in the passage in question; e.g. in Homer's τῷ ὁ ἐσχετο χάλκεους ἔγχος one should consider the possible senses of 'was stopped there'—whether by taking it in this sense or in that one will best avoid the fault of which Glaucon speaks: 'They start with some improbable presumption; and having so decreed it themselves, proceed
ti dôkei e'ptiμwòsw, ἀν ὑπεναυτῶν ἓ τῇ αὐτῶν οἶήσει. τοῦ
to δὲ πέπονθε τὰ περὶ Ικάριον. οἴονται γὰρ αὐτῶν Λάκωνα
5 εἶναι ἂτοτον οἷον τὸ μῆ ἐντυχεῖ τὸν Τυλέμαχον αὐτῷ εἰς
Λακεδαιμόνα ἔλθοντα. τὸ δ' ἱσως ἐχεῖ ὁσπερ οἱ Κεφαλλη-
vές φασιν παρ' αὐτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι λέγουσι τὸν 'Οδυσσέα
eκαὶ εἰναι 'Ικάδων ἀλλ' οὐκ 'Ικάριον. οἱ ὁμάρτημα δὲ τὸ
πρόβλημα εἰκὸς ἐστων. ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν
10 ποίησιν ἦ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἦ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν δεὶ ἀνάγειν.
πρὸς τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἱρετῶτερον πιθανὸν ἄδυνατον ἦ
ἀπίθανον καὶ δυσατον * * τοιούτου εἰναι οίους Ζειξίς
ἐγραφείν, ἀλλὰ βέλτινον τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεὶ ὑπερέ-
χειν. πρὸς οὐ φασιν τάλογον οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἀλο-
15 γὸν ἐστων εἰκὸς γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι. τὰ δ' ὑπε-
ναυτῶς εἰρημένα οὕτω σκοπεῖν ὁσπερ οἱ εν τοῖς λόγοις
ἐλεγχοι εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁσαίτως, ὡστε
καὶ αὐτῶν ἦ πρὸς αὐτὸς λέγει ἦ δ' ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθήται.
ἔρθη δ' ἐπιτίμησις καὶ ἀλογία καὶ μοιχηρία, οὕτως μὴ ἀνάγ-
20 κης οὔτης μηθεν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὃσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ
Ἀλεξεῦ, ἦ τῇ ποιηρίᾳ, ὃσπερ ἐν 'Ὀρέστῃ (τῇ) τοῦ Μενελάου.
τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμήματα ἐκ πέντε εἰδών φέροντων ἦ γὰρ ὡς
ἀδύνατα ἦ ὡς ἀλογά ἦ ὡς βλαβερὰ ἦ ὡς ὑπεναυτία ἦ ὡς

3 ἐπιτιμῶσιν pr. Αε αὐτῶν Parisinus 2038: αὐτῶν Αε 4
πέπονθε Λε Περ Ικάριον Αε 5 τιλέμαχον Αε 6 Κεφαλλήρεσ
Tyrwhitt: κεφαλήρεσ Αε 7 αὐτῶν pr. Vaticanus 1400: αὐτῶν Αε
8 δι' ἀμφίρημα Madius (errone Valla): διαμάρτημα Αε 9 <eινα>
εἰκὸς Hermann 11 πεθανοῦ Λε 12 απείδανον Αε καὶ
ei ἄδυνατον intercódigo coni. Vahlen (confirm. Ar.) οἴους
Parisinus 2038: οἴον Αε 15 ὑπεναυτίας Twining: ὑπεναυτία ὡς
Αε 18 φρόνιμοι apogr.: φρόνιμον (corr. φρόνιμον) Αε 19
ἀλογία καὶ μοιχηρία Vahlen: ἀλογία καὶ μοιχηρία Αε 21 Ἀλεξεῦ ἦ
τῇ margo Riccardiani 16: αἰγεήτη Αε τῇ addendum coni.
Vahlen
to draw inferences, and censure the poet as though he had actually said whatever they happen to believe, if his statement conflicts with their own notion of things. This is how Homer’s silence about Icarius has been treated. Starting with the notion of his having been a Lacedaemonian, the critics think it strange for Telemachus not to have met him when he went to Lacedaemon. Whereas the fact may have been as the Cephallenians say, that the wife of Ulysses was of a Cephallenian family, and that her father’s name was Icadius, not Icarius. So that it is probably a mistake of the critics that has given rise to the Problem.

Speaking generally, one has to justify (1) the Impossible by reference to the requirements of poetry, or to the better, or to opinion. For the purposes of poetry a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility; and if men such as Zeuxis depicted be impossible, the answer is that it is better they should be like that, as the artist ought to improve on his model. (2) The Improbable one has to justify either by showing it to be in accordance with opinion, or by urging that at times it is not improbable; for there is a probability of things happening also against probability. (3) The contradictions found in the poet’s language one should first test as one does an opponent’s confutation in a dialectical argument, so as to see whether he means the same thing, in the same relation, and in the same sense, before admitting that he has contradicted either something he has said himself or what a man of sound sense assumes as true. But there is no possible apology for improbability of Plot or depravity of character, when they are not necessary and no use is made of them, like the improbability in the appearance of Aegeus in Medea and the baseness of Menelaus in Orestes.

The objections, then, of critics start with faults of five
παρὰ τὴν ὁρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. αἱ δὲ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν
25 εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι, εἰς τιν ὄντος δώδεκα.
Πότερον δὲ βελτίων ἡ ἐποποική μίμησις ἡ ἡ τραγική, 26
dιαπορφήσειν ἃν τις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἤπτουν φορτικὴ βελτίων, τοιαύ-
tη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίων θεατὰς ἐστιν ἂει, λιαν δὴν ὦτι ἡ
〈πρὸς〉 ἀπαντα μιμομενὴ φορτική: ὡς γὰρ ὦκ ἀληθαιμένων
30 ἀν μὴ αὐτὸς προσθή, πολλὴ κύψης κυνωτάτα, οἷον οἱ φαύλοι
αὐληταὶ κυλώμενοι ἀν δίσκου δὴ μιμεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔκκοιτες
τῶν κορυφαῖν ἀν Σκῦλλαν αὐλώσωι, ἡ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδία
tοιαύτη ἐστίν, ὡς καὶ οἱ προτέρους οὐσίαν ἄνω φύτῳ
ῦποκρίτας· ὡς λιαν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα πῦθηκον ὁ Μυστάκος
35 τῶν Καλλιπτηθῆν εἰκάλει, τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα καὶ περὶ Πω-
1462 δάρων ἵππ. ὡς δ' οὖν τοῖς [θ'] ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἡ ὀλὴ τέχνη
πρὸς τὴν ἐποποιών ἐχεῖ. τὴν μὲν οὖν πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς
φασιν εἶναι (οὗ) οὔδεν δέονται τῶν σχημάτων, τὴν δὲ τραγικὴν
πρὸς φαύλοις: εἰ οὖν φορτική, χεῖρων δῆλον ὅτι ἀν εἰη.
5 πρῶτον μὲν οὖ τῇ ποιητικῇ ἡ κατηγορία ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑποκρι-
kῆς, ἐπεὶ ἐστὶν περιεργάζεσθαι τοῖς σημεῖοι καὶ μαθητοῦν,
ὅπερ [ἐστὶ] Σωσίάστατος, καὶ διάδοσα, ὅπερ ἐποίει Μυστά-
θεος ὁ Ὀπούντιος. εἴτε οὖν καίστας ἄπαστα αὐτοδικαστέα,
εἴπερ μηδ' ὄρχησις, ὅλλα ἐρφαλῶν, ὅπερ καὶ Καλλιπτηθῆ
10 ἐπετιμᾶτο καὶ νῦν ἀλλοι οὐκ ἤλευθερας γυναῖκας μιμο-
μένων. ἔτι ἡ τραγῳδία καὶ ἂνει κυήσεως ποιεῖ το αὐτῆς,
ὥσπερ ἡ ἐποποιῶα: διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγινώσκεκεν φανερὰ ὑπολα

25 σκεπταία Λο 26 βελτίων Λο 28 θ' ἐπιγρ.: δη Λο
ἀει, λιαν Vahlen: δειλω Λο 29 πρὸς addidi 30 κυνωτάτα
ἀπogr.: κυνωτά Λο 1462 ιθ' alterum om. ἀπogr. αὐτοῦ
Hermann: αὐτοῦ ᾿Λο 3 αὐτὸν Victorius σχημάτων τὴν
ἀπogr.: σχημα | τα αὐτὴν (τα αὐ m. rec. in loco macula deformato)
Λο 4 εἴ] ᾿Λο 5 μὲν (οὗ) Parisinus 2038 7 ἐστὶ
induxit Duenterz διάδοσα ἀπogr.: διάδοσα Λο 8 ὁ ποιήτους
Λο 10 ἐπετιμᾶτο pr. Λο 11 αὐτῆς Λο
kinds: the allegation is always that something is either (1) impossible, (2) improbable, (3) corrupting, (4) contradictory, or (5) against technical correctness. The answers to these objections must be sought under one or other of the above-mentioned heads, which are twelve in number.

The question may be raised whether the epic or the tragic is the higher form of imitation. It may be argued that, if the less vulgar is the higher, and the less vulgar is always that which addresses the better public, an art addressing any and every one is of a very vulgar order. It is a belief that their public cannot see the meaning, unless they add something themselves, that causes the perpetual movements of the performers—bad flute-players, for instance, rolling about, if quoit-throwing is to be represented, and pulling at the conductor, if Scylla is the subject of the piece. Tragedy, then, is said to be an art of this order—to be in fact just what the later actors were in the eyes of their predecessors; for Mynniscus used to call Callippides 'the ape,' because he thought he so overacted his parts; and a similar view was taken of Pindarus also. All Tragedy, however, is said to stand to the Epic as the newer to the older school of actors. The one, accordingly, is said to address a cultivated audience, which does not need the accompaniment of gesture; the other, an uncultivated one. If, therefore, Tragedy is a vulgar art, it must clearly be lower than the Epic.

The answer to this is twofold. In the first place, one may urge (1) that the censure does not touch the art of the dramatic poet, but only that of his interpreter; for it is quite possible to overdo the gesturing even in an epic recital, as did Sosistratus, and in a singing contest, as did Mnasitheus of Opus. (2) That one should not condemn all movement, unless one means to condemn even the dance, but only that of ignoble people—which is the point of the criticism passed on Callippides and in the present day on others, that their women are not like gentlewomen. (3) That Tragedy may produce its effect even without movement or action in just the same way as Epic poetry; for from


1462a 13–1462b 19

τίς ἐστιν ἐι οὐν ἔστι τά τ’ ἄλλα κρείττων, τούτο γε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτή υπάρχειν. ἐπειτὰ οὐκτὸ πάντ’ ἔχει οὔσατο ἡ ἐπο-15 ποία (καὶ γὰρ τῷ μέτρῳ ἔξεστι χρῆσθαι), καὶ ἔτι οὐ μικρὸν μέρος τὴν μονοσικὴν καὶ τὰς όψεις, ὅτι ἂν αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνύσταν- ται ἐναργέστατα: ἐξαι καὶ τὸ ἐναργῆς ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώ- σει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἔτι τὸ ἐν ἐλάττων μῆκε τὸ τέλος1462b τῆς μυμήσεως εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἀθροώτερον ἥδιον ἡ πολλὰ κεκρα-μένου τῷ χρώμῳ, λέγω δ’ οἶνον εἰ τις τῶν Οἰδίπουν θεί- τῶν Σοφοκλέους ἐν ἔπεσον ὁσίος ἡ Ἰλώς); ἔτι ἦττον μία ἡ μύμησις ἡ τῶν ἐποποίων (πημεῖον δέ, ἐκ γὰρ ὁποιασοῦν 5 μυμήσεως πλείους τραγῳδία γίνονται), ὥστε ἐὰν μὲν ἕνα μίθου ποιῶσιν, ἡ βραχέως δεικνύμενον μείονον φαίνεσθαι, ἡ ἀκολουθοῦσα τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μῆκε ὑδάρη· λέγω δὲ οἶνον ἐὰν ἐκ πλευρῶν πράξεων ἡ συγκεκριμένη, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλώς ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη καὶ ἡ Ὅδυσσεα, καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ 10 ἔχει μέγεθος (κατοι ταῦτα τὰ ποιῆμα συνεστηκεν ὡς ἐν- δέχεται ἁριστα καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μίας πράξεως μύμησις) —εἰ οὖν τούτοις τε διαφέρει πᾶσιν καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ (δεὶ γὰρ ὦ τὰν τυχοῦσαι ἥδονην ποιὲσιν αὐτός ἄλλα τῆν εἰρήμενην), φανερῶν ὅτι κρείττων ἃν εἰ ἡ μᾶλλον τοῦ 15 τέλους τυγχάνοντα τῆς ἐποποίας.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδίας καὶ ἐποποίας, καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν μερῶν, καὶ πόσα καὶ τί διαφέρει, καὶ τοῦ ε痪 ἡ μῆ καὶ τίνες αὐτίκας, καὶ περὶ ἐπιτιμήσεων καὶ λύσεων, εἰρήμεθα τοσάτα. * * *

14 αὐτῆ πρ. Αε 17 ἀναγράφει Madius (e codd. quibusdam):
the mere reading of a play its quality may be seen. So that, if it be superior in all other respects, this element of inferiority is no necessary part of it.

In the second place, one must remember (1) that Tragedy has everything that the Epic has (even the epic metre being admissible), together with a not inconsiderable addition in the shape of the Music (a very real factor in the pleasure of the drama) and the Spectacle. (2) That its reality of presentation is felt in the play as read, as well as in the play as acted. (3) That the tragic imitation requires less space for the attainment of its end; which is a great advantage, since the more concentrated effect is more pleasurable than one with a large admixture of time to dilute it—consider the Oedipus of Sophocles, for instance, and the effect of expanding it into the number of lines of the Iliad. (4) That there is less unity in the imitation of the epic poets, as is proved by the fact that any one work of theirs supplies matter for several tragedies; the result being that, if they take what is really a single story, it seems curt when briefly told, and thin and waterish when on the scale of length usual with their verse. In saying that there is less unity in an epic, I mean an epic made up of a plurality of actions, in the same way as the Iliad and Odyssey have many such parts, each one of them in itself of some magnitude; yet the structure of the two Homeric poems is as perfect as can be, and the action in them is as nearly as possible one action. If, then, Tragedy is superior in these respects, and also besides these, in its poetic effect (since the two forms of poetry should give us, not any or every pleasure, but the very special kind we have mentioned), it is clear that, as attaining the poetic effect better than the Epic, it will be the higher form of art.

So much for Tragedy and Epic poetry—for these two arts in general and their species; the number and nature of their constituent parts; the causes of success and failure in them; the Objections of the critics, and the Solutions in answer to them.
FRAGMENTA

I.

Aristoteles Rhet. 3. 2, 1404\textsuperscript{b} 37: τῶν ὁ ἀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμίᾳ χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταῦτα γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμία. Λέγω δὲ κύρια τε καὶ συνώνυμα οίον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα καὶ κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλους. τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐκαστῶν ἐστὶ καὶ πόσα εἴδη μεταφοράς καὶ ὅτι τούτο πλείστον ὄνταται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, αἱ μεταφοράι, εἴρηται καθάπερ ἔλεγομεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

Simplicius in Categ. 36. 13 Kalbfleisch: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητικῆς συνώνυμα εἶπεν εἶναι ὅν πλείω μὲν τὰ ὀνόματα λόγοι δὲ ὁ αὐτός, οἷα ὅτι ἔστι τὰ πολυώνυμα, τὸ τε λόπτων καὶ ἱμάτιον καὶ τὸ φάρος.

II.

Aristoteles Poet. 6, 1449\textsuperscript{b} 21: περὶ κωμῳδίας ὑπέρεσεν ἐρωτήμεν.

III.

Aristoteles Rhet. 1. 11, 1371\textsuperscript{b} 33: ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἔπει ἡ παιδία τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πάσα ἀνεσίς καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων,
FRAGMENTA

analygei kai _ta_ gelyoia _hde_ exei, kai _antropon_ kai _logos_ kai _egge_ diwristai _de_ peri _gelyow_ χωρις _en_ tois peri _pouistikis_.

Idem Rhet. 3. 18, 1419b 2: peri _de_ _tow_ _gelyow_, επειδη twn _dokei_ χρησω _exeo_ _en_ _tois_ αγωσι, kai _dein_ _ephi_ Gorgias _twn_ _mew_ _spoudh_ _diafthierev_ _tow_ _euanthow_ _gelyo_t _tow_ _gelyota_ _spoudh_ _drhws_ _lege_ _en_ _eirhata_ _topa_ _eido_ _gelyow_ _estin_ _en_ _tois_ _peri_ _pouistikis_, _dio_ _to_ _mew_ _amottei_ _eleuthero_ _to_ _di_ _oiv_ _opos_ _ou_ _to_ _amottom_ _autw_ _lypseai_.

Conf. Cicero de Oratore 2. 58: Locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi . . . turpitudine et deformitate quadam continetur; haec enim ridentur vel sola vel maxime, quae notant et designant turpitudinem aliquam non turpiter . . . nec insignis improbitas et scelere iuncta nec rursus miseria insignis agitata ridetur: facinerosos maiore quadam vi quam ridiculi vulnerari volunt: miser os includi solunt, nisi se forte iactant; parcendumautem maxime est caritati hominum, ne temere in eos dicas qui diliguntur. haec igitur adhibenda est primum in iocando moderatio; itaque ea facillime luduntur quae neque odio magno neque misericordia maxima digna sunt; quam od rem materies omnis ridiculorum est in iis vitius quae sunt in vita hominum neque carorum neque calamitosorum neque eorum qui ob facinus ad supplicium rapiendi videntur; eaque belle agitata ridentur.

IV.

Antiatticista in Anecdotis Bekkeri 101. 32: κυντοτατου: 'Αριστοτέλης _peri_ _pouistikis_ _to_ _de_ _pantw_ _kyn_ _tota_tou_._

V.

Aristoteles Pol. 8. 7, 1341b 32: _etel_ _de_ _tiv_ _diairesw_ _apodekomega_ _tow_ _melo_ _ωs_ _diairovsi_ _tines_ _tow_ _en_ _philosophia_, _ta_ _mew_ _hthik_ _ta_ _de_ _prraktik_ _ta_ _di_ _en_ _thousiastik_ _tidevtes_, _ka_
tōn ἀρμονίων τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἐκαστά τούτων οἰκεῖαν ἅλλην, πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος τυθείση, φαίμεν δ' ὅν μᾶς ἕνεκα ὥφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρήσθαι δεῖν ἅλλα καὶ πλειώνων χάριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἐνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' εν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐρούμεν σαφεῖστερον—τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν, πρὸς ἀνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν), φανερῶν ὅτι χρηστέων μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέων, ἅλλα πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἡδικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων χειρογραφοῦτων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχᾶς ὑσχυρῶς τούτῳ ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἡπτὸν διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἐτί δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταῦτης τῆς κυψῆσεως κατοκώχυμι ταῖς εἴσεν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν λερῶν μελῶν ὁρῶμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τῇ ψυχῇ μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὅσπερ λατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταῦτῳ δὴ τούτῳ ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὀλος παθητικοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐκάστῳ, καὶ τάσι γίγνεσθαι των κάθαρσιν καὶ κονφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ὁμοιῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τά καθαρτικά παρέχει χαράν ἄβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Conf. Aristoteles Pol. 8. 6, 1341a 21: ἐτί δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἀιῶν ἡθικῶν ἅλλα μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικῶν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους αὐτῷ καιροῖς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία καθάρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἡ μάθησιν.

Proclus in Plat. Remp. 1 p. 42 Kroll: εἰτέν χρή ... δεύτερον, τί δὴποτε μάλιστα τὴν τραγωδίαν καὶ τὴν κωμικὴν οὐ παραδέχεται [sci. Plato] καὶ ταῦτα συντελοῦσα πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν, ἀ μίτη παντάπασιν ἀποκλίνειν δυνατόν μίτη ἐμπικλάναι πάλιν ἀσφαλές, δεῶμεν δὲ τίνος ἐν καιρῷ κυψῆσεως, ἢν ἐν ταῖς τοιοῦτοι ἀκράσεσιν ἐκπληρομένων ἀνενοχλητοῦ ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ χρόνῳ ποιεῖν ... p. 49: τὸ δὲ δεύτερον [sci. πρόθεσιμον]—τούτο δ' ἤν τὸ τῆς τραγωδίας ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ κωμῳδιᾶν ἀπότομος, εἰπὲ διὰ τοῦτων δυνατὸν ἐμέμτρως ἀποπλησάντας εὐεργά πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν ἔχειν
τὸ πεπονηκός αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας—τοῦτο δ' οὖν πολλὴν καὶ τῷ Ἀριστο-
τέλει παρασχὼν αὐτίσκες ἄφορμήν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιήσεων τούτων ἀγανιστάς τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα λόγων οὕτως ποιεῖς ἐπόμενοι τοῖς ἐμπροσθέν διαλύσομεν... p. 50: δεῖν μὲν οὖν τὸν πολιτικὸν διαμηχανᾶσθαι τινας τῶν παθῶν τούτων ἀπεράσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν, ἀλλ' οἷς ὡστε τὰς περὶ αὐτὰ προπαθείας συνείνευς, τούσκαντιον μὲν οὖν ὡστε χαλινοὶ καὶ τὰς κίνησις αὐτῶν ἐμμελῶς ἀναστῆλλεν' ἐκείνας δὲ ἄρα τὰς ποιήσεις πρὸς τῇ ποικιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἁμέτρον ἐχούσας εὖ ταῖς τῶν παθῶν τούτων προκλῆσει πολλοῦ δεῖν εἰς ἄφοσίωσιν εἶναι χρησίμους. ἂν γὰρ ἄφοσίωσεις οὐκ εὖ ὑπερβολάις εἰσίν ἀλλ' εὖ συνεστάλμεναι ἐνεργείαις, σμικρὰν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἐχούσας διὸ εἰσίν ἄφοσίωσεις.

Iamblichus de Myst. 1. 11: αἰ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παιδικῶν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντη μὲν εἱργόμεναι καθίσταται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχείαν [ita Bernays; βραχείς vulg.] καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμέτρον προαγόμενα χαίρομαι μετρίως καὶ ἀναπληροῦμαι, καὶ ἐντεύθεν ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι πειθόμας καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀναπαύονται. διὰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἄλλητα πάθη θεωροῦντες ἵσταμεν τὰ οἰκεία πάθη καὶ μετρίωτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν.
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τῶν εἰδών αὐτῆς. The ἑιδὴ meant are epic poetry, Tragedy, and 1447 a 8 Comedy, as is clear from 6, 1449 b 21, where the main subjects for consideration in the Poetics are enumerated. Lyric poetry, apart from an occasional reference to the Dithyramb and Nome, or the chorica in Tragedy, is ignored in the existing Poetics; and there is little or no reason to suppose it to have been discussed in the lost portion of the book. The probability is that, from the importance of its musical element, it belonged in Aristotle’s classification of the arts to the theory of μελοσοφία rather than to that of poetry proper. The work of the two lyric poets Phrynis and Timotheus is put under the head of μελοσοφία in Metaph. a 1, 993 b 15; and in the Problems, where Phrynichus is said to have been a μελοσοφία rather than a tragedian (Probl. 18. 31, 920 a 11 Διὰ τι οἱ περὶ Φρύνικον ἦσαν μάλλον μελοσοφοὶ; ἢ διὰ τὸ πολλαπλασσαί τὸ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τῶν μέτρων;), the same view is implied of the lyric parts of Tragedy. It is to be remembered too that Aristophanes in Ran. 1250 makes Euripides begin his criticism of the chorica in Aeschylus by calling him a κακὸς μελοσοφίας.

For the antithesis in the text comp. 26, 1462 b 16 καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδών.—Top. i. 15, 106 b 37 ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων [scil. οἴνοιας], οὔτε αὐτὸ πλεοναχώς λέγεται, καὶ ἡ πτώσις ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πλεοναχῶς ῥηθῇσται, καὶ εἰ ἡ πτώσις, καὶ αὐτό.—Eth. E. 7. 15, 1248 b 22 δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτή καὶ αἱ πράξεις.

ἡν τινα δύναμιν ἐκαστον ἡχει = δί τι δύναται ἐκαστον: comp. Pol. 5. 2, 1302 b 5 τούτων δὲ ὑβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἄχουσι δύναμιν καὶ τῶς αἰτία, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ φανερὸν . . . δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμή καὶ τί δύναται καὶ τῶς αἰτία στάσεως. Each species of poetry has its special capacities, which enable it to do what the rest either cannot do at all or cannot do so well and effectively. Other Aristotelian instances of δύναμις with a sense approximating to our ‘function’ or ‘effect,’ will be found in Bon. Ind. 206 b 29.

οὐνίσταταὶ is a passive in 26, 1462 a 16, and probably also in a 9 24, 1460 a 28. That it is a passive in the present passage is shown

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by the parallels, τούς συνεστώτας εὐ μέθους in 7, 1450b 32, and ὀντος συνεστάναι τὸν μέθον in 14, 1453b 4.

**a 10** καλῶς ἔχειν: 13, 1453b 12 τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μέθον.—24, 1459b 12 τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. As anything good of its kind may be said to be καλῶς, so anything that is in the condition in which it ought to be is said to καλῶς ἔχειν (comp. Bon. Ind. 360b 38).

ἐτι δὲ ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποιῶν ἐστὶ μορίων, scil. ἡ ποίησις. Many of the translators, however, suppose the subject to be ἐκαστὸν εἶδος ('ex quot et cujusmodi partibus constant singulae species,' Goulston). The question is considered in chap. 6 in reference to Tragedy, and in 24, 1450b 10 in reference to epic poetry.

**a 11** περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ μεθὸδος: Soph. el. 33, 183b 12 δεδηλωταί δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς τῆς αὐτῆς μεθόδου τῶν λόγων ἐστίν. The meaning of μέθοδος, a favourite word with Aristotle, has been discussed by Wailiz, Org. 2 p. 297 (comp. Bon. Ind. 449b 43).

**a 12** λέγωμεν ἄρξαμενοι κτε. The language here is very like that in Soph. el. 1, 164a 20 περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων... λέγωμεν ἄρξαμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων (comp. De sensu 1, 436a 6; De part. an. 1. 5, 646a 3; 2. 10, 655b 28; Eth. E. 1. 7, 1217a 18; Rhet. 1. 13, 1373b 1). In order to determine the definition of poetry, or rather of Tragedy as the highest form of the art, Aristotle starts with the assumption that Tragedy, together with certain other allied arts, comes under the general head of μύρησις, 'imitation,' and then proceeds by successive divisions of this genus to note one by one the various points which differentiate it from the rest. (1) Tragedy has language, metre, and music as its means of imitation; the music in it, however, comes in only from time to time, in the choral parts—which distinguishes it from the Nome and the Dithyramb. (2) It represents noble personages—which distinguishes it from Comedy. (3) It has a dramatic form—which distinguishes it from the Epic. These with other differentiae less clearly accounted for are combined in the definition of Tragedy at the opening of chap. 6. The logical order here exemplified is what Aristotle regards as the natural order of procedure: Phys. 1. 7, 189b 31 ἐστι γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ κοινὰ πρῶτον εἰπώτας ὀντώ τὰ περὶ ἐκαστὸν ἓδαι θεωρεῖν.

**a 13** ἐποποιία κτέ. This enumeration of imitative arts comprises the four great species of poetry distinguished by Plato in Rep. 394 c, together with two purely musical arts, ἀθλητικὴ and κυθαριστική.
These last may be supposed to be added partly on account of the manifest analogy between them and poetry, both being imitative arts appealing to the ear, and partly also on account of the historical connexion of poetry with music (comp. Cicero De Orat. 3. 174 musici, qui erant quondam idem poeae). Even Plato occasionally merges the one in the other. In the Republic μονωσική includes poetry, and in Symp. 205 c poetry includes τὸ περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς.

ἡ τῆς πραγματικῶς ποίησις: b 26 ἢ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις.—Plato Gorg. 501 ε ὡς τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις.—502 β ὡς τῆς πραγματικῆς ποίησις.

διθυράμβοποιητική: Plato cites the Dithyramb as an instance of the non-imitative type of poetry: Rep. 394 c τῆς ποιήσεως . . . ἡ μὲν διὰ μυθιστῶς διὰ ἑτοῖμα, διὰ τὸ ποιήσει τῆς τραγῳδίας τὸ καὶ κωμῳδία, ἡ δὲ διὰ ἀραγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—ἐφεξῆς δὲ ἀν αὐτὴν μᾶλλον τοὺς ἐν διθυράμβοις. By Aristotle's time, however, the Dithyramb (as also the Nome) had lost its original form, and become 'imitative' or semi-dramatic, a sort of musical counterpart of the Drama, dealing with the same kinds of subject as Tragedy, and with solos by professional singers corresponding to the speeches of the tragic actors. This change in the character of the Dithyramb is noted in Probl. 19. 15, 918 b 18 οἱ διθυράμβου, ἐπειδὴ μυθικός ἐγένοντο, οὖκετί ἐχοῦσιν ἀντιστρόφους, πρὸτερον δὲ εἴχον· αὐτοῦ δὲ ὅτι τὸ παλαιὸν οἱ ἐλευθεροὶ ἐχόρευον αὐτοῦ· πολλοὶ οὖν ἀγνωστικῶς ἤδειν χαλεπῶς ἤν, ώστε ἕναρμόνιν μελή ἐνθουμμένης μεταβάλλει γὰρ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς τῷ ἐνί μᾶν ἢ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ τῷ ἀγνωστῇ ἢ τοῖς τῷ ἡθος συλλαττούν (comp. Bergk, Gr. Lit. 2 p. 529, and Wilamowitz, Euripides Herakles 1 p. 79). In this mention of the Dithyramb, therefore, Aristotle does not cite it as a type of lyric poetry in general (as is often supposed), but as representing an imitative or dramatic form of lyric—a lyrical μύθος or picture of life and manners. A certain approximation to this later form of Dithyramb is to be seen in Bacchylides (Comparetti, Mélanges Weil p. 30).

τῆς αὐθητικῆς ἢ πλειστῆ: De Caelo 3. 1, 298 b 2 τῆν πλειστὴν τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 279).

The αὐθής was the accompaniment of the Dithyramb and the κιβάρα of the Nome. That, however, is not the reason for this reference to them, as it is clear from a 23 that Aristotle is thinking rather of music without words, i.e. of that which was termed in antiquity ψυλὴ αὐθητής and ψυλὴ κιβάρισις. Plato in the Laws (669 ε) sets his face against this purely instrumental music, which had evidently attained

H 2
to a high degree of perfection in his time, on the ground that it ends in a mere display of technical execution (θαυματουργία) and a 'brutish noise' (φωνής θηριώδους σφόδρα φίλον). Aristotle's language in Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 11 τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἑργῶν ἀ νῦν ἐκλήθησθε εἰς τοὺς ἁγώνας, seems to imply that there was in his view some truth in Plato's criticism. In the present passage accordingly, instead of saying ἡ αὐλητική, or ἡ αὐλητικὴ πᾶσα, he adopts the qualified form of expression, τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη, in order to show that he is not unaware of there being exceptions to the rule.

μιμήσεις. The general meaning of μιμεῖσθαι is either 'to do what another has done', or 'to make something like something else', i.e. to represent by means of a copy or counterfeit of some sort. The primitive sense of the word must have been 'to play the μέμος', to reproduce the language, tones, gestures, etc., of another—a sense which survives in the use of the term for the imitation of persons by actors on the stage. In actual use the word is wide enough to include the counterfeiting of movement and attitude by the dancer, that of voice and sound by the singer and musician, that of the forms and colours of things by the sculptor and painter, and even the representation of things in words, as in speech and literature. A noteworthy variation, however, is to be observed in the application of the word to a work of literature. Owing to the traditional associations connected with it Plato in the Republic opposes μιμήσεις to narrative, restricting it to the dramatic mode of statement, in which the speaker effaces himself, as it were, and identifies himself with his personages: Rep. 393 B οὐκοῦν διήγησις μὲν ἔστι καὶ ὅταν τὰς βίοτες ἐκάστοτε λέγῃ [scil. Ὄμηρος] καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξύ τῶν ῥήσεων; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἀλλ' ὅταν γε τινα λέγῃ βίον ὡς τις ἄλλος ἄν, ἢρ οὐ τούτο ὑμοίοιν αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ λέξειν ἐκάστῳ δὲν ἄν προείη ὡς ἐρούντα;Φήσομεν τε γὰρ; Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε ὑμοίοιν ἐκάστῳ ἄλλῳ ἣ κατὰ φωνήν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαι ἐστίν ἐκείνων ὧν ἄν τις ὑμοίος; Τί μὴν; 'Εν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὡς ἔσκεκεν, οὔτος τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Εἰ δὲ γε μηδαμοῦ ἐαυτὸν ἀποκρίπτοτο ὁ ποιητής, πᾶσα ἄν αὐτῷ ἄνειον μιμήσεως ἡ ποιήσις τε καὶ διήγησις γεγονύσιν ἔτη.—394 B τῆς ποιήσεως τε καὶ μυθολογίας ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστὶν, ὡσπέρ οὖ λέγεις, τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἢ δὲ δὲ ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—εὗρος ὧ ἄν αὐτὴν μάλιστα πον ἐν διδυμάμβως—ἡ δ' αὐτ' ἀμφοτέρων ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐπών ποιῆσει, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι. In his use of μιμεῖσθαι in
the Poetics Aristotle has fallen into a grave inconsistency, as he distinctly makes it in one place (3, 1448 a 21) include narrative, and in another (24, 1460 a 9) exclude it.

to sýνολον qualifies πᾶσαν, what is said of the class as a whole being opposed to the specific differences which reveal themselves in it on closer examination; comp. Plato Soph. 220 b ΞΕ. Τοῦ δὲ ἐνδιδοῦ [scil. γένους ἡ θήρα] σχεδόν τὸ sýνολον ἀλητικόν; ΘΕAI. Ναί. ΞΕ. Τη δὲ; ταύτην αὐτῇ τὴν θήραν ἄρ' οὐκ ἄν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύναμαι διελούμην;

τῷ γένει ἑτέρωι. Forchhammer’s correction τῷ ἐν ἑτέρωι is supposed to be confirmed by the use of the preposition to denote the means or vehicle of imitation in a 22 and b 29, and also elsewhere (3, 1448 a 20 etc.). The sense, however, is just as well expressed by the simple dative, as it is for instance in the immediate context in a 18 and a 26; and as the means under consideration, λόγος, ἀρμονία, and νοῦς, differ in kind, they are rightly described as γένει ἑτέρα. There is no need to restore τῷ γένει; Aristotle not unfrequently omits the article in this and cognate formulas, e.g. in Top. 1. 7, 103 a 13 γένει ταῦτα, in H. A. 2. 1, 497 b 9 and Metaph. I 10, 1059 a 14 γένει ἑτέρα. In An. post. 2. 15, 98 a 26–28 we find him saying τῷ γένει and γένει, and in Eth. N. 10. 5, 1175 a 25 τῷ εἴδει and εἴδει without perceptible difference of meaning. The distinction in fact between γένει ἑτέρα and τῷ γένει ἑτέρα is not greater than that between ‘different in kind’ and ‘different in their kind’ in English. A confirmation of Forchhammer’s reading has been seen in the fact that in 8, 1451 a 17 Αε has τῷ γένει instead of the true reading τῷ ἐνί. The two cases, however, are not quite parallel. ΤΟΓΕΝΕΙ=ΤΟΙΕΝΙ assumes only a very familiar kind of corruption, whereas ΤΟΓΕΝΕΙ=ΤΟΙΕΝ leaves an important part of the word (the termination) unexplained. It is also to be observed that the comparison in the next line, ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώματι κτὲ, seems to presuppose γένει ἑτέρωι, as χρώματα καὶ σχήματα and φώνη, which appeal to different senses, are marked instances of things γένει ἑτέρα (comp. An. post. 2. 13, 97 b 34). There is no doubt a certain inelegance in τῷ γένει ἑτέρωι μεμείσθαι, but it is not greater than that in Phys. 1. 7, 191 a 1 διὰ τὸ ἑτέρον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῦ, or that in Plato Rep. 534 B διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας.

ἡ τῷ ἑτέρα καὶ ἡ τῷ ἑτέρως. The distinction is already in Plato, Rep. 398 B a τε γὰρ λεκτέων καὶ ως λεκτέων εἰρήνη.
καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Other instances of parallelismus antitheticus will be found in 3, 1448a 22, 6, 1449b 26, 15, 1454a 30, 24, 1460a 16.

δοσπερ γὰρ κτέ. Aristotle prepares us for the difference of means in these arts by pointing to the difference of means in a larger group of imitative arts. The distinction between the arts that address the eye and those that address the ear is frequently noted by Plato in similar terms, e.g. in Rep. 373b οἱ τε μυθηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματα τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικῆν, ποιηταὶ τε καὶ τοῦτον ὑπηρέται, ῥαφῳδοὶ ὑποκρεταὶ χορευταὶ κτέ. (comp. Rep. 603b; Crat. 423b; Gorg. 474e). It is assumed also in a number of Aristotelian passages (e.g. in An. post. 2. 13, 97b 35; Eth. N. 3. 13, 1118a 3; Pol. 8. 5, 1340a 34). Aristotle has a special reason for saying ἔτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, because the great imitative capacity of the voice is what renders language and poetry possible, together with many of the arts subsidiary to the latter: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404b 21 ὑπηρέτε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μυθητικῶτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῶν διὰ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνεστησαν, ἡ τε ραφῳδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκρετική καὶ ἄλλαι γε.

a 19 πολλὰ is not otiose. The art of the painter or sculptor has certain limits; it can represent many things; but there are some (e.g. character and feeling) that it can only imperfectly or indirectly express (Pol. 8. 5, 1340a 32; comp. Xenophon Mem. 3. 10, 1). The theory in Lessing's Laocoon is based on an idea already in Aristotle.

μυθηταὶ τινες ἀπεικάζοντες: Xenophon Mem. 3. 10, 1 σώματα διὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμεμείηθε.

οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνθείας is thrown in parenthetically, like the very similar remark in 8, 1451a 24, ἦτοι διὰ τέχνην ἡ διὰ φύσιν. As opposed to τέχνη, συνθεία means much the same as ἐμπειρία, with which it is coupled in Eth. N. 8. 7, 1158a 14 δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνθείᾳ γενέσθαι, and in 10. 10, 1181a 9 οὐ μὴν μικρὸν γε ἐοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ’ ἀν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνθείας πολιτικόι. The contrast is between the skill depending on mere practice or habitude, and that directed by a consciousness of the rules and principles of the art which deals with the particular subject. On this distinction see Metaph. A 1, 980b 28, and Mill's Logic Bk. II. ch. 3 (1, p. 214, ed. 4).

a 20 ἔτεροι δὲ corresponds to a foregoing τινὲς in Eth. N. 1. 1, 1094b 18 ἦδη γὰρ τινὲς ἀπόλυοντο διὰ πλούτου, ἔτεροι δὲ δι’ ἀνθρείαν.
Compare also Plato Rep. 349 D μοντικόν δὲ τινα λέγεις, ἐτερον δὲ ἴσον ἄμονον;

διὰ τῆς φωνῆς = τῇ φωνῇ. Aristotle has allowed himself to repeat the prepositional construction used in the parenthesis. The emendation of Madius, διὰ τῆς φύσεως, besides making too much of a merely incidental remark in a parenthesis, leaves χρώματι καὶ σκέματι without an antithesis; it ignores in fact the whole point of the analogy to which attention is drawn, the diversity of means. The diversity of means, λόγος, ρυθμός, and ἄρμονία, in the group of imitative arts under consideration is said to be like the diversity of means, χρώματα καὶ σκέματα and φωνή, observable in a larger group of imitative arts.

ἐν ρυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἄρμονίᾳ. The three terms had already appeared in the same sense in Plato’s analysis of the song or choral in Rep. 398 D τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστὶ συγκέιμενον, λόγον τε καὶ ἄρμονίας καὶ ρυθμοῦ (comp. Laws 661 c; 669 D). His terminology, however, is not always quite the same; he sometimes says ρυθμὸς καὶ μέτρον (Phil. 17 ν, Gorg. 502 c) or μέτρον καὶ ρυθμός (Rep. 601 λ) in lieu of ρυθμός; and μέλος, ‘melody’ or ‘tune’, in lieu of ἄρμονία (Rep. 400 λ, Gorg. 502 c, Laws 656 c, etc.). Aristotle also, in more than one passage in the Poetics (1, 1447 b 25; 6, 1449 b 31), has put μέλος in place of ἄρμονία; and in one instance (6, 1449 b 29) he combines the two terms as synonyms. It is clear, therefore, that in its present application ἄρμονία means no more than ‘melody’ or ‘tune’. ρυθμός is properly ‘time’ or ‘pace’. It is a very general word, since it includes the element of rhythm in language and in the movements of the dance, as well as that in music; comp. Plato Laws 665 λ τῇ δη τῆς κινήσεως τάξει [scil. ἐπομεν ὄς] ρυθμός οὖν οὖν εἶ, τῇ δ’ αὖ τῇ φωνῆς, τοῦ τε δέος ἁμα καὶ βαρέως συγκεραμεμένων, ἄρμονία οὖν προσαγορεῦσθαι, χορεία δὲ τὸ ἐφαρμόστερον κληθεῖ.—

672 E Ὁλη μὲν τον χορεία δὴ παίδευσι  ἵνα ἴμιν, τούτου δ’ αὖ τὸ μὲν ρυθμοῖ τε καὶ ἄρμονίατ, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ... τὸ δὲ γε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν ρυθμῶν μὲν κοινῶν τῇ τῆς φωνῆς εἴχε κινήσει, σκέμα δ’ ἐδοκεῖν. ἐκεῖ δὲ μέλος ἢ τῆς φωνῆς κίνησις (see also Symp. 187 b and Phil. 17 c). The various applications of ρυθμός are thus summarized in Aristoxenus (p. 411, 8 Marquard): ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ ρυθμιζόμενα τρία: λέεις, μέλος, κίνησις σωματική. Plato’s view as to the great imitative capacities of rhythm and harmony and music generally may be seen in Rep. 399 a sqq., in Laws 668 a sqq., and more briefly put, in Laws 798 D τὰ περὶ τοὺς
COMMENTARY

1447 a 22 ὑθμοῦς καὶ πᾶσαν μονατικὴν ὅστι τρόπων μιμήματα βελτιώνων καὶ χειρόνων ἀνθρώπων. The point is recognized with equal clearness by Aristotle in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 18, ἐστὶ δ’ ὀμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις εὐ τοῖς ρυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὄργῆς καὶ πράγματος, ἐτι δ’ ἀνθρείαι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἦδικων ... (a 38) ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν ... (b 7) τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τρόπων ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τούς ρυθμοὺς: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦδος ἔχουσι στασιμότερον οἱ δὲ κυκτικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικοτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας.

a 23 ἡ χωρίς ἡ μεμιγμέναι: a reminiscence of Plato Laws 669 ν διασποσών οἱ ποιηταὶ ρυθμοὺς μὲν καὶ σχῆματα μέλους χωρίος, λόγους φυλοὺς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες, μέλος δ’ αὐτοὶ καὶ ρυθμοῖν ἀνεῖ ρημάτων, φυλή καθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐξήσει προσχρώμενοι.

χρώμεναι, scil. ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

a 25 τυγχάνουσιν. On the construction with καὶ εἰ see Vahlen, Beitr. 1, p. 35. Mr. Newman in a note on Pol. 2. 1, 1260 b 31 seems to doubt the necessity of restoring the indicative in this and other similar places in Aristotelian texts.

ἡ τῶν συρίγγων. The word to be supplied is apparently μίμησις— not τέχνη, as is assumed in HSt. s.v. σύριγγες, and in Bon. Ind. 735 a 39. The Platonic ἡ τῶν λόγων τέχνη in Phaedr. 260 d is not a true parallel. For a similar genitive after μίμησις comp. Lucian De salt. 64 ἡ μίμησις τῆς ὀρχήσεως.

a 26 αὔτῷ δὲ τῷ ρυθμῷ κτέ. is an unnecessary clause, as ὀρχηστική is not one of the arts in the list in a 13; it will be observed too that there is a change in the form of expression, μιμοῦνται, instead of χρώμεναι with ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν understood. The clause would seem to have been originally an afterthought, worked in by Aristotle as soon as he saw that there was an art that used rhythm alone. His giving a reason for this mention of ὀρχηστική may be supposed to imply a consciousness of its being a new point, and one requiring demonstration.

αἰ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν. The traditional reading οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν has been corrected into ἐνοικοῖ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Twining; into οἱ (πολλοὶ) τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Heinisius; and into οἱ (χαρίεις) τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Zeller. It is assumed that Aristotle may have wished to recognize the fact, of which Plato had spoken in Laws 795 e, that dancing is sometimes a mere exercise of the body and without dramatic meaning. A much simpler correction, however, is αἰ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν, with μιμήσεις (rather than τέχναι) understood from the context.
Aristotle is thinking of the professional dancers, who told a story in \textit{1447a 26} pantomime, by the mere movements and attitudes of their bodies (comp. Sittl, Die Gebärdener der Gr. u. Röm. p. 244).

\begin{axioma}
\textit{σχηματιζομένων} \textit{ρύθμων}: the rhythms in their movements, in the \textit{a 27} succession of their \textit{σχήματα}, their gestures or attitudes (see on \textit{26, 1462a 3}). The emphasis is on \textit{ρύθμων}; that the attitudes of the dancer might be dramatic, and represent 'what men do or have done to them', was too obvious to require saying. Aristotle is insisting on the 'ethical' significance which rhythm imparts to the dance. On rhythm as expressive of character and temperament see Pol. 8. 5, \textit{1340a18} and the Platonic passages referred to on \textit{a 22}.

\textit{ηθη}: the character and temperament of the personages represented, as distinct from their \textit{πάθη καὶ πράξεις}, 'what they do or have done to them'. The meaning of \textit{πάθη καὶ πράξεις} is sufficiently shown by \textit{9, 1451b 11} τ' \textit{Αλκιβιάδης} \textit{ἐπράξεν} \textit{ή} \textit{τ̆ι} \textit{ἔπαθεν}, and \textit{13, 1453a 22} \textit{παθεῖν} δεῖνα \textit{ή} \textit{πούσσαι} (see also on \textit{II, 1452b 11}). \textit{πάθη} is generally assumed (e.g. in Bon. Ind. 557\textit{a 49}) to denote in this passage 'feelings' or 'emotions'. The words \textit{πάθη καὶ πράξεις} cover the whole ground of the story in the dance; so that Aristotle, if he had cared to anticipate the term used later on in \textit{6, 1450a 4}, might have said here, without difference of meaning, \textit{ηθή} καὶ \textit{μύθους}.

\begin{axioma}
\textit{η δὲ [ἐποποιία] κτὲ}. Suckow's correction, \textit{τυγχαίει οὖσα}, is to be found in his Form der Platonischen Schriften p. 53. With it, and the readings implied in the Arabic Version, the whole passage becomes intelligible and in harmony with the context. We were told at the outset in \textit{a 22} that the three means of imitation, \textit{ρύθμωs}, \textit{λόγος}, and \textit{ἀρμονία}, may be employed either singly or in certain combinations. Having just spoken (1) of imitation \textit{ἐν} \textit{ἀρμονία καὶ ρυθμωs}, and (2) of imitation \textit{ἐν} \textit{ρυθμωs} alone, Aristotle passes on to (3) to imitation \textit{ἐν} \textit{λόγῳ}—whether alone, or in combination with rhythm or metre, and finally (4) to imitation \textit{ἐν} \textit{ἀρμονία καὶ ρυθμωs} καὶ \textit{λόγῳ}. This exhausts the possibilities, since it is evident that \textit{ἀρμονία} alone, and the combination \textit{ἀρμονία} + \textit{λόγος}, need not be taken into account. The third of his four heads Aristotle divides, and recognizes three possible forms of means, (1) \textit{λόγος} alone, (2) \textit{λόγος} + some one kind of metre, and (3) \textit{λόγος} + a plurality of metres. In other words he distinguishes between (1) imitations in prose, (2) imitations in some one metre (hexameters, trimeters, etc.), and (3) imitations in a plurality of metres. Of this large and well-
marked class of imitative literature, which includes the Mime, the
‘imaginary conversations’ of Socrates, the Epic, and Chaeremon’s
Centaur, Aristotle observes that it has ‘remained to this day
without a distinctive name’. The common fact here is \( \text{μύρησις ἐν λόγῳ} \), but there is, he says, no one common name connoting the
common fact and equally applicable to all the kinds within the
class.

Those who retain ἐποποιία, with the addition of ἀνώνυμος at the
end of the sentence, suppose it to mean ‘word-poetry’ (Worldich-
tung, Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 81). Such a special and unique
sense, however, for a term like ἐποποιία is highly improbable, and
also against the analogy of all the similar compounds (e.g. λογοποίια,
μελοποίια, μνημοποίια, ὀνοματοποίια), in which the -ποιία means
simply the making of something, just as much as in ἄρτοποιία,
δοποιία, παιδοποίια and the like. And even if the word could bear
its new meaning, it would be inappropriate here, as the Mime and
the ‘Socratic Conversation’ were prose imitations—not poems.
To a Greek of Aristotle’s time the idea of a prose poem would
have seemed a contradiction in terms.

\[ a \text{29} \] toῖς λόγοις ἴλοις ἢ τοῖς μέτροις = τοῖς λόγοις ἴλοις ἢ τοῖς μέτροις
ψιλοίς: comp. 2, 1448 \[ a \text{11} \] τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν. ψιλοῖς,
which in this connexion means χωρίς ἄρμονίας, ‘without melody’
(v. Tyrwhitt ad loc. and Bon. Ind. 433 \[ b \text{29} \]), differentiates this
group of imitative arts from the semi-musical arts considered
later on, at the end of the chapter; comp. Plato Phaedr. 278 c
πολύσιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν φωῇ συντεθῆκε, and Laws 669 \[ b \] (quoted on \[ a \text{23} \]).
λόγοις ψιλοῖς has been taken by several (including Bon. Ind.
862 \[ b \text{31} \]) to mean ‘prose’ in the present passage—a sense which
ψιλὸς λόγος has no doubt in a good many instances, e.g. in Rhet.
3. 2, 1404 \[ b \text{14} \], 33. But there is nothing in the general meaning
of the word to necessitate this interpretation here. ψιλὸς means
simply ‘by itself’, without some accessory, whatever the accessory
thus excluded may happen to be (v. HSt. s. v.).

\[ ἢ τοῖς μέτροις. \] μέτρα has to be understood in the concrete
sense of ‘kinds of verse’, i.e. as equivalent to λόγοι ἕμμετροι or
λόγοι + ἰνθμός. Aristotle remembers that the literary form of
imitation is generally in verse, and accordingly adds ἢ τοῖς μέτροις.
The addition, however, has a sort of reflex influence on the general
term λόγοις which precedes it, and by the contrast it suggests gives
the word for the moment the special sense of ‘prose’, as distinct
from verse. Other instances of a general term with its meaning
modified by what follows will be found in 22, 1458 a 28 and 25, 1447 a 29 1460 b 11. The logical scheme of the statement in a 29—b 23 may be thus exhibited:—

Language { prose { in some one kind of metre
without music } verse } in a plurality of metres

Plato has the same division in Laws 810 b, where he is protesting against the divorce of poetry and literature from music: πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἄλλα ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοὺς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων τοὺς δὲ ἄνευ [μυθικῶν τιμημάτων], δὲ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, πητώμενα μυθικοὶ τε καὶ ἄρμονίας, σφαλερὰ γράμμαθ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ παρὰ τινον ... καταλειμμένα. Here ἄλλα corresponds to Aristotle's ψιλοίς, τοὺς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων τοὺς δὲ ἄνευ to his τοῖς λόγοις ἦ τοῖς μέτροις, and κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον πητώμενα μυθικοὶ τε καὶ ἄρμονίας to his μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς.

ἀνώνυμος: Phys. 5. 2, 226 a 26 
ἀλλοώνησι ἐστώ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπέζευκται κοινὸν ὄνομα ... ἦ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν τὸν μὲν κοινὸν ἀνώνυμον, καθ' ἐκάτερον δὲ αὔξησις καὶ φθόνος.—
De anima 2. 7, 418 a 26 ὁρατὸν δ' ἐστὶν χρωμά τε, καὶ δ' λόγῳ μὲν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυχχάνει ὅτι.—H. A. 10. 40, 623 b 5 ἐστὶ δὲ τι γένος τῶν ἐντόμων, δ' ἐνι' μὲν ὄνοματ' ἀνώνυμον ἐστιν.—Pol. 3. 1, 1275 a 30 ἀνώνυμον τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ. For other instances see Bon. Ind. 69 b 2. Aristotle has often to speak of a class as being still without a name, because its existence has not yet been recognized by ordinary thought (comp. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 81).

τυγχάνει οὖσα. Similarly in De sensu 5, 447 b 7 Thurow would restore ὑπάρχει οὖσα for ὑπάρχουσα.

ὁνομά👊α κοινόν: scil. ὄνομα; comp. Meteor. 4. 9, 387 b 2 ou γὰρ b 10 κεῖται ὄνομα κοινόν.—H. A. 4. 7, 531 b 22 οὐκ ἐπέζευκται κοινόν ὄνομα ὀδέν.

touς Σώφρονος καὶ ξέναρχου μύμοις. The surviving fragments (Kaibel, CGF. I pp. 152 and 182) show that the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus were in prose (comp. Bernhardt, Gr. Litt. 3 2. 2 p. 533). And as their very name is suggestive of μύμοις, Aristotle points to them as an indisputable example of prose-imitation, μύμοις ἐν λόγῳ χωρὶς ἄρμονίας καὶ μυθικοῖ. A very similar view of them is implied in a fr. of the dialogue περὶ ποιητῶν (72 Teubn.): οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐμέμτρους τοὺς καλομένους

1 These two words seem to represent a gloss, μυθικῷ τητάμενα.
COMMENTARY

1447 b 10 Σώφρονος μέρος μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι λόγον καὶ μιμήσεις, ἡ τούς Ἀλεξαμενοῦ τοῦ Τήνου τοὺς πρῶτους γραφέντας τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων (v. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 82; Kaibel l. c., p. 152). The fr. makes it clear that Aristotle saw a certain affinity between the Mime and the 'Socratic Conversations' of Alexamenus; and with it before us, it is not difficult to divine the reason for the juxtaposition of the Mime and the Σωκρατικός λόγος in the present passage of the Poetics; the two things differed in name, but at the same time they had an essential element in common, that of being prose-imitations, μιμήσεις ἐν λόγῳ, and not (like poetry) ἐν μέτρῳ.

b II τοὺς Σωκρατικοῖς λόγοις. As used here and in Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 20, the term Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι must be taken to cover the ground of the whole of this species of literature, the 'Socratic Conversations' not only of Alexamenus, but also of Plato, Aeschines and the rest (comp. Joel, Archiv f. Gesch. der Phil. 8, 468). A certain resemblance between the Platonic Dialogue and the Mime is presupposed in the story (Duris fr. 45 in Müller, FHG. 2 p. 486) of Plato having been a zealous student and imitator of Sophron. It is difficult, therefore, to agree with Teichmüller's view, that Aristotle's intention was to contrast the Mime and the Dialogue, and insist on the difference between them.

οὐδὲ εἶ: De interpr. II, 20 b 25 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἢ ἐρώτησις μία οὐδὲ ἢ ἀληθῆς.—14, 24 a 3 οὔδὲν διώςει οὐδὲ ἢ καθόλου τιθῶμεν τὴν κατάφασιν.—Soph. el. II, 171 b 12 τὰ γὰρ ψευδογραφήματα οὐκ ἐρωτικά . . . οὐδὲ γ' εἰ τ' ἔστι ψευδογράφημα περὶ ἀληθῆς.

At this point Aristotle runs off into a digression (comp. 9, 1451 b 1) in order to minimize the importance of the element of metre in the imitative forms of literature. Even if a mime and a dialogue were both written in verse, either in some one (b II-12) or in several kinds of metre (b 20), they would still be without a common name connoting the μιμήσις in them, which is their essential point of agreement. The writer of such a versified mime or dialogue might no doubt be described in ordinary parlance as an ἐποτοῖος or ἔλεγεωτοῖος, or by some similar name indicating the kind of verse in which his work happens to be written. Names of this kind, however, are misleading, since they imply that the verse rather than the μιμήσις embodied in it is the essence of the literary form of imitation. Metre, in Aristotle's view, is only one of the accidents of poetry; and the use of it does not make a writer like Empedocles a poet in any true sense of the word.
still less insert, τοὺς μὲν before ἐλεγειοποιοῦσιν (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 265); comp. the instances cited by Vahlen (ad loc.); to which may be added Soph. el. 21, 178 a 3, Metaph. A 28, 1024 a 33. oὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μῷσην ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὴν μῷσην. For the position of the negative comp. Plato Phaed. 77 ε ὡς δεδιότων... πεφῶ ἀναπείθειν, μάλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἵστως ἐν τοῖς καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν πᾶς, ὡστε τὰ τοιαύτα φοβεῖται.

'Εμπεδοκλῆς. In a fragment (fr. 70 Teubn.) of the dialogue of peri ποιητῶν he is declared to have been a master of all the resources of epic language: Ὀμηρικὸς ὁ 'Εμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονε, μεταφορικός τ' ἄν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς περὶ ποιητῶν ἐπιτεύγμας χρώμενος. This is not inconsistent with the present passage; Aristotle's meaning is that, though Empedocles may be a poet in his form, he is not a poet in his matter. A philosophic poem comes under the head of what the ancients termed didascalice, its purpose being to teach or instruct, rather than to interest us in a μῳδης, a picture of life and manners. That Empedocles was not in any real sense a poet is implied in Plato Theaet. 152 ε καὶ peri τοῦτο πάντες ἔξης οἱ σοφοὶ πλῆν Παρμενίδου ἐμφαρέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἐκτέρα, καμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, πραγματίας δὲ "Ομηρος,—where Empedocles, it will be observed, is put into distinct contrast with Homer. This view of him is more clearly stated in later writers, e.g. in Plutarch, De aud. poet. 16 c τὰ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἐπη καὶ Παρμενίδου καὶ θηρικὰ Νικάνδρου καὶ γνωμολογίας Θεόγνιδος λόγου εἰσὶ κεχρημέναι παρὰ ποιητικῆς ὀστερ ὀχχια τὸ μέτρον καὶ τῶν ὄγκου, ἵνα τὸ πεζὸν διαφύσων.—Schol. Dionys. Thr. p. 166. 13 Hilgard οὐκ ἐστὶν ποιητὴς ὁ μέτρῳ μόνῳ χρώμενος; οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ τὰ φυσικά γράφας, οὐδὲ οἱ περὶ ἀστρολογίας εἶπόντες, οὐδὲ οἱ Πυθίοι ἐμμέτρως χρησμοφόδων.

ποιητὴν. The poet is tacitly assumed to be a μῳδης εν μέτροις (comp. 24, 1460 a 7; 25, 1460 b 8).


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COMMENTARY

1447b 20 is used in just the same way in An. pr. 2. 24, 69 a 11 τον αυτον δε τροπον καιν ει δια πλειων των δομιων ή πιστις γινουτν.

b 21 Χαιρήμων. For the little that remains of his Κένταυρος see Nauck, TGF.2 p. 784. Aristotle terms it a μαψυδα as though it were a sort of epic; and it is clear that in 24, 1460 a 2 he still regards it as coming under that head. If Athenaeus 608 ε speaks of it as a δράμα πολύμετρον, the explanation is that such a bizarre experiment in literature might very well be placed in more than one class. The title was no doubt taken from its subject; not from its monstrous combination of metres, as Welcker imagines (Nachtrag zu der Schrift über die Aeschylische Trilogie p. 71). There were several comedies (Kock, CAF. 3 p. 698) and also an ode (by Lasus of Hermione) with this or a very similar title.

b 22 εξ απαντων των μετρων: to be taken with μυκτην (comp. Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze 2 p. 42). απαντων must be an exaggeration, since it is inconceivable that every kind of metre was represented in Chaeremon’s poem. Similar instances of overstatement are to be found in b 28 (πασιν), in 18, 1455 b 33 (το δολον), in 22, 1458 a 24 (απαντα), and in De anima 2. 6, 418 a 11, 19 (v. Rodier ad loc.).

και ποιητην προσαγορευτεον has been altered in some apographs into οτικ ηδη και ποιητην προσαγορευτεον and in others into και τουτον ποιητην προσαγορευτεον. Various other corrections have been recently suggested, e. g. κατα τουτο ποιητην προσαγορευτεον (M. Schmidt), δικαιως ποιητην προσαγορευτεον (Ueberweg), κατοι ποιητην προσαγορευτεον (Rassow and Gomperz). Susenohl omits the clause (with Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 38), but finds a place for προσαγορευτεον by inserting it after ποιητην in b 20.

The clause (if we retain the reading of the MS.) seems to come in in much the same way as that in b 18, διο του μεν ποιητην δικαιον καλειν, τον δε φυσιολογον μαλλον η ποιητην. As an illustration of the third of his three possibilities (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 4) Aristotle cites Chaeremon’s Centaur; and his assumption is that, as a work of this description is a μυροσ (comp. b 21 ποιοτο την μυροσ) and also in verse (b 22 εξ απαντων των μετρων), the author is a μυροσ εν μετροι, and therefore rightly regarded as a poet, though popular language does not give him a special name of the type of those considered in the preceding section (b 13-19). The argument, therefore, will come to this: If a mime and a dialogue were written in a medley of metres, the writers would have to be recognized as poets; but we should have no common
name for the two works themselves, notwithstanding their similarity in form as well as nature. Some such meaning seems to be demanded by the general logic of the argument, which is directed to show that not only the prose forms of the literary ‘imitation’, but also the various poetic forms of it are ‘to this day’ without a general name (\(\delta \alpha \nu \omega \nu \mu \nu \sigma \tau \gamma \chi \alpha \varepsilon \) \(\omega \sigma \delta \alpha \mu \varepsilon \gamma \nu \tau o\) τον νῦν). The only difficulty is to see how the clause καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον is brought in. Vahlen (ad loc.) takes it as following after the apodosis implied in ὁμοῖος—‘adnecti non positae sed cogitatae apodosi sententiam (καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον)’. I suspect that it was primarily meant to apply to Chaeremon, and that it is loosely subjoined to what is said of him in the context, as an assertion of his claim to be ranked among the poets in spite of his metrical absurdities.

The question may perhaps be asked: If it was possible to give ποιητής the sense assumed for it in this chapter and elsewhere, why did not Aristotle recognize the word ποίημα as an equally legitimate ‘common name’ for all the various species of verse-imitation? The answer may perhaps be this, that he thought it to be (like ἐποιεῖσθαι, ἔλεγχος, etc.) too directly suggestive of the metrical form (comp. Rhet. 3. 8, 1408 b 30), which he puts aside as only one of the accidents even of the poetical ‘imitation’.

The term ‘Poet’, as used by most of the ancients, is the subject of a valuable inquiry by H. Weil (Études sur l’antiquité grecque, p. 237), who shows that the nearest modern representative of it is ‘author’ or ‘composer’. Its primary meaning is the man who writes the words, or composes the music, in contradistinction to the rhapsodists, actors, singers or musicians, who present the work to the public (comp. Plato Rep. 373 B ποιηταὶ τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοὶ, ὑποκριται, χορευταὶ, κτλ.). But as the literary work which had to be thus recited or sung was by custom in verse, the ‘poet’ was also a writer of verses. The idea of verse in fact became part of the conventional meaning of the word—as also of the verb ποιεῖν, which often means to write or say in verse; the compounds, likewise, ἐποιεῖσθαι, ἔλεγχος, etc., all denote writers of some kind of verse. ποιεῖν is thus opposed to λέγειν, to speak in prose, and the ποιητὴς either to the συγγραφεῖς, who writes prose, or to the ἱδιώτης, the ordinary man who speaks in prose. Another association attaching to the word had its origin in the matter with which early Greek poetry was connected. The poet was distinguished from the historian or chronicler by the fact
that he was so constantly dealing with a remote or legendary past, in the treatment of which there was ample room for play of imagination. All the great poetical subjects are classed by Plato under the general head of 'myths' or fictions (Rep. 377 a and 382 d; comp. Xenophanes fr. 1, 21 Diels); and it was an understood thing that a free use of fiction was one of the privileges of the poet: Solon fr. 29 Bergk πολλα ψευδοται άνεσι—Isocrates 195 δ των γε παλαιων καθων αντι μαλατ' ευδοκιμουσιν, ὁς παρα των ποιητων ἀκούομεν. οὕτω γάρ οὗ μόνον τῶν γεγενημένων τὰς καλλιστας ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλωσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν κανὼς συντι-θέασιν (also Horace A. P. 9). This recognition of an element of fiction in poetry is perhaps the nearest approach the ancients make to our idea of 'poetic creation'. The ordinary conception in antiquity of the poet was that he was, just like the painter (v. Poet. 15, 1454 b 9, and 25, 1460 b 8), an imitator, and that his work was not so much a creation as a copy, more or less faithful, of something already existing in legend or life.

μέλει = ἀρμονία in the scheme in a 22.

μέτρον, which now takes the place of the original term λόγῳ in a 22, has the concrete sense of 'verse' or versified language, i.e. as equivalent to λόγος ἐμετρος or λόγος + μετρός (comp. 4, 1448 b 21). It is an ill-chosen word, therefore, as it says too much, and, if understood strictly, would make the μέτρον, with which the enumeration begins, a superfluity.

αἱ μὲν ἀμα πασιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος. As Teichmüller points out, πάσιν repeats the πάσιν in b 24, χρωνται having to be supplied. The antithesis is between ἀμα and κατὰ μέρος; so that in lieu of the latter Aristotle might have said οἷς ἀμα ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος. Comp. Meteor. 1. 14, 351 a 28 ἐκείνους μὲν οὗ κατὰ μέρος ταῦτα συμβαίνει πᾶσιες, ἄλλ' ἀμα πάν ἀκμαίεσι καὶ φθείεσι ἀναγκαίον.—Plato Theaet. 189 ε ητοι ἀμα γε ἦ ἐν μέρει (also Bon. Ind. 455 b 14 and 571 b 47). Aristotle's language would naturally imply that, whereas the three means of expression, language, metre, and music, are inseparable in the Dithyramb and Nome, they appear separately and by turns in the Drama. This, however, is an overstatement (see on ἀπαντών in b 22), as it is only the musical element that comes in intermittently, in the choral parts of the play (6, 1449 b 30).

μιμοῦται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττονται: comp. 1, 1447 a 28; 3, 1448 a 27; 6, 1449 b 36; 1450 b 3, 9; 1451 b 29. This is to all appearance another reminiscence of Plato: Rep. 396 c μιμού-
1447^22-2. 1448^3

λενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφανὸς πράττοντα.—603 c 1448 a 1
πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμάται ἡ μυθικὴ βιαῖος ἡ ἐκοινωνίας πράξεις.

ἡ στοιχείου ἡ φαίλους is explained by what follows, κακία γὰρ a 2
καὶ ἁρτῆ ὑπὲρ ἡθὶ διαφέρουν πάντες (comp. 5, 1449 a 32). This,
Aristotle adds, is the primary and most universal distinction between
man and man; nearly all other distinctions of character may be
classed under this one common head.

ἀκολουθεῖ: De part. an. 2. 1, 646 a 17 ai δε ἀλλαὶ διαφορὰς ταύτας a 3
ἀκολουθοῦσιν.

κακία γὰρ καὶ ἁρτῆ κτὲ. Pol. 5. 2, 1303 b 15 μεγίστη μὲν οὖν
ἰώσις διάστασις ἁρτῆ καὶ μαχθηρία.

ὕτου βελτίωνας . . . τοιούτως, scil. μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμοῦμενοι. We a 4
have been prepared for this distinction by the preceding ἐπεὶ
μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμοῦμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων ἡ στοιχείου ἡ
φαίλους εἶναι; but the third possibility, that the personages repre-
sented may be on the same level as ourselves (ἡ καὶ τοιούτως), is
a new point, which is felt to require a word of proof. Aristotle
accordingly reminds us of a similar fact in painting (a 5): the
personages in the works of Dionysius are just like ourselves
(δημοῖοι). The three possibilities being thus generally established,
Aristotle proceeds to say, by way of corollary (δῆλον δὲ a 7), that
the same distinction is to be seen in the poetical arts, in epic, lyric,
and dramatic poetry (a 11), and that it constitutes also the essential
point of difference between Tragedy and Comedy (a 16). That
μιμοῦμαι may be supplied from the protasis (a 1) after ἡ καὶ
τοιούτως in a 5 is assumed by all the older translators. Vahlen
illustrates the construction from Metaph. Δ 7, 1017 a 13 τὸν γὰρ
ἀνθρώπον ὅταν μουσικὸν λέγομεν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν ἀνθρώπον, ἡ τὸν
λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἡ τούτων λευκόν, τὸ μὲν (scil. λέγομεν) ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ
αὐτῷ συμβεβήκασι κτὲ. Other instances of a verb having to be
understood in the principal from a subordinate clause will be found
in Kühner, Gr. Gr. a 2. 2, p. 574.; an exact parallel, however, to
the construction in the present passage is still wanting. The
only alternative is to suppose the apodosis to begin at δῆλον δὲ (a 7)
in which case it will be necessary to restore δῆλον δῆ, and to
take the words ὕτου βελτίωνας κτὲ. as appositional to the ἡ στοιχείον
ἡ φαίλους εἶναι in a 2. The clause, however, that follows,
ὁσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς (scil. μιμοῦνται), seems to show that ὕτου βελτίωνας
κτὲ. = ὕτου βελτίωνας . . . μιμοῦνται.

ὁσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς. Plutarch, who defines poetry as a μυθικὴ a 5

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1448 a 5 τέχνη καὶ δύναμις ἀντίστροφος τῇ ζωγραφίᾳ, quotes a saying, commonly attributed to Simonides, ζωγραφίαν μὲν εἶναι φθεγγομένην τὴν ποίησιν, ποίησιν δὲ συγώσαν τὴν ζωγραφίαν (De aud. poet. 17 F, with Wytenbach's note). The comparison, which reappears in Poet. 6, 1450 a 26, b 1; 15, 1454 b 9; 25, 1460 b 8, and indirectly elsewhere, is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (v. Rep. 377 e, 597 e, 603 b, 605 a etc.).

γραφεῖς. The Attic form γραφῆς has survived in the text of Meteor. 3. 2, 372 a 7, and De sensu 3, 440 a 8.

Πολύνωτος: comp. 6, 1450 a 27.

a 6 Παύσων: Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 36 δεί μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἄλλα τὰ Πολυγνώτου καὶ εἰ τίς ἄλλος τῶν γραφεῶν ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματιστῶν ἔστιν ἥδικος. If he was the same as the Pauson of Aristoph. Ach. 854, he must have had a certain sort of affinity to our modern caricaturists (comp. Hor. Ep. 2. 1, 264; Aelian V. H. 4. 4); it will be seen also that Aristotle regards his work as the analogue of that of the parodists and comic poets in literature.

Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίως εἰκαζεν. ὁμοίως, as the context shows (comp. τοιούτως in a 5), means 'like ourselves', neither better nor worse than the average man. εἰκαζεν (= to produce an εἰκὼν or portrait) is practically synonymous with μιμεῖσαι, the word ordinarily used by Aristotle even of a painter. In 1, 1447 a 19 he has the more precise expression, μιμοῦνται ἀπεικάζοντες. The Dionysius meant is Dionysius of Colophon. It is a disputed point (Overbeck, Schriftquellen 1136) whether he is to be identified with the painter of whom Pliny N. H. 35. 113 says: Contra Dionysius nihil aliud quam homines pinxit, ob id anthropographos cognominatus. The epithet ἄνθρωπογράφος would certainly seem peculiarly applicable to Aristotle's Dionysius, as a realistic painter, whose gods and heroes were too like ordinary men.

a 8 ἔτερα is qualified and explained by the τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον that follows. The personages represented differ in the way just described, i.e. as being either better or worse than, or on the same level as, the ordinary man. For the neuter ἔτερα see on a 19.

a 9 ὀρχήσει: Plato Laws 814 ε δύο μὲν αἰτῆς (scil. ὀρχήσεως) εἰδη χρῆ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων ἑπὶ τὸ σεμνῶν μιμομεμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχύνων ἑπὶ τὸ φαύλον (comp. also 655 c; 798 b). For the kind of dancing Aristotle has in mind here see on 1, 1447 a 27.

αὐλῆσει καὶ κιθαρίσει: see on 1, 1447 a 15.
2. Ι448 a 5-12

τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν is a general expression 1448 a 10 for the group of purely literary imitative arts, which were described in 1, 1447 a 29 as using τοὺς λόγους ψιλοίς ἢ τοὺς μέτρους. Ψιλομετρία—a term misunderstood by later writers (v. Bernays, Heraklit. Briefe p. 116)—means verse without music (χωρίς ἀρμονίας; see on 1, 1447 a 29). The qualifying addition 'without music' might no doubt have been appended to τοὺς λόγους also; but it is more wanted where it is, so as to distinguish the verse that was simply recited from the verse that was sung. From this point onward Aristotle ignores the prose imitations (the Μime and the Dialogue), and deals only with 'poetry', the versified forms of imitative literature (μιμητικος ἐν μέτρους; see on 1, 1447 a 23).

τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους = ἐν τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, the preposition being understood from the preceding context (comp. Bon. Ind. 630 a 40).

The restoration of τῷ for τὸ in 25, 1461 a 33 admits of the same explanation. For τὸ περὶ τἰ in the sense of 'the class comprising' see Plato Soph. 221 b (with Campbell's note), Symp. 205 c, Rep. 394 b.

Κλεοφών. In 22, 1458 a 20 his diction is said to be ταπεινή. a 12 Aristotle notes elsewhere the ludicrous effect his occasional attempts at fine language produced owing to the incongruity between the expression and the matter he dealt with: Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 10 τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἐξεὶ ἡ λέξις, εἷν γὰρ ... τῶν ύποκειμένων πράγμασιν ἄναλογον. τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον ἐστιν ἐὰν μὴ τὰ περὶ εὐδοκίαν αὐτοκαθάδους λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδὲ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεὶ ἐνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος. εἰ δὲ μηδὲ κωμῳδία ['a comic joke', Casaubon on Ath. 3. 12] φαίνεται, οἶον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν ὁμοιῶς γὰρ ἐνα ἐλέγει καὶ εἰ ἐγένετο ἐν ποτνια συκῆ. In the present passage we are told that his personages were 'like ourselves' (ὁμοιῶν), neither better than the ordinary man, like those in Homer, nor worse, like those in a parody. From the context as well as the company in which he is placed it is plain that he is to be regarded as a sort of epic poet. He is taken as the representative of the prosaic Epic—the Epic of the commonplace, as distinct from the noble Epic of Homer and the debased Epic known as parody. His work being put under the head of ψιλομετρία, 'verse without the accompaniment of song,' he cannot have been in Aristotle's view either a lyric or a dramatic poet (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.). The notion that he was the writer of a dialogue entitled the 'Mandrobulus' is based on an erroneous interpretation of Soph. el. 15, 174 b 19 (see J. of Phil. 12 p. 17).

'Ηγήμων: see Brandt, Paradorum epicorum reliq., p. 37, and
Parody was an element in the humour of the Old Comedy, as also of Epicharmus; and there were certainly others before Hegemon who travestied Homer. What Aristotle means, however, is that Hegemon was the first to take up parody as a special form of poetical literature (Schrader, Rh. Mus. N. F. 20, p. 186). According to Athenaeus 699 a (comp. 407 a) he was the first to present a parody in the poetical contests in the theatre: πρῶτος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς ἄγωνας τοὺς θυμελικοὺς Ἑρημών, καὶ παρ’ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνίκησεν ἄλλας τε παρῳδίας καὶ τῇ Γιγαντομαχίᾳ.

A παρῳδία, in Aristotle’s sense of the word, is a mock epic, a poem on an ignoble theme in epic language and metre.

Νικοχάρης: he may perhaps be the same as the comic poet of the same name (Kock, CAF. 1 p. 770). We know nothing more of his work, and there is some uncertainty even as to its title. Δελίας (which is assonant to Ἰλίας) would mean, as Twining says, the ‘Poltroniad’; Δηλίας, either the ‘Tale of Delos’, or the ‘Tale of Delium’; it is practically impossible to say which.

It is important to bear in mind that in Λεόντων ὁ δισπερός here ends a line, and that the γὰς stands at the beginning of another. The better apograph have either ὦς περγάς or ὦς πέργας. The reading ὦς Πέρσας καὶ Κύκλωπας was probably due to a corruptor who knew of the Πέρσας as a name of Timotheus; it may be seen in the process of genesis in the text of Parisinus 2038. In his latest edition (comp. Hermes 12, p. 192) Vahlen puts a colon after νόμον, and suggests that ὦς περγάς γὰρ Κύκλωπας should be restored—on the supposition (1) that Timotheus and Philoxenus may represent the ignoble Nome and Dithyramb, and (2) that instances of the opposite were not wanted, as the Nome and Dithyramb were so generally associated with noble subjects. However attractive this explanation may be, Vahlen’s reading fails to account for the accent in the traditional ὦς περγάς of the Paris MS. Castelvetro was probably right in recognizing in γὰς the second half of Ἀργάς, the name of one notorious in antiquity as the writer of a debased kind of nome (Meineke, FCG. 3, p. 388). If we accept Castelvetro’s suggestion, a question naturally arises as to the extent of the lacuna before the γὰς of the MS. The original statement may have been something like what Vahlen formerly supposed, ὦς περγάς θεοῦ Ὁρώς γὰς; but it is quite as likely that more than this has been lost, and that the text, when entire, gave the name of another writer of nomes, who
was put in contrast with Argas, and also the name of a common subject differently treated by the two poets (ὁσπέρ＜—καὶ Αρπ＞ γᾶς); so that this clause may have said of the Nome what the next (Κύκλωπας Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος) says of the Dithyramb. If it be objected that, on this hypothesis, Aristotle ought to have considered also, as a third possibility, the ‘realistic’ or intermediate type of Nome and Dithyramb, the reply is that, if it ever existed, it was of no real importance for his purpose. He is simply preparing us for the distinction in the Drama between Tragedy and Comedy; and when he comes to the subject of the Drama in a 16, we see that he omits to recognize an intermediate or ‘realistic’ drama, in which the chief personages were ὄμοι, like the ordinary man.

Κύκλωπας. Polyphemus must have been a stock-subject in literature, as there were dramas with the title Κύκλωψ, dealing with him and his story, by Epicharmus, Aristias, and Antiphanes, as well as the existing play of Euripides. The plural here, as Dünzer points out, denotes not several Cyclopes, but Polyphemus as treated in different poems. For the Κύκλωψ Ἡ Γαλάτεια of Philoxenus see Bergk, LG. 3 p. 609, and Schmidt’s Diatribe in dithyrambium, p. 54. It seems to have been a covert satire on the elder Dionysius, who had offended the poet; we may suppose, then, that Philoxenus made his Cyclops an ignoble personage, χεῖρων Ἡ καθ’ ἡμᾶς. We have no evidence even of this indirect kind as to the Polyphemus of Timotheus (see Bergk l.c. p. 620; Schmidt l.c. p. 102), but it is a natural inference from what Aristotle implies in the context, that he was not like the Cyclops of Philoxenus.

ἐν ταύτη δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ. Vahlen retains the traditional ἐν αὐτῇ a 15 δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ, taking it to mean ‘in ipsa quam dico differentia’.

βούλεται: this is their general tendency and intention, though a 18 there may be exceptions to the rule (comp. Bon. Ind. 140 b 41).

τῶν νῦν replaces the Ἡ καθ’ ἡμᾶς in a 4. Aristotle is thinking more especially of the chief personages in Tragedy, who belong in most instances to the heroic age; comp. 13, I 453 a 20 and Probl. 19. 48. 9.2 b 17 ἐκεῖνοι [i.e. the tragic actors as distinct from the chorus] μὲν γὰρ ἡρώων μυρταῖ, οἱ δὲ ἥγεμονες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνοι ἤσαν ἠρώες: οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἀνθρωποί, δὲν εἰστὶν ὁ χορός.

τούτων τρίτη διαφορά. τούτων = τῶν λεξιθείσων μεμήσεων in a 7; a 19 comp. 1, I 447 b 29 τάς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνών. Vahlen supposes the words to mean ‘harum quas recenseo differentiarum tertia’.
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1448 a 19 ἔκαστα τούτων: the objects with the possibilities of difference described in chap. 2. Though the objects of the poetic imitations are properly persons, the neuter is used as a more general way of designating them; it reappears in the context in τὰ αὐτά (a 20) and ἐτερὸν τι (a 21), as well as in the formula (repeated from 1, 1447 a 17) ἐν οἴς τέ καὶ ἄ καὶ ὡς in a 25.

a 20 τὰ αὐτά μουσώματα. The subject understood with μουσώματα is τῶν μουσώμων; and the participles which follow in a 21–22, to describe the differences of manner, are in apposition to that. In a 23, however, where Aristotle is dealing with the Drama, in which there is a plurality of imitators, he has to put the participles in the plural (ὡς πράπτοντας), and the subject, instead of being left to be supplied, is definitely mentioned, and in the plural (τῶν μουσώμων, a 24).

a 21 ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα κτέ. The amended reading of this passage (ἡ) ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὅτε δὲ ἐτερὸν τι γιγνόμενον is anticipated in Goulston's paraphrase, 'aut ut interdum eae exponat poeta, et interdum ipse aliquid quid, i. alia persona, fiat.' Theἡ which the MS. has before ἐτερὸν may very well be supposed to have been omitted (comp. 25, 1461 a 9), and then re-inserted in the wrong place, as a correction of ὅτε δὲ (comp. my 'Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics', p. 18).

ἐτερὸν τι. Ulrici's correction ἐτερὸν τινα (suggested by Plato's ὡς τίς ἄλλος ὁν in Rep. 393 c) is the result of a curious oversight. As Aristotle began by speaking of the objects imitated in the neuter (τὰ αὐτὰ μουσώματα: see on ἔκαστα τούτων in a 19), he was bound to describe the imitator as identifying himself, not with 'some one else', but with 'something else' (ἐτερὸν τι).

The statement in the text in a 21–24 is on the same lines as that in Plato Rep. 392 d–394 d; its very terminology is a reminiscence of Plato's; and it would be a mere enigma to us, if we had not the key to it in the Republic. Plato distinguishes between three forms of διήγησις: (1) simple narration, in which the poet speaks throughout in propria persona; (2) imitative or dramatic narration, in which he effaces himself as it were, and speaks in the person of another; and (3) the mixed manner, narrative and dramatic by turns, which we see in Homer. Aristotle's ἀπαγγέλλοντα recalls Plato's δι' ἀπαγγελλάς αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ (Rep. 394 c); and his ἐτερὸν τι γιγνόμενον the Platonic ὡς τίς ἄλλος ὁν (Rep. 393 c). The combination also of the two manners in Homer (ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὅτε δὲ ἐτερὸν τι γιγνόμενον) is a point
which Plato works out and explains at some length: μέχρι μὲν τοῦτον τῶν ἑπτὼν, 'καὶ ἐλίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαίοις, Ἀτρεῖδα δὲ μάλιστα δών, κοιμᾶτοροι λαών,' λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἄλλοτε τρέπειν, ὡς ἄλλος τίς ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτὸς: τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταύτα ὡστε αὐτὸς δὲν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει καὶ πειράται ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα ποιήσαι μὴ "Ομηρον δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἄλλα τὸν ἱερά, προσβούτην ὄντα (Rep. 393 λ). Plato's concluding formula for the Homeric or mixed mode of representation, τὰς διηγήσεις πουίσθαι ... τὰ μὲν μμομμένους τὰ δὲ μῇ (Rep. 394 δ), is the all but exact equivalent of Aristotle's μμεισθαι ... οτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα οτὲ δὲ ἑτερὸν τι γιγνόμενον. At the same time it must be admitted that there are certain noteworthy points of differences between the two statements. (1) With Plato the term μμεισθαι is restricted to the dramatic mode of representation; whereas Aristotle uses it in a much wider sense (see on 1, 1447 α 16). (2) The order also, in which the three possibilities are arranged, is different, since Aristotle takes them, not in the order of logic, but in that of time; and begins with Homer and the Homeric manner. And (3) when he comes (in α 23) to the third possibility, the purely dramatic form of expression, he is apparently thinking more of the actors than of the dramatic author himself (v. on α 23). Aristotle's general view in fact of the Epic is that it comes under the head of narrative, as distinct from dramatic, imitation (5, 1449 b 11 τῷ ... ἀπαγγελλαν εἶναι; comp. 6, 1449 b 26 δρωτον καὶ οὖ δ' ἀπαγγελλας); and in his two chapters (23 and 24) especially dealing with epic poetry the Epic in ἡ διηγηματικὴ μύμησις (23, 1459 a 17; 24, 1459 b 36)—the Drama being ἡ ἐν τῷ πρᾶττειν μύμησις (22, 1459 a 15). This, however, does not prevent him from recognizing the Epic (as Plato had done before him) as a quasi-dramatic form of poetry. Every epic is said to have a quasi-dramatic element in it to some extent (μμοῦνται δὲ ἀλήγα, 24, 1460 a 9), and the Homeric Epic has it in a very marked degree. Homer is said to reduce the element of narrative to a minimum (ἀλήγα φρομμασάμενος, 24, 1460 a 9; comp. ἔλαχιστα λέγειν, a 7), taking every opportunity of making his personages come forward and speak for themselves, just as though they were characters in a play and on the stage (εἴθως εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἡ ἄλλο τι θῆσο, 24, 1460 a 10). The 'mixed manner' of Homer, therefore, is acknowledged in chap. 24, as clearly and in much the same way as it seems to be in the words of the present passage (as amended), οτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα οτὲ δὲ ἑτερὸν τι γιγνόμενον.
The traditional text may be read thus: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἐστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα—ἡ ἐτερῶν τι γεγράμενον ὡσπερ Ὄμηρος ποιεῖ, ἥ ὄς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα—ἡ πάντας ὃς πρᾶπτοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμούμενους. According to this view the words ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα have to be taken as a general description of the narrative as opposed to the purely dramatic manner (πάντας ὃς πρᾶπτοντας κτ.), the parenthesis recognizing the two possibilities within the sphere of narrative poetry. This interpretation of the passage (1) implies, to my mind, too wide a divergence from the scheme in the Republic; and (2) it practically assumes that ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα means no more than ἀπαγγέλλοντα or ἡ ἀπαγγέλλοντα; it also involves (3) what seems to me a hardly tenable interpretation of the concluding clause (see on a 23).

Another instance of parallelismus antitheticus (see on 1, 1447 a 18); it is the converse in sense of that in De caelo 2. 6, 288 a 31 εἶτε ... ἀλλοιῶτα καὶ μὴ διαμένοι τὸ αὐτό. It is not necessary to bracket the article before αὐτὸν, though the omission would certainly bring the present statement into closer conformity with that in Plato Rep. 393 a-d, and make the antithesis to be between what the poet says in proprià persona (comp. 24, 1460 a 6, 11) and what he says in an assumed character.

The correction of Casaubon (De Sat. Poesí p. 82 Rambach), was tacitly adopted by Goulston. It is in apposition to the τὰ αὐτὰ in a 20, and serves to distinguish the Drama from the Epic, which is at best only partially dramatic. If πάντας be retained, it has to be taken with τοὺς μιμούμενους as the object after μιμεῖσθαι understood from a 21. μιμεῖσθαι, however, is already provided with an object, viz. τὰ αὐτὰ (a 20); and τὰ αὐτὰ is much too important logically to be ignored through a change of construction. In chap. 2 Aristotle has shown how the subjects of the representation may differ. He tells us now that there are possibilities of difference also in the mode or manner of the representation, even when the subjects are the same (τὰ αὐτὰ); these differences of manner are indicated by the circumstantial participles in the clauses which follow τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἐστιν. It will be observed that in this third participial clause the participles are in the plural, and that the grammatical subject, instead of being understood, as it was in a 20, is expressed, and also in the plural, τοῖς μιμο-
μένων. The explanation of the change of number is probably this, that Aristotle is thinking for the moment of the actors rather than of the poet himself. There are certainly several passages in the Poetics, very closely resembling that before us, in which the reference must be to the actors, a play being conceived to be something which 'they act,' i.e. with a plurality of imitators concerned in it: comp. 6, 1449 b 26 δρώντων; b 31 πράττουτες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν; 1450 a 21 πράττουσιν. The suggestion that τοὺς μεμοιρώνειν refers to the actors is due to E. Müller, Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten 2 p. 18. The clause, with the reading πάντας, is generally supposed to mean 'aut omnes qui imitatione exprimuntur quasi agentes et operantes imitari' (Tyrwhitt), τοὺς μμοιρώνειν being taken as a passive in the sense of the 'personages imitated.' The use of the present of μεμοιρωθαί as a passive is not impossible, but there is, as far as I am aware, no clear instance of it; it may be observed too that in 15, 1454 a 26, where Aristotle wants a present passive of μμεισθαί, he does not say δ μμοιρέων, but has recourse to a periphrasis, δ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων.

ἐν τρις δὴ ταῦταις κτέ. Comp. 1, 1447 a 16 διαφέρουσι δὲ ἄλλη... a 24 Λον τρισὶ κτέ. The preposition here (unlike that in the following ἐν οἷς) denotes the sphere within which the poetic imitation works. ταῦταις is the real subject of the proposition (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3 2, 1 p. 628), and preparative to the enumeration that follows, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἦ καὶ ὡς (comp. De caelo 2. 2, 285 a 11). The whole statement, therefore, is practically the same thing as ταῦτα δὴ, τὰ ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἦ καὶ ὡς, τρεῖς διαφοραῖς εἰσιν ἐν αἷς ἡ μίμησις εἴσιν, or as Bon. Ind. 546 a 57 puts it, ἐν αἷς δὴ διαφοράς ἡ μίμησις γέγενται, αὐταὶ τρεῖς εἴσιν, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἦ καὶ ὡς.

ὅστε τῇ μὲν κτέ. is a sort of corollary to what was said in chap. 2 a 25 and the opening section of chap. 3. Aristotle is now once more viewing plays in their relation to the authors, and the actors are ignored. In chap. 6 there are several instances of his passing unconsciously from the one point of view to the other. Thus in 6, 1449 b 26, 31, 1450 a 10, 21, b 11 the reference is to the play as acted; whereas in 6, 1449 b 34, 1450 a 25–37, b 7 it is to the play as a literary production, the work of the poet.

πράττουτας γὰρ μμοιρώνται. The dramatic poet, instead of giving us a merely verbal description of the incidents, makes his person-

1 The passage in Plato Rep. 604 E (if μμοιρέων be retained) admits of another interpretation.
The difference between Aristotle's language here and in 23 is to be noted: the dramatic poet μιμείται πράττοντας; the actor μιμει
tai ώς πράττων.

This reminds Aristotle of a current explanation of the word *drama*, ὦτι μιμοῦνται δράντας, and leads him off into a digression on the claim of the Dori ans to the discovery of the Drama. This claim, he says, they support by an appeal to lan
guage; they maintain that not only κωμῳδία but also the general term δράμα are words of Dorian origin. The statement here being quite sufficient for its purpose, it is not necessary to suppose (with Egger) a lacuna in the text, on the assumption that a Dorian etymology of τραγῳδία also must have been mentioned. The present passage is clearly the ultimate source of the corresponding statements in the grammarians: Anon. De Comedia (Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 6) τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἁρμόθθαι φασιν ὑπὸ Σουσαρώων: τὴν δὲ ὀνομασίαν ἔχειν οἱ μὲν, ὦτι περὶ τῶν κώμας περιμόντες ἱδόν καὶ ἐπεδείκνυντο, μήτω πόλεων οὐσῶν ἄλλ' ἐν κώμαις οἰκονύμων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὲ ἀντιλέγοντες φασὶ μὴ κώμας καλεῖσθαι παρ' Ἀθηναίοις ἄλλα δῆμους, καὶ κωμῳδίαν αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν ἑπεὶ ἐν ταῖς ὠδοῖς ἐκώμαζον. —Diomedes 486 P. (=Kaibel, l. c. p. 57) Comedia dicta ἀπὸ τῶν κωμῶν; κώμαι enim appellantur pagi, id est conventicula rusticorum . . . vel ἀπὸ τὸν κώμων, id est comisatione, quia olim in eiusmodi fabulis amantium iuventum κώμοι canebantur (v. Reifferscheid, Suetonii Reliq. p. 7).

On the Megarian Comedy see Meineke, FCG. 1 p. 18. The doubts about it raised by Wilamowitz (Herm. 9 p. 319) have been examined by Gomperz (Vienna Academy, Sitzungsb. 1888 p. 12) and Zie linski (Gliederung der altattischen Komödie p. 243). The Megarian claim to Comedy is noted by the anonymous commentator on Eth. N. 4. 6, 1123a 24 (p. 186 Heylb.): διασύρονται γὰρ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς ἐν κωμῳδία (ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀντι
ποιοῦνται αὐτῆς ὡς παρ' αὐτῶν πρῶτον εἰσέβεισθε, εἰ γε καὶ Σουσαρίων ο κατάρξας κωμῳδίας Μεγαρεῖς ἵπτε.; his parenthetical recognition of it, however, has no independent value, as it is obviously only an amplification of the words in the text. It will be observed that Aristotle says nothing about Susarion either here or in chap. 5—where he expressly tells us that the earlier history of Comedy is not known.

Megara is said to have expelled the tyrant Theagenes about B. C. 600.
oi ἐκ Σικελίας, the Megarians of Megara Hyblaea—literally, the 1448 a 32 Megarians ‘on the Sicilian side’. For this use of the preposition comp. Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 28 oi ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ‘those on the philosophical side’.

Ἐπίχαρμος. In 5, 1449 b 6 he and Phormis are said to have a 33 been the first to discard the Comedy of personalities; so that from this point of view he was the forerunner of the New Comedy, i.e. of what Aristotle regards as Comedy proper. Plato had already given him the premier place in Comedy: Theaet. 152 ἐ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἐκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὀμήρος. The Sicilian origin of Comedy is often asserted by post-Aristotelian writers: Theocritus Ep. 17. 1 ὁ τῶν κωμῳδιῶν εἰρῶν Ἐπίχαρμος.—Solinus 5. 13 Hic [scil. in Sicilia] primum inventa comedia.—Themistius Or. 27, 406 Dind. καὶ κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἠρέσατο μὲν ἀπὸ Σικελίας ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἡστη Ἐπίχαρμος τε καὶ Φόρμως [see on 5, 1449 b 6] κάλλων δὲ ᾿Αθηναίες συνηνεξήθη.—Prol. de Comedia 3 = Kaibel CGF. I p. 7 Ἐπίχαρμος: οὔτος πρῶτος τὴν κωμῳδίαν διερρημένην ανεκτήσατο πολλὰ προσφιλετεχνῆσα. — Suidas Ἐπίχαρμος: εἰρὴ τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἐν Συρακοῦσαι ἀμα Φόρμω. The whole question has been discussed by Bentley, Wks. I p. 251 Dyce, and by Welcker, Kl. Schr. I p. 273.

Χιώνιδου καὶ Μάγνητος. From this mention of them here, as a 34 also from the allusion to them further on, in 5, 1449 b 3, it is clear that Aristotle knows of no Attic writers of Comedy earlier than Chionides and Magnes; and even these apparently are mere names to him (see on 5, 1449 b 4). The comedies usually ascribed to them (Kock, CAF. I pp. 4–9) were no doubt the work of a much later age (comp. Wilamowitz, I. c. p. 335). As regards Chionides, his appearance as a comic poet has been placed as early as p. c. 487 on the strength of the statement in Suidas: Χιώνιδης, ᾿Αθηναῖος, κωμικὸς τῆς ἄρχαίας κωμῳδίας ἐν καὶ λέγουσι πρωταγωνιστὴν γενέσθαι τῆς ἄρχαίας κωμῳδίας, διδάσκειν δὲ ἔτεσιν οὗτο πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν. Magnes, who is known from an inscription (694 Dittenberger 2) to have been exhibiting a play at the city Dionysia in or shortly after p. c. 464 (v. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 475), is expressly described by Suidas as a much younger man than Epicharmus: ἐπιβάλλει δ’ Ἐπιχάρμῳ νέος πρεσβύτη. The chronology of the life of Epicharmus is beset with difficulties. He is said to have lived to a very great age (90, or even 97), and to have ‘flourished’ at the time of Gelo and Hiero, the tyrants of Syracuse (p. c. 485–467); we may very well suppose him, however,
to have written comedies before this period, as also to have lived beyond its limits. Suidas' statement that he was producing comedies at Syracuse six years before the Persian war (i.e. in B.C. 485; comp. Clinton FH. 23 p. 31), when 'Euetes, Euxenides, and Myllus were performing at Athens' (γάρ τοις Ἑρατικῶις ἔτη ἤξις διδάσκων ἐν Συρακούσαις' ἐν δὲ 'Αθηναις Εὐέτης καὶ Εὔξενιδῆς καὶ Μῦλλος ἐπεδείκνυτο), is of some importance, as showing that Epicharmus was conceived to be coeval with a generation at Athens anterior to Chionides and the regular drama which began with him (comp. Usener, Rh. Mus. 28 p. 423). There is no very serious difference, therefore, between Suidas and Aristotle as to the priority of Epicharmus.

καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας = τῆς δὲ τραγῳδίας. Vahlen illustrates the change of construction by Soph. el. II, 171 b 8 συλλογισμὸς ἑρμητικὸς καὶ σοφιστικὸς έστιν εἰς μὲν ὁ φαινόμενος συλλογισμὸς ... καὶ ὅσοι μὴ ὄντες κτε.—where καὶ ὅσοι seems to stand for ἄτεροι δὲ ὅσοι; comp. also Hartung, Lehre v. d. Partikeln 2 p. 410. It would be a very simple alteration, and an improvement to the sense, to read καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας (δ') ἔνως (J. of Phil. 10 p. 67).

ἔνως, i.e. the Sicyonians: Herod. 5. 67 τά τε δὴ ἄλλα ὁι Σικυώνοι εὐτίμων τῶν Ἀδρηστον καὶ δὴ πρός τὰ πάθεα αὐτὸν τραγικοῦ χορότιν ἐγέραρον, τὸν μὲν Διώνυσον οὐ τιμώντες, τὸν δὲ Ἀδρηστον.—Themistius Or. 27, 406 Dind. καὶ τραγῳδίας εὑρεται μὲν Σικυώνωι, τελεσιουργοι δὲ Ἀττικοὶ τουρταί.—Suidas: Θέσπις, Ἰκαρίου πόλεως Ἀττικῆς, τραγικὸς ἐκκαίδεκατου ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτον γενομένου τραγῳδοτοῦ Ἐπιγένους τοῦ Σικυώνου τιθέμενον, ὁς δὲ τινας, δευτέρος μετὰ Ἐπιγέννης ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτὸν πρῶτον τραγικὸν γενέσθαι φασίν (comp. also Suid. s.v. Οἰδῆν πρός τὸν Διώνυσον). On Epigenes see Bentley, Wks. 1 p. 286 Dyce, and Bernhardy, Gr. Litt. 18 p. 430.

περιοικίδες: Pol. 6. 5, 1320 b 6 ἄει γὰρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοις δήμοις πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦντες εἰπόρους. As understood at Athens the term κώμη meant a quarter of the city, as distinct from the outlying townships (δήμοι). Plato Laws 746 ν φρατρίας καὶ δήμων καὶ κώμας.—Isocrates 149 λειλόμενοι τὴν μὲν τόλμην κατὰ κώμας τὴν δὲ χώραν κατὰ δήμους (v. also Photius Lex. s. v. κώμη, and Suidas s. v. with the commentators).

κωμόφοδος ... ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμόφοδου. The connexion is indirectly implied in the juxtaposition of the two words in the law cited (or interpolated) in Demosthenes 21. 10 ἡ πομπῆ καὶ οἱ παῖδες καὶ ὁ κώμος καὶ οἱ κωμόφοι καὶ οἱ τραγῳδοί.

καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν κτέ. The argument comes practically to this:
Plays confessedly represent actions: now if they had been originally an Athenian invention, one would expect them to have been called πράγματα rather than δράματα; πράττειν being the ordinary Athenian word for to act. That Aristotle does not accept this view of δράμ and πράττειν is indirectly shown by his own use of the words. He has just said (a 27) πράττοντας καὶ δρόντας, and in his definition of Tragedy (6, 1448 b 26) his word is δρόντων, though he might easily have said πραττόντων.

τῆς μιμήσεως is the genitive after τῶν διαφορῶν. Vahlen illus-
trates the order by Plato, Phil. 17 c ἐπειδὴν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα ὅπως έστι τῶν αρχηγῶν τῆς φονῆς.

σώκρατ. Setting aside the antiquarian questions raised in chap. 3, Aristotle asserts that the birth of poetry was due to large natural causes. The origin of poetry generally (γεννήσας μὲν ἄλφος) is attributable to the imitative instinct in all men. The origin of the two great kinds of poetry (διεσπάσθη δὲ b 24), of which Tragedy and Comedy were the ultimate developments, is attributable to the personal tendencies and differences of character in the individual poets (τὰ οἰκεῖα ἡθη b 24).

αἰτία δύο. The two causes are those mentioned in the imme-
diate context, τὸ μιμεῖσθαι (a 5) and τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμῆμαι (a 8).

These Aristotle regards as two distinguishable facts in human nature; it will be observed too that he proves the second point by a formal argument, which he has not thought necessary to do in the case of the first. τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμῆμαι, instead of coming in as a mere afterthought after τὸ μιμεῖσθαι, involves a different idea, and relates to a different class of persons—the public interested in works of art, as distinct from the artists who produce them. Aristotle is perfectly aware that the cultivation of an art implies not only artists but also a public to accept and reward their work (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 2 p. 203).

μιμητικῶτατον: Probl. 30. 6, 956 a 14 Διὰ τι ἀνθρώπῳ πειστέον b 7 μᾶλλον ἡ ἄλλως ζῷο; ... ἡ στι μιμητικῶτατον; μακράνειν γὰρ δύναται διὰ τοῦτο. Vahlen illustrates this use of the neuter singular by De somn. 3, 457 b 24 καταπίπτοντοι ... οι ἀνθρωποι, μόνον γὰρ ὁρθὸν τῶν ζῴων, and Pol. 1. 2, 1253 a 16 τούτο γὰρ πρὸς τῶλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑδον, τὸ μόνον ἐγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ... αἰσθησιν ἔχειν.

μαθήσεις: Quintilian 10. 2, 1 Neque enim dubitari poteles quin artis pars magna continentur imitatione. nam ut invenire primum futur estque praecipuum, sic ea quae bene inventa sunt utile sequi, alque omnis vitae rationis constat, ut quae probamus in aliis facere
ipsi velimus. sic litterarum ductus, ut scribendi fiat usus, pueri sequuntur; sic musici vocem docentium, picture opera prōriorum, rustici probatam experimento culturam in exemplum inuentur; omnis denique disciplinae initia ad proposition sibi praelection formari videmus.

9 σημεῖον. A σημεῖον is that which proves or confirms a proposition; an αίτιον, that which explains or gives a reason for it. Aristotle defines a σημεῖον in An. pr. 2, 27, 70 7 σημεῖον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἐνδοξος’ οὐ γὰρ ὄντος ἐστιν ἢ οὐ γενομένων πρότερον ἢ ὑστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τούτο σημεῖον ἢ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι (comp. Bon. Ind. 677 b 1).

10 ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων: 're ipsa' (Tyrwhitt; v. Bon. Ind. 286 a 43 and Schwegler on Metaph. A 3, 984 a 12). τῶν ἔργων here is often rendered by 'works of art' ('in operibus opificium', Victorius).

ἀ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρὸς ὄρωμεν: Rhet. 1. 11, 1371 b 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τὸ ἥδι καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον τὸ τε μεμιμημένον [μιμητικὸν Vet. Vers.], ὡσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδραποτοικα καὶ ποιητική, καὶ τὰν δὲ ἀν εἰ μεμιμημένον ἢ, κἂν ἢ μὴ ἢδι αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαϊρε, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τα συμβαίνει. —De part. an. 1. 5, 645 a 11 καὶ γὰρ ἀν ἐκίνησε παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αἰτίων [i.e. τῶν ζων τῶν τὴν κεχαρισμένων] θεωροῦτες χαίρεμεν ὅτι τὴν ὑθμωργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τῆν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικὴν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστῶτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοι γε τὰς αἰτίας καθόρνων. διό δὲ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτέρων ζων ἐπισκεψιν. Plutarch also (De aud. poet. 18 a; Qu. conv. 5. 1, 674 a) has a good deal to say on this point.

12 ἀτιμοτάτων: De anima 1. 2, 404 b 3 εἰ ἀπαντήσῃ γὰρ υπάρχειν αἰτίων [i.e. νοῦν] τοῖς ζωίς, καὶ μεγάλους καὶ μικρούς καὶ τιμίως καὶ ἀτιμώτατοι.—De part. an. 1. 5, 645 a 15 (see on b 10).

13 καὶ τοῦτο. For the conjunction comp. 13, 1453 a 17 σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γεγομένον. —De somno 3, 456 b 28 σημεῖον δὲ τοῦτω καὶ τὰ ὑπονοικα.—Meteor. 2. 8, 367 a 11 τεκμήριον δ’ ἐστὶ... καὶ τὸ γεγομένον. —Xenoph. An. 1. 9. 29 τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δε. 16 θεωρούντας μανθάνειν: comp. Rhet. 1. c., and Plato Rep. 475 D oī... φιλοθεμάμενες πάντες εἴροιγο δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν χαίροντος τοιούτω εἶναι. Belger (De Aristotele etiam in Arte Poetica componenda Platonis discipulo p. 45) finds some further traces of Plato in this portion of the Poetics. Our pleasure in the contemplation of a picture or other work of imitative art is explained here.
to be the natural concomitant of an intellectual act, the discovery or recognition on our part of the meaning of the picture (comp. Probl. 19. 5, 918 a 3).

οὐχ ἦν. οὐκ ἦν for οὐχ ἦν is found in K b in Eth. N. 8. 12, 1161 a 1, b 18 and in D (the Marcianus) in An. post. 1, 23, 84 b 8.

κατὰ φύσιν δὲ διὸν ήμιν τοῦ μυμείσθαι. This has been supposed to stand somewhat loosely for the two things previously mentioned, τὸ μυμείσθαι and τὸ χαίρειν τοὺς μυμήματι; but a little reflection will show that Aristotle has not fallen into any such inexactness of language. What he is now considering is the evolution of the poet; and he tells us that the imitative aptitude of the poet is only a higher and more developed form of that natural aptitude for imitation which is common to all mankind. There is no reason why he should also remind us at this point of the naturalness of the pleasure that we derive from poetry and other kinds of imitation.

καὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ seem to be added as an afterthought, in recognition of the historical connexion between music and poetry. Except in its lyric forms, however, poetry was now no longer combined with music; in Aristotle’s view, also, even metre is at the most only one of its accidents (1, 1447 b 11). A very different view has been taken of these words by Tyrwhitt and Vahlen—and long before their time by Averroes and Sigonius (Emend. p. 152)—who suppose harmony and rhythm to be the second of the aitia ὑο ὅσικαί mentioned in the early part of the chapter (b 5). There are two objections to this interpretation: (1) it ignores the significance of the distinction between τὸ μυμείσθαι and τὸ χαίρειν τοὺς μυμήματι (v. on b 4); and (2) if τῆς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ are to bear this emphasis, one would expect them to be brought in in a less incidental way, and with a reason of some sort to justify the position ascribed to them. As the matter is in Aristotle’s opinion of such secondary importance, he does not stop to show that our sense of harmony and rhythm is natural, or to explain how it has come to be natural to us (comp. Probl. 19. 38, 920 b 29). Metre is said to be a mode of rhythm in Rhet. 3. 8, 1408 b 28, ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχῆματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμός ῥυθμός ἐστιν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τιμητά [τιμήματα]. On the difference between them see Cicero Orator 67, Quintilian 9. 4, 45, and Schol. Hephaest. p. 144 Gaisf.

ἔξ ἀρχῆς is much the same thing as ἐν ἀρχῇ (Eucken, Sprachgebr. b 22 p. 10). If it may be taken not with ἐγέννησαν but with the
participle, the antithesis between εὖ ἀρχής πεφυκότες and προάγοντες will be not unlike that in Metaph. A 2, 982b13 εὖ ἀρχής μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀπόρων θαναμάσσεται, εἴτε κατὰ μικρόν οὖτω προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειξόνων διαπορήσαντες.

αὐτά: loosely used for ‘their work’ or ‘performances’; it anticipates what is termed in the next line ‘their improvisations’. προάγειν is here (and again in 4, 1449a13) a transitive verb; in the Aristotelian passages in which it seems to be intransitive (= προιέναι) an object can generally be supplied without difficulty from the context (comp. Bon. Ind. 633b10). The meaning of the word in the present context is to ‘advance’, or ‘carry a stage further’ (comp. Plato Polit. 262c), as may be seen from the parallel in Soph. el. 33, 183b, in which the gradual progress or advance of Rhetoric and other arts is described: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὑρόντες παντελῶς ἔπὶ μικρὸν τι προῆγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προγαγόντων οὖτως ἔξηκασιν.

b23 αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων. On the verb αὐτοσχεδιάζειν = ‘to speak off-hand, without premeditation or previous study’ see Ernesti, Lex. techn. gr. s.v. The fact is described in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 54 θέως δ' ὑπὸ καλὸν ἀείδειν, εἰ αὐτοσχεδίης πεφυκόμενος, ἣντε κοινὰ ήδητα τιθῆτον παραβόλα κερτομένωσιν, ἄμφι Δία Κρονίδαν καὶ Μαιάδα καλλιτέκτον. A similar view of the origin of poetry is implied in Quintilian 9.4, 114 poema nemo dubitaverit imperito quodam initio fusum et aurium mensura et similiter decurrentium spatiorum observatione esse generatum, mox in eo repertos pedes.—Maximus Tyrt. 37. 4 'Αθηναίοις δὲ ἡ μὲν παλαιά μούσα χοροῖ παίδων ἥταν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, γῆς ἐργάται κατὰ ὅμοιοι ιστάμενοι . . . ἄσμα ἀδιόντες αὐτοσχεδία (comp. on 4, 1449a9, and Bentley, Wks. i p. 250 Dyce). The phallic-song, in which Aristotle finds the germ of Comedy, was sometimes described as an φονὴ αὐτοσχεδίας (see on 4, 1449a12).

b24 διεσπάσθη δὲ corresponds with the γεννῆσαι μὲν ἄλως in b.4. κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἠθῆ: comp. Plato Rep. 396c sqq.

b25 τὰς καλὰς . . . πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων. As Düntzer (Rettung der aristotelischen Poetik p. 129) and Bernays (Zwei Abb. p. 28) have shown, this is not a tautology, as the actions of those who are καλοὶ (τῶν τοιούτων) are not always καλαὶ πράξεις; comp. Plato Rep. 396c μάλιστα μὲν μιμοῦμενος τὸν ἀγάθον ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἔλλαττῳ δὲ καὶ ήτοιν ἦ ὑπὸ νόσων ἦ ὑπὸ ἐρώτων ἐσφαλμένον ἦ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἦ τινος ἀλλής ἐξυμφορᾶς.
ψόγοις has the same concrete sense of 'invectives' in Plato Laws 829 c ἐγκώμια τε καὶ ψόγοις ποιεῖν. The earliest, as well as the most eminent representative of this kind of literature, was Archilochus, the ὁγερός 'Ἀρχίλοχος βαρυλόγοις ἐχθεσιν πιανώμενος of Pindar (Pyth. 2. 100).


εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλοὺς, scil. τοιούτους; comp. Goulston's version, b 29 'verissimile autem est, qui talia considerint, exitississe multos.' Aristotle says this because he thinks that even in those days the baser sort (οἱ εὐτελεστεροὶ b 26) were probably in a majority; he has no romantic illusions as to the superiority of the men of an earlier age (Pol. 2. 8, 1269 a 5). On the pre-Homeric poets, to whom Aristotle refers, comp. Sextus Emp. Adv. math. i. 204 οὗτ οὕτος πάντων ὁμολογεῖται ποιητής ἀρχαίοτατος εἶναι ὁμήρος: ἐνοι χάρ Ἡσίοδος προίκες τοῖς χρόνοις λέγουσιν, Λίυνο τε καὶ Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαίων καὶ ἄλλως παμπληθεὶς: see also Bernhardy Gr. Litt. i p. 308. Aristotle, however, was quite aware that the writings which bore the names of these legendary poets were not really by them (H. A. 6. 6, 563 a 18; see Bernays, Dialoge d. Aristot. p. 95).

εἰκόνιον ὁ Μαργίτης: Eustathius on Eth. N. 6. 7, 1141 a 14 (p. 320 b 30 Heylb.) παράγει . . . καὶ τινα ποίησιν Μαργίτην ὄνομαζομένην ὁμήρου. μνημονεῖα δ' αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης εν τῷ πρῶτῳ Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἄλλα καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος καὶ Κρατίνος καὶ Καλλίμαχος εν τῷ ἐπειράματι καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν εἶναι ὁμήρου τὸ ποίημα. On the Margites, which Aristotle thus attributes to Homer, see Kinkel, EGF. p. 64. This statement in the Poetics does not throw any light on the question of the original form of the Margites, whether the iambic lines in it were a primitive part of the poem, or subsequently added by Pigres (see Goetting, Op. Acad. p. 167, and Hiller, N. Jahrb. f. Phil. 1887 p. 13 for a discussion of it); it stands in a parenthesis, and must not be taken in any direct connexion with the ἐν οἷς . . . ταμπεῖον ἠλθε μέτρον that follows.

καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα refers to writings more or less like the Margites by post-Homeric poets—not to other minor poems of a light order attributable to Homer himself, as Bergk (Gr. Litt. i p. 775) suggests.

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1448 b 30  enim ois = enim de tostos, sicil. tois ψόγοις, the relative beginning a new sentence, as in 24, 1459 b 12 ois ἀπασιν.—Phys. 8. 3, 253 b 12 πρὸς οὐ... oυ χαλεπῶν ἀπαντήσαι.—Metaph. Θ 3, 1046 b 33 ois τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἀποτα oυ χαλεπῶν ἰδειν.—Δ 8, 1074 b 8 ὡν εἰ τις χρωσίας αὐτῷ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον.

κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόττον: 17, 1455 b 10 κατὰ τὸ εἰκός.—Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 22 and 9, 1367 b 12 κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον (opposed to παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον).—Eth. N. 4. 6, 1123 a 20 παρὰ τὸ δεόν. The reading of the Aldine (and of Parisinus 2038), καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον, has been accepted by Bon. Ind. 357 b 48.

b 31 ἤλθε: the verb has the same sense in Eth. N. 5. 8, 1133 a 20 ἐφ' ὁ τὸ νόμομα ἐλήλυθε.—Pol. 1. 9, 1258 a 6 ὁ τὸ ἔτερον εἰδὸς τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τούτο ηλήλυθεν.

ιαμβείων καλείται: Strabo 422 Cas. ὁ μὲν (sicil. ὁ δάκτυλος) ὢνοις ἐστὶν οἰκεῖος ὁ δ' ἱαμβος κακομοίς.—Proclus Chrestom. 7, p. 346 Gaisf. τὸν ἱαμβὸν τάσσεσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ λοιδορία τὸ παλαιόν καὶ γάρ καὶ τὸ ἱαμβίζειν κατὰ τινα γλώσσαν λοιδορεῖν ἔλεγον... ἐνικε δὲ τὸ ἱαμβος τὸ μὲν παλαίον ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ψόγον καὶ ἐπαίνον γραφομένων ὠμοίως λέγεσθαι εὔτε δὲ τὶνες ἐπέλαυσαν ἐν ταῖς κακολογίαις τὸ μέτρον, ἐκείθεν τὸ ἱαμβίζειν εἰς τὸ ὑβρίζειν ὑπὸ τῆς συνθείας ἐκπεσεῖν.

—Schol. Hephast. 6, p. 182 Gaisf. ἐκλήθη δὲ ἱαμβος, ἀφ' οῦ τὸ μέτρον παρονομάζεται ἱαμβικόν, ἐπείπερ οἱ ὑβρίζειν καὶ λοιδορεῖν τινὰς βουλόμενοι τοῦτο ἐχρῶντο τῷ μέτρῳ ἱαμβίζειν γάρ ἔλεγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ὑβρίζειν.—Suetonii Reliq. p. 19 Reiff. Iambus est carmen maledicum... appellatum est autem παρὰ τὸ ἱαμβίζειν, quod est maledicere.

b 33 τῶν παλαιῶν. The reference is apparently to Homer and Archilochus, as the first and greatest representatives of the two great directions in poetry; comp. Velleius Paterc. 1. 5 Neque quenquam alium, cuius operis primus auctor fuerit, in eo perfectissimum praeter Homerum et Archilochum reperiemus.—Dio Chrysost. Or. 33, p. 5 R. ὅδ' ἐὰν ποιητῶν γεγονότων εἶ ἀπαντὸς τοῦ αἴωνος, οἷς οὖν οὖν τῶν ἀλλῶν συμβάλλειν ἄξιον, Ὁμήρου τε καὶ Ἀρχιλόχου, τούτων Ὁμήρος μὲν σχέδιον πάντα ἐνεκομίασε... Ἀρχιλόχος δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναιστι ἦκε [fort. ἢ], τὸ ψέγαν. Their pre-eminence is implied in the juxtaposition of the two names in Heraclitus fr. 119 (42 Diels), τὸν τε Ὁμήρου ἐφασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἑκβάλλεισθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι τα Ἀρχιλόχου ὑμοῖοι.

b 34 τὰ σπουδαῖα... ποιητῆς: comp. Plato Apol. 18 ἐν τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής.

b 35 οὖχ ὅτι εὖ, sicil. ἐποίησεν. Homer 'wrote well', as a master of
the art of poetic expression (comp. 24, 1459 b 16; 1460 b 1); his poems are 'imitations', or pictures of human life, which distinguishes them from those of Empedocles and others (comp. 1, 1447 b 15); and they are moreover 'dramatic imitations', i.e. not unlike those in the Drama (comp. 24, 1460 a 5). In this way, then, Aristotle intimates that Homer not only dealt with the same kind of subject as Tragedy (tà στοιχεῖα), but also anticipated the dramatic manner.

σχῆμα... ὑπεδειξεν, 'marked out for us the great outlines of Comedy'. σχῆμα has the same sense in 5, 1449 b 3, and in Plato Laws 5, 737 D σχῆματος ἔνεκα καὶ ὑπογραφῆς. For the use of ὑπεδειξε comp. Rhet. 3, 2, 1404 b 25 ὅπερ Εὐρυπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπεδειξε πρῶτος.—Ath. Pol. 41 Ἀριστείδης μὲν ὑπεδειξεν, Ἐφιάλτης δ' ἐπετέλεσεν.—Isocrates 268 η ταῦτα πράττοντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑποδεικνύοντες.

οὗ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας. The sense is that, when Homer passed from στοιχεῖα to φαῖλα, his treatment of the latter was more akin to that in the comic poets than to that in the iαμβοτοιοι; Margites with him was only ridiculous—not vicious or held up to obloquy as vicious, as a writer of ψόγοι would have made him. A ψόγος dwells on some serious vice of character; whereas Comedy, as Aristotle conceives it, deals only with those lesser faults which we are able to laugh at (see on 5, 1449 a 33). This view of the Margites is not quite in harmony with that in 4, 1448 b 30, where it is regarded as a ψόγος, the first known instance of the kind.

With οὗ ψόγον Vahlen supplies ποιήσας from the δραματοποιήσας that follows. This is legitimate enough, but hardly necessary, as δραματοποιεῖν, 'to write, or describe, as a dramatist would' (see on 22, 1458 b 9) is just as applicable to ψόγον as it is to τὸ γελοῖον (comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering 'non vituperium sed ridiculum dramaticum exprimis'). The meaning Aristotle attaches to it may be seen from μιμήσεις δραματικᾶς ἔτοιμης in b 35 (v. ad loc.).

ὦσπερ Ἰλίας καὶ ἦ Ὀδύσσεα. Vahlen illustrates this insertion of the article before Ὀδύσσεα by De resp. 17, 478 b 28 ἐστι δὲ βάνατος καὶ ἦ φθορὰ πάσιν ὧμοιος τοῖς μὴ ἀτελέσιν, and Rhet. 3, 13, 1414 b 13 ἔσται οὖν... διήγησις ἔτερον καὶ ἦ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις, and a number of other passages in Aristotle (comp. also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 240 c). On the other hand Spengel would restore the article before Ἰλίας on account of its appearance in the parallel in 26, 1462 b 8 ὥσπερ ἦ Ἰλίας ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαύτα.
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1448 b 38 μέρη καὶ ἡ 'Οδύσσεια (comp. also 24, 1459 b 14 ἦ μὲν Ἰλιᾶς . . . ἦ δὲ 'Οδύσσεια). There is as a rule nothing exceptional or anomalous in Aristotle's usage in reference to the article with the titles of books. He is apt to omit it, just as Athenaeus does, when the title is given in the actual form which it would have as the heading of a MS. (comp. Apollonius Synt. 1, 26), after the preposition ἐν. The Poetics supply a number of examples of this usage, e.g. 16, 1455 a 2 ἐν Ἀλκίνου ἀπολογίῳ.—24, 1460 a 35 τὰ ἐν Ὀδύσσεια ἀλογία.—14, 1454 a 1 ἐν Ἀντίγονη.—16, 1455 a 4 ἐν Χορήφοις.—24, 1460 a 31 ἐν Ἡλέκτρᾳ.—a 32 ἐν Μυσίοις.—25, 1461 b 21 ἐν Ὀρέστῃ. In 24, 1460 a 30, however, the traditional text omits the article with the title in the nominative; for it is clear that Ὀδύσσεια in this place means the Oedipus Tyrannus, in the same way as with us 'Hamlet' may mean the play, not the person. In many places in which the article is omitted, the title is used in a general sense as a common noun; thus in Soph. el. 24, 180 a 21 δῶς μοι Ἰλιᾶς means 'give me an Iliad' (i.e. a copy of the Iliad). Instances of this in the Poetics are 8, 1451 a 20 Ἡρακλείδα Θησεύδα, 'a Heracleid, a Theseid'.—a 24 'Οδύσσειαν, 'an Odyssey'.—23, 1459 b 3 Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδύσσειας, 'a poem like the Iliad or Odyssey'.—b 4 Κυπρέων, 'a poem like the Κύπρια'. I am inclined to think, therefore, that Spengel was right in suggesting ὅσπερ ἦ Ἰλιᾶς in the present passage; and also that in 24, 1460 a 30 the true reading must be ὅσπερ ὅ Ὀδύσσειας.

1449 a 3 ἐκατέραν τὴν ποιήσιν recalls the distinction drawn in 4, 1448 b 24 between the two great forms of poetry, the higher and the lower.

κατὰ τὴν οἰκεῖαν φύσιν: 4, 1448 b 24 κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ὡθή.

a 4 ἀντὶ τῶν ἰάμβων κωμῳδοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο. Vahlen compares De part. an. 2. 13, 657 b 34 ἀντὶ ταύτης τῆς φιλακῆς πάντα σκηνοφρονοφθαλμά ἐστιν, and Herod. 7. 62 ἀντὶ τῶν πλωμῶν μυηρφοφορέων ἦσαν.

a 7 ἔχει . . . τοῖς εἰδεσιν ἰκανῶς. For the dative comp. Meteor. 1. 3, 339 b 5 πῶς ἔχει τάξει πρός τὰλλα.—De anima 2. 3, 414 b 33 τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχονται.

For the sense of εἰδεσιν in this passage, Vahlen (Beitr. i p. 22) compares that of σχήματα in the account of Comedy in 4, 1448 b 36 and 5, 1449 b 3. εἴδη seems to mean the formative constituents of Tragedy, the forms it must embody in order to realize its nature in its completeness. Aristotle assumes that Tragedy has by this time attained to its natural form (a 15 ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν); but he declines to consider the question whether there is still a possibility
of improvement in the treatment of its various formative constituents. The suggestion that the ἐνθ in the sense of a formative constituent is perhaps unique in Aristotle, but there are certainly a few instances of it in Plato Rep. iv (comp. Campbell, 2 p. 298), where the three faculties in the soul are sometimes described as ἐνθ (434 b, 439 e, 440 b) and sometimes as μέρη (442 b, c). The alternative interpretation is to take ἐνθ in the logical sense of "species". This view, though not improbable in itself (comp. 18, 1455 b 32), is hardly reconcilable with the use of ἐνθ in 6, 1450 a 13 as a designation for the μέρη with which the chapter is dealing.

αὐτὸ τε καθ' αὑτὸ κρίναι. On the reading here see J. of Phil. 5 a 8 p. 117. The conjunction serves to connect κρίναι with ἐπισκοπεῖν, the second clause being complementary to the first (comp. 6, 1450 b 3). Similarly in De anima 3. 3, 427 b 15 φαντασία γὰρ ἐπερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοήσεως αὐτῇ τε οὐ γίγνεται ἀνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἀνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπόλυψις, the second clause (αὐτῇ τε κτ.) is explanatory of the first. κρίναι has been taken as an infinitive of limitation by Vahlen, who quotes H. A. 9. 38, 622 b 20 τὸν δ' ἑντόμων ἑγκατακόσιον γόμων ἔστι, σκεδών δὲ καὶ πρὸς τάλαν συγκρίνεσθαι πάντα, τὸ τε τῶν μυρμήκων γένος καὶ τὸ τῶν μελιτῶν. As far as I can see, an infinitive of limitation would not be quite in place in a passage like the present.

For the anaphora between καθ' αὑτὸ and πρὸς τὰ θέατρα comp. Top. 5. 1, 128 b 16 ἀποδίδοτα δὲ τὸ ἵδων ἃ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἀεὶ ἃ πρὸς ἐπερον καὶ ποτὲ.—Cat. 6. 5 b 16 οἴδεν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ὃ μικρὸν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς ἐπερον ἀναφέρεσθαι (comp. Bon. Ind. 212 a 2). κρίνειν has an indirect question after it in Metaph. A 4, 984 b 31 τούτως μὲν οὖν πῶς χρῆ διανείμαι ... ἔξεστο κρίνειν ὑποτευν. ἦνομενης δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικής = γενομένη δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικής. Having begun with γενομένης ... αὐτο- σχεδιαστικῆς, scil. τῆς τραγωδίας, Aristotle sees that the same is true of Comedy, and adds a parenthesis to show that; after which he says in a 13 ἡμίζηθη, just as though γενομένη ... αὐτοσχεδιαστική had begun the clause. For another instance of a gen. abs. in lieu of a nominative see 17, 1455 b 3 (comp. Bon. Ind. 149 b 26 and Kühner, Gr. Gr.² 2. 2 p. 110). A parenthetical addition of very similar form is found in 5, 1449 b 12, and also (with Christ's punctuation) in Metaph. Θ 10, 1051 b 11. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is used adverbially (comp. Pol. 7. 16, 1334 b 29, and Plato Critii. 112 e) in the same
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1449a

sense as ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Several of the recent editors and translators, however, accepting the reading γενομένη of certain apographs, take ἀρχῆς and αὐτοσχεδιαστικὴς together as meaning an 'improvisational beginning'. This certainly simplifies matters, but it may be doubted whether ἀρχη αὐτοσχεδιαστικὴ would naturally bear that meaning.

a11 τῶν ἐξαρχόντων. ‘ἐξάρχειν τὸν διθύραμβον, ὡς τὰ φαλλικά, ii dicebantur qui choro utrizis canendo praeverunt; qui, ut verisimile est, ab initio poetae ipsi fuerunt’, says Tyrwhitt, quoting Archilochus (fr. 77 Bergk) ὡς Διωνίσου ἀνακτος καλὼν ἐξάρχει μέλος οἶδα διθύραμβον. By the ἐξαρχον here Aristotle means the poet-composer, who supplied both words and air, and taught them to the chorus—not as is sometimes supposed, the κορυφαῖος, who was only one of the chorus (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 39 p. 325). ἐξάρχειν διθύραμβον is practically a synonym for διδάσκειν διθύραμβον, the expression in Herodotus i. 23.

It is clear that Aristotle has in his own mind a general view of the historical development of early Greek poetry, but he tells us as little as possible about it—in fact no more than is absolutely necessary for present purposes. The intention of the Poetics is to give us a theory of the Epic and of the Drama (see on 1, 1447a 8), not a treatise on the history and archaeology of the Drama. The Epic having been traced to its origin (4, 1448b 23–33), Aristotle turns to the question of the rise and progress of the Drama. Both forms of Drama, he thinks, arose out of lyric or choral poetry. Tragedy began when the author of the dithyramb came forward with an 'improvisation', i.e. with a μήτες or spoken statement, which he improvised in the interval between the two halves of the song of the chorus—that being the origin of the two great constituents of a Greek drama, a spoken part and a sung part, an actor and a chorus. This is a sufficient account of the facts; and there was no need for Aristotle to go off into a multiplicity of historical or antiquarian details. His silence on such points is no proof of his ignorance of the legendary history of Attic Tragedy. The allusion in τῶν ἐξαρχόντων in the text is probably to Thespis, whom he is known to have mentioned, in a fragment (probably of the dialogue περὶ ποιητῶν) preserved by Themistius Or. 26, 382 Dind.: οὗ προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσίν ὡδὲν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς, Θεσπίς δὲ πρῶλογον τε καὶ μήτες ἐξείρεσε; (comp. Heitz, Fr. Arist. 19 and Bernays, Dial. d. Aristot. p. 139). Here the 'hymn to the gods' corresponds with
the Dithyramb; and the ‘prologue and speech’ introduced by by 1449 a II Thespis may be identified with the improvisations of the actor-poet, which transformed the Dithyramb into Tragedy. It is clear from Aristotle’s confession of ignorance as to Comedy in 5, 1449 a 37 that he knows more of the history of Tragedy than he actually tells us, and that he is not aware of there being any serious lacuna in it (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 39 p. 320).

Φαλλικά: Phoebus Lex. Φαλλικόν ποίημα αυτοσχέδιον ἐπὶ τῷ φαλλῷ ἁδόμενον.—Hesychius Φαλλικόν ὅρχημα τυ οἱ δὲ μέλος ἅλλοι φόθν αὐτοσχέδιον ἐπὶ τῷ φαλλῷ ἁδόμενην. In these phallus-songs, which were a widespread institution in Greece (comp. Heraclitus fr. 127, and Herodotus 2, 48), Aristotle sees the origin of Comedy; it arose, he thinks, through the author of the song ‘improvising’ some scurrilous tale—no doubt in the interval between the parts of the song—and becoming in this way the forerunner of the single actor of the earliest form of Comedy. It will be observed that he supposes Tragedy and Comedy to have developed on exactly the same lines. A coarse and irregular Comedy, not unlike what Aristotle seems to be assuming, is known to have survived in certain parts of Greece even in post-Aristotelian times (Athenaeus 621 ε sqq.).

προαγόντων: see on 4, 1448 b 22.

μεταβολάς: 5, 1449 a 37 αἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας μεταβάσεις.

ἡ τραγῳδία. The word is repeated, because Comedy is in a somewhat different position (5, 1449 a 38).

ἔπαινατο. For the tense of the participle (misunderstood by Elmsley on Eurip. Heracl. 721) comp. An. post. 2. 1, 89 b 27 εὐφύντες γὰρ ὅτι ἐκλείπει τεπαύμεθα.—Meteor. 1. 3, 339 b 32 θεωρήσατε ἄν τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα . . . ἵσως ἄν ἔπαινατο ταύτης τῆς παιδικῆς δόξης.—De mem. 2, 453 a 24 οὖ γὰρ ῥομίως παύεται κυνηγεῖα.

φύσιν: Pol. 1. 2, 1252 b 32 ἢ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἑστίν οἶδον γὰρ ἐκαστῶν ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθεισῆς, ταύτην φαινὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκαστόν, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἠποπου οἰκίας. On φύσις in the sense of the natural form of a thing see Bon. Ind. 838 a 41.

καὶ τὸ τέων ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος. There is no need to assume a lacuna here (with Ueberweg). Having shown how Tragedy began with a single actor (a II), Aristotle proceeds to note the introduction of a second, and after that, of a third actor. The increasing prominence of the actor is in his view the most significant fact in the evolution of the Drama; the other points
1449\textsuperscript{a} 15 mentioned are either of minor importance or the direct consequence of the change in the number of actors. A difficulty may perhaps be found in the language in the text, as the καὶ, with which the statement begins, cannot be taken as connecting ήγαγε etc. with the ἐπαίσατο or the ἐσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν in the preceding sentence. The difficulty disappears if one observes that the emphasis there is on the participial πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα (comp. 5, 1449\textsuperscript{b} 2 ἢδη δὲ σχήματα τινα αὐτῆς ἔχοντας), which repeats the idea of the κατὰ μικρὸν ἡνίχθη in \textsuperscript{a} 13. The καὶ in fact is explanatory, introducing a series of statements in support of the original assertion that Tragedy underwent many changes before attaining to its ultimate form.

ὑποκριτῶν. The actor is called a ὑποκριτῆς not (as is so often said) because he answered the chorus, but because he was the poet's spokesman, who interpreted his text to the public (see Heimsoeth, De voce ὑποκριτῆς, and Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 259, 289). The term must have acquired this sense at the time when, by a division of labour, the poet left the acting to others, instead of being himself the performer of his pieces, as he originally was according to Rhet. 3. 1, 1403\textsuperscript{b} 23 ὑπεκράνοντο γὰρ αὐτοί τὰς τραγῳδίας οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον. The position of the ὑποκριτῆς in fact was analogous to that of the ραψῳδός; they were both of them intermediaries, who interpreted the words of a poet to the public. It is to be noted that in describing the rhapsodist in the Ion Plato in one place terms him a ἐρμηνεύς and in another a ὑποκριτῆς, apparently without any difference of meaning: Ion 530 c τῶν γὰρ ραψῳδῶν ἐρμηνεύα δεν τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γέγονεν οὗ τοῖς ἀκούοντι, and 535 e οὕτως ἔστω οἵ θεάτης τῶν δακτυλῶν ὁ ἐσχάτος... ὁ δὲ μέσος σὺν ὁ ραψῳδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτῆς, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος αὐτός ὁ ποιητής. For the sense of the derivative ὑποκριτική see on 19, 1456\textsuperscript{b} 10.

\textsuperscript{a} 16 Αἰσχύλος: comp. the Aristotelian survey of the progress of the Drama in Themistius Or. 26 p. 382 Dind. (v. on \textsuperscript{a} 11): οὗ προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσόν ἤδη εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς, Θεάτης δὲ πράσσον τε καὶ ῥήσου ἔξεσθαι, Αἰσχύλος δὲ τρίτον ὑποκριτὴν καὶ ὁκρίβαντας, τὰ δὲ πλεῖό τούτον Σωφοκλέους ἀπελαύσαμεν καὶ Εὐριπίδου; There is no doubt a discrepancy between this and the statement in the text about Aeschylus, but it need not disturb us, unless we assume Aristotle to have been incapable of a change of opinion even on a small matter of learned research. Ancient opinion was divided on the point: Vita Aeschyli
4. 1449 a 15-19

(Dindorf, Poet. scen.5 prol. p. 3): ἐχρήσατο δ' ὑποκρητὴ πρώτῳ μὲν 1449 a 16
Κλεάνδρῳ, ἐπείτα καὶ τὸν δεύτερον αὐτῷ προσήψε Μυννίσκον τὸν
Χαλκίδα: τὸν δὲ τρίτον ὑποκρητὴν αὐτὸς ἐξεύρεν, ὦς δὲ Δικαίαρχος ὁ
Μεσσήνιος, Σοφοκλῆς.

τῶν λόγων: the portion recited or spoken, as opposed to τὰ a 17
τοῦ χοροῦ, the portion sung (τὰ ἀδῷμενα in 18, 1456 a 28); comp.
the use of λόγοι in 6, 1450 b 6, 9 in the sense of the speeches or
μῆθεις in a play. Λόγος is a word with a Protean variety of
meanings even in the Poetics. In 1, 1447 a 22 (etc.) it means
‘language’, as opposed to metre and music; in 6, 1450 b 15
‘prose’, as distinct from verse; in 22, 1459 a 13 an ‘oration’, as
opposed to a poem; in 15, 1454 a 18 (comp. 19, 1456 a 37, b 6),
the ‘language’, as distinct from the action, of the personages; in
17, 1455 b 17 (comp. a 34; 5, 1449 b 8; 24, 1460 a 27), the ‘story’,
as distinct from its setting in the actual poem. And in 20, 1457 a 23
it is one of the technical terms of Aristotelian logic or grammar.

πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν, ‘made it assume the leading part a 18
in the play’. For this metaphorical use of πρωταγωνιστῆς comp.
that of the derivative πρωταγωνιστεῖν in Pol. 8. 4, 1338 b 29 ὅστε
τὸ καλὸν ἄλλ’ οὐ τὸ θηρίῳς δὲ πρωταγωνιστεῖν οὐ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ
tῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τι ἁγωνίσαιτο ἀν οὐθένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἄλλα
μᾶλλον ἀνήρ ἀγαθός. Instances of this extension of meaning
(which is common enough in later Greek) will be found in HSt.
s.v. πρωταγωνιστῆς and πρωταγωνιστεῖω. Aristotle is apt to use
technical terms of theatrical origin in their popular sense (see on
14, 1453 b 8 χορήγίας) even in a book like the Poetics.

σκηνογραφίαν: i.e. Sophocles was the first to have the screen
behind the actors painted to represent the façade of a palace or
a temple, or whatever else the play required as its background.
The improvement here ascribed to Sophocles was sometimes attri-
buted to Aeschylus (Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 142; Haigh, Attic
Th.3 p. 181).

ἐτὶ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος: comp. a 28 ἐτὶ δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλῆθη. τὸ μέγεθος a 19
is apparently a nominative extra structuram, like an item in an
inventory. There are some fairly well-established instances of this
anomalous use of the nominative (Bon. Ind. 46 b 41; Meisterhans,
Gr.3 p. 203; Kühner, Gr. Gr.3 2. 1 p. 45). τὸ μέγεθος=its magni-
tude, or extent, i.e. the length now usual in Tragedy. The word,
however, is not always a purely neutral term; as the opposite of
μικρότης (comp. the ἐκ μικρῶν μῦθων in the context), it may very
well mean a ‘considerable length’ (or ‘size’), so as to suggest an
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1449 a 19 idea of the importance or dignity of the object; comp. Eih. N. 4. 4, 1122 b 32 μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἄξιομα.—Pol. 5, 10, 1313 a 7 τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἄξιομα τῆς ἄρχης. The ἀπεσεμνύθη in the next line shows this to be at any rate by implication the sense of μέγεθος in the present passage.

Aristotle evidently had in his own mind a clear and precise conception of the origin of Tragedy, though it is difficult for us to recover more than fragments of it from a statement so brief and allusive as that in the text. He merely tells us (1) that the most primitive tragedies dealt with short stories; (2) that the language of the primitive actor, instead of being serious and solemn, was sportive or jocose, and (3) in trochaics, not in iambics. By way of explanation of this last point, he adds that, as Tragedy was originally akin to the satyric drama, the language of the primitive tragic actor had still something of the rhythm of the dance about it. Aristotle's idea of the original tragic actor may possibly have been that he also was made up as a satyr (comp. Wilamowitz, Eurip. Herakles 1. p. 87). He certainly mentions one characteristic of the stage-satyr, his jesting language, and seems to imply another, viz. his dance-like movements (comp. Welcker, Nachtrag zu der Schrift ü. d. Aesch. Trill. p. 337).

ἐκ μικρών μῦθων: such as might be told, for instance, in a single act. For the asyndeton comp. 5, 1449 b 12; De anima 3. 2, 426 b 24; De sensu 3, 440 a 8 (ὁδον ἐνίοτε οἱ γραφῆς ποιοῦντι ἐτέραν χρών ἔφ' ἐτέραν ἐναργεστέραν ἐπαλείφουσιν); Metaph. Θ 10, 1051 b 11 (ed. Christ).

a 20 ὅψι ἀπεσεμνύθη. The time meant is presumably the age of Phrynichus.

a 21 ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἱαμβείων ἐγένετο: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 30 οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιοῦντες ... ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἱαμβείων μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῶ λόγῳ τούτῳ τῶν μέτρων ἁρμοίτατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων.

a 23 ὀρχηστικώτεραν: 24, 1459 b 37 τὸ δὲ ἱαμβείων καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν.—Rhet. 3. 8, 1408 b 32 τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἕρως σεμνός καὶ λεκτικῆς ἁρμοίας δεόμενος, ὁ δὲ ἱαμβος αὐτῆς ἡτοῖ τῇ λείψει τῶν πολλῶν διὸ μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἱαμβεία φθέγγονται λέγοντες. δεὶ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστάσιν. ὁ δὲ προχαῖος κορδακικῶτερος δηλοὶ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα ὅτι γὰρ ῥυθμός τροχαῖος τὰ τετράμετρα.—Longinus 41. Ι μικροποιοῦν δ' οὐδὲν οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ἐψηλῶς ὁ ῥυθμός κεκλασμένος λόγοι καὶ σεσυβμένοι, οἷον δὴ πνεύματος ταῖς προχαίοις καὶ διεξάγων, τέλεον εἰς ὀρχηστικῶν συνεκπαίπτοντες. ὀρχηστικὸς in this
connexion means practically μυθικός ὁρφήσεως, just as ἡθικός in 1449 a 23 in the Poetics (see on 6, 1450 a 29) means μυθικός ἔθος. Similarly λεκτικός = μυθικός λέξεως (comp. 21, 1459 a 12), πρακτικός = μυθικός πράξεως, and παθητικός = μυθικός πάθους.

λέξεως, 'speech' as opposed to song (comp. on 21, 1459 a 12).

αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις: 24, 1460 a 4 αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει το ἀρμόττουν a 24 αὐτῇ αἰρεῖται.—De caelo 3, 8, 306 b ἦσαν ἡ φύσις αὐτῇ τούτῳ σημαίνειν ἦμιν.—Hippocrates 3 p. 606 K. ἀνευρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτῇ ἐωτῷ τὰς ἐφόδους οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας, οἴον τὸ σκαρδαμύσσειν καὶ ἡ γλώσσα ὑπογρηγεῖ καὶ ὡσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα: ἀπαίδευτος ἡ φύσις ἐσώσα καὶ οὐ μαθόντα τὰ δεόντα ποιεῖ.

λεκτικόν: 21, 1459 a 11 ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἱαμβεῖοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλαστα λέξειν μιμεῖσθαι ταύτα ἀρμόττει ὅσοι καὶ ὑπὸ λόγους τις ἁρπάσαι. Comp. also Rhet. 3, 1, 1404 a 30, 3, 8, 1408 b 32 (quoted on a 21 and a 23). The term is sufficiently explained by a 26 πλείστα γὰρ ἱαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἄλλης.

διαλέκτω, 'talk', 'converse', as in Plato Symp. 203 a διὰ τοῦτον a 26 πᾶσα ἠστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διαλέκτος θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον: comp. Rhet. 3, 8, 1408 b 34 μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἱαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες, and 3, 2, 1404 b 34 πάντως γὰρ μεταφορᾶς διαλέγονται. For the general meaning of διαλέκτος see on 22, 1458 b 32. Horace's alternis aptus sermonibus (A. P. 81) is a distant echo of this statement of Aristotle's. Cicero also observes that ordinary speech constantly falls into iambics: Orator 189 senarios vero et Hippocrates effugere vivi possimus; magnam enim partem ex iambis nostra constat oratio.

λεκτικής ἄρμονίας. ἄρμονία here seems to mean 'pitch' (τόνος) a 27 as in Rhet. 3, 1, 1403 b 31 (v. Monro, Modes of ancient Greek music p. 15). Aristoxenus recognizes a similar distinction between the musical and the conversational μέλος: λέγεται γὰρ δὴ καὶ λογοδίδει τὸ μέλος, τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ τῶν προσωπίων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὄνομασιν φυσικῶν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιτείνειν καὶ ἀνέναι ἐν τῷ διαλέγονται (p. 24 Marquard).

ἐπεισοδίων: see on 12, 1452 b 20.

δὸς ἐκαστα κοιμηθήναι λέγεται is added to explain the main a 30 statement, τὰ ἄλλα . . . ἐστω εἰρημένα (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2. p. 495). For the general form of the sentence Vahlen compares Metaph. Γ 3, 1005 b 19 τὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό καὶ ὡσα ἄλλα προσδιορισάμεθ' αὖ, ἔστω προσδιωμεμένα.

κοιμηθήναι = ἐπικοσμηθήναι. Certain elements in a play Aris-
tote dismisses as κώσμοι, decorative accessories rather than structural parts of the work. With this use of κοσμεῖν we may compare that of ἣδυνειν in 6, 1449 b 28 and 24, 1460 b 2, to denote the addition of accessories designed to make the work agreeable to us.

η δὲ κωμῳδία κτέ. The progress of Tragedy having been sketched, the next point to be considered is the progress of Comedy (a 37–b 8). The statement is introduced by a definition (a 32–37) based on hints already given in preceding chapters as to the nature of Comedy. In 2, 1448 a 16 Comedy was said to deal with personages worse than the average man (χείρονς = φαινό- τεροι in the present passage); and in 4, 1448 b 36 its subject was assumed to be τὸ γελοῖον. These two points Aristotle reconciles and combines in a rough provisional definition (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.), before proceeding to the question more immediately before him, that of the μεταβάσεις of Comedy. It is not necessary, therefore, to suppose this defining clause to be out of place. If we try the experiment of transferring it to another place, by putting it for instance after λόγον καὶ μῦθον in b 8 (with Thurot), or after ἐπιστοιὰ in b 20 (with Vahlen, Beitr. i p. 48), it will be found that little or nothing is gained by this disturbance of the traditional order (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. i p. 34).

-aos-pe eιπομεν: in 2, 1448 a 17 and 4, 1448 b 37.

πᾶσαν κακίαν: Plato Rep. 490 δ ὅραν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀχρίστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν.—Demosthenes 18, 279 τὸ δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἐμ' αὐτῶν ἀγώνας ἐιςαγατα νὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ἥκεν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐχει κακίαν.

ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀληθροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον: a compressed statement, practically equivalent to οἷς ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ καθ' ἐν τι ἔδος κακίας· τοῦ γὰρ ἀληθροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. The personages in Comedy are worse than most men, but only in one particular respect, as presenting a certain harmless deformity or ugliness of character, which makes them ridiculous only—not objects for blame or aversion. It is, in Aristotle's view, the harmlessness of the evil in them that makes them fit objects of laughter.

tὸ γὰρ γελοῖον κτέ. Two kinds of possible objects of laughter are implied in the text. (1) An act is γελοῖον when it is of the nature of a harmless mistake or blunder (ἀμάρτημα ἀνώδυνον); and (2) a person is γελοῖος when he presents some moral or physical deformity of the same harmless kind (ἀληθρος ἀνώδυνον). The negative element here is a very essential part of the definition. Plato also, who thinks that the spectacle of human ignorance is the
true object of laughter in Comedy, explains that, to be laughable, the ignorance must be harmless (ἀβλαβής τῶς ἄλλως Phil. 49 e).

As γέλωτα are the basis of all Comedy, Aristotle must be assumed to have devoted a section of his theory of Comedy (in the lost Second Book) to the causes and conditions of laughter, in the same way as we find him analysing τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεῖνον in chaps. 13-14 of the existing Poetics. It is not impossible that several traces of his theory survive in Cicero's discussion of the 'Ridiculous' in De Oratore 2, 58–59, which seems to be on distinctly Aristotelian lines. Part of it has been quoted under Fr. III.

ἀμάρτημα: see on 13, 1453 a 16.

αἰσχος (like the adj. αἰσχρός) includes moral as well as physical deformity. Though the illustration in a 36 relates to physical ugliness, Aristotle is really thinking of the ugliness of character in the personages of Comedy, who have been described as being χαῖρον τῶν νῦν (2, 1448 a 17). Their visible ugliness is part of their ἀψις (see on 6, 1449 b 33), which lies outside the limits of the art of the poet himself.

ἀνώδυνον: comp. a 37 ἄνευ ὀδύνης. ὀδύνη is a pain that one feels strongly: Plato Crat. 419 c ὀδύνη δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑιδύσεως τῆς λύπης κεκλημένη ἐσκεκ. The Stoic definition (Diog. Laert. 7. 112) was ὀδύνη λύπη ἐπὶπονος, translated by Cicero (Tusc. 4. 8) by aerumna aegritudo laboriosa.

εὐδός: 'to take the first instance that occurs'; in 10, 1452 a 14 a 36 it means suapte natura (Bon. Ind. 296 a 13).

τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον. For the masks in Comedy see Pollux 4, 143, and Haigh, Att. Th. 3 p. 242.

αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον: Plato Rep. 506 c βούλει ὄνα αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά, ἐξὸν παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά;

κωμῳδών. The correction κωμῳδῶν, which I have now relegated b 1 to a note, was suggested by Tyrwhitt's interpretation of ἐθελονταί, the word being intended to bear the sense of the comic actor, i.e. the actor-poet, since Aristotle is referring to the time when the actor was the poet himself (comp. Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 23). This sense of the word in the Greek of Aristotle's period has been contested by Mr. H. P. Richards (Class. Rev. 14 p. 201); but I think he has carried his negation too far 1, more especially as we find

1 Prof. E. Capps also (Trans. of the American Philological Association 31 p. 117) is unable to accept Mr. Richards' view.
the corresponding word τραγωδοί in the sense of the tragic actors in Poet. 22, 1458 b 32 (v. ad loc.). The traditional doctrine of the grammarians was that κωμῳδοί was used for the actors as well as for the members of the chorus in Comedy: Ammonius τ. διαφ. λέξ. p. 86 Valck. Κωμῳδος καί Τραγῳδος λέγεται ὁ χορευτής καί ὑποκριτής (v. also p. 138; comp. Rohde, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 408). That κωμῳδοί may refer to the actors even in strict Attic seems to be shown by Plato Phaedr. 236 e ἢν μὴ τὸ τῶν κωμῳδῶν φορτικὸν πράγμα ἀναγκαζόμεθα ποιεῖν, ἀνταποδοθῶντες ἀλλήλων, in illustration of which W. H. Thompson quotes Aristoph. Eq. 286 sqq. and 361 sqq. For Aristotle's time, however, the use seems to be pretty clearly established by the language of his contemporary, Chares of Mytilene (ap. Ath. 538 f.): ὑπεκρίθησαν δὲ τραγῳδοί μὲν Θέουσαλος καί Ἀθηνόδωρος καί Ἀριστόκριτος, κωμῳδοὶ δὲ Λύκων καί Φορμίων καί Ἀρίστων. And half a century after Aristotle this was the normal sense of the term, as is proved by inscriptions of the period (Dittenberger, Syll. 5 p. 517, 519; Lüders, Die dionyischen Künstler p. 187-97), in which the κωμῳδοί or actors are expressly distinguished from the χορευταὶ κωμικοὶ, who had taken the place occupied by the chorus in the older Comedy. The history of the word, therefore, runs parallel with that of the comic chorus. Whether the comic chorus in its original form was actually extinct or only verging on extinction at the time when Aristotle was writing the Poetics, it is impossible to say (comp. E. Capps, American J. of Archaeology x p. 319); but there is evidence that, whatever its form may have been, it was no longer a very important part of a comedy. And if that was the fact, the gradual restriction of the term κωμῳδος to the actor would be the natural result of the absence or diminished importance of the chorus in the Comedy of the period.

 Aristotle seems to have had a definite date in his mind. He conceives the history of Attic Comedy to begin with Chionides, who is said to have exhibited as early as b. c. 487 (see on 4, 1448 a 34); but the formal recognition of it by the state must have come later, probably about b. c. 465 (Wilamowitz, Eurip. Herakles 1 p. 51; comp. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 503).

 ἔθελονταί ἤσαν. 'Intelligi potest de Choro, sed etiam de poetis, secundum illa quae ex Aelio Dionysio [fr. 150 Schwabe] protulit Eustathius ad II. K v. 230. Ἐθελοντήσ ὁ αὐθαυτετος τι ποιῶν ἐκαλοῦντο δὲ καὶ ἔθελοντα διδάσκαλοι, δραμάτων δηλαδή, ὅτε τις μὴ λαβόν χορόν μηδὲ χορηγητήν ἔχων ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα παρεῖχε.
Et sic fortasse rectius. Hinc enim poeta*rum, nascenti*ae Comoe*dia, conditio difficilis maxime appar*et, quod non modo Chor*um docere sed etiam conducere, nutrire, vestibus alioque omni apparatu instruire necesse haberent' (Tyrwhitt). A somewhat similar use of the term seems to have survived at Thebes, where ἐθελοντής is said to have been the name for the actor in a rude species of burlesque (Sosibius ap. Ath. 621 ν)—presumably because the performance was at his own charge and risk. The alternative to Tyrwhitt’s interpretation is to suppose the reference to be either to volunteer χορηγοί (comp. Demosth. 21. 13 ὑπεσχόμην ἐγὼ χορηγήσεων ἐθελοντής, and Hesych. ἐθελοντάς τοὺς βουλομένους ἵ ὧν ἐθελοντέω), or as Usener (Rh. Mus. 28 p. 424) has suggested, to volunteer actors and chorus-singers.

σχηματα: comp. 4, 1448 b 36 and Bon. Ind. 740 a 24.

οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτής, scil. τῆς κομψίδας. It has been thought that the form of expression here may imply some slowness to grant the name ποιητής to a comedian (Neil on Aristoph. Eq. 507).

μυημονευόνται. As soon as Comedy became a state institution, an official record of the successful poets must have been kept in the public archives; the successful χορηγοί also sometimes set up a similar record on their own account in temples (Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 35; comp. Bernhardt, Gr. Litt. 2. 2 p. 152).

ἀπεδωκεν: De sensu 2, 438 b 17 ἀποδόσει καὶ προσάπτειν ἐκαστον τῶν αἴσθητηρίων ἐν τῶν στοιχείων. In Plato Laws 2, 669 c ἀποδόσει καὶ προσαρμόσει are treated as synonymous.

προλόγοι. The term is defined in 12, 1452 b 19. The introduction of a ‘prologue’ in Tragedy was sometimes said to have been due to Thespis: Themist. Or. 26 p. 382 Dind. Θέσπις δὲ προλόγον καὶ ρήσιν εξεύρει. It was obviously a significant moment in the history of the Drama when the play, instead of beginning with a choral song, opened with a statement spoken by an actor.

πλήθη: comp. the use of πλήθη in 4, 1449 a 28 and 21, 1458 a 13. b 5

The plural is in keeping with that in προλόγοι and μύθους in the context.

μύθοι: see on b 9.

Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις. These words, which were first bracketed by Susemihl (Rh. Mus. 18 p. 376), cannot be retained where they stand. No appropriate verb can be supplied with them; for though Aristotle might have said μύθους ἀπέδωκε, he could hardly have meant to say μύθους ποιεῖν ἀπέδωκε. And even if ἀπέδωκε is to be understood, there is an awkward asyndeton in τὸ μὲν ἢ
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1449 ἀρχής, which on this assumption should surely be τὸ μὲν ὁδὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, as is actually read in certain of the apographs. From the reminiscence of this passage (comp. Welcker, Kl. Scr. i p. 330) in Themistius Or. 27 p. 406 Dind. καὶ κωμῳδία τὰ παλαιὰν ἵρεῖτο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας (ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἡσυχά τ᾽ ἐπίχαρμος τε καὶ Φόρμος), κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι συννεβίβασιν, it would seem that the words ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμος were originally part of a clause which came in after ἐκ Σικελίας ἱλθεν, and that what Aristotle wrote was something like this: τὸ δὲ μύθου ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἱλθεν (ἡσυχά γὰρ ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμος ἐκεῖθεν), τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων Κράτης κτέ. (v. J. of Phil. 5 p. 118).

Φόρμος, sometimes called in later writers Φόρμος. On the two forms of the name see Lobeck Pathol. serm. gr. prolegomena p. 502. All that is known of him will be found in Grysar, De Doriensium comoedia p. 76 (comp. Bernhardy, Gr. Litt. 2. 2 p. 520, and Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 148).

7 Κράτης: his ‘floruit’ may be put about B.c. 450. For the fragments of his comedies see Kock, CAF. 1 p. 130; Meineke, FCG. 1 p. 58.

8 ἀφέμενος τῆς ιαμβικῆς ἱδέας. ‘Ac mihi quidem hoc Aristoteles significare voluisse videtur, cum Cratinus ceterique antiquiores comici certos quosdam homines in fabulis suis exagitassent populoque ridendos propinassent, Cratetem primum apud Athenienses exitisse qui Epicharmi exemplo comicæ poesiæ materiam a singulorum hominum irrisione ad generales morum notationes rerumque descriptiones traduceret. . . Quod autem lacessendi consuetudinem omississe Crates ab Aristotele dicitur, id plane fragmenta fabularum confirmat, in quibus nihil prorsus reperias ex quo certos quosdam homines eum carpsisse intellegatur’ (Meineke l. c. p. 59). The ‘iambic form’ of Comedy is the Old Comedy, which, from the personal nature of its satire, was only one remove from the ‘invective’ of Archilochus and the Iambographers (4, 1449 4). It is thus characterized in Horace Sat. i. 4. 1: Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae Atque alii, quorum comedia priscæ virorum est, Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus aut fur, Quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui Famosus, multa cum libertate notabant.

καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους is the opposite of περὶ τὸν καθ᾽ ἐκαστὸν ποιεῖν (see 9, 1451 14). The implied antithesis is between a story about some particular person, e.g. Alcibiades, and one about (for instance) ‘a man’, or ‘a man of such and such a type’
5. 1449 b 6-9

(δ τοιόσθε, Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 b 30), i.e. as we should say, 'a character', the representative of a possible class. A 'character' is a coherent group of qualities disengaged from the various accidents which coexist with it in the concrete individual; it is therefore in the nature of things something general and attributable to several, whereas the individual as such is unique. Aristotle's view is that the personages in Crates, as in all the higher forms of poetry, are 'characters', i.e. more or less idealized personages, not real men as in History, the Ψάγος, and the Old Comedy. How these abstracts of human personality come to get proper names attached to them in the Drama is a point which Aristotle considers at some length in 9, 1451 b 13-22 (comp. 17, 1455 b 12).

μῦθους: i.e. his stories were as imaginary as his personages.  b 9

Α μῦθος according to Plato Rep. 377 a is a λόγος ψευδός (either taken from legend or invented by the poet himself), though there may be some element of truth in it.

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποτοίμα κτε. At this point, the evolution of the Drama having been sketched, Aristotle inserts a provisional note on the points of agreement and difference between Tragedy and epic poetry, which anticipates to a certain extent the longer statement in chaps. 23-24. The two points of agreement had been already intimated, the first in 4, 1448 b 34, and the second in 5, 1449 a 20.

μέχρι μὲν τοῦ... ἐίναι: 7, 1451 a 10 μέχρι τοῦ σύνθηλος ἐίναι.—

Top. 8. 1, 155 b 7 μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἐφέσι τὸν τόπον ὁμοίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ ἡ σκέψις. The construction συνακολουθεῖν μέχρι occurs in Phys. 1. 5, 188 b 26 μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦτον σχέδιον συνακολουθήσας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι—where also συνακολουθεῖν, just like ἀκολουθεῖν here, is the opposite of διαφέρειν (188 b 30: comp. Bon. Ind. 26 a 23). In these and similar instances the preposition μέχρι is to be understood as inclusive of that which is mentioned as the limit (comp. Eucken, Sprachgebr. p. 17). A difficulty has been found in ἡκολουθησεν (by Thurot and Spengel), on the ground that it would be more natural to speak of Tragedy following the Epic than of the Epic following Tragedy. This view assumes that ἀκολουθεῖν must mean to 'follow after' in order of time, whereas the word may very well mean 'go with' (comp. Rhet. 1. 6, 1362 a 29), i.e. 'agree with'. The aorist seems to imply that the fact has been already recognized.

μὲν τοῦ. With the traditional reading μόνου (retained by Vahlen) the infinitive ἐίναι which follows is out of construction.
1449 b 10 (διὰ) μέτρου μεγάλου. For the preposition comp. 1, 1447 a 27 διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ρυθμῶν.— b 11 διὰ τριμέτρων.— 16 διὰ τῶν μέτρων. As here used, μέτρον μέγα seems to mean a large kind of verse, one fitted for a large subject (comp. 4, 1449 a 6 μείζονα σχῆματα). The hexameter is a metre of this description (24, 1460 a 3); and Aristotle may be presumed, I think, to have taken the same view of the tragic iambic as corresponding to the μέγεθος of the tragic stories, and the gravity of the tragic diction (comp. 4, 1449 a 19). Vahlen, retaining the manuscript reading μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου, takes μέτρον μέγα to mean 'spatium magnum sive fines ampli'; this, however, is hardly probable with τοῦ μέτρου in the sense of 'metre' in the very next line (comp. Gomperz, Zu Aristoteles' Poetik 1 p. 25).

The following are some of the attempts at emending this passage: μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μετὰ λόγου (the Aldine, and corr. Parisinus 2038 b); μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μέτρου [μετὰ λόγου] (Tyrwhitt); μέχρι μόνου τοῦ διὰ λόγου ἐμμέτρου μεγάλου (Ueberweg); μέχρι μὲν τοῦ [μέτρου μεγάλου] (Christ).

μύμπησις... σπουδαίων: as was said in 4, 1448 b 34. σπουδαίων is presumably neuter (comp. 4, 1448 b 34, and the note on 3, 1448 a 19).

b 11 τῷ δὲ τοῦ μέτρου ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν, scil. τῶν ἐποποιιῶν. ἀπλοῦν is the opposite of ποικίλον (comp. Bon. Ind. 76 b 12); the contrast is between the one metre of the Epic (v. 24, 1459 b 32) and the variety of metres in Tragedy.

ταύτη. In illustration of the construction Vahlen quotes 23, 1459 b 30 ταύτῃ θεοτέρως ἄν φανείη... τῷ μηδὲ τῶν πάλιμον... ἐπιχειρήσας ποιεῖν ὁλον.—Pol. 7. 15, 1334 a 41 οὔ ταύτη διαφέροντι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μῆ νομίζειν.—Plato Rep. 605 Α τῷ πρὸς ἐτερον τουσώτον ὀμίλειν... ταύτη ὑμοιώται.

b 12 ἐτὶ δὲ τῷ μήκει: scil. διαφέρει ἡ ἐποποιία. Having laid this down, however, Aristotle remembers that the difference did not always exist; he accordingly repeats his original proposition by a resumptive καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3 2 i p. 660), in order to introduce a qualifying clause, καλτοῦ το πρῶτον κτέ. The clause marked as a parenthesis is equivalent to ἡ μὲν γὰρ κτέ. (actually found in some apogaphs), and is similar in form to that in 4, 1449 a 19 (v. ad loc.).

1 Perhaps also the Arabic translation (Margoliouth, A. O. p. 54); it is certainly implied in the paraphrase 'metrico sermone' of Averroes (p. 359 Heldenhain).
τῶ μῆκεν. Aristotle is thinking of a very obvious fact, viz. that an epic (the Iliad or Odyssey, for instance) runs to several thousand lines, whereas a tragedy rarely exceeds some 1,600. This difference he never loses sight of; he notes it in 17, 1455b16, and (in a context just like the present) in 24, 1459b17 (διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τὴν συντάσεως τὸ μῆκος ἡ ἔποιεῖα καὶ τὸ μέτρον); and he returns to it in his concluding chapter (26, 1462a18), where the comparative merits of the two forms of poetry are under discussion. These parallels, as Teichmüller has seen, are enough to show that μῆκος must denote here not the ambitus actionis, the imaginary duration of the action of the poem, as is often supposed, but rather the real length of the work itself, a length to be measured by the number of lines the work would take up in a book, or the hours it would need for recitation. It has the same sense in 7, 1451a6 and in 24, 1459b18. A reason for this difference of length, one quite sufficient for Aristotle's purpose, is given in the parenthesis, ἡ μὲν δὲι μάλιστα κτῆ. He regards it as the natural consequence of another kind of difference, viz. the fact that the action in a Greek tragedy is as a rule kept within a limit of some 24 hours, whereas that in an epic may extend over weeks, or even years. There being this difference, therefore, in the extent of the action, the quantum of matter to be included in the story, it is only natural that there should be a corresponding difference in the length of the literary statement in the two instances, and that an epic poem accordingly should be of greater length than a tragedy. A certain correspondence between the length and the quantum of matter in a poem is recognized in 26, 1462b2. Assuming this correspondence, Aristotle explains the great length of an epic, as compared with a tragedy, as due to the great length of time over which the epic action extends. In other words, he passes from the idea of the actual length, the actual time required for the recitation, to that of the imaginary time covered by the action of the poem; and he does this on the tacit assumption that the two things are so closely connected that the one may serve to explain the other (comp. Ueberweg, Aristoteles über Dichtkunst p. 57). Teichmüller's theory, that Aristotle is referring in the parenthesis to the time of the actual recitation or performance 1, and thinking

1 The idea of some of the older dramatic critics, that in a perfect drama the actual time of the performance and the supposed time of the action of the piece would coincide, is not unlike that which Teichmüller reads into the text of Aristotle.
1449 b 12 of the series of dramas (a trilogy or tetralogy) presented on the
stage in a single day, may be set aside at once, not only on
archaeological grounds, but also because it assumes an impossible
sense for ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλιοῦ.

πειράται means much the same thing as βούλεται in 2, 1448 a 18.
The same anxiety to avoid overstatement is to be seen in ὅτι μᾶλλον
and ἤ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν in the context.

13 μίαν περίοδον ἡλιοῦ cannot be, as Teichmüller imagines, a way
of describing the natural day of 12 hours or so; the periphrasis is
deliberately chosen in order to make it clear that the solar
day of 24 hours is meant. Λ περίοδος of the sun is not its half-
circuit, but its circuit, i.e. the time it takes to come round again to
an assumed starting-point. For other Aristotelian instances of this
sense of the word see Bon. Ind. 582 b 29. The statement in the
text was often quoted in former times as evidence for the assertion
that the so-called ‘Unity of Time’ was one of Aristotle’s rules for
the Drama. ‘The stage’, says Sydney in his Apology for Poetry
(p. 63 Arber), ‘should always represent but one place; and the
uttermost time presupposed in it should be, both by Aristotle’s
precept and common sense, but one day.’ What Aristotle actually
says is not a precept, but only an incidental recognition of a fact
in the practice of the theatre in his age. The same is true also of
the ‘Unity of Place’, which was believed to be implied as a rule
in 24, 1459 b 25. The ‘Unity of Action’, however, is very em-
phatically asserted in chaps. 8—11 and elsewhere.

μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν = ‘to vary, or depart, from that only a little’,
i.e. ‘to exceed that limit only a little’. The reference is not to
variation within the limit, but to variation beyond it.

b 15. τὸ πρῶτον. In the earliest drama, says Aristotle, the Unity of
Time was not observed with strictness, any more than it is in epic
poetry. This passage has been discussed by M. Maurice Croiset
(Rev. des Études grecques 1, p. 373; comp. Heimsoeth, De tragoe-
diae graecae trilogiis p. iv), who suggests that Aristotle may be
referring to the period anterior to the institution of the trilogy,
when a long tragic story, instead of being dealt with in three
tragedies, may be supposed to have been told in one. It is clear
that the action in such a play would be very like that of an epic,
and cover a longer time than 24 hours. One may ask how in the
absence of some device like the modern curtain the lapse of time
between act and act could be sufficiently indicated; and one may
also ask whether there was the same chorus throughout the
performance. These are difficulties which we have now no means of answering.

ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις. The preposition shows that Aristotle is thinking not of the imaginary time of the performance, but of something within the play, the imaginary time of the action in it (Ribbeck, Rh. Mus. 24, 135); comp. 13, 1453 b 25 τοῦτο ὥρρ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳ-

δίαις.

μέρη: i.e. the constituents enumerated and distinguished in 6, 1449 b 31 sqq. The parts peculiar to Tragedy are melody and 'spectacle' (24, 1459 b 10).

διόσπερ κτέ. Similarly in chaps. 23-24, before explaining the differences between epic poetry and Tragedy, Aristotle is at some pains to show that a good epic will have much the same structure as a good tragedy, and that in most respects the same canons of construction are applicable to it (23, 1459 a 17-24, b 17). The corollary ends at ἐπών; what follows (ἂ μὲν γὰρ κτέ,) is a reason in support of the main statement (b 16).

περὶ ... τῆς ἐν ἔξαρμέτρους μιμητικῆς: in chaps. 23-24.

περὶ κομῳδίας: in the lost Second Book of the Poetics.

ἀναλαβόντες: Top. 6, 14, 151 b 19 καλῶς εἰρημένον ὄρον ἀναλαβέων. —Meteor. i. 3, 339 a 33 ἀναλαβόντες οὖν τὰς ἐς ἄρχης θέσεις ... λέγωμεν.—1. 8, 345 b 31 ἣμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν ὑποκει-

μένην ἄρχην ἡμῖν.—Rhet. i. 13, 1373 b 27 ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γνώμονα = τὸν γνώμονα ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. For the hyperbaton comp. Metaph. Θ 3, 1047 a 12 τὸ δ' ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι δ' λέγων ἦ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεθον λειτοῦσα.—Eth. N. 8. 16, 1163 b 18 εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ τεραπευών ἐτικητής εἶναι δοκεῖ (also Kühner, Gr. Gr. a 2. 1 p. 616).

ὄρον τῆς οὐσίας: the definition of its essence, or essential nature; comp. Metaph. Ζ 13, 1039 a 19 δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἔλεγχῃ πάλαι ἄ μόνον εἶναι οὐσίας ὃν ἡ μάλιστα.—De part. an. i. 1, 642 a 26 ὅρισασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν.—4. 5, 678 a 34 τῶ λόγῳ ... τῷ ὧρμοντι τὴν ὦσίαν αὐτῶν.

ἐστιν οὖν τραγῳδία κτέ. The definition, which is in logical form, per genus et differentias, professes to be a summary of points already established; and in its principal elements it is that.

1 There is no hyperbaton in An. post. i. 34, 89 b 14 πάστα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια τὰ μέσα ὁ ἱθῶν τὰ ἄκρα ἐγνώρισεν, which has been cited as an instance of it. The sense shows that ὁ ἱθῶν is to be taken with τὰ ἄκρα, and that the accusatives before it are the object of ἐγνώρισεν.
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1449 b 24 (1) That Tragedy is a μίμησις was said in 1, 1447 a 13; and that it is a μίμησις πράξεως is implied in 1, 1447 a 28. (2) σπουδαίας, which differentiates Tragedy from Comedy, recalls chap. 2 and 4, 1448 b 34—καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἔχουσης being added in recognition apparently of the point indicated in 4, 1449 a 19. (3) The means in Tragedy were noted in 1, 1447 b 24–8; and (4) the dramatic manner of its imitation in 3, 1448 a 23–28. But for the concluding clause, on the effect of Tragedy on the emotions, we have not been prepared by anything in the earlier chapters. Aristotle no doubt regarded one part of it, δὲ ἐλέον καὶ φόβον, as self-evident, but the rest is presumably an anticipation of a point worked out at length in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. In just the same way we find him using the term προαιρετική in the definition of virtue in Eth. N. 2, 6, 1106 b 36, and reserving the formal explanation of προαιρεσις for 3, 4, πιθηκος b 4. This concluding clause is an integral part of the definition, since the end of the thing to be defined cannot be ignored in any logically complete statement of its nature (De anima 1.1, 403 a 25; Metaph. H 2, 1043 a 14).

b 25 τελείας μέγεθος ἔχουσης. The point is considered in chap. 7, where 'completeness' is said to imply a whole of some magnitude (7, 1450 b 24). We have not yet been told that the action in Tragedy must be a τελεία πράξεις, but from the explanatory μέγεθος ἔχουσης Aristotle would seem to regard the point as the natural consequence of the μέγεθος mentioned already in 4, 1449 a 19 as one of the characteristics of Tragedy proper. In that case the term distinguishes Tragedy proper with its complete and self-contained stories from the rudimentary Drama of an earlier period.

ἡδυμένῳ: Plato Rep. 607 a εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυμένην μονὴν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἡ ἐπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον. The word is taken from cookery (comp. De sensu 4, 442 a 10). The nature of the metaphor may be seen, in the case of the substantive ἡδύμα, from Aristotle's criticism of the style of Alcidamas in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 19 οὗ γὰρ ἡδύματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδάσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ('the sauce with him is the dish'). Said of language ἡδύμανος implies the accession of something (here metre and music) to make it agreeable, just as κοσμηθἠναι in 4, 1449 a 29 meant the accession of something to make the work beautiful. An echo of this passage (comp. 6, 1450 b 11) may perhaps be recognized in Plutarch Enot. 769 c λόγῳ ποίησις ἡδύματα <τὰ> μέλη καὶ μέτρα καὶ ρυθμοὶς ἐφαρμόσασα, and also in Strabo 818 Cas.
6. 1449 b 24-27

φλαναρούσιν ὠστερ μέλος ἡ ρυθμόν [ἡ] ἡδυσμά τι τῷ λόγῳ τὴν τερατείαν προσφέροντες. The metaphor reappears in Shakespeare, Hamlet 2. 2 I remember one said there were no sallets in the lines to make the matter savoury.

ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν: scil. τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, understood from ἡδυσμένῳ. Similarly in Isocrates 190 b 1 ἐπὶ τοίνυν δηλώσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις όνομασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔννοις τὰ δὲ κανονίς τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλυτεῖν ἀλλὰ πάσι τοῖς εἴδεσι διαποκλαίς τὴν ποίησιν one may supply τῶν ὁνομάτων with εἴδεσι. For another instance of this allusive use of εἴδος see 25, 1461 b 22. In what follows (b 29) ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν is replaced by τοῖς εἴδεσι; the reading of the MS., ἐκάστῳ, seems to have arisen through χωρίς having been mistaken for a preposition. The juxtaposition of χωρίς and ἐκάστῳ is just like that in Pol. 7. 1, 1323 b 41 καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ τοῖς πόλεσιν (comp. χωρίς ἐκαστον in De caelo 2. 12, 292 a 13, b 27). The implied antithesis in the present passage is between 'each separately' (χωρίς), and 'all together, and at once' (ἀμα: comp. De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 322 a 13, and Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 23). Tragedy (unlike the Dithyramb etc.) has the ἡδυςμα of metre in the dialogue, and that of melody only in the choral parts (see on 1, 1447 b 28). ἐκάστῳ, therefore, is loosely put for ἐκατέρω (comp. Pol. 3. 12, 1282 b 38, and HSt. s. v.).

δρώντων: scil. τῶν μμουμένων, the subject being omitted as it is b 26 in a 13, b 31, 1450 a 10, a 21, and 26, 1461 b 29. Other Aristotelian instances of this ellipse with a gen. absolute may be seen in Bon. Ind. 149 b 29. Tyrwhitt, with less probability, as it seems to me, supplies μίμησις with δρώντων, comparing 3, 1448 a 29 μιμοῦται δρώντας.

οὐ δὲ ἀπαγγελίας: scil. μμουμένων.

di' ἑλέου καὶ φόβου means practically δι' ἑλευνών καὶ φοβερῶν, 'by b 27 piteous and alarming scenes'; comp. Goulston's paraphrase, 'per misericordiam metumque factis expressum'. The more abstract form of expression is adopted in order to prepare the way for τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων. For the use of the preposition in this connexion comp. b 30 διὰ μέτρων περαινεθαι.—De part. an. 3. 4, 666 b 15 περαινοῦσα [scil. αἱ κανὴσεις] διὰ τοῦ ἑλκεὶν καὶ ἀνεῖναι.—Plato Gorg. 450 δ διὰ λόγου πάν περαινοῦσι.—Rep. 392 b δι' ἀμφοτέρων περαινοῦσιν (v. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 85). This excitement of pity and fear is, as far as the poet is concerned, the end of Tragedy, but it is in truth only a means to its ultimate end, its κάθαρσις of such emotions.
COMMENTARY

1449 b 27 τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν, ‘its catharsis of such emotions’, just as ποιεὶσθαι τὴν μῆνην (1, 1447 a 22; 6, 1449 b 31) means ‘to make their imitation, and ποιεῖν τὴν ἡδονήν (4, 1448 b 18), ‘to produce its pleasure’ (comp. 4, 1448 b 7, and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3 2. 1 p. 593). The article, in fact, is not so otiose as is usually supposed. This interpretation of the article removes more than one of the preliminary difficulties in this much debated passage, the implication being that a cathartic effect is not peculiar to Tragedy; so that the text is seen at once to stand in close relation to the passage in Pol. 8. 7 (v. Fr. V), in which the existence of several forms of catharsis is affirmed. Aristotle recognizes there a catharsis of ‘enthusiasm’ effected by certain kinds of music, as well as a catharsis of pity and fear effected by Tragedy; and there is reason to think that a catharsis of laughter also must have been similarly posited as the effect and ultimate justification of Comedy in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, therefore, is a general expression for this whole group of disturbing emotions (enthusiasm, pity, fear, etc.), instead of being, as is so often thought, either limited to the two emotions (pity and fear) which appear in the context, or applying to the emotions in general.

The great difficulty, however, in this formula is as to the interpretation of κάθαρσις. Is the term to be understood as a physiological metaphor, in the sense of ‘purging’, or ‘clearing away’; or as a metaphor from the religious rite of lustration, in the sense of ‘purification’? The ancient evidence, in Aristotle and elsewhere, is to my mind very decidedly in favour of the first interpretation.

I.

This, the pathological interpretation, as it may be called, is now generally associated with the names of Weil (1848) and Bernays (1857), who each independently arrived at a very similar conclusion1. It is in reality much older; all its essential points in fact are to be found in Tyrwhitt’s note on the present passage: ‘Ex his quae de Musica dicuntur [i.e. in Pol. 8. 7], colligere licet, opinor, Aristotelem similem quandam ratiocinationem de poesi etiam

1 See II. Weil, Ueber die Wirkung der Tragödie nach Aristoteles, Verhandl. der zehnten Versammlung deutscher Philologen zu Basel, p. 140 (comp. his Études sur le drame antique, p. 158); the article of Bernays is reprinted in his Zwei Abhandlungen p. 1. I have shown elsewhere (J. of Phil. 27 p. 267) that the pathological interpretation of κάθαρσις was not unknown in Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
tragica instituisse, qua scilicet probaret affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragoediis vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo nutriti et validiores effici, quod Plato criminabatur, sed contra levari et exhausiri; et proinde affectuum horum purgationem opus esse proprium et quasi finem Tragoediae; cum caeterae Poesis species vel ad doctrinam, vel ad delectationem magis aptae sint.' To understand Aristotle's position we have to go back to Plato's condemnation of the Drama in the Tenth Book of the Republic. One of Plato's points is, that the Drama appeals mainly to two of the inferior elements in the soul, our faculty for grief (τὸ θρηνώδὲς, τὸ ἔλευθον) and our faculty for laughter; and that its effect is to gratify these at the expense of the reason, and ultimately to weaken or nullify the self-control prescribed by reason (Rep. 605 c–606 c). As a view like this, supported by so great a name, could hardly be ignored by Aristotle in an Art of Poetry based throughout on the assumption of the legitimacy of the Drama, and of the emotional effects it aims at, his catharsis theory may very well be supposed to have been intended as his answer to the Platonic indictment. Though the formal exposition of the theory, as it was to be read in the complete Poetics, is no longer before us, it is still possible to recover some idea of it from the two statements in the Politics on the 'cathartic' effect of certain kinds of music. In Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 21, as a reason for leaving the flute to professionals, instead of making it part of a liberal education for all, Aristotle explains that the flute, instead of having an 'ethical' effect, is simply orgiastic or exciting, and to be kept for the times when the hearing of music is a 'catharsis' rather than a form of instruction: οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αἰῶν ῥυθμός ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἀρχαίοι στοιχεῖοι, διὸ πρὸς τοὺς τουούς αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν διὸ ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν. It will be seen that a sharp distinction is drawn here between the emotional effect of the flute, and the 'ethical' effect of certain other kinds of music; and that κάθαρσις is in Aristotle's view connected with the former rather than with the latter. A much more important passage, however, is that in Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32, which will be found in extenso among the Fragments of the Poetics (Fr. V). It begins by assuming a current division of 'airs' into ῥυθμικά, πρακτικά, and ἐνθουσιαστικά μέλη,1 and a similar

1 The distinction here is between (1) the music that imitates character, and has thus a reflex influence on the character of the hearer (comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 6); (2) that which imitates action (comp. Plato Rep. 399 A), and moves us to it; and (3) that which imitates, and so arouses in us, the orgy of emotion termed by the Greeks 'enthusiasm'.

6. 1449 b 27
classification of ‘harmonies’ or modes. The most ‘ethical’ harmonies may be practised by all, as a regular part of their lives; whereas the other two kinds are to be left to professionals. This tolerance of the ‘enthusiastic harmonies’ in a well-ordered state Aristotle justifies by showing that they stand in much the same position as Tragedy. There are certain emotions, he tells us, which arise in some degree in every man’s soul, and in a disquieting degree (ισχυρῶς) in certain of us, e.g. pity and fear. Enthusiasm is one of these disturbing emotions. Experience, however, shows that the enthusiastic music (that of the hymns of Olympus, for instance) has a salutary effect on those subject to accesses (κατοκώχυμοι) of enthusiasm, restoring them to a normal condition of calm and peace (καθισταμένως: comp. Bon. Ind. 356 a 35 and 375 a 8), just as though they had undergone a cure or catharsis at the hands of a physician (ἀστέρω τιθόνα καὶ καθάρωσιν). The same sort of treatment (πάσχειν) is required by other emotional natures also, e.g. by those liable to accesses of pity and fear, and by the rest of mankind likewise, in so far as they have a share in these feelings; all want a certain catharsis, a pleasurable relief (κοντίκεσθαι) from emotion. And it is in just the same way (i.e. by the relief they bring) that the cathartic airs give a harmless delight to mankind. The sense of κάθαρσις in the Politics is well explained by Sepulveda in his note on 8. 6, 1341 a 23: ‘Purgatio intelligitur expulsio cuiuspiam affectus’; and again in that on 8. 7, 1342 a 6 (τῷ δὲ ἦπτον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον): ‘Itaque plus et minus, tamen omnes moventur affectibus, a quibus iucunde per musicam sanantur et quasi medicamento quodam adhibito purgantur’ (comp. J. of Phil. 27 p. 269).1 The term in fact is a metaphor from medicine,

1 To the passages in Italian writers quoted in this article I may add one from A. S. Miuturnus (1:59), De Poeta p. 64: ‘Quamobrem cum miserabiles horribilesque eventus Tragoedia spectandos ad perturbationum vacuitatem in medium proferat, non est profecto, si miserationem commovet pavoremque infert, quod morbos animo alere atque augere videatur. An Platoni, nedum Aristotelis Musica probatur, quae nisi motus in animo cieret, nunquam sane cum purgaret. Nam affiliat favoris qui essent concitati, cum modis ac numeris canticisque sacris, qui ad animi expiationem adhiberi solemint, uterentur, his quidem ita expliabantur, ac si aliqua potionem purgarentur; Homerica poesis, quod vim mentis et ad miserandum et ad timendum permoveat, improbanda est? Scilicet ad depellendam agrationem, quae veneni instar habet, vis ciens in corpore motiones medicina vehementis noxiaequae naturae excitatur; ad morborum expiationem animus commoveri non debet?’ The parallel statement in his Arte Poetica p. 77 i: ‘Nè più forza haurà il Physico di spengere il fervido veleno della infermità, ch’el corpo afligge, con la velenosà medicina; che l’Tragico di purgar l’animo delle impetuose perturbationi.’
as Aristotle intimates by making it a synonym for ἵπτρεία (ὁσπερ ἵπτρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως), in a context too which presents a whole series of words which either have, or may have, a medical meaning (πόθος, πάσχειν, ἴσχυρος, κίνησις, κατοκόμχωμοι, καθιστα-
μένους, κοινζεσθαι, καθαρτικά). In Greek physiology and pathology κάθαρσις is a very general term for a physical clearance or
discharge, the removal by art or an effort of nature of some bodily product (some περίττωμα, as Aristotle would call it), which, if allowed to remain, would cause discomfort or harm. The κάθαρσις of the soul as described in the Politics is a similar process in reference to certain emotions (πάθη)—the tacit assumption being apparently that the emotions in question are analogous to
those peccant humours in the body which, according to the ancient
humoral theory of medicine, have to be expelled from the system
by the appropriate κάθαρσις. With some adaptation of the state-
ments and hints in Pol. 8. 7, as thus interpreted, it is not difficult to
recover the outlines at any rate of the Aristotelian theory of the
cathartic effect of Tragedy: Πity and fear are elements in human
nature, and in some men (τοῖς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοῖς φοβητικοῖς) they
are present in a disquieting degree (ἰσχυρῶς). With these latter the
tragic excitement is a necessity (ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν); but it is also
in a certain sense good for all. It serves as a sort of medicine,
producing a catharsis to lighten and relieve the soul (κοινζὲ-
ζεσθαι) of the accumulated emotion within it; and as the relief is
wanted, there is always a harmless pleasure attending the process
of relief. This, then, may be taken as Aristotle’s answer to the
Platonic argument in the Republic; it shows that the pleasure we
derive from the moving scenes in Tragedy is not, as Plato had
maintained, a demoralizing, but on the contrary a harmless pleasure
(χαρὰ ἀβλαβῆς). The legitimacy of this pleasure is assumed
throughout the Poetics (see especially 14, 1453 b i), but its pre-
cise nature is not explained, either in the existing book or else-
where, by Aristotle. It falls naturally enough, however, into its
place in the classification of pleasures in the Nicomachean Ethics,
which recognizes the existence of a class of things as pleasurable
not directly and in themselves, but through their effect, as being of
the nature of cures or remedies (ἵπτρείαι) to remove the disquietude

1 Nearly all these terms are to be found in the Oeconomia. Hippocratis of
Foés; see Döring's Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 319 for a discussion of them.
2 Comp. Probl. 4. 30, 880 a 31 οἷς οὖν πολύ τὸ τοιόῦτον, ἀνάγκη πολλάκις
ἔπιθυμεν τοῦτον ἀποκαθαίρεσθαι κοινζέσται γάρ.
arising from an unsatisfied want, and restore us to a normal condition of body or mind (Eth. N. 7. 13, 1152 b 34; 7. 15, 1154 b 17). The tragic excitement, which in the language of the Politics, acts as an iatreia or katharsis, is clearly a pleasure of this kind, one of those described by Aristotle as iatreionta idea. A further point in his idea of katharsis may perhaps be noticed, as suggested at any rate by his use of the term to express the effect of Tragedy on the mind. A catharsis in the medical sense of the word is an iatreia, and only for occasional use; and its analogue, the pathymatos katharsis, may very well be presumed to resemble it in this respect. In assuming Tragedy, therefore, to have a cathartic rather than a permanent moral effect, Aristotle would seem to have been mindful of the position of the Drama in Greek life, and to have seen that the dramatic performances in the theatre were not sufficiently frequent or continuous to generate a moral habit, or make a lasting impression for good or evil on character—a point overlooked not only by Plato but also by Lessing and most of the modern interpreters of the Aristotelian theory of Tragedy (comp. E. Müller, Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten 2 p. 378).

In the phrase pathymatos katharsis the genitive after katharsis, denoting the object purged away or removed, is a construction not uncommon in Aristotle’s physiological writings (v. Bon. Ind. 354 b 22); and it is found also in other authors, e.g. Hippocrates i p. 104 K. πνεύμαν καθάρσεις.—p. 654 καθάρσεις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.—3 p. 502 τῶν ἀπὸ πλευρίων καθάρσεις.—Thucydides 2. 49 ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς.—Demosthenes 64. 12 καθάρσεις αἵματος.—Polybius 5. 100. 6 ἀνακαθάρσεις πτώματος. The same construction is found with κάθαρσις (etc.) in its metaphorical application to the analogous process in the mind: Plato Phaed. 69 b κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιοῦτων πάντων, 'a purging away of all such things' (Jowett), where the object purged away or removed is shown by the context to be certain affections of the soul (γινόντων καὶ φάβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων).—Plutarch De cap. ex inimicis utilit. 91 f τῶν παθῶν τοιοῦτων τοιούτιμος εἰς τοὺς ἔχθρους ἀποκαθάρσεις.—Iamblichus De myst. i. 12 κάθαρσις παθῶν.—Hierocles in Aur. carm. p. 124 (Needham) ἦ τῶν λυμανμένων παθῶν ἐκκάθαρσις.—p. 134 κάθαρσις τῆς οἴησεως.—p. 194 ἀποκάθαρσις νείκους.

1 Comp. what is said of the flute and its cathartic music in Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 21.
2 Aristotle’s τῆς τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν may perhaps be an unconscious reminiscence of the phrase in Plato.
The idea of κάθαρσις, in the sense of a working-off of emotion brought about bysomething that excites emotion, was not unknown in late Greek literature; it is recognized in reference to music by Plutarch and Aristides Quintilianus, and in reference to the Drama by Iamblichus and Proclus. The theories reproduced by these writers are clearly of Peripatetic origin, and on exactly the same lines as the Aristotelian justification of the emotional forms of music and of the Drama in the brief statement in the Politics.

(1) In his very curious chapter on the ἀκροβότρακες, on whom wine is said to have a sedative effect, Plutarch illustrates the paradox (Qu. conv. 3. 8, 657 λ) by a parallel instance, that of the sad airs at funerals, which, while exciting the grief of the mourners, at the same time work off their sorrow:—

διὸ καὶ τὰς Βασιλείας τελετάς καὶ ὅσα ταῦτας παραπλήσιοι λόγου τινὸς ἔχουσι φασιν, ὅπως ἐν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίσις διὰ βίον ἡ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελωδίαις τε καὶ ἀρχήσεως ἀμα παιδιάς ἐκκαθαίρησιν.

(2) The language in Aristides Quintilianus De Musica 3. 25 (p. 13 Jahn), on the cathartic effect of the music and dancing in the Bacchic and other mysteries, has a more distinctly Aristotelian imprint on it:—

diὸ καὶ τὰς Ἀριστεράς τελετάς καὶ ὅσα ταῦτας παραπλήσιοι λόγου τινὸς ἔχουσι φασιν, ὅπως ἐν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίσις διὰ βίον ἡ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελωδίαις τε καὶ ἀρχήσεως ἀμα παιδιάς ἐκκαθαίρησιν.

(3) There are two passages in Iamblichus, which may serve to illustrate the Aristotelian idea of κάθαρσις. In De myst. 3. 9 (ed. Parthey), writing as a Neoplatonic occultist against the naturalistic explanation of enthusiasm, he insists that it is an error to regard the effect of the enthusiastic music as being of the nature of a mere ἀποκάθαρσις, a working-off or evacuation (ἀπέρασις) of some morbid product within the soul:—

ἀπέρασιν δὲ καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν ἰατρεῖαν τε οὐδαμῶς αὐτὸ κλητέον. οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ νόσημα τι ἡ πλεονασμὸν ἢ περίττωμα πρός ὑμῖν ἐμφύτευται, θεία δὲ αὐτοῦ συνιστάται ἡ πάσα ἀνωθεν ἀρχὴ καὶ καταβολή.

There is reason to think that the theory thus set aside was that of Theophrastus, and, through him, of Aristotle. And it will be seen how completely the language of the above passage har-
monizes with the pathological interpretation of the formula, ὁσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως in the Politics. The second passage is in De myst. i. 11:—

αι δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντη μὲν εἰργάμεναι καθίσταται σφυδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχείας [so Bernays; βραχεῖς vulg.] καὶ ἀχρι τῶν συμμέτρων προσαγόμενοι καίρους μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι πειθοὶ καὶ οὓς πρὸς βιάν ἀναπαύονται. διὰ δὴ τούτο ἐν τε κομψῶς καὶ τραγωδία ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἰσταμέν τὰ ὁικεῖα πάθη καὶ μετρίωτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν.

The theory Iamblichus is accepting for the moment is that the passions cannot be suppressed for any length of time with impunity; that they require an occasional outlet (comp. ἀποκαθαιρομέναι) to keep them quiet; and that the secret of our interest in the Drama is that it serves to work off emotion (τὰ ὁικεῖα πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν). It is clear that Iamblichus must have had a pathological explanation of the effect of the Drama before him. But he has taken the edge off the Aristotelian theory by giving it an ethical turn; it will be seen that he makes the catharsis of passions mean the same thing as the moderation of them (μετρίωτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν), thus anticipating by many centuries the interpretation of παθημάτων κάθαρσις now usually associated with the names of Heinsius and Lessing.

(4) The cathartic effect of the Drama is one of the many controversial points discussed by Proclus in his commentary on Plato’s Republic. The passages bearing on it will be found quoted under Fr. V. According to Proclus the Aristotelian answer to Plato was that the Drama serves a useful purpose as an outlet for emotions which would disturb the peace of the soul, if their just claims were not recognized and from time to time duly satisfied by means of some such gratification as is supplied in the theatre. This view of the effect of the Drama Proclus attributes to Aristotle; his reference, however, to other apologists for the Drama may make one hesitate to believe him to have found it for himself in the now lost Second Book of the Poetics. The statement in its existing form seems rather to have been taken from some follower of Aristotle, possibly from Theophrastus, its phraseology representing the sense rather than the words of the Aristotelian original.

Disengaged from its Neoplatonic surroundings in Iamblichus and Proclus, the catharsis theory before them may be thus
reconstructed in outline: The Drama has a therapeutic (comp. Proclus τὸ πεπονηκός αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας) rather than a directly moral effect; and the excitement it supplies is required by us at times (comp. Proclus δεύμενα δὲ τινὸς ἐν καιρῷ κατάσκευας) to carry off (comp. παθῶν ἀπεράσεις in both Iamblichus and Proclus) or purge away (comp. Iamblichus πάθη . . . ἀποκαθαίρομεν) certain emotions, and relieve the soul of the disquietude they would cause (comp. Proclus ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν . . . ποιεῖν), if defrauded of the satisfaction naturally due to them (comp. Proclus πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν). The whole theory in fact is simply a fuller and more complete version of that we still have in brief in the Politics, with ἀποκάθαρσις or ἀπέρασις in place of the primitive Aristotelian term, κάθαρσις.

II.

Notwithstanding the arguments of Weil and Bernays, the old interpretation of παθημάτων κάθαρσις, which makes it mean the ‘purification’ of certain passions, is far from being extinct even in our own day. Κάθαρσις is supposed to be a metaphor from the religious rite of purification, whereby the hand or soul was cleansed from some pollution or stain of sin. Understood in this sense, therefore, the term would naturally imply that certain passions require ‘purification’ from something, i.e. from something more or less of the nature of an impurity. What this element of impurity is, and in what sense the emotions in question are supposed to become ‘pure’, are points on which there is no slight divergence of opinion among the upholders of this interpretation of κάθαρσις. The principal explanations which have been propounded may be roughly distinguished and classified as follows1:

(1) Tragedy is said to purify pity and fear, because the frequent excitement of these emotions in the theatre has a tendency to weaken their force, and thus moderate and reduce them to just measure (Heinsius, Milton, Lessing, etc.).

(2) The lessons and examples in Tragedy have a purifying and moderating effect on pity, fear, and other evil passions (Victorius, etc.).

(3) The tragic pity and fear are regarded as pure, because they are aroused not by real suffering, but only by the imaginary

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1 Comp. Twining 2 p. 3, and Weil l. c. p. 135.
woes of the theatre; so that there is no admixture of pain in them (Batteux, etc.).

(4) They are regarded as pure, because, as aroused by Tragedy, they are disinterested emotions, with no self-regarding element in them (Brandis, Susemihl).

(5) They are pure, because the sublimity of Tragedy exalts pity and fear into high and noble forms of feeling (Hermann).

The first of these, the only view that calls for serious consideration, has an especial interest for us owing to the fact that in the eighteenth century it found a very distinguished exponent in Lessing. It must be admitted, however, that Lessing himself did little more than expand the old idea of 'moderating' the passions, and translate it back into the language of the Nicomachean Ethics. 'The tragic purification of the passions,' he says, 'consists merely in the conversion of pity and fear into virtuous habits of mind. But as with every virtue, according to Aristotle, there are on either side of it extremes of excess and defect, between which it stands as a mean, Tragedy, if it is to turn pity into virtue, must be able to purify us from both extremes of pity; and it must do the same thing with fear likewise.'

The whole theory, as stated even by Lessing, is open to many and very grave objections. (1) It confuses two distinct things, the purification of a feeling and the purification of the soul from a feeling. (2) It confuses the ideas of 'pure' and 'moderate', though there is no direct logical or other relation between them; excess or defect in certain matters may be a fault, but they cannot be termed 'impurities'. (3) It rests on a false hypothesis as to the position of Tragedy in the social life of ancient Greece; the performance of Tragedy was too

1 Da nämlich, es kurz zu sagen, diese Reinigung in nichts andern beruht, als in der Verwandlung der Leidenschaften in tugendhafte Fertigkeiten, bei jeder Tugend aber, nach unserm Philosophen, sich dieses und jenes ein Extrem findet, zwischen welchem sie inne steht: so muss die Tragödie, wenn sie unser Mitleid in Tugend verwandeln soll, uns von beiden Extremen des Mitleids zu reinigen vermögend sein; welches auch von der Furcht zu verstehen. Das tragische Mitleid muss nicht allein, in Ansehung des Mitleids, die Seele desjenigen reinigen, welcher zu viel Mitleid fühlt, sondern auch desjenigen, welcher zu wenig empfindet. Die tragische Furcht muss nicht allein, in Ansehung der Furcht, die Seele desjenigen reinigen, welcher sich ganz und gar keines Unglücks befürchtet, sondern auch desjenigen, den ein jedes Unglück, auch das entfernteste, auch das unwahrscheinlichste, in Angst setzt.' (Hamb. Dram. St. 78). As Heinsius had said something very like this long before him (v. Zerbst, Ein Vorläufer Lessing's in der Aristotelesinterpretation p. 29), Lessing's originality here is not so marked as his power of statement.
occasional to have a marked and abiding effect on the moral character of the hearers (v. supra, p. 176). (4) Even if the tragic excitement of emotion be supposed to have been sufficiently frequent to produce a habit, it does not follow that the resulting habit would be one of moderation in the matter of feeling; we have no right to suppose that the habitual indulgence of strong emotion (e.g. pity and fear) will weaken its force or reduce it to just measure. Habits according to Aristotle arise from corresponding activities, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις γάνοται (Eth. N. 2. 1 p. 1103 b 21). We should expect, therefore, that the strong emotion aroused by Tragedy would, if habitualized by repetition, end in a habit of strong emotion, not in a habit of subdued or moderate emotion, not in that mean state of feeling which Aristotle identifies with virtue. The primary error, however, in this and similar interpretations of παθημάτων κάθαρσις is that it reads a directly moral meaning into the term, as though the theatre were a school, and the tragic poet a teacher, of morality. That, however, is not Aristotle’s theory; the great function of the tragic poet, he thinks, is to excite certain emotions, and procure us the pleasure that must accompany such excitement (Poet. 14, 1453 b 11). This pleasurable excitement of emotion, in fact, is with him the end and aim of Tragedy, so far as the poet himself is concerned. The statesman, however, viewing human nature and society as a whole, is able to look beyond all this, and see the ultimate justification of the existence of Tragedy. In the Politics, accordingly, Aristotle recognizes the usefulness of Tragedy, explaining that it supplies a natural want, as a sort of catharsis of emotion, which as emotional creatures men require from time to time to keep their souls in health and quietude. This is a reasonable apology for Tragedy, and a sufficient answer to Plato’s criticism. One may perhaps also say of it, that it is more consonant with fact and experience than the moral or disciplinary purpose which many still profess to regard as the true raison d’être of the theatre.

ἀρμονίαν καὶ μέλος. The καί is explanatory, μέλος being added b 29 as a synonym to explain ἀρμονία (v. on 1, 1447 a 22).

διὰ μέτρων is opposed to διὰ μέλους: comp. Probl. 19. 31, b 30 920 a 12 διὰ τὸ πολλαπλασία ἐναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τῶν μέτρων.—Plato Symp. 187 D μέλοσί τε καὶ μέτροις.—Lysias 205 a οὐ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἄκουσαι οὐδὲ μέλος.—Isocrates 191 B ταῖς φαίνει καὶ τοῖς μέτροις.

POETICS
1449 b 31 πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μῦθησιν, scil. οἱ μυρόμενοι. Aristotle is thinking not of the poet but of the performers, who tell the story by acting it on the stage (v. on 3, I 44 S a 23). πράττοντες recalls the idea of the δρώτων in the preceding definition of Tragedy.

b 33 ὁ τῆς ὅψεως κόσμος. ὅψε is usually rendered by 'spectaculum,' 'apparatus,' 'scenery,' or mise en scène; according to Twining it comprehends 'scenery, dresses—the whole visible apparatus of the theatre'. This explanation is too wide; the reference is merely to the visible appearance of the actors when got up in character by the σκηνοποιός or costumier (see on 6, I 450 b 20). Aristotle accordingly more than once uses the word in a concrete sense in the plural, because each of the characters would require a special and distinctive make-up. The formula ὁ τῆς ὅψεως κόσμος implies that the visible make-up of the actors is of the nature of a decorative adjunct (v. on 4, I 449 a 29), a mere accessory to the poet's work (v. 6, I 450 b 16), on which he, as an artist, has no right to rely for his effects (v. I 4, I 453 b 7). The term ὅψε like many other technical words in the Poetics was probably already familiar in this sense in the language of the theatre (comp. Festchrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 166).

μελοποιία (properly the making of μέλη) replaces the original term μέλος as a synonym for it; comp. 6, I 450 b 16, and Pol. 8. 7, I 341 b 23 τὴν μουσικὴν ὅρομεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ρυθμῶν οὖσαν.

b 34 λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν ταύτην is to be compared with λέγω γὰρ μύθον τοῦτον in 6, I 450 a 4 (v. ad loc.). A definition is given because λέξις is a term with several meanings (v. on 21, I 459 a 12). The present definition describes the λέξις in a play in reference to the poet, as the 'composition of the verses'; that which comes later on, in 6, I 450 b 13, views it rather from the side of the dramatic personages, as the 'expression of their thought in words'.

b 35 μέτρων has the concrete sense of 'verses', like τοῖς μέτροις in I, I 447 a 29 (comp. on b 30).

b 36 πᾶσαν. πᾶσαν, the emendation of Madius, may perhaps seem to be supported by the fragment of Democritus (fr. 165 Diels), ἀνθρωπός ἄστιν δὲ πάντες ἴσιμοιν. But no change is really wanted; instead of defining μελοποιία Aristotle thinks it enough to say that its whole nature is too obvious to require explanation.

έπει δὲ πράξεως ἐστι κτέ. Comp. μύθησις πράξεως in the preceding definition. Having spoken of the externals of a tragedy, its ὅψε, λέξις and μελοποιία, Aristotle passes on to elements of another kind, those which constitute its internal content. The subject in a
tragedy is an action with the personages concerned therein as agents. The μῦθος, the fable or plot of the play, represents the action as such; the ἡδος and διάνοια manifested in the language of the dramatis personae represent the personality of the agents. Oedipus, for instance, is in a poem only a name for a certain group of qualities, moral and intellectual, which his actions and the language put into his mouth reveal to us (comp. 9, 1451 b 7).

Ποιοῦσ τινας εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ἡδος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. Intellectual as well as moral states are included under ποιότητες (Cat. 8, 8 b 29). A little further on, however, in 1450 a 5, Aristotle uses the term ποιοῦσ τινας as though it naturally referred rather to the ἡδος or moral character. For the antithesis between ἡδος and διάνοια comp. Pol. 8, 1, 1337 a 38 οἶδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μάλλον ἡ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδος, and the distinction assumed throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere between the ἠθικὴ and the διανοητικὴ ἀρετή.

πέφυκεν begins the apodosis. There are thus in the natural 1450 a 1 order of things, says Aristotle, two distinguishable factors in the action of the individual agent, his ἡδος and his διάνοια; these are the inner causes of men’s actions, and of the success or failure of their lives. πέφυκεν is, like the Platonic φύσιν ἔχει (Rep. 473 a, 489 b), impersonal. Vahlen illustrates this usage from Pol. 2, 2, 1261 b 7 οὕτε πέφυκε μίαν οὔτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν.—4. 12, 1296 b 26 ἐκταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, and Demosthenes 14, 30 τὰς κρίνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ἐπικείμενα πέφυκεν.

κατὰ ταύτας = κατὰ τὰς πράξεις; comp. a 19 κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις 2 εἰσίαιμοις ἢ τοιούτιον.

τῆς μὲν πρᾶξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μύρμης. To complete the statement Aristotle might very well have added a clause like τῶν δὲ πραττόντων τὰ ἡθῆ καὶ αἱ διάνοιαι; and it has been suggested (J. of Phil. 5 p. 119) that these words or something equivalent must have dropped out. In a context like the present, however, this second point may have been left to be mentally supplied by the reader (comp. Vahlen ad loc.), as the emphatic mention of the first point (τῆς μὲν πρᾶξεως κτὸς) is enough to suggest it (comp. De interpr. 14, 23 b 30, and Waitz ad loc.). For this use of μὲν solitarii comp. 26, 1462 b 5, and Waitz on An. pr. 2, 11, 61 a 19.

τοῦτον (=τοῦτο) is preparative and explained by τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων. The assimilation of gender has been a stumbling-block to Madius and others, though found again in 22, 1458 a 26.
1450 a 4 αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αἰτῆ ἔστι, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἄδινατα συνάψαι (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2, 1 p. 74).

a 6 διάνοιαν, scil. εἶναι λέγω. Instead of attempting a definition, Aristotle evades the difficulty by saying that διάνοια is manifested in the argumentative and reflective utterances of the dramatic personae (comp. infra b 11). The statement here is merely provisional, as one may see by comparing the fuller exposition in 19. 1456 a 34–b 8—where we are told among other things that the διάνοια of a personage may be shown in his actions as well as in his words. Διάνοια in the sense it bears in the Poetics is, like ἡθος, an element in the personality of the dramatic personae. It is their intellectual capacity, as evinced in their language (or it may be, in their actions), and it is to be seen whenever they argue or make an appeal to the feelings of their hearers, in other words, when they reason or plead with one of the other dramatic personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do. Hence it is that the general theory of the διάνοια in a play is said (19, 1456 a 34) to belong to Rhetoric rather than Poetry; and a speech with a great display of διάνοια in it is a rhetorical speech (v. on b 6). The term answering to Aristotle's διάνοια in Isocrates is ἐνθυμήματα, 'arguments': Isocr. 191 ο μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἀπαντά τουίνθων . . . ο τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὅστ'}
6. 1450 a 4-13

φανεις, οὖ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἑκατον, οἴνον ποίός τίς Ἰφικράτης, 1450 a 7 ἀλλὰ καθόλον καὶ οὖ περὶ πάντων καθόλον, οἴνον ὅτι τὸ εἰθύ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσὶ, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἡ ἑκατόν ἐστί πρὸς τὸ πράττειν. The corresponding Latin term was sententia: Quinilian 8. 5. 3 Antiquissimae sunt quae proprie . . . sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci γνωμάς appellant: utrumque autem nomen ex eo accipitur, quod similis sunt consiliis aut decretis.

μέρη εἶναι ἔξ. An answer to the question announced in 1, a 8 1447 a 10 ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποῖών ἐστὶ μορίων.

καθ’ ὁ ποιά τις ἔστιν ἡ πραγματία. The word μέρος being ambiguous (Metaph. Δ 25, 1023 b 12; Z 10, 1034 b 32), this clause had to be added to mark the distinction between the 'parts' at present under consideration and those to be enumerated hereafter in chap. 12. The parts here described are the formative constituents of a tragedy; whereas those defined in chap. 12 are the sections into which it is divided. It is through these various formative constituents that we are able to speak of a tragedy as ποία τις—as good or bad, as ἴδική or πεπλεγμένη or παθητική, or whatever else it may be said to be, when we come to judge of its quality.

οὐκ ὁλίγοι αὐτών = οὐκ ὁλίγοι τῶν ποιητῶν. The ὡς εἰπέων which a 12 follows should perhaps be transposed and inserted after πᾶν in the next line. Of the many emendations that have been propounded the simplest certainly is that of Bursian, οὐκ ὁλίγοι αὐτῶν (ἀλλὰ πάντες), on which that formerly suggested by myself, ὁλίγοι αὐτῶν (ἀπαντεῖς) (J. of Phil. 14 p. 44), was based. οὐκ ὁλίγοι αὐτῶν, however, has on it a certain stamp of genuineness. The sense seems to be this: The six parts are in the nature of things possible elements in every tragedy, so to say; and due use has been made of them by not a few of the poets. The statement may be compared with those in a 15, a 36, and 18, 1456 a 3, where the existence is recognized of plays weak or deficient in some of the parts. For the sense of ἕχει in this passage (= 'admits of', 'has in it the possibility of') comp. 2, 1448 a 7; and for the distinction between it and κέχρηται, Eth. N. 7. 4, 1146 b 32 ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὖν χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.—1147 a 1 ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφισβήτων [scil. τὰς προτάσεις] οὕτως καλύπτει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμῃν, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος (comp. Bon. Ind. 854 b 37).

εἰςεις: see on 4, 1449 a 7.

ὄψεις: see on 6, 1449 b 33.
πάν, i.e. every play; comp. 12, 1452 b 18 ἀπάντων.— 18, 1456 a 31 ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο.

 Aristotle proceeds at this point to arrange the six elements in the order of their relative importances; and he begins by asserting, with an abundance of reasons which seems to imply that it was a subject of controversy at the time, the supreme importance of the μυθος. As it is the first duty of a tragedy to represent an action, the μυθος or story of action in it must be the first and most essential element in its construction. The characters, i.e. the personal agents, are mainly required in order to work out the story, and as means to that end; so that this element is to be deemed of secondary and subordinate significance as compared with the μυθος. The paramount importance of plot in Drama has been re-asserted with equal emphasis in our own time by an eminent living dramatist: ‘The idea, the plot, always comes first. The plot, in a sense, is nine-tenths of a play’ (H. A. Jones, Strand Magazine 34 p. 379).

η τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσις = δ μυθος. As the action in a tragedy is a whole of some magnitude (comp. 4, 1449 a 19; 6, 1449 b 25), it must have a plurality of incidents (πράγματα) embodied in it. What Aristotle means by a combination of incidents may be seen from his synopses of the Iphigenia and Odyssey in 17, 1455 b 2 sqq.

βίου: Plato Laws 817 β ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν τραγῳδίας αὐτοῦ ποιηται κατά δύναμαι ὧν καλλίστην ἀμα και ἀριστήση: πάσα οὖν [ἡ γονία] ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ἐξενοτηκε μέρησις τοῦ καλλίστου και ἀριστοῦ βίου, δ δὴ φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε οὕτως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθοῦταν.—Lycurgus in Leocr. 102 οἱ ποιηταί μιμοῦμεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον βίον. Alcidas described the Odyssey as a καλὸν ἄνθρωπινον βίον κατοπτρον (Aristot. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 12). Of Menander also it was said: "Ω Μενανδροί καὶ βίει, πότερος ἀρ' ἡμῖν πότερον ἀπεμιθήσατο; (Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. Fragm. p. 249).

καὶ εὐδαιμονίας: Plato Rep. 603 c πράττοντας, φαμεν, ἄνθρωπους μιμεῖται ἡ μμητικὴ βιαίους ἡ ἐκοινώς πράζεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττεν ἡ εὖ οἰόμενους ἢ κακῶς πετραγέναι.

ἐν πράξει. According to the definition in Eth. N. 1. 6, 1098 a 16 happiness is a certain kind of activity, a ψυχής ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν. Comp. Phys. 2. 6, 197 b 4 ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία πράξεις τῆς εὐπραξία γὰρ. —Pol. 7. 3, 1325 a 32 ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξεις ἐστιν (also Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 21; Rhet. 1. 5, 1360 b 14).

tὸ τέλος: Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 18 πράξεις τνῆς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος.
6. 1450 a 13-26

οῦ ποιότης: Eth. N. 10. 2, 1173 a 14 οἴδε γὰρ αἱ τῆς ὄρετῆς ἐνέρ- 1450 a 18
gεια ποιότητες εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐνδαμονία.

πράττουσι: scil. οἱ μιμούμενοι. The reference is to the actors a 21
(see on 3. 1448 a 23) rather than the poets.

συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν, scil. ἐν τῇ μιμήσει, 'they include in the
representation'; συμπεριλαμβάνειν in this sense is not infrequent
in later Greek (v. HSt. s. v.). It is hardly necessary, therefore, to
reject it for the reading of one of the apographs, συμπαραλαμ-
βάνουσιν, though it is no doubt quite true that manuscripts are
apt to confuse the two prepositions.

διὰ τὸς πράξεις: διὰ in this connexion must mean 'with a view a 22
to', 'for the sake of', as in Thuc. 2. 89. 4 διὰ τὴν σφατέραν δόξαν.
καὶ ὁ μύθος. The καὶ is explanatory, 'that is to say'.

τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἀπάντων: modelled on the proverb in Plato a 23
Rep. 377 Λ ἀρχή παντός ἐργον μέγιστον, which reappears in Aris-
totle Soph. el. 33, 183 b 22 μέγιστον γὰρ ἰσος ἀρχή παντός, ὥστερ
λέγεται.—Probl. 10. 13, 892 a 29 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἐργον
μέγιστον ἤμισυ γὰρ.

τῶν νέων. As it is clear from 14, 1453 b 28 that Euripides is not a 25
classed among the old poets (οἱ παλαιοὶ), οἱ νέοι, 'the moderns,'
must mean the poets from Euripides downwards. It is to be
observed also that, when Aristotle a little further on in this chapter
distinguishes between οἱ ἀρχαῖοι and οἱ νέοι, the point noted as
characteristic of 'the moderns' (ῥητορικῶς ποιοῦσι λέγοντας) is
manifestly true of Euripides, and was recognized as true of him
by the ancients themselves (see on ῥητορικῶς, b 8).

ἀθέως: 24, 1460 a 11 οἴδεν' ἀθήν ἄλλ' ἔχοντα ἔθη. ἀθήν is,
like other compounds of a privativum (De anima 2. 10, 422 a 26;
Metaph. Δ 22, 1022 b 32), an ambiguous word, as it may mean
either 'destitute of character', or merely 'deficient in character'.
Aristotle must be using it in this latter sense, since a play with
personages wholly destitute of character is hardly conceivable.
The language in the illustration which follows from painting,
οἴδεν ἔχει ἦθος, is an instance of a common form of exaggeration,
just like that in the saying of Pope, Most women have no
characters at all.

τοιοῦτοι: i.e. ἀθέως. a 26

οἶνον . . . πέπονθεν: De gen. an. 5. 3, 783 a 6 ἔστι δ' ἐνα τῶν
ἐφών ἀ μαλαικὴν μὲν ἔχει τὴν τρίχα ὑπτον δὲ λεπτὴν, οἶνον τὸ τῶν
dαπτόδων πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων πέπονθεν.—Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 22
οἶνον ἡ Θεοδόρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν.
For other illustrations from painting see on 2. 1448 a 5.

The same view of him, as one who knew how to indicate character in painting, is implied in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 37 τὰ Πολυγνύτου καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφεῶν ᾗ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστιν ἤθικός.

This taken in connexion with what is said of him later on, in 25, 1461 b 12, would seem to show that, in Aristotle's view, Zeuxis sacrificed expression to beauty.

The word had been already used in this technical sense by both Plato and Aristophanes.

In the Rhetoric the ἤθικός λόγος is one designed to create a favourable idea of the speaker's ἤθος, in contradistinction to the παθητικός λόγος, which addresses the feelings, and the ἀποδεικτικός λόγος, which addresses the reason of his audience. In matters of imitative art, however, the usual meaning of ἤθικός is μιμητικός ἤθος, 'expressive of character' (comp. Bon. Ind. 315 b 21)—which is the sense the word has in the present and other passages in the Poetics. Thus in 18, 1456 a 1 a certain kind of tragedy is termed the ἤθικη τραγῳδία, 'the tragedy of character', because its main interest is as a portraiture of character; in 23, 1459 b 16 the Odyssey is described as ἤθικη, because it is more of a portraiture of character than the Iliad; in 24, 1460 b 3 certain passages in a poem are termed ἤθικα μέρη, as serving to bring out the ἤθος of the personages in the story.

In the same use of the dative is found in a 36 τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἀκριβοῖν.—24, 1460 b 2 τῇ δὲ λέξει δεῖ διαποιεῖν; and in Alcidamas De soph. 12 οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβῶς ἐξειργασμένοι [scil. Λόγοι].

The Arabic version seems to suggest οὐπω (see on 9, 1451 b 13) rather than οὐ. For the fut. with οὐπω comp. Eth. N. 5, 10, 1135 a 22 ὡστε ἔσται τι ἀδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὐπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἐκκύνουν προσφη.—6. 13, 1144 b 35 ὡστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δὲ οὐπο εἰληφὼς ἔσται. The imperfect in δ ἤν τής τραγῳδίας ἔργου implies that the point has been already settled in the preceding discussion (comp. Bon. Ind. 754 a 40), the reference being presumably to 6, 1449 b 36, where Tragedy is said to be a μιμησις πράξεως.
6. 1450 a 26–37

... πολὺ μᾶλλον, scil. ποιήσει, as in Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141 b 18 1450 a 31

ei γὰρ εἰδεῖν ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα κρέα καὶ ἱγνειν, πολὺ δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοεῖ, όν ποιήσεις ἱγνείαν, ἄλλ'o ὁ εἰδώς ὅτι τὰ ἄρνιθεα [κοῦφα καὶ] ἱγνεινά ποιήσει μᾶλλον. For the form of antithesis comp. De caelo 2. 3, 286 a 5 πόρρω δ' οὐχ οὐτω τῷ τόπῳ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ ... ἱλίγγν ἕξειν αἰσθήσει, and the instances collected by Vahlen (ad loc.) and Schwab (Schanz's Beiträge 4. 1, p. 66).

τοῦτος refers back to the ρήσεις ἑθικὰ καὶ λέξει καὶ διανοιαὶ εἰ πεποιημέναι of a 29. Aristotle's point is, that the dramatic effectiveness of a tragedy depends before all else on its plot, and that no literary or rhetorical brilliancy will make up for a weak plot.

ψυχαγωγεῖ: comp. b 17 ψυχαγωγικόν. Said of a work of art the a 33 word means no more than to 'move' or 'rivet the attention', and is thus the equivalent of our word 'attract' or (as people now sometimes say) 'fascinate'. This sense of ψυχαγωγεῖν is as old as Xenophon: Mem. 3. 10, 6 δ' δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὅψεως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὸ ἐωτικὸν φαινεσθαι, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖ τοὺς ἄνθρωπος: It is found more than once in Isocrates: 24 δ' ἐδείκται τοῖς ἐπιθυμούσι τοὺς ἀκρωμένους ψυχαγωγεῖ ὅτι τοῦ μὲν νουθετεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἀφετέον, τὰ δὲ τωλὰτα λεκτέον ὡς ὁρώντως τοὺς ὄχλους μάλιστα χάροντας.—191 ληταίτην ἔξει χάριν, ὡστ' ἀν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχει κακῶς, ὡμοὶ αὐταῖς ταῖς εἰρημέναις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. Later writers also often use the word in the sense of to 'attract' or 'please'; comp. the Antiatticista in Bekker's Anecdota 116 ψυχαγωγεῖν: τὸ τέρπειν, and Vahlen, Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 168.

α' τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις. These are considered later a 34 on in chap. ΙΙ. It will be observed that Aristotle uses the two terms without explanation, as though they were already part of the established language of the theatre. The appositional clause comes in as an afterthought, at some distance from the words it illustrates (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. a 2. 1 p. 282).

οὐσίστασθαι is apparently a middle in 24, 1460 a 34 also (v. ad loc.). a 37

οἶνον καὶ introduces not an instance but a parallel from a different class of things just like ὡστερ καὶ, from which it is often hardly distinguishable in sense (comp. Top. 6. 9, 148 4; Eth. N. 9. 1, 1164 a 15; Rhet. 3. 11, 1412 a 11; 3. 12, 1413 b 25). In De mem. 1, 450 b 20 and in Plato Phaedr. 255 c οἶνον is so completely equivalent to ὡστερ as to have a οὖτως as its antecedent. In Poet. 25, 1460 b 33 οἶνον ... ταύτης is practically the same thing as ὡστερ ... οὖτως.
A little before this the μῦθος was said to be the τέλος τῆς πραγμάτων (a 22). From one point of view it is the ἀρχή, as being the necessary basis of every tragedy; from another it is the τέλος, because it is this much more than the characters that Tragedy as a μέρος πρᾶξεως has to represent.

ψυχή: Isocrates 142 c ἐστι γάρ ψυχή πόλεως οὐδὲν ἐπερον ἢ πολιτεία.—261 c τῶν πόλεων ἢ πολιτείας ἢ ψυχή πόλεως ἢ πολιτείας.—[Demosthenes] 60. 22 ἢ τῶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετὴ τῆς Ἔλλαδος ἢ ψυχή τάληθές εἶπεν—Martianus Capella 3, 268 Est accentus, ut quidam putaverint, anima vocis.

This clause Castelvetro and others would transpose and insert after σύντασιν πραγμάτων in a 33. It comes in, however, naturally enough where it stands, as an afterthought to illustrate the secondary position (δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἡθη) of the element of character in a play. So also in the sister art of painting, says Aristotle, the colouring is of subordinate importance in comparison with the design which makes the work to mean something and be like something; a portrait is a portrait, and will give us the pleasure of one, even though executed in mere whites and greys; whereas a medley of much more beautiful colours without a design to give them meaning will not produce the same pleasure, because we cannot see that it represents anything. The nature of the pleasure found in a work of imitative art was explained in 4, 1448 b 13.

εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλείψει κτέ. The sense is thus given by Goulston: 'si quis tabulam, pigmentis licet pulcherrimis, temere fusimque illeverit; non perinde spectantem oblectet, ac si, albo licet colore, imaginem delinearet certam: pari modo in tragediis absque constitutione rerum minus valent mores quam morum expers fabula.' The object left to be understood with ἐναλείφετε is τὸν πίνακα, the 'panel' or 'canvas', as we should say; ἀλείφειν and ἐναλείφειν are used in just the same way, in the sense of covering a surface with colour. ἐναλείφεω, it is to be observed, has apparently a different kind of object in De gen. an. 2. 6, 743 b 23 οἱ γραφεῖς ύπογράφαντες τοῖς γράμμασι οὕτως ἐναλείφοντι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ φῶς ('painters first sketch the outline of the figure before proceeding to work it out in colour'). χύδην means 'without system or order', i.e. without a design to give form and sense to the whole. The direct opposite of this unmeaning medley of the most beautiful colours (εἰ τις ἐναλείψει τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην) is a portrait in plain whites and greys (λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα); in what follows,
therefore, εἰκόνα serves as an antithesis to χύδην (comp. Vahlen, I 450 b 1 Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 166) and λευκογραφήσας to τοὺς καλλίστους φαρμάκους. λευκογραφεῖν, as a derivative from λευκογράφος (a word no longer to be found), is to ‘paint monochromes in white’, i.e. in shades of white and grey (it would seem) on a dark ground. Zeuxis, whom Aristotle has just mentioned in a 27, was among other things a painter of monochromes in white—ρινξίτι et mono-chromata ex albo (Pliny N. H. 35. 64; comp. Brunn, Gr. Künstler b 2 p. 55). A portrait, however, even though it be a mere monochrome in whites (comp. λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα), will have a meaning, and give the mind the intellectual pleasure which accompanies the recognition of the meaning (comp. 4, I 448 b 15); whereas a medley of beautiful colours has no meaning, and the pleasure it gives the beholder is of a wholly different order (comp. 4, I 448 b 18 οὐχ ἡ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἱδονὴν ἄλλα διὰ . . . τὴν χρωμαίν). The antithesis, therefore, is simply between beautiful colours without an εἰκόν, and an εἰκόν without any beauty of colour. Vahlen’s view of the import of these words is somewhat different. He thinks that λευκογραφήσας may denote the preliminary sketch (like ὑπογράφειν in the above-quoted passage in the De gen. an.) in white, which is afterwards filled in with colour, when the picture comes to be finished; so that the clause may be taken to describe two stages in the process of painting, (1) λευκογραφεῖν εἰκόνα, and (2) ἐναλείφαν φαρμάκοις, and serves to illustrate the order of procedure in Tragedy, where the μῦθος is said to come first, as the ἀρχὴ τῆς πραγμάτων, and the ίθι second: ἐν οράτιον formam sic accipio, εἰ τις ἐναλείψει τοὺς καλλίστους φαρμάκους χύδην, οὐκ ἀν ὀρώσω εὐφράνειν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα εἰ ἐναλείψει φαρμάκοις', ut χύδην, h.e. nulla ante delineatione facta, et λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα inter se opponentur'. This very subtle interpretation seems to me to read more into Aristotle’s words than is required for the argument. 

ἐστιν τε μίμησις πράξεως κτλ. supports the statement (a 38—39) b 3 before the parenthesis by recalling the general fact on which it is based (v. a 20—23).

τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια. As the intellectual quality of the dramaticis b 4 personae comes out mainly in what they are made to say, διάνοια is provisionally explained (see on a 6) as a power of making the best of one’s case or of saying the right thing.

1 Aristotle would perhaps have said: οὐκ ἄν ὀρώσω εὐφράνειν καὶ εἰ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα οὕτως ἐναλείψει τοῖς φαρμάκοις.
COMMENTARY

**1450 b 5** τὰ ἑνότα, scil. ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, as in Isocr. 292 ἐπισχυόνται τοιούτοις ρήτορας τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσεις ὡστε μηδὲν τῶν ἑνότων ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παραλιπεῖν (comp. Bon. Ind. 250 a 56). The whole expression τὰ ἑνότα καὶ τὰ ἄρμόστοιτα covers the same ground as that in Rhet. 2. 22, 1396 b 5, τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ τὰ ἐπικαιρότατα.

**b 6** ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων has been taken to mean ‘in soluta oratione’ (Paccius), and ‘in orationibus’ (Valla) or ‘in eloquentia’, ‘bei der Beredsamkeit’ (Vahlen). The explanation, however, in the context, ἐποίουν λέγοντας (b 7), is enough to show that the λόγοι Aristotle has in mind are the λόγοι in a play, i.e. the ρήτορες put into the mouths of the personages. This is apparently the sense the word bears in the next sentence also, τῶν λόγων ἐν ὀἷς μηδ’ ὁλος ἔστιν ὁ τι προαριτεῖα ἤ φευγεί ὁ λέγων (b 9).

τὴς πολιτικῆς καὶ ρήτορικῆς ἔργον. Aristotle seems to be thinking of what is said in a play by the chief personages (e.g. the tragic hero), and of the kind of intellectual capacity (διάνοια) revealed in their statements. One has to remember that the chief personages in ancient Tragedy are not ordinary men, and that the tragic hero is expressly said by Aristotle (13, 1453 a 10–21) to be always in the best tragedies a man of great position and lineage. In a play, therefore, such personages might very well be made to speak πολιτικῶς, ‘like statesmen’, and to show a statesmanlike power of saying what is appropriate to the situation before them (τὰ ἄρμόστοιτα). But it would also be possible to make them speak ρήτορικῶς, ‘like rhetors’, with something of the rhetor’s cleverness in seizing on the various possible points that may be urged on the occasion (τὰ ἑνότα, i.e. τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα). Though ρήτορική stands in a certain relation to πολιτική (Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 27), the distinction between them is a very real one with Aristotle; πολιτική is with him the practical wisdom of the statesman (Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141 b 23), and ρήτορική only a form of the art of argumentation—a δύναμις τοῦ πορέσιον λόγους (Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 33), or a δύναμις περὶ ἐκάστου τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν (Rhet. 1. 2, 1355 b 26). There is no reference to πολιτική in chap. 19. Aristotle may perhaps have felt that the practice of the later dramatists (οἱ νῦν) was too firmly established to admit of change, and that the tragic personages accordingly must still be allowed to speak ρήτορικῶς, as they did in the Tragedy of his time.

**b 7** ἀρχαῖοι: the dramatists anterior to Euripides (see on 6, 1450 a 25).
πολιτικός . . . λέγοντας, which Valla rendered by 'civiliter di-
centes', is often taken to mean 'to speak the language of civil
life', like ordinary citizens, as distinct from the professional orator.
But as the context shows that the ability to speak πολιτικός
implies something of πολιτική in the speaker (comp. Newman
on Pol. 2. 11, 1273 b 12), πολιτικός would seem rather to mean
'like a πολιτικός'—the statesman being assumed to say that which
is befitting (τὰ ἄρμοττοντα) without any ostentation of rhetorical
cleverness (comp. HSt. s. v. πολιτικός).
Vahlen (Symb. phil. Bonn. p. 175) supposes the expression to coincide in sense with the
ἡθικός λέγειν of Rhet. 3. 17, 1418 a 38, which means ἀπὸ προαι-
ρήσεως λέγειν, as opposed to ἀπὸ διάνοιας λέγειν (Rhet. 3. 16,
1417 a 23). The objection to this interpretation is twofold. (1)
Aristotle is to all appearance not contrasting διάνοια with ήθος, but
distinguishing between the two forms it may assume in the dramatic
ρήσεις. (2) πολιτικός λέγειν can hardly be identical with ἡθικός
λέγειν; the personages in Comedy speak ἡθικός, but it would be
a paradox to say of them that they speak πολιτικός, in the sense of
there being something of πολιτική in their utterances.

ῥητορικώς. Euripides is termed by Aristophanes (Pax 534) α b 8
ποιητῆς ῥηματῶν δικανοικῶν. Quintilian also (10. 1, 68) thinks
the study of his plays one of the best preparations for the bar:
Iliud quidem nemo non fateatur necesse est, ipsis qui se ad agendum
comparant utiliorum longe fore Euripidem. namque is et sermone
... magis accedit oratorio generi et sententiiis densius et in ipsis quaer
a sapientiibus tradita sunt paene ipsis par, et dicendo ac respondendo
culibet eorum qui fuerunt in foro diserti comparandus.

ήθος. A statement is said to have ήθος in it when it reveals
the moral purpose of the speaker, the kind of thing that he purposes to do
or not to do. ήθος is an element in oratory also, as the credibility
of the orator often depends on the impression one forms of
his character. The language in the text may be compared with
that in Rhet. 2. 21, 1395 b 13 ήθος δ' έχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις ἡθή
ἡ προαιρέσεις: αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πάσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνοντα
τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περί τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὥστε ἢ χρηστα-
ζουν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοτήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα.—3. 16,
1417 a 16 ἡθικήν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἐσται δὲ τοῦτο ἢ εἰδώλει
τι ήθος ποιεῖ. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαιρέσειν δηλοῦν, ποιοῦ δὲ τὸ ήθος τῷ
ποιοῦν ταύτιν: ή δὲ προαιρέσεις ποια τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὖκ ἔχουσιν
οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ήθῆ, ὡς οὐδὲ προαιρέσεις τῷ γάρ οὐ ἐνέκα οὖκ
ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ' οἱ Σωκρατικοὶ περὶ τοιοῦτον γὰρ λέγουσιν.
1450 b 9 ὄποιά τις. This (the reading of Αο) is very rightly retained by Vahlen, who translates the clause by 'quod aperiat voluntatem, qualia quis in quibus apertum non est aut appetat aut fugiat'; the explanation is added to show that προαίρεσις is to be taken in a wide sense, which may include aversion as well as desire. For an explanatory clause of this form comp. 16, 1455 a 10 συνελογίσαντο τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ ἔμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν, and Plato Rep. 535 λ μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρχώντων, οίνως ἔξελέξαμεν;

ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον is added because there are situations in which the moral purpose of the agent is too obvious to require to be revealed in an 'ethical' speech; see 19, 1456 b 7 for a parallel statement on the subject of διάνοια.

προαίρεται. Though the usual opposite of φειγεῖν is the simple verb αἵρεσθαι (Bon. Ind. 18 b 3), there is a certain propriety in προαίρεται in a clause explanatory of προαίρεσις. The word is found in a similar antithesis in Eth. N. 10. 1, 1172 a 25 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἵδα προαιροῖται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φειγοῦσιν.

b 9* διόπερ κτέ. In the Rhetoric we are told that a mathematical argument does not admit of any colouring of character, because the facts with which it deals are indifferent to us—not objects of either desire or aversion: Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 19 διὰ τούτο οὖκ ἐξουσιῶν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ήθη, ὅτι οἰδὲ προαίρεσιν τὸ γὰρ οὐ ἔνεκα οὖκ ἐχονσιν. In like manner a speech in a play may be on a subject wholly indifferent to the speaker, and in that case there is no room for any infusion of ἴθος into his statement.

b 12 καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνουται replaces the ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην in a 7 (v. ad loc.).

tέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ κτέ. On the reading which I have ventured to introduce into the text see the J. of Phil. 5 p. 119. It is clear that the four elements in a tragedy, the μύθος ήθη διάνοια and λέξις, belong to it as a work of literature, and that the music and 'spectacle' are accessories, which attach to it only when it comes to be acted on the stage. Apart from these accessories, a tragedy is, like an epic (comp. 23, 1459 b 10), a μύησις ἐν λόγῳ (see on 1, 1447 a 29), and all the elements which constitute it are ἐν λόγῳ. τὰ ἐν λόγῳ, therefore, is a comprehensive designation for the four literary elements, as distinct from the non-literary elements (τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν b 15), the music and 'spectacle', with which the enumeration concludes. If τῶν μὲν λόγων be retained, the genitive

1 Comp. Markland's ἄστιν ἐν ὑπολόγῳ for ἄστι μὲν ὑπὸ λόγῳ in Lysias 4. 18, and Canter's ἄκοθ ἐν ἡμῖν for ἄκοθ μὲν ἡμῖν in Clem. Al. Str. 7. 36, 852 P.
has to be taken as an objective gen. after λέγεις. Valla renders the words by ‘orationum dictio’, Pacchius by ‘sermonum dictio’, and Goulston by ‘ipsarum orationum elocutio’. The main difficulty, however, is in the particle, which has never been satisfactorily explained. Vahlen formerly (Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 181) connected the clause with that which follows in b 15 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κτέ., supposing the sense to be ‘viertens für die Dialoge (τῶν λόγων) die sprachliche Form; für das übrige (τῶν λοιπῶν) die Melopöie’. His later view (1885) is that the μέν in τῶν μέν λόγων may be an instance of μέν solitary, and that Aristotle may have meant at first to append something about the μέλη (τῶν δὲ μελῶν . . .). Such a division of the fourth part, it seems to me, is wholly inconsistent with the general scheme of the six parts, which is throughout this chapter so clearly before Aristotle’s mind, as well as with the express mention of the μελοποιία in its proper place in the next sentence.

\(\delta\sigmaπερ\ \πρώτερον\ \εἰρηται.\) If the reference is to 6, 1449 b 34, where the λέγεις is defined as \(\varepsilon\ τῶν \ μέτρων\ \σύνθεσις\), Aristotle must have forgotten the exact terms of his previous formula. The point, however, is practically the same in both instances; λέγεις is to be understood in the sense of ‘diction’ or ‘expression in language’, and not in any of the other senses which the word might bear (see on 23, 1459 a 12).

\(\deltaιά\ \τῆς\ \ονομασίας = \deltaιά\ \τῶν\ \ονομάτων,\) i.e. by means of the words or language of the speaker. As the ονομα, which includes the verb and the adverb as well as the noun, is the directly significant part of all language, ονομασία means practically the same thing as vocabulary or language.

\(\epsilonρμηνειαν,\) ‘communication’, ‘expression’; the Latin equivalent for it is interpretatio. After \(\epsilonρμηνειαν\) we may supply τῶν \(\varepsilon\ τῆς\ \ιδιολογίας\), the spoken word being the outward sign or expression of a thought in the mind: De interpr. 1, 16 a 3 \(\epsilonστι\ \μέν\ \οίν\ τὰ \(\varepsilon\ \τῆς\ \φωνῆς\ \τῶν\ \(\varepsilon\ \τῆς\ \ψυχῆς\ \παθημάτων\ \σύμβολα.\) On the meaning of \(\epsilonρμηνεια\) in Aristotle see Waitz, Organon 1 p. 323, and Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschafts 2 1 p. 235.

\(\epsilonχει\ \τῆς\ \αὐτῆς\ \δύναμιν = \tauα\ \τὸ \ δύναται,\) ‘is practically the same thing’ (see on 1, 1447 a 8).

\(\πέντε.\) Similar instances of an intrusive numeral will be found in Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 21, and 1. 13, 1373 b 3 (v. Roemer ad loc.). Vahlen accepts the correction πέμπτον, in the sense of quinto loco: ‘reliquarum autem partium (h. e. quae post illas quattuor iam
reliquae sunt duae) quinto loco melopoeia gravissimum est condimentum, ὑψι autem ad poeticaem artem non pertinet'.

μέγιστον τῶν ἴδουσμάτων: see on 6, 1449 b 25 (ἡδυσμενη). For the pleasure given by music comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 20 τὴν δὲ μονοκήν πάντες εἶναι φαινεῖν τῶν ἴδιοτῶν.—1340 a 2 δει μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἴδιοτής μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἂς ἔχοντες πάντες αἴσθησιν. έχει γὰρ ἡ μονοκήν τὴν ἴδιοτὴν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσας ἴδιοτας καὶ πᾶσιν ἴδιας ἴδιας αἴσθησις ἐστὶ προσφιλής.—15 οἱ μὲν γὰρ νῦν διὰ τὴν ἴδιοτίαν ἄνθρωπον οὐδὲν υπομένουσιν ἐκόντες; δὲ μονοκήν φύσει τῶν ἴδιοσμάτων [ἡ ἴδιοσμάτων] ἐστίν. Bernays (Zwei Abhandl. p. 157) supposed that a further statement on the subject of music, like that in the Anonymus De Comœdia (Kailb, CGF. i p. 52), μέλος τῆς μονοκήν ἐστὶν ὅδιον, ὃθεν ἀπ' ἐκεῖνης τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς ἀφορμὰς δεῖσθαι λαμβάνειν, may have dropped out after ἴδουσματων.

ψυχαγωγίκοιν: see on a 33.

ἀτεχνότατον: 13, 1453 b 7 τὸ δὲ δια τῆς ὑψως τούτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δειμενον ἐστιν. ἀτεχνός is frequently used in the sense of 'depending on means outside the art itself'; comp. Rhet. 3. 16, 1416 b 18 σύγκεται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἀτεχνόν, οὐθὲν γὰρ αὖτος ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς τέχνης. The opposite of it in this sense is ἐντεχνὸς (Bon. Ind. 119 b 4).

ἡ γὰρ τῆς πραγματίας δύναμις κτέ. The tragic effect may be produced by a good tragedy even without any actual performance of it on a stage, i.e. as a mere work of literature (comp. 14, 1453 b 4, and 26, 1462 a 11). The reading of Δε here, ὅσ γὰρ, is defended by Vahlen, who translates it by quia enim (even nämlich), on the assumption that the apodosis is omitted in the same way as in Eth. N. 8. 6, 1157 b 3 οἱ δ' ἄγαθοί δὲ αὐτῶν φίλοι: ἡ γὰρ ἄγαθοι [scil. φίλοι εἰσίν].—8. 10, 1159 b 10 οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἴδιες ἐπὶ πλείων διαμένουσιν. έσος γὰρ ἐν πορίζωσιν ἴδιον ἡ ἀφελείας ἄλλῃ τρόπῳ [scil. διαμένουσιν], and certain more or less similar passages. The present passage (with the reading ὅσ γὰρ) does not seem to me to be a genuine parallel. On behalf of the amended reading (ἡ γὰρ) it has to be remembered that a confusion between ἡ and the compendium for ως is not so uncommon in MSS. of a certain date (Bast, Comm. Palaeogr. p. 780).

ἀνευ ἀγώνος. ἀγών is generally rendered by certamen or 'contest', but it is not clear that that is the sense Aristotle attaches to it in the present and other places (7, 1451 a 6; 13, 1453 a 27) of the Poetics. It seems to mean rather little more than a 'public performance'. Similarly ἀγωνίζομαι in 7, 1451 a 8 and 24, 1460 a 9.
means apparently 'to perform in public', συναγωγείσθαι in 18, ἰογωνισμα in 9, ἰογωνιστής, likewise, in Pol. 8. 7, ἰοσας ἰιν 18 and Probl. 19. 15, ἰοσας 28, means no more than a 'public' or 'professional performer' (comp. πρωταγωνιστής etc.). In Rhet. 3. 12, ἰοσας 4 ἰονιστική λέξει means the style allowable in public speaking, as distinct from the γραφική λέξει, the more formal style required for a purely literary work. The idea of contest or competition, therefore, is not always a recognizable element in the meaning of this group of words (comp. Nitzsch, De historia Homeri 2 p. 113).

ἀγώνοι καὶ ὑποκρίτων: 13, ἰοσας 27 ἐπὶ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἰογωνων.—Probl. 19. 15, ἰοσας 28 ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκρίτη ἰονιστής.—Rhet. 3. 12, ἰοσας 8 ἐστὶ δὲ λέξις γραφική μὲν ἢ ἄρμαστιγῆ, ἰονιστική δὲ ἢ ὑποκριστικάτη κτέ. The present clause shows that the ὄψις is ἴκαστα οἴκειον τῆς ποιητικῆς; the next, that it is ἀτεχνώτατον.

ὀψεω: for the plural see on 6, ἰοσας 33.

σκευοποιοι, the theatrical costumer, who enabled the actors to appear in character by supplying the masks, dresses, and other paraphernalia of their make-up; comp. Aristophanes Eq. 230 καὶ μη δέδωθ' οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εξεκασμένος. ὑπὸ τοῦ δεός γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲς ἦθελε τῶν σκευοποιῶν εἰκάσαι (v. Schol. ad loc.).—Aelian V. H. 2. 13 οἱ σκευοποιοὶ ἐπιλαβαν αὐτῶν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα εξεκασμένες.—Pollux 4. 115 σκευὴ μὲν ἢ τῶν ὑποκρίτων στοιχῆ ... σκευοποίους δὲ ὁ προποσποίοι.—2. 47 η δὲ νέα κωμῳδία καὶ προσωποποίου εἶρηκεν δὴ δὲ αρχαία σκευοποίων ἐκάλει (v. Meineke, FCG. 4 p. 680). For σκευή in the sense of the make-up of actors see Eurip. Suppl. 1054,


κεῖτα: as has been stated in the definition of Tragedy in 6, ἰοσας 23 ἰοσας 25 (comp. Bon. Ind. 386 ἰοσας 43).

τελείας καὶ ὀλης. Although there is strictly speaking a certain distinction between the idea of 'complete' (τέλειοι: v. Metaph. Δ 16, 1021 ἰοσας 12) and that of 'whole' (ὀλοιοι: v. Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 ἰοσας 26), the two terms are so closely allied in sense as to be all but synonymous: Phys. 3. 6, 207 ἰοσας 7 ἀπειρον μὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὐ κατὰ ποισιν λαμβάνοντοι αἰεὶ τι λαβεῖν ἐστιν ἐξο. οὐ δὲ μηδὲν ἐξω, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τελείου καὶ ὀλον' οὐτω γὰρ ὀμοιομεθα τὸ ὀλον, οὐ μηδὲν ἀπετυ σολον δὲ καὶ τελειον ἢ τὸ αὐτο πάμπαν ἢ σύνεγγυσ τὴν φύσιν ἐστιν.

ἔχοισις τι μέγεθοσ: see on 4, ἰοσας 19 and 6, ἰοσας 25.
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μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος, 'of no size,' as we say, means the same thing as πάμμικρον in b 37 (Sauppe ap. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. 1 p. 54), just as in 6, 1450 a 28 οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦδος means practically 'has but very little character' in it.

μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. By a 'beginning' Aristotle does not mean something without antecedents, but only something that may be detached as it were from its antecedents, and viewed apart from them as the first term in a new series of events.

μετ' ἐκείνῳ δ': comp. b 30 μετά δὲ τοῦτο.— b 31 καὶ μετ' ἐκείνῳ.— An. pr. 1. 4, 25 b 35 καλῷ δὲ μέσον μὲν ὁ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν.

ιδέας. ιδέα, 'form,' 'sort,' or 'kind,' is frequently used, just like ἔδος, which has much the same sense, without any genitive to explain it. Instances of this allusive, or rather evasive, use will be found in 5, 1449 b 8, in 19, 1456 b 3, and in 22, 1458 b 18. It is a favourite term with Isocrates also: 24 c ἀμφότεραι ταῖς ἰδείαις ταύταις κατεχομέναι.— 36 ή χρή δὲ δοκιμάζειν τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐκ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶς ἰδείαις ἀπάσας, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις κτέ.— 319 τὸ ἄλλως ἰδεαὶ ἐπιφανεστέραις καὶ πλείον οὐλον τὸν λόγον διωκοῦν.— De perm. § 183 τᾶς ἰδείας ἀπάσας, αἰς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμανι, διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς. For instances from other authors see Campbell's Essay on Plato's use of language, Rep. of Plato 2 p. 301.

tὸ καλὸν κτέ. Having just laid it down that the μὴ ἔδος must be a complete whole, Aristotle assumes that it must also be a beautiful whole, and proceeds to show that, if it is to be that, it must be of a certain magnitude, neither too long nor too short. Beauty, he says, depends on two conditions: the beautiful object must be (1) large enough to allow of our seeing the orderly arrangement of its parts, and (2) not so large as to be incapable of being taken in as a whole in one coup d'œil. With this we may compare Metaph. M 3, 1078 a 36 τού δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξεις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὀρισμένον—where τάξεις corresponds with the first, and τὸ ὀρισμένον with the second of the two conditions in the present passage. For the form of the opening statement comp. De long. vitae 5, 466 a 26 τὰ μεγάλα καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτά.

ξύον: 23, 1459 a 20 ἐν ὦστερ ξύον ἐν ὀλον τοῦτῃ τὴν οἰκείαν ἠδονήν. The analogy between a literary whole and a living organism is postulated in Plato Phaedr. 264 c ἀλλὰ τὸ δε γε οἷςοι σε φάναι ἂν, δὲν πάντα λόγον ὦστερ ξύον συνειστάναι σῶμα τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὦστε μὴ ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μὴ ἄπων, ἀλλὰ
same assumption underlies many of the terms of early grammar or rhetoric, e.g. κόλων, ἀρθρον, σύνδεσμος (see on 20, 1456 b 38), ἀκέφαλος, κολοβός, μείονος (see on 26, 1462 b 6). I am unable, therefore, to accept Sueimihl’s view, that ζώον both here and in chap. 23 means a picture or statue (Gemälde, Bild)—though it certainly has that sense in a passage not very unlike this in form, in Plato Polit. 277 B ἀτεχνώς ὁ λόγος ἦμαν ὁστερ ζῷον τῇν ἐξωθεν μὲν περιγραφήν ἐοικεν ἰκανόν αἴειν κτέ. It seems to mean here a living, as distinct from an artificial, whole, as it clearly does in another Aristotelian passage, Topr. i. 15, 106 a 20 τῷ καλῷ τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῷον τῷ αἰσχρῷ [sic. ἐναντίον], τῷ δ’ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας τῷ μοχθηρόν. In saying καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἀπαν πράγμα δ’ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν Aristotle passes from the living wholes called ζῷα to a large kind of whole, ‘everything made up of parts’, a formula wide enough to include the creations of human art as well as those of nature. This addition is of some importance for the argument; it prepares us for the application of the general law to the case of the μῦθος, which, as a σύντομοι or σύντομος πραγμάτων (comp. 6, 1456 a 15), is a πράγμα δ’ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν. I may add that the conjunctions in Aristotle’s statement (καί . . . καί = cum . . . lim) seem to imply that the stress is really on the second of the two points.

πράγμα, a ‘thing’: Topr. i. 5, 102 a 18 ἰδιὸν δ’ ἐστὶν δ’ μὴ δῆλοι b 35 μὲν τὸ τῇ ἦν εἶναι, μόνη δ’ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος, ἰδιὸν ἰδιὸν ἀνθρώπου τὸ γραμματικῆς εἶναι δεκτικῶν.—De anima 3. 8, 132 a 3 πράγμα οὐδὲν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθήματα ἕχωμεν.——Plato Crat. 390 D Κρατίλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων δόσει τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν.

ταῦτα = τὰ μέρη, implied in συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν.

μέγεθος ὑπάρχει μὴ τὸ τυχόν: De gen. an. 2. 6, 745 a 5 ἐστὶ γὰρ b 36 ἔν πάσι τοῖς ζῴοις πέρας τοῦ μεγέθους.—Pol. 7. 4, 1326 a 35 ἐστι τι καὶ πόλεμοι μεγέθους μέτρον, ὁσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζώον τῶν ὄργανων.

μεγέθει: Eth. N. 4. 7, 1123 b 6 ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοφυσία, b 37 ὁσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ’ ἀστείοι καὶ

7. 1450 b 25-37

muçta te eixen kai akra, prêpont' allolous kai tv oîl o oegrammènai 1450 b 34 (comp. Hermias and W. H. Thompson ad loc., and Dionysius Hal. 5, p. 381 R.); and also in Rhet. 3. 14, 1415 b 7 av m' toioitos ý [sic. o akroatís], oðên de prooumion, all' ý óson to prâagma eiteîn kefalaiodwos, ùna êchô osteper ôôma kefalhyn [sic. o lógyos]—where the exordium of a speech is likened to the head of a body. The same assumption underlies many of the terms of early grammar or rhetoric, e.g. kólon, árbroon, sýndesmos (see on 20, 1456 b 38), akéfalo, koloðoû, méiounos (see on 26, 1462 b 6). I am unable, therefore, to accept Sueimihl's view, that òóno both here and in chap. 23 means a picture or statue (Gemälde, Bild)—though it certainly has that sense in a passage not very unlike this in form, in Plato Polit. 277 B atexwos o lógos hêm wòster êchôn tîn êxwthen méν periographîn èoikei ikanôn èchên kte. It seems to mean here a living, as distinct from an artificial, whole, as it clearly does in another Aristotelian passage, Topr. i. 15, 106 a 20 tô kâlô tô ménti tô tô êchôn tô aîxhron [sic. enantion], tô d' ði tôs oikias tô mokthiron. In saying kai êchôn kai antan prâigma d' suneîsthken êk tînôn Aristotle passes from the living wholes called êtha to a large kind of whole, 'everything made up of parts', a formula wide enough to include the creations of human art as well as those of nature. This addition is of some importance for the argument; it prepares us for the application of the general law to the case of the múthin, which, as a sústuma or sústama praghmâton (comp. 6, 1456 a 15), is a prâigma d' suneîsthken êk tînôn. I may add that the conjunctions in Aristotle's statement (kai . . . kai = cum . . . imm) seem to imply that the stress is really on the second of the two points.

prâigma, a 'thing': Topr. i. 5, 102 a 18 idion d' ðesti d' mè dhlo b 35 mèn tô tô tô ðe eînai, mônè d' upárxhèi kai antikefhoreiâ toû praghmatos, dion idion anθhropôn tô graghmatikês eînai dektikon.—De anima 3. 8, 132 a 3 prâigma oðîben ðesti para tô megeðh, ðò dhkei, tô âiðhthta eîchôrmimôn.—Plato Crat. 390 D Krathulos allêth légei légon doûse tô ðnômata eînai tôs praghmasin.

taûta = tôs méres, implied in suneîsthken êk tînôn.

mègenos upârxheî mè tô thûnon: De gen. an. 2. 6, 745 a 5 ðesti ðâr b 36 ði pásî tôs zôiôn péras tôs megeðhou. —Pol. 7. 4, 1326 a 35 ðesti tôi kai ðôlemi megeðhous métrown, ðòsper kai tôv tôv állov pàntov, zôiôn ðovot oðhagnôn.

megeðhe: Eth. N. 4. 7, 1123 b 6 én megeðhei ðâr ðî megalofusia, b 37 ðòsper kai tô kàllos én megalô stôma, oî miðroi d' âstêioi kai

N 2
Similarly in Pol. 7. 4, 1326 a 33, speaking of the size of the καλλιότη τόλης, Aristotle explains that τὸ καλὸν ἐν πλῆθει καὶ μεγέθει εἶσθε γίνεσθαι.

According to Top. 3. 1, 116 b 21, beauty is thought to consist in συμμετρία (τὸ δὲ κάλλος τῶν μελῶν τις συμμετρία δοκεῖ εἶναι); and according to Metaph. M 3, 1078 a 36 in τάξει καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὅρμυμένον. In the beauty of a μῦθος, however, there is no room for the idea of συμμετρία. A well-constructed story involves a certain order in its incidents and a limit of length; but there is nothing in it directly corresponding to the symmetry or proportion which is one element in the beauty of a living creature.

The reason for our not seeing any beauty in a very minute creature is that we perceive it as a whole too quickly to discern the parts and the order and symmetry there may be in them. συγχείται = 'becomes blurred, or indistinct', as in H. A. 7. 5, 585 b 34 συγκεκφυμένων μέλαιν, and the other passages noted in Bon. Ind. 709 b 43.

The word, 'sight' or 'view' (comp. Bon. Ind. 329 a 31).

There is no necessity to bracket χρόνον (with Bonitz). The time a thing takes to be seen may be of perceptible or of imperceptible duration; and in the latter case it may very well be described as an ἀναίσθητος χρόνος, a time too short for one to be conscious of its duration. This expression, ἀναίσθητος χρόνος, appears in the definition of the 'sudden' or 'instantaneous' in Phys. 4. 13, 222 b 15 τὸ δὲ ἐξαιρήθη τὸ ἐν ἀναίσθητῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκταίναι (comp. Probl. 3. 10, 872 b 9).

The equivalent in the Analytics is ἀσκέπτος χρόνος: An. post. 1. 34, 89 b 10 ἡ δὲ ἀγχώνια ἐστὶν εἰστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου, οἴου εἰ τις ἴδιον ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἦλιον, ταχὺ ἐνενόησε διὰ τὸ τούτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἦλιον. The converse of all this is the assertion in Probl. 19. 21, 919 a 32, that the longer the time is, the more perceptible it is: πλεῖον ὁ χρόνος ὁ τοῦ βαρέως, οὗτος δὲ μάλλον αἰσθητός. According to the stricter psychology of the De sensu (7, 448 a 24) there is no such thing as a χρόνος ἀναίσθητος.

οὐτε παμμέγεθε: comp. the rule for the size of the πόλις in Pol. 5. 2, 1302 b 35 and 7. 4, 1326 a 35.

οἶνον εἰ κτέ. refers back to παμμέγεθε. Other instances of an illustration with οἶνον (= e.g.) at some distance from the main statement will be found in 18, 1456 a 13; 19, 1456 b 11; 20,
καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων. The argument proceeds on the assumption of an analogy between a beautiful whole that addresses the eye, and one that addresses the mind; and the conclusion is that as the one is ἐισύνοπτον, so the other must be ἐισυνημόνευτον. At this point Aristotle changes his construction, repeating his original statement (1450 b 34) in the form required for an argument from analogy, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῷων... οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μῦθων, with συστημάτων as a short equivalent for the foregoing ἀπαν πράγμα δ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν. A σύστημα is a product of combination, something that comes into being through a union, natural or artificial, of parts into a whole; a state, for instance, is a σύστημα (Eth. N. 9. 8, 1168 b 32) as being due to a combination of classes or individuals, and a ζῷον is a σύστημα (De gen. an. 2. 4, 740 a 20), as being an organized whole of parts. The present passage, however, implies a more restricted sense of σύστημα, as though the term were properly applicable only to a whole that is made, as distinct from an organic whole, which grows to be what it is. This or some similar sense is suggested by the passage also in Eth. N. 9. 8, 1168 b 32 ὡσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπων—where the implication is that a man is not a σύστημα proper, though his composite nature gives him a certain resemblance to one.

The difficulty in the manuscript reading σωμάτων is that the word would have to be understood in one of two senses, either in that of ‘material substances’, or in that of ‘living bodies’. The first interpretation is out of the question, since beauty is in the τάξεις or συμμετρία τῶν μερῶν, and, therefore, in the form, not in the matter, of things. The second, which makes ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων and ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων mere synonyms, leaves us without any equivalent for the ἀπαν πράγμα δ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν of his original statement (1450 b 34), which was, if I am not mistaken, far too important for Aristotle’s argument to be ignored in any résumé of it (comp. J. of Phil. 5 p. 120).
COMMENTARY

1451 a 3 ἐπὶ τῶν ξύλων: see on 1450 b 36.

a 4 εὐυόντον, ‘easily taken in as a whole by the eye’, as opposed to εὐμνημόνευτον (a 5), ‘easily taken in as a whole by the memory’. The word, however, is metaphorically used as equivalent to εὐμνημόνευτος in 23, 1459 a 33, as also in Rhet. 3. 9, 1409 a 35 λέγω ὑπερ ηεύουν ἔχουνταν ἄρχῃ καὶ τελευτᾷν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτῆς καὶ μέγεθος εὐπόντον. ἤδεια δ’ ἡ τοιαύτῃ καὶ εὐμαθής ... εὐμαθής δὲ ὅτι εὐμνημόνευτος.

a 6 ὅρος (ὅ) μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἄγώνας: the limit in practice, in contradistinction to the theoretic limit of length, ὅ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος (a 9). In actual practice the length of the play is determined by the conditions of the public performances (ἄγώνες) in which it will be presented on the stage; the time it is to occupy there is fixed by custom and convention rather than theory.

a 7 τὴν αἰσθήσιν, scil. τῶν θεατῶν (see on 15, 1454 b 15); comp. 4, 1440 a 8 πρὸς τὰ θέατρα. The language here, though quite general, seems to refer more especially to the power of attention in the audiences.

ἐκατὸν τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι: an extreme instance like the μυρίων σταδίων ξύλον in a 2. The subject of ἀγωνίζεσθαι, if expressed, would be ‘the performers’, ἀγωνίζεσθαι τι in stage matters being synonymous with ὑποκρίνεσθαι τι; comp. Demosth. 19, 246 τούτῳ δὲ τῷ δράμα ... Μάλων ἡγωνίζετο.—250 ὡς ἡγωνίσω καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐξηγήσασθαι.—337 τὰ θεατρὰ ... ἡγωνίζετο (see on 6, 1450 b 18). In the sense of ‘contend’, as said of the dramatic poet, it would require an instrumental dative (τραγῳδίαι) after it. The personification implied in Tyrwhitt’s rendering, ‘si centum tragedias in theatro certare oportet’, is (I think) questionable in Aristotle. Goulston takes ἀγωνίζεσθαι as a passive (= agi), as it certainly sometimes is.

a 8 πρὸς κλεψάρας. For the preposition comp. fr. 468 Teubn. μέτρον τί ἔστιν ὑδατος πρὸς μετερμενόν ἡμέρας διάστημα μέον ... πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο ἡγωνίζοντο οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἄγωνες.

a 9 ὅσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε φασίν. The idea of tragedies having been at some date or other timed by the clepsydra is to my mind highly improbable, and there is no hint of such a thing elsewhere. The language also here is not free from difficulties. Tyrwhitt translates it by ‘quemadmodum aliquando alias etiam factum esse perhibent’; and Vahlen (Berlin Academy, Sitzungsberichte 1897 p. 639) by ‘wie man sagt, dass sie auch sonst gespielt haben’. To get this out of the words, and make them relate to Tragedy,
or rather the past history of Tragedy, it becomes necessary to supply (with Vahlen) an aorist infinitive, ἀγωνίσασθαι, from the preceding imperfect ἠγωνίζοντο, and also to make ποτὲ καὶ ἀλλοτε mean simply ‘once’ or ‘formerly’, though its natural meaning would be ‘at a certain other time’. Two instances have been pointed out of ποτὲ καὶ ἀλλοτε: Xenophon Anab. 6. 4. 12 ὡμὸς δέι παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς μαχουμένους εἰ ποτὲ καὶ ἀλλοτε [= ‘si unquam alias’]; Lucian Hermot. 24 ἠδὲ γὰρ ποτὲ καὶ ἀλλοτε [= ‘alias quondam’] προσβιτὸν ἀνθρός ἤκουσα διεξάντος. These, however, are not enough to show that ποτὲ καὶ ἀλλοτε can only refer to an indefinite past or future; with a verb in the present it may very well refer to the indefinite present also, and have the sense of ‘at certain other times’, just in the same way as ποτὲ, with a present, means ‘at certain times’ in Soph. el. 16, 175 a 27 συμβαίνει δὲ ποτὲ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμαισιν, and in the familiar antithesis of ποτὲ and δὲ. M. Schmidt’s correction, εἰώθαιαν (for φασιν), though perhaps too bold, yields an unimpeachable sense, ‘as is regularly done at certain other times’, i.e. by another class of ἀγωνισταί, the pleaders in the law-courts. As a variation on it, to make the sense clearer, I would suggest ἀστρεπτο ποτὲ καὶ ἀλλοι εἰώθαιαν.

ὁ δὲ ὅρος is appositional to what follows.

ὁ μεῖζον, scil. μῦθος; comp. Tyrwhitt’s rendering ‘quo maiore est fabula’.

σύνδηλος is explained in the reference to this passage in 24, 1459 b 18 τοῦ μὲν ὦν μύκος ὅρος ἰκανὸς ὁ εἰρημένος: δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος.

ἐν δὲ συμείει κτῆ. A reminiscence apparently of the language of Plato Rep. 423 b ὧκοιν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὗτος ἄν εὶν καὶ κάλλιστος ὅρος τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἁρχομενιν, ὡστε δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεις ποιεῖσθαι . . . Τὰς, ἐφ’ ὅρος; Οἴμαι μὲν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τόνδε: μέχρι οὐ ἂν ἔθελη αὐξανομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὔξεσθαι, πέρα δὲ μῆ.

κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀραγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γεγομένων, scil. τῶν πραγμάτων (see on 6, 1449 b 26). The consequents must be always the natural or necessary effect of the antecedents. A well-constructed μῦθος is a consecutive whole, not a mere series of incidents which happen to follow one after the other in actual order of time (comp. 10, 1452 a 19); and it is this that differentiates it from a history or a biography (comp. 9, 1451 a 36), which records everything that may have befallen a community or an individual, however loose and separate the various incidents were in themselves.
COMMENTARY

1451a 12 (comp. 23, 1459a 23). The poetic story in fact must satisfy our sense of logic, incident following after incident as its necessary and inevitable, or as its probable and natural consequence. The technical meaning of the terms εἰκός and ἀναγκαῖον in Aristotle may be seen from An. post. 2. 27, 70a 4 τὸ μὲν εἰκός ἐστι πρῶταις ἐνδοσος· δὴ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ πολλῷ ἱσασθαι οὕτω γινόμενον ἢ μὴ γινόμενον, ἢ ὅν ἢ μὴ ὁν, τοῦτ’ ἐστίν εἰκός, οὗν τῷ μασείν τοὺς φθονοῦντας ἢ τῷ φιλεῖν τοὺς ἐρωμένους.—Rhet. 1. 2, 1357a 34 τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστιν ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν πολλῶν γινόμενων . . . τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν.—Metaph. Γ 5, 1010b 28 τὸ ἀναγκαῖον οἷκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.—Δ 5, 1015a 34 τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον φαμεν οὕτως ἔχειν. The distinction between the two terms had been already recognized by Plato: Theaet. 149c εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.—Tim. 40e ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν. They were, it would seem, already established in the rhetorical terminology of the sophists (Stallbaum on Tim. 40e).

a 13 εἰς εὐτυχίαν κτέ. This is obviously meant to apply only to the tragic hero, not to the secondary personages in the play, about whom Aristotle has very little to say. Though he acknowledges the legitimacy of a transition from misery to happiness as a dramatic motive—it will be remembered that it is the motive in the Iphigenia in Tauris (comp. 17, 1455b 12 καὶ ἑντεύθεν ἢ σοτηρία)—he does not think it so distinctively tragic or so effective in Tragedy as the opposite kind of transition, that from happiness to misery (13, 1453a 14 sqq.).

a 14 μεταβαλλέων. The synonym for this in 13, 1453a 2 is μεταπίπτεων. The implied subject of μεταβάλλεις is ‘the tragic hero’; comp. 13, 1452b 34 οὗτοι τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι ἀνδράς δεῖ μεταβάλλοντας φαινεσθαι ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν, and 14, 1453a 1 οὖδ' αὖ τὸν σφόδρα πονηρὸν ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίας μεταπίπτειν.

a 16 μόθος δ' ἐστὶν εἰς κτέ. See Schoemann, Opusc. Acad. 3 p. 31. ὁσπερ τινὲς οἴσται: i.e. certain post-Homeric poets, whose theory apparently is inferred from their practice (comp. a 21).

a 17 πολλὰ καὶ ἀπειρά: De caelo 1. 9, 278a 19 ὄρῳμεν . . . πλεῖον καὶ ἀπειρά ὄντα τὰ ὁμοιειδή. Vahlen (Rh. Mus. 28 p. 184) quotes also Plato Theaet. 159a ἐλέγομεν ὅσ πολλὰ μὲν εἰπ ὅτι ποιοῦτα καὶ ἀπειρά.—Tim. 31α πότερον οὖν ὄρθος ἐνα οὐρανον προστείραμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπειροῦς λέγειν ἢν ὀρθότερον; τῷ ἐνὶ: Phys. 2. 5, 106b 28 τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀόριστον ἀπειρά γὰρ ἄν τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίη. On the strength of this parallel
τῷ ἐν in the present passage is taken as a neuter by Vahlen, who translates the clause accordingly by ‘in unam rem innumeram cadunt’. This interpretation, it seems to me, misses the point—the distinction Aristotle assumes between the many things that befall the individual (πολλὰ τῷ ἐν συμβαίνει), i.e. that he suffers or has done to him, and the many things that he does (πράξεις ἐνὸς πολλαί εἰσον a 18). That τῷ ἐν is masculine here is shown not only by περὶ ἔνα (a 17), πράξεις ἐνὸς (a 18), and ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη (a 25) in the context, but also by the parallel in 23, I459 a 23, ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἔνα ἡ πλείους.

ἔνων, which has been questioned by Spengel and others, is an understatement of a kind not so uncommon in Aristotle (see on 6, I450 a 12). The sense is: In the infinite variety of things that befall the individual in the course of his life there are some [i.e. many] which it is impossible to bring into relation with the rest, as parts of one connected whole. The qualifying ἔνων is like ἔνιοτε in 23, I459 a 27 οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις ἔνιοτε γίνεται βάτερον μετὰ βάτερον, εἴ δὲν ἐν οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος, εἴ δὲν ἔνων has been rendered by ‘ex quorum aliquibus’ (Tyrwhitt), or ‘quorum ex quibusdam’ (Hermann). In the parallel, however, in Dem. 18. 12 περὶ δὲν ἔνων both Weil and Goodwin regard ἔνων as appositional; and the same view has been taken of the word in Dem. 19. 260 (τὰς ἀκροτόλεις αὐτῶν ἔνων), and in Xen. Anab. 6. 6. 34 (περὶ ἵμων ἔνων). Another instance of this same ambiguity is in Meteor. i. 3, 339 θυλὺ καὶ τῶν ἀστρων ἔνων ἑλάττων ἑστίν (comp. L. Dindorf in HSt. s. v. ἔνως). There is a clear instance of the appositional use of ἔνων, in a different case, in Poet. 9, I451 b 19 ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἔνιας μὲν κτῆ.

πάντες οὐκασιν ἀμαρτάνειν: comp. 23, I459 a 29, 37.

Ἡρακλῆδα. Several Ἡράκλεαι were known in antiquity (Kinkel, EGF. i p. 212, 249, 254).

Θησηῆδα: Kinkel, i p. 217.

προσήκειν = ‘must be’, ‘ought to be’ according to the fitness of things, as in Meteor. i. 3, 340 a 26, De anima 1. 5, 411 b 15, Rhet. 2. 2, 1379 b 3, and Plato Rep. 362 c.

Ὁδύσσειν: for the absence of the article see on 4, I448 b 38.

οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἄπαντα δότα αὐτῷ συνέβη: i.e. his poem was not made to cover the whole ground of the life of Ulysses, but only a selected section of it, a limited group of incidents sufficiently

The version in the Paraphrase of Averroes, uni rei multa accidunt, implies the same interpretation.
coherent and connected to form a single action of the requisite kind (μίαν πράξιν οίαν λέγομεν a 28). The unity in the story of the Odyssey, as Aristotle conceives it, may be seen from his survey of the poem in 17, 1455 b 17. The sense of the οίνον πληγήναι μέν, scil. αὐτῶν συνέβη. This and the second incident, μανήναι δὲ προσποιήσασθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγερμῷ, are given as examples of two disconnected events in the life of Ulysses (ὡς οἴδε θατέρον γενομένον ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς θατέρον γενέσθαι, a 27). The antithetic particles (μέν, δὲ) imply a difference between them; the one (πληγήναι) is a πάθος, and the other (μανήναι προσποιήσασθαι) a πράξις —a distinction which the preceding context (see on a 17) shows to have been already present in Aristotle’s mind. I have ventured to restore οἴδε in place of οἴδεν for two reasons, partly because with οἴδεν the verb (γενέσθαι) seems to have two subjects (οἴδεν and θατέρον), and partly because the ὡς being followed by θατέρον and θατέρον naturally refers to the two incidents just mentioned. It has been urged, as one of the difficulties in this statement, that the wounding of Ulysses is actually part of the Odyssey, being described at considerable length in the story of the Discovery in Od. 19, 392–466. The Discovery is certainly part of the action of the Odyssey (v. 17, 1455 b 21), but the incident on Parnassus is in a very different position; it comes in as an episode (v. 17, 1455 b 23), not as one of the series of incidents which form the action of the poem. The action in the Odyssey (summarized in 17, 1455 b 17 sqq.) extends over a space of some six weeks; but the encounter of the boy Ulysses with the boar belonged to a period of his life not covered by the Odyssey. The second incident, his feigned madness, is said to have been part of the story in the Cypria (Kinkel, EGF. p. 18). Bergk (Gr. Litt. 1 p. 711) thinks there may have been some epic in which both incidents were included. The superior unity of the Homeric Epic is emphatically reasserted in 23, 1459 a 30.

a 27 ὡς = ἀλλὰ τούτων.

a 28 μίαν πράξιν οίαν λέγομεν, ‘a single action of the kind we are describing’, i.e. one that forms a coherent and closely connected whole. The opposite of this is the μία πράξεις πολυμερής of the inferior epics (23, 1459 b 1). The reading of Αε, οίαν λέγομεν, may have arisen through ΟΙΑΝ being misread, and taken to stand for οἰ ᾿α.
διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι has been rendered in various ways—Ι451a 34
by 'diversum reddatur vel moveatur' (Victorius), by 'dissolvatur et luxetur' (Heinsius), and by 'differatur et moveatur' (Tyrwhitt).
The general sense is clear: when a part in a whole is removed, by being transferred to another place or withdrawn altogether, the continuity of the whole is broken at that point.
Both διαφέρεσθαι and κινεῖσθαι seem to be (as Heinsius must have seen) metaphors from surgery. διαφέρεσθαι may be regarded as a synonym for διάστασθαι, the term in use in medical Greek for the diastasis of a limb as distinct from a complete luxation (ἐξιστάσθαι or ὀλίσθανεν); comp. Hippocrates 3 p. 132 K. ὅκοσα διάστασαν καὶ ὅκοσα ὄλσάνει.
If this view is correct, the κινεῖσθαι which follows will mean to be 'dislocated'. Hippocrates often has κινεῖσθαι and κίνησιν in the sense of 'displacement' as an equivalent for diastasis (comp. 3 p. 81 K. ἣν δὲ τι κινηθῇ ἐκ τῆς χώρης).
οὐθὲν μόριον: it is not a part of the whole, but an accident or addition to it; comp. De gen. an. 1. 4, 717 a 34 οὐθὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν μόριον τῶν πόρων οἱ ὀρχεῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸςκενταῖ καθὰπερ τὸς λαίας προσάπτουσιν αἰ δραίονον τοῖς ἵστοῖς. In Metaph. Γ 5, 1010 a 30 ὅσοι [scil. ὁ περὶ ἡμᾶς τόπος] οὐθὲν ὃς εἰτεὶ μόριον τοῦ παντὸς ἐστιν, the phrase means practically 'is as nothing compared with', just like οὐθὲν μέρος in Isocrates 90 εἰ τις ἀθρόσει καὶ σκέψατο τᾶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων συμμορφός, οὐθὲν ἄν μέρος οὐσαὶ φανεῖν τῶν . . . ἡμῖν γεγυμένων.

φανερῶν δὲ κτέ. In Aristotle's view a history is a chronicle, or a register, of events taken just as they came in order of time, however separate and disconnected they may have been in themselves (23, 1459 a 21). The present distinction between a history, in this sense of the term, and a poetic story is a corollary to what he lays down in chaps. 7–8 on the unity and logical coherence of the parts in a well-constructed story. The action in such a story is a πρᾶξις μία καὶ ὀλη (a 32), i.e. a whole with a beginning, middle, and end (7, 1450 b 26); each incident resulting from something that goes before it, and the entire series from the state of things presupposed, as the ἄρχη of the whole, at the opening. Given a personage of a certain character and in a certain position as the
beginning of the story, all the rest must be the natural or necessary consequence of this initial situation. Hence it follows that the incidents in the poetic story are not only possible but also always possible, because they are such as may or must happen at any time, whenever the man and the circumstances are found together. Aristotle accordingly notes two great points of contrast between history and poetry: (1) whereas the former is a record of actual events (τὰ γενόμενα), the latter describes rather possible incidents of another kind, τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ ἐκδὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (α 38); (2) whereas the one tells us what is true only of some particular person (or persons) at a particular time, the other tells us something universally true (τὰ καθόλου b 7), something that will hold good at all times of all persons of the same type in a similar set of circumstances.

τὰ δυνατὰ, scil. γενέσθαι (comp. b 32). The qualifying κατὰ τὸ ἐκδός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον excludes the third kind of δυνατά, viz. τὰ γενόμενα. These also are obviously possible (see b 17 and De interpr. 13, 23 a 7), but as mere γενόμενα they belong to history rather than poetry. A little further on, however (b 29), Aristotle explains that under certain conditions even historic incidents may be a legitimate subject for poetry.

ου τὸ ἢ ἐμμετρα λέγειν κτὲ.: see 1, 1447 b 11, where it is shown that metre is only one of the accidents of poetry.

διαφέρει, scil. ὃ ἱστορικὸς τοῦ ποιητοῦ.

σπουδαίτερον is the opposite of φαινότερον. In Plato also σπουδαῖος (v. Ast, Lex. s.v.) is applied to things in the sense of ἄξιος σπουδῆς, 'of serious value or interest', as the opposite of either 'trivial' (φαύλος) or 'ludicrous' (γελοῖος: see on 4, 1448 b 34). Poetry, as Aristotle conceives it, is 'more philosophic', because of the large and generalized view of human nature which it implies; it tells us in effect what all men of a certain character may or must do in a certain set of circumstances, whereas historic truth is limited to particular times and persons. A great master of rhetoric, Diderot, has enlarged on this text in a well-known passage in his Éloge de Richardson (Œuvres t. 3 p. 18 ed. 1821): 'O Richardson! j'oserai dire que l'histoire la plus vraie est pleine de mensonges, et que ton roman est plein de vérités. L'histoire peint quelques individus; tu peins l'espèce humaine: l'histoire attribue à quelques individus ce qu'ils n'ont ni dit, ni fait; tout ce que tu attributes à l'homme, il l'a dit et fait: l'histoire n'embrasse qu'une portion de la durée, qu'un point de la surface du globe; tu
as embrassé tous les lieux et tous les temps. Le cœur humain, qui a été, est et sera toujours le même, est le modèle d’après lequel tu copies. Si l’on appliquait au meilleur historien une critique sévère, y en a-t-il aucun qui la soutint comme toi? Sous ce point de vue, j’oserai dire que souvent l’histoire est un mauvais roman; et que le roman, comme tu l’as fait, est une bonne histoire.

O peintre de la nature! c’est toi qui ne mens jamais.’

μάλλον τὰ καθόλου. μάλλον implies a qualification, which re-appears in another form in b 9 οὐ στοχάζεται ἡ τούτης ἀνώματα ἐπιτεθεμένη. Poetry deals with ‘characters’ rather than actual individuals, and with universal rather than particular truth. Its universality, however, is somewhat disguised by the proper names it attaches to its characters, which acquire in this way a certain resemblance to the real personages of history. A reason for the retention in Tragedy of traditional names is given further on, in b 15.

τὰ καθόλου . . . τὰ καθ’ ἱκαστον. The present explanation of the terms may be compared with that in De interpr. 7. 17 a 39 λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὁ ἐπὶ πλειώνων πέργυκε κατηγορεώσας, καθ’ ἱκαστὸν δὲ ὁ μη, οἶνον ἀνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ’ ἱκαστον: comp. also Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 b 28 οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ’ ἱκαστον, οἶνον ἡ ἱατρική ὢν τὶ Σωκράτει τὸ ἐγενός ἔστιν ἢ Καλλία, ἀλλὰ τὰ τῶν τουφεκὸν ἢ τοῖς τούτοις—2. 4, 1382 a 4 ἢ μὲν ὀργὴ ἂν περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἱκαστα, οἶνον Καλλία ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μύσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη. For a similar use of καθόλου see 17, 1455 b 1. The element of ‘universal’ in Greek Tragedy, as Aristotle understands it, means no more than is indicated in his present distinction between a poem and a history; and it is in no wise peculiar to Tragedy. Aristotle tells us it was to be seen in the Comedy of his time (b 111); and it is found in just the same way in the modern novel—even in the historical and in the so-called realistic novel. In all these forms of imaginative literature the personages are, as we say, ‘characters’, in other words, ideal personalities, made to act and speak in accordance with the law of character which the author has assumed for each. The novel, however (owing in some degree to its length), admits of characters of a subtlety and complexity which would have been simply impossible in the ancient Drama. The Greek dramatist was practically restricted to the larger and more obvious types of character, which did not require much explanation to make them intelligible to his public in the brief space of time allotted to his work.
COMMENETARY

1451\textsuperscript{b} 10 ὄνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη = καύσερ ὄνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη; comp. 25, 1461\textsuperscript{a} 30 οὐ πινόντων οἶνον. The characters in the Drama are 'universals', i.e. types of character rather than actual individuals; that is what poetry really means them to be, notwithstanding the individualizing proper names it attaches to them. The alternative rendering of ὄνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη, 'in giving names to its personages' ('dum nomina imponit', Heinsius), would imply that the names were definitely chosen as significant of character. This would be true to some extent of those in Comedy (see infra on \textsuperscript{b} 13 τὰ τυχόντα ὄνόματα), but not of those in Tragedy. As abstracts of character the personages ought to have general names, like those in Theophrastus, instead of the individualizing proper names given them in Drama.

For the use of the middle verb in this connexion comp. 21, 1457\textsuperscript{b} 34 and Homer Od. 8. 552 οὐ μὲν γὰρ τις πάμπαν ἄνωνυμος ἐστιν ἀθρόωνων . . . ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πᾶς τίθεται, ἐπεὶ κε τέκως, τοκῆς.

\textsuperscript{b} 12 ἦδη: i.e. now that the New Comedy has taken the place of the Old (see on 5, 1449\textsuperscript{b} 8), Comedy instead of satirizing individuals (like Cleon or Socrates) tells imaginary stories of imaginary personages labelled with imaginary names.

\textsuperscript{b} 13 διὰ τῶν εἰκότων. The same use of the preposition is found in 26, 1462\textsuperscript{a} 16 διὰ ᾧ ὡς αἱ ὑδωραὶ συνίσταται. It denotes the basis or chief ingredient in a compound, as it often does in later Greek, e.g. in expressions like τὸ διὰ ἀλών, τὸ διὰ κολοκυνθίδος, etc. in the medical writers; comp. also Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 14 R. διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων τε καὶ ταυτευνοτάτων ὄνομάτων πέπλεκται πᾶσα ἡ λεξίς.

οὐτω, the reading of Α, is too idiomatic to be lightly surrendered (comp. Bon. Ind. 546\textsuperscript{b} 13). The Arabic version is said to imply not οὐτω but οὗ; the same Arabic word, however, which Dr. Margoliouth renders by nequaquam, would seem to occur also in the Arabic text in 6, 1450\textsuperscript{a} 30, where it may be taken to represent οὐτω. One may suspect, therefore, that the Greek reading before the Syriac translator in the present passage was οὐτω, a mere corruption of οὐτω.

τὰ τυχόντα ὄνόματα. Ritter has a note here on the names of the characters in the New Comedy. Aristotle's point is this. In the Old Comedy the names of the chief characters were already fixed and prescribed for the poet, because actually borne by the persons whom he wished to satirize. Socrates, Cleon, Agathon, Euripides are instances of such names in Aristophanes. But in the New Comedy the names were not thus fixed. In calling a
soldier Thraso or Pyrgopolinices, for instance, the poet did not mean to satirize some actual person of that name; the name was a matter of choice or accident—invented it may be by the poet himself, or borrowed by him from his predecessors or from life. Such names may no doubt be stock-names, or have a certain conventional or etymological appropriateness as suggestive of certain types of character (comp. Dieterich, Pulcinella p. 45); but they obviously stand on quite a different footing from the real names in Aristophanes. Names also like Phormio, Chremes, Menedemus, etc., were in Comedy fictitious names, though outside Comedy they may have been borne by real persons (comp. on b 21).

υποτίθεαν, 'lay down as a foundation,' so that the story may look like one founded on fact (comp. 17, 1455 b 12).

ιαμβοποιοί: see on 4, 1448 b 27 and 5, 1449 b 8.

τῶν γενομένων ὄνομάτων ἀντέχωνται: comp. Evanthis De Comedia 4, 2 (Kaibel, CGF. r p. 66) omnis comedia de fictis est argumentis; tragoeidia saepe ab historicis fide petitur. The reading γενομένων has been questioned, but (as it seems to me) without sufficient reason. τὰ γενόμενα ὄνοματα are the already existing names, as fixed in history or legend (γυνόματα b 20), in contradistinction to a newly-invented name (comp. τὰ ὄνοματα πεποίηται b 22), or one which, whether new or not, is arbitrarily assigned to a character by the poet (τὰ τυχόντα ὄνοματα b 13) at the time of writing.

πιθανόν (comp. πιστεῖόμεν in the next line) is the Greek equivalent of our modern term 'convincing', and practically synonymous with εἰκός (comp. 24, 1460 a 27) and εὑδοχόν (Bon. Ind. 593 a 45). The word was sufficiently established to be applied even by Xenophon to a work of art which has a look of life and reality: Mem. 3. 10, 7 ομοίωτερα τε τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καὶ πιθανώτερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι. In 17, 1455 a 30 πιθανός is said of a person, the poet who writes 'convincingly'. The adv. πιθανῶς has the same sense in Aristophanes Thesm. 266 ἀνὴρ μὲν ἡμῶν ὑποτιθέοι καὶ δὴ γυνὴ τὸ γ' εἴδος· ἦν λαλήσ δ', ὅπως τῷ φθέγματι γυναικεῖς εὖ καὶ πιθανῶς ('play the woman well and convincingly').

ἐνίας: see on 8, 1451 a 18 for this appositional use of the word.

'Ἀνθέθ' was first suggested, somewhat tentatively, by Welcker in his Gr. Tragödien p. 995. 'The Flower' would certainly be a very strange title for a Greek tragedy. The play being on a purely fictitious story, the names also of the characters, instead of being taken over from legend or history, were fictions, and due to the choice of the poet himself. But they need not be supposed
1451 b 21 to have been new or newly-coined names. Ἄνθεως, for instance, seems to have been known already in mythical history as the name of certain legendary personages; and not so very long after Agathon's time it was actually borne by an Athenian citizen (Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica 953). In this respect, therefore, it was in just the same position as so many of the names in Comedy, Chremes, Menedemus, Phormio, and the like.

b 23 εὑραίνει: an incidental recognition of pleasure as the immediate end of Tragedy (see 14, 1453 b 12, and Döring, Kunstlehe des Aristoteles p. 104). εὑραίνειν serves as a transitive to χαίρειν: Top. 2. 6, 112 b 21 εἰ καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συμβεβηκός ἐθηκεν ὡς ἐτέρων διὰ τὸ ἔτερον εἶναι ὄνομα, καθάπερ Πρόδικος διήρετο τὰς ἱδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τῆς ἱδονῆς, ὄνοματά ἐστιν. εἰ οὖν τις τὸ χαίρειν τῷ εὑραίνεσθαι φησί συμβεβηκέναι, αὐτὸ ἄν αὐτῷ φαίνη συμβεβηκέναι.—Eth. E. 3. 2, 1231 a 6 τῶν ὀσμῶν ταύτας χαίροντας ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκός εὑραί-
νονον. The word may describe the pleasurable effect of anything, e.g. that of a painting (Poes. 6, 1450 b 2), of music (Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 24), and of odours (Eth. E. l. c.; Rhet. 3. 4, 1407 a 10).

ὦστ᾽ οὗ πάντως ἄν εἰήν ἡμητέρου. Spengel suggested that the εἶναι of the MS. should be bracketed. In these negative statements of result with ὥστε οὗ, which are so common in Aristotel, the verb is usually either in the indicative, (1) expressed or (2) understood, or (3) in the potential optative, as the following passages from the Organon may suffice to show: (1) An. pr. 1. 36, 48 a 36 ὥστε οὗ ἐσται μέσον τοῦ Ἀ Β.—Top. 8. 11, 151 b 30 ὥστε οὗ τῷ ταῖτ' εἶναι γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμὸς [comp. Poet. 22, 1458 b 15]. (2) An. pr. 1. 32, 47 a 35 ὥστ' οὗ ἐστι τι συμβαίνει συνεδέων τινών, πειρατέον ἀνάγεων εὐθύς.—Top. 6. 5, 142 a 4 ὥστ' ὅστε πρός τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ὁ αὐτὸς ὁμοιῶς ἀποδοτέος [comp. Metaph. Z 12, 1038 a 12]. (3) An. post. 1. 12, 77 b 12 ὥστ' οὗ ἄν εἴη ἐν ἀγεωμετρήτως περὶ γεωμετρίας διακλέτων.—An. pr. 1. 16, 36 a 14 ὥστε οἴδειν ὃ οὖ παντὶ τῷ Γ τῷ Β ἐνδέχεται ἄν ὑπάρχειν.—Top. 6. 12, 149 b 2 ὥστ' οὗ ἄν εἴη χρώμα πιρὶ μεμεγένεν.—Soph. el. 6, 168 b 4 ὥστ' εἰ ὁ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός τις, οὗ ἄν εἴη ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἔλεγχος. Two instances of ἐναί for ἄν εἴη are to be found in MSS. of great antiquity and value, one in Par. A of Plato (Tim. 17 b), and the other in K b of the Nicomachean Ethics (8. 2, 1155 b 20). The error may have arisen either from the omission of ἄν, a word very apt to be lost in MSS., or through ὥστ' οὗ being misread and turned into ὃς τοῦ (as it has been in fact in Αο).
tā γνώριμα δλίγοις γνώριμά ἐστιν. It may be observed here that Antiphanes, who belonged to the generation before Aristotle, was not of the same opinion on this point (v. fr. 191 Kock).

δήλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων refers back to the distinction drawn in the earlier part of the chap. (I 451 b 1-5) between a poetic story and a history; a history was said to be still a history even if put into a metrical form. From this Aristotle once more (v. I. 1447 b 11) draws the conclusion that the story is a more essential part of a poem than the language or versification.

ὅσων ποιητής κτέ. is added as a further reason for regarding the story (rather than the verse) as the great and essential thing in a poem. The argument, which might have been more clearly stated, tacitly assumes what we have been told of the μῦθος and its pre-eminent importance in chap. 6. The poet’s function, says Aristotle, is to imitate (ποιητής κατὰ τὴν μύμησιν), and it is actions that he imitates (μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις): but the μῦθος in a poem is what represents the action (τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μύμησις, 6, 1450 a 4); the μῦθος therefore is the poet’s first business, and he must be accordingly a ποιητὴς τῶν μύθων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν μέτρων.

ποιητής κατὰ τὴν μύμησιν: I, 1447 b 15 οἷς ὡς κατὰ τὴν μύμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῆς κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες. Vahlen, in the discussion on this chapter in his Beiträge, maintains that μύμησις may involve the idea of a poetic reconstruction of the traditional materials: ‘Also die nach dem Gesetz der Wahrscheinlichkeit und Notwendigkeit vollzogene dichterische Umbildung (μύμησις) des gegebenen, von Sage oder Geschichte überlieferten Stoffes macht den dramatischen Dichter aus’ (Beitr. I p. 29). Such a meaning can hardly be ascribed to μύμησις (see on I, 1447 a 16); it is rather part of the general idea of ποιητής (see on I, 1447 b 23), which in the case of a traditional story implies a certain free handling of the materials to adapt them to the purposes of poetry (comp. 14, 1453 b 25).

καὶ ἄρα συμβῆ γενόμενα ποιεῖν. Up to this point the subject of a poem has been assumed to be always a μῦθος, a fictitious story (see on 5, 1449 b 9), either invented by the poet himself (b 12, b 21) or adapted from legend. Aristotle, however, now remembers that there may be such a thing as an historical play, one with incidents taken from actual history (γενόμενα). Such incidents, he explains, are legitimate subjects for poetry, if they admit of being exhibited as probable and natural, as well as actual occurrences. It is only
in this aspect, and on this condition, that they are admissible in poetry; as so many mere facts they belong to the domain of history. καὶ ἄρα = καὶ εἰν ἄρα, the ἄρα implying that the supposition is not very probable (Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 324).

b 33 τὸν δὲ ἀπλῶν μύθων κτέ. An episodic story, as here defined, offends against the rule of unity and consecutiveness of incident laid down in chap. VIII. Aristotle’s theory is that in a well-constructed story every incident is wanted (8, 1451 a 32); so that a plot with irrelevant incidents violates a fundamental principle of dramatic construction. Plots of this faulty kind, he adds, are sometimes produced even by good poets through the practical exigencies of the theatre; as a play is expected to be of a certain length, if the story proves too short, it may have to be artificially lengthened out by the insertion of superfluous episodes. Tyrwhitt points to the Prometheus as an instance of this: ‘Fabulae ἐπεισοδιώδους luculentum satis exemplum habemus Prometheus Aeschyl. Episodia enim Oceani, 284–396. et Iūs, 563–885. nec inter se, neque cum fabula principali ullam habent connexionem aut necessarium aut verismilem . . . Satis manifestum est et Io et Oceanum, et ipsas etiam Oceanidas, quae chorum constituant, in id tantum sine ullâ verismilitudine induci, ut argumentum tenue in iustam Tragoediae magnitudinem extendant.’ The episodic plot is mentioned here because of its resemblance to a history, since its incidents have no more necessary interconnexion than those in a chronicle. The paragraph, therefore, is a very natural sequel to the preceding discussion (b 1–32); and it is in its right place where it stands. Those who wish to find another place for it do so mainly on the ground that the text presupposes the distinction between the ἀπλῶς and the πεπληγμένος μύθος explained in the next chapter. This anticipatory use of a technical term, however, is not so uncommon in Aristotle. Thus—to say nothing of his use of κάθαρσις in 6, 1449 b 28—we find him talking of περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις or ἀναγνωρισμός in 6, 1450 a 34 and 10, 1452 a 16, and giving an explanation of them afterwards in chap. XI. Besides this it has to be remembered that the expression ἀπλῶς μύθος need not be assumed to have been an invention of Aristotle’s; for it may very well have been merely adopted by him as one of the already existing terms of dramatic criticism (see infra on ἐπεισοδιώδεις, and on 6, 1449 b 33, 1450 a 34). Another difficulty was found in the text by Tyrwhitt, who proposed to remove it by reading τὸν δὲ ἄλλων μύθων, a suggestion which the Arabic Version is believed to
confirm. The traditional reading τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν μύθων is supposed to restrict the fault in question to the ἀπλοῖς μύθοις, whereas the same fault was no doubt quite possible in the πεπλεγμένους μύθοις also. No such restriction, however, is involved in the text. All that Aristotle implies here is a distinction between the worst form of the ἀπλοῖς μύθοις and the worst form of the πεπλεγμένοις μύθοις. The worst fault in the one is the irrelevant episode. That in the other is no doubt the ἀναγράφοντας δία σημείων, which is so emphatically condemned in 16, 1454 b 20 as the least artistic of Discoveries.

ἐπεισοδιώδεις. An ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος is a plot in which the continuity of the action is not maintained. That the term was fairly established in this sense is shown by the metaphorical use of it in Metaph. A 10, 1076 a 1 ἐπεισοδιώδης τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ὑπόν ποιοῦντι ὑθέν γἀρ ἡ ἐτέρα τῇ ἐτέρᾳ συµβάλλεται ὑστα ἡ μὴ ὑστα. — N 3, 1090 b 19 ὁκ ἐπεισοδιώδης ὑστα ... ἄσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγῳδία.

τὰ ἐπεισοδία: for the origin of the term see on 12, 1452 b 20. In this definition of the ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος, as also in 4, 1449 a 28 and 18, 1456 a 31, ἐπεισοδιών has the technical sense given it in 12, 1452 b 20 ἐπεισοδιών δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγῳδίας τὸ μεταξὺ ὅλον χωρικῶν μελῶν, 'an episode is all that comes in in the interspace between two entire choral songs'. In other words the ἐπεισοδία together with the πρόλογος and ἔξοδος are the acted parts of the play, the 'acts', as we should say. The term, however, often has the more general meaning of an 'insertion'; a sense which takes us back to the early days of the Drama, when Tragedy was still essentially choral, and the episode, or acted part, was only a sort of interlude in the singing. There are several instances even in the Poetics of this sense of the word. In 17, 1455 b 13 the accessories worked into the story are termed 'episodes' —the process of working them in being ἐπεισοδιών (v. 17, 1455 b 1; 24, 1459 b 30); and in 23, 1459 a 36 the Catalogue of the Ships is said to be one of the 'episodes' in the Iliad. The adj. ἐπεισοδιώδης in the present context involves the same notion; the ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος is one with acts or incidents inserted into it, i.e. only loosely connected with the main course of the story.

ὑποκριτάς. κρητᾶς, the reading of certain of the apographs, has an air of plausibility, but it is difficult to see how the judges, whatever their weaknesses, could be responsible for the particular fault under consideration, the undue lengthening out of the story through the insertion of irrelevant episodes. The statement in
1451 b 37 the text has to be read in the light of that in 7, 1451 a 6, where Aristotle draws a distinction between the theoretical and the practical limit of length, and explains that the latter depends on conditions imposed by the public performances (πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν). As every play, as an acting play (comp. ἀγωνισματα in the context), has by custom to be of a certain length, the poet, if his story proves too short, may have to spin it out (παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες) by the insertion of additional incidents, which will break the sequence of the story (διαστρέφειν τὸ ἐφεξῆς, 1452 a 1). διὰ τοὺς ἐποκριτάς, 'with a view to the actors,' may be taken as equivalent to διὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, 'because the play has to be acted' (comp. Ueberweg ad loc.); the more concrete form of expression makes an antithesis to the δε' αὐτοῖς in b 36. A much less probable interpretation of these words is that the actors are assumed to put pressure on the poet to make him provide them with parts of sufficient importance.


b 38 παρατείναντες. The story being too short, they stretch it out, as it were, to make it fill up the time. This can only be done in two ways, either by a diffuse treatment of the incidents (comp. 26, 1462 b 2–7), or by the insertion of additional incidents not wanted for the main purpose of the story. A similar combination of a present and an aorist participle is found in 16, 1455 a 2 ἄκοινοι . . . καὶ μνησθείς, and in 22, 1458 b 19 ποιήσαντος . . . μετατιθέντος.

1452 a 1 διαστρέφειν . . . τὸ ἐφεξῆς: comp. Aeschylus Suppl. 1017 ἦχος τὸ πρόσθεν οὗ διαστρέψα φρενός. The sense is that a side incident is introduced, one not in the natural course of the story—not in line with the rest.

ἀναγκάζονται. They do so because they cannot help it, not like the inferior order of poets, through their own fault (δε' αὐτοῖς). For another instance of ἀναγκάζεσθαι see 14, 1454 b 12.

a 3 καὶ μάλιστα. The καί emphasizes μάλιστα (comp. De sensu 3, 440 b 12; De part. an. 1. 5, 643 a 24; also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 133). At this point Aristotle recognizes a new element of interest in Tragedy, the element of surprise, but only incidentally, in order to bring it under the canon of construction laid down in
chap. 7. The ἕβερα καὶ ἀλευνά of Tragedy, he says, have the 1452 a 3 very great effect on the mind, when they come in unexpectedly, but at the same time as the natural or necessary consequence of incidents within the play itself (ὅτι ἄλληλα).

τὸ θεαματον, the element of the marvellous, is recognized as a 4 a legitimate source of interest in Tragedy in 24, 1460 a 12. Teichmüller has a lengthy discussion on it (Aristotelische Forschungen 2 p. 282 sqq.).

ὁυτως, i.e. if they come about ὅτι ἄλληλα, through incidents in a 5 the preceding part of the play.

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ τῆς τύχης. Aristotle treats the two terms here as synonyms, though a distinction is drawn between them in Phys. 2. 4—6 (Bon. Ind. 780 b 33; comp. Torstrik, Hermes 9 p. 425).

ὡπερ ἐπίτηδες: De caelo 2. 8, 290 a 33 ὅ φύσις... ἐοικεν ὡσπερ a 7 ἐπίτηδεσ ἀφελέων πάντα δι' ὅν ἐνδεχέστερο προϊναι καθ' αὐτά.

αὐδρίας ὅ τοῦ Μίτυνος κτέ. Excerpted by the compiler of the a 8 De mirab. ausc. 156, 846 a 22. The same story is told, apparently from another source, by Plutarch, De supernum. vind. 553 d και τὸ Μίτυνος τοῦ Ἀργείων κατὰ στασιν ἀναιρεθέντος ἀνδρώντα χαλκοῦ ἐν ἀγορὰ. θέασ ὁυσιν ἐμπεσεῖν τῷ κτείναντι τὸν Μίτυν καὶ ἄνελεων. A certain Mitys of Argos is mentioned in [Demosethenes] 59, 33 in connexion with an occurrence which took place in b. c. 374.

τεφορούντι is usually understood to mean 'when he was looking a 9 at it' ('spectanti incidentis,' Tyrwhitt; comp. Bon. Ind. 328 a 5). But as the parallel in Plutarch has θέασ ὁυσιν, Dacier would seem to be right in translating it by 'au milieu d' une grande fête', taking it in the sense of 'being present at a τεφορία, or public spectacle'.

ὡτε: see on 7, 1451 a 3.

εἰς δὲ τῶν μύθων κτέ. Chap. 10 is a sequel to 9. 1452 a 1—11, a 12 and an application of its results. The real point is not in the formalistic distinction between the two kinds of μύθοι, with which it opens (a 12—18), but in the assertion that follows, viz. that even the complex story comes under the general canon of construction laid down in chap. 7, and that the element of surprise (the ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτεια) must be, like everything else in a play, part of the unity of the whole, the natural or necessary consequence of something before it (ἐκ τῶν προγενεθμένων a 19).

εὑδος: see on 5, 1449 a 36.

ὡπερ ὁμεται, i.e. in chaps. 7—8.

περιπέτειας ἡ ἀναγνώρισι: see on 6, 1450 a 34. Both terms are explained in the next chapter.
δὲ λέεις. The editors generally acquiesce in the corrected reading δὲ ἢς, in lieu of which Vahlen has δὲ ἐστιν ἢς, and Sussemihl ὥστιν ἢς. I have suggested that Aristotle may possibly have written πεπλεγμένν ὅ ἤ λεγω ἢς, on the supposition that λέεις may be taken to represent λεγὼς.

ταῦτα, i.e. ἄναγγεωρμός and περιπέτεια.

If any correction is wanted, αὐτά or τὰ μετ’ αὐτά is perhaps simpler than either τὰ ὑστερα (Gomperz) or τὰναντία (Bonitz)—though this last has certainly the great advantage of supplying an easy explanation of the καθάπερ εἰρηται in 11, 1452a23. The objection to ταῦτα is its supposed inelegance and superfluity. It is not more inelegant, however, than the γίγνεσθαι that immediately precedes it (ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι . . . ὡστε . . . γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα); and its apparent superfluity is a common phenomenon with demonstratives in Greek (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.3 2. 1 p. 660).

διαφέρει τὸ γίγνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἢ μετὰ τάδε. Aristotle's construction after διαφέρει is not always quite the same as that in the present passage. (1) The disjunctive is sometimes doubled: Rhet. 1. 15, 1375b20 οὐδέν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεύθαι ἢ μὴ χρήσθαι [comp. Poet. 9, 1451b1; 18, 1456a30]. (2) It may be replaced by a καί: An. post. 1. 11, 77a13 τὸ δὲ μέσον οὐδέν διαφέρει εἶναι καλ᾽ ἢ εἶναι καλσεῖν—or by τε καί: Soph. el. 18, 177a6 διαφέρει δὲ πλείστων ἐρωτάμενον τε καὶ μὴ λέειν λόγον. (3) A clause also with εἰ may take the place of one with the infinitive: De interpr. 9, 18b36 οὐδὲ τούτῳ διαφέρει εἰ τινὲς εἴπον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἢ μὴ εἴπον.—Soph. el. 17, 176a6 οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτῳ διαφέρει ἢ εἰ ἤρετο κτὲ. [comp. Poet. 18, 1456a30].

περιπέτεια, as a stage-term, seems to mean a complete change or reversal of situation within the limits of a single scene or act [v. Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 168]. Apart from the stage it has the sense of a sudden change of fortune in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371b10, καὶ εἰ περιπέτειαι [τραπελίναι μεταλλήσεις, Goulston] καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν σφέξεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κυνήσεων [scil. ἤδυ]. πάντα γὰρ βαγμαστὰ ταῦτα; and that of a reversal of the natural order of things in H. A. 8. 2, 590b131. This same idea of an unforeseen reversal of fortune is implied also in the adj. περιπέτεις in Herod. 8. 20 περιπέτεα τε ἐποιήσαντο σφόδρα αὐτοῖς τὰ πρήγματα, and in

1 Bekker's punctuation of this passage requires to be amended, as the whole statement from καὶ τις συμβαίνει in b13 to σαρκοφάγα ἐστιν in b20 is a digression. The clause that precedes it, οἱ δὲ κάραβιν κρατοῦσι μὲν τῶν μεγάλων ἱχθών (b12), is answered by νέμοντα δ' οἱ κάραβοι τὰ ἱχθύδια in b20.
Eurip. Andr. 982 περιπέτειας ἔχεις τόχας, καὶ ἐυμφοράν τίνος ἐστελεύοντ' 1452 a 22 ἄμφωον. Every tragedy, according to Aristotle (7, 1451 a 13), describes a transition from happiness to misery or vice versa; but in the 'complex story' the change, however gradual it may be, seems to the hero to come upon him all at once, by a sudden reversal of the state of things; he thinks himself a happy man (let us say) at the beginning of an act, and a miserable man at the end of it. It has been argued, however, by Vahlen (Beitr. 2 p. 6), and more recently by Dr. Lock (Class. Rev. 9, 251) 1, that a περιπέτεια in Aristotle's sense of the term is something different from this—that it is conceived as arising when a man's actions (τῶν πραττομένων) are found to have consequences the direct opposite of what the agent meant or expected. The language in a 25 (v. ad loc.) hardly justifies such a very artificial interpretation of a word like περιπέτεια, which must be presumed to have been already an established and well-understood term of dramatic technique (see on 6, 1450 a 34, and comp. 10, 1452 a 15). If we refrain from putting pressure on isolated points, the general sense and connexion of ideas in Aristotle's statement is sufficiently clear. He begins by assuming (1) a working definition of περιπέτεια (ὑπειράνσι τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή καθάπερ εἰρηταὶ), with an addition to remind us (2) that even an incident like this (καὶ τοῦτο δὲ) is in a well-constructed play κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ὡς τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, i.e. the natural or necessary consequence of antecedents in the story (10, 1452 a 18–20), as it is for instance (3) in the Oedipus Tyrannus (a 24–26), and (4) in the Lyceus (a 27–29). In the O. T. the sudden fall of Oedipus is the consequence of the revelation of his parentage (ἡλώσας δὲ ἤν a 26), and the revelation of his parentage the consequence of the presence of the messenger from Corinth (ἐλθὼν a 25). Similarly in the Lyceus the sudden change of situation—the salvation of Lyceus and death of his enemy (a 29)—is the consequence of certain incidents in a previous act (συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων a 28). This second instance—which seems to be added as a reminder that the περιπέτεια may be a turn for good (comp. τὸν δὲ σωθὴναι a 29) as well as a turn for evil—is too clearly described to leave any opening for any subtleties of interpretation. Aristotle's language puts before us an act or scene, which begins with Lyceus being led off for execution (ὡς ἀποθανοῦμενον a 27) and ends with his salvation (σωθήναι a 29). This was the περιπέτεια—the εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή (a 22)—of the Lyceus;

1 Pye anticipated this suggestion in his Commentary on the present passage.
and as it came about according to Aristotle through incidents in the preceding portion of the play (συνεβη έκ των πεπραγμένων a 28), it was in conformity with the great law of construction laid down in the preceding chapter and elsewhere.

καθάπερ εἰρήται may be taken (with Vahlen) as κατὰ τοῦς εἰρημένους τρόπους, i.e. εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἢ εἰς δυστυχίαν, as was said in 7, 1451 a 13, and tacitly assumed in 6, 1450 a 3, a 17. If we accept Bonitz's correction in 10, 1452 a 20, the reference will be to that passage.

καὶ τούτῳ δὲ κτέ. By omitting the stop before these words Vahlen makes them part of the definition of περιπέτεια. But it is much more natural to take them as an additional clause, like that in 10, 1452 a 18 ταῦτα δὲ δὲ γίνεσθαι κτέ.—in which case the illustrations from the O.T. and Lynceus are given as instances not of περιπέτεια in general, but of the kind of περιπέτεια which accords with Aristotelian principles of construction.

ὡσπερ λέγομεν: 'in the way we are saying', what follows being the explanation of this. The reference is to the formula at the end of chap. 10, ἢ εὖ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα.

tὸ Οἰδίποδε: Soph. O.T. 924. The Oedipus Coloneus is never mentioned in the Poetics or elsewhere in Aristotle.

εἶδον κτέ. 'Bene factum est quod ipsam tragocidiam adhuc superstitem habemus, nam alioqui ex Aristotelis verbis credere deberemus Nuntium eo consilio venisse ut Oedipum a metu circa matrem liberaret' (Tyrwhitt). It is to be remembered that the Messenger in the O.T. arrives in the scene (911–1085) preceding the peripety (1110–1185). Even after the announcement of the death of Polybus Oedipus is not quite freed from his old anxieties, as Merope, his supposed mother, is still living; all further disquietude on that account the Messenger seeks to allay by his assurance that Oedipus was no son of Merope but a foundling, whom he had himself received from one of the servants of Laius. This disclosure is enough for Iocasta (1056); but neither Oedipus nor the chorus has as yet any suspicion of its import. It is only in the next scene (1110–1185) that he learns the whole truth, and thus falls, all at once as it were, from happiness into misery. This is in brief the peripety in the O.T.; and it is, as Aristotle says, the natural result of the arrival of the Messenger and his disclosure in the preceding scene. Vahlen and others point to this passage, έλθων δὲ εἰδρανών ... τοιναντιόν ἐποίησεν, as evidence for their contention, that a peripety is said to take place when something
done by a man with a certain end in view has consequences of a directly opposite kind. If that were the meaning, the peripety in the O.T. would surely be a fact in the life of the Messenger, not the turning-point in that of Oedipus.

εὑφρανὼν: O.T. 934 sqq.

ἀπαλλάξων κτέ.: O.T. 989 sqq.

δηλώσας δς ἢν: O.T. 1016 sqq. It is this that leads to the examination of the Servant in the following scene, which is the immediate cause of the catastrophe.

τοῦναντίον: not the opposite of what the man intended, but the changed situation. The meaning is sufficiently shown by the use of τὸ ἐναντίον in the first line of the chapter.

Λυγκεί: the Lynceus of Theocritus; comp. 18, 1455 b 29 and Nauck, TGF. It is clear from Aristotle's account that it must have been a play with a 'double plot' (v. 13, 1453 a 30).

τὸν μὲν συνεβὴ κτέ. The construction is changed in order to show that the new situation was the result of something that had gone before, some incident in a preceding scene (συνεβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων).

τῶν πεπραγμένων: comp. 10, 1452 a 19 ὡστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενεμένων συμβαίνειν κτέ., and 18, 1455 b 30 δεσις μὲν τά τε προπεπραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λήψις.

ἀναγνώρισις. Aristotle has already laid it down in 10, 1452 a 18 that the Discovery should arise ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συντάσσως τοῦ μύθου, and he does not repeat his rule in the present chapter. He assumes that in a 37 ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου, and also later on, in chap. 16, which is a sort of appendix to this discussion (see esp. 16, 1455 a 16).


περιπέτεια. The plural is used, just as in 6, 1450 a 34, 18, 33 1456 a 19, 24, 1459 b 10, to denote the concrete instances of περιπέτεια, as actual incidents in plays. The formal incongruity of number in the juxtaposition of ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτεια in the present passage is certainly not greater than that in 9, 1451 b 3 μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων, or Thuc. 2. 4. 2 λέθοις τε καὶ κεράμῳ βαλλόντων. See also the instances quoted on 19, 1456 b 1 (μέγαθος καὶ μικρότητα).

οἶαν. Bon. Ind. 50 a 26 would restore οἶαν for οἶον in Magna mor. 2. 8, 1207 b 18. If (with Vahlen) we retain the MS. reading
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1452\a 33 οἶνον (= e. g.), it becomes necessary to understand περιπέτειαν after ἔχει.

η ἐν τῷ Ὠδίποδι, scil. ἀναγνώρισις.

a 34 πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα. The καί here means ‘even’, not ‘and’, as is often assumed by the interpreters. Aristotle distinguishes between three possible forms of Discovery, according as it relates to (1) persons, (2) things, or (3) acts or deeds. In dealing with the second form he adds that the things recognized may be even of a very casual kind, καί τὰ τυχόντα—thinking perhaps of objects like certain of the σημεία mentioned in 16, 1454\b 21 sqq.

a 35 ἔστιν ὡς ὅπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει. If we adopt Vahlen’s suggestion, ἔστιν, ὃς ὅπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει, we have to dissever τὰ τυχόντα from ἄψυχα, and take ὃς ὅπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει as an explanation of it. It is not easy to see how τὰ τυχόντα, i.e. concrete things of some sort or other, can be said to ‘happen’ or ‘come about’ (συμβαίνει) in a particular way. Spengel’s reading ὅπερ εἴρηται aptly recalls the idea of ἀναγνώρισις as defined at the beginning of this paragraph, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνώσιν μεταβολῆν ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν. As this recognition of ‘things’ however is not a μεταβολή εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, but at best only a means to that, Aristotle throws in the qualifying ἔστιν ὡς (‘in a way’, ‘in a sense’) —an expression that always implies some reserve or limitation; comp. Phys. 2. 5. 197\a 10 ἔστιν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τύχης δοξεῖν ἂν γίγνεσθαι.—De anima 3. 2. 425\b 22 καὶ τὸ ὄρον ἔστιν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται.—De mem. 1. 450\b 20 ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνει τοῦτο;—Eth. N. 5. 12, 1136\b 30 καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτεῖναι. The construction πρὸς ἄψυχα συμβαίνει is sufficiently assured by the parallel in Pol. 7. 17, 1336\b 31 συμβαίνει δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμολίας καὶ πρὸς τῶν πραγμάτων—where ταῦτα τοῦτο recalls a previous statement just in the same way as the ὅπερ εἴρηται in the amended text of the present passage (comp. J. of Phil. 14 p. 45).

a 36 πέπραγε is transitive, as often in Aristotle, if our existing texts are to be trusted (comp. Bon. Ind. 632\a 17).

ἀναγνώρισαί: see on \b 5.

a 37 μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου: comp. 10, 1452\a 18 γίνεσθαι εἰς αὐτῆς τῆς συντάσεως τοῦ μύθου. As the relationship between the parties is presupposed, the discovery of it in the course of the play is a very natural kind of incident.

μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως is explained by what follows, ἕ γαρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισι κτε.
II. 1452 a 33—1452 b 5

η ἐλεον ἐξει ἡ φόβον. The grammatical subject is ἀναγνώρισις, 1452 a 38 καὶ περιπέτεια being overlooked (see on 26, 1462 a 16). The Discovery will produce pity, when it synchronizes with the πάθος or anguish of the hero, as it does in the O. T.; but may also only suggest the coming of evil, in which case it will arouse fear. It is to be remembered that pity arises through the spectacle of suffering actually present and before us; whereas fear is apprehension of evil still to come (see on 13, 1452 b 32).

εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν κτέ. is a further reason for b 2 saying that the discovery of relationships is ἡ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως (a 37). If the play has a happy ending, like the Lyceus (ⁿ 27) or the Iphigenia in Tauris for instance, such a Discovery will be a very natural way of bringing that about; and it is equally natural in the O. T. and other plays with an unhappy ending.

tινῶν ἔστιν ἀναγνώρισις. For the emphatic position of the in- b 3 definite pronoun comp. Soph. el. 13, 173 b 3 ἡ τε ὅρεις τινὸς ὅρεις καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τινὸς ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τινὸς διπλάσιον.

ἀναγνωρίσαι, scil. τίνες εἰσίν (to be supplied from the preceding b 5 δὴ λος ἄτερος τὸς ἔστιν), 'to reveal who they are', 'to make themselves known'—not as Tyrwhitt renders it, 'se invicem agnoscre'. The simple verb γνωρίζεω has (just like our English 'discover') two meanings, that of 'to learn' (= γιγνώσκεω) and that of 'to make known' (= γνώρισιν ποιεῖν or δηλοῦν). The first sense reappears in certain of the compounds (προγνωρίζεω, συγγνωρίζεω), and the second in others (διαγνωρίζεω, ἐπιγνωρίζεω). ἀναγνωρίζεω recalls both senses of γνωρίζεω, sometimes meaning 'to recognize', and sometimes 'to reveal'. (1) It means to 'recognize' in 14, 1453 b 31 ἀναγνωρίσαι τήν φιλίαν, and (with φιλίαν or some such word understood) in 14, 1453 b 35, 1454 a 3, 6, 8. This is the sense of ἀναγνωρισόντος also in 16, 1455 a 15—where τὸ τόξον is understood, as the context (τὸ τόξον γνώσεσθαι) will show; and of ἀναγνωρίσαι in 11, 1452 a 35 τ ἡ πέπραγε τίς ἡ μὴ πέπραγεν ἀναγνωρίσαι, 'utrum fecerit aliquid non fecerit agnoscre' (Ritter). Another instance is in the passive, ἀνεγνωρίσθη ἵπτο τῆς τροφοῦ, in 16, 1454 b 27. (2) On the other hand the word must mean 'reveal' in 16, 1454 b 32 ἀνεγνωρίσεν ὅτι 'Ὅρεστης, 'manifestum fecit se esse Orestem' (Ritter), and in the parallel in 17, 1455 b 9, where ὅτι 'Ὅρεστης or some equivalent has to be understood after ἀνεγνωρίσεν (comp. 17, 1455 b 21). The same sense is found in the passive in the present context (b 6), τό 'Ὅρεστη ἀνεγνωρίσθη, which means 'was revealed to Orestes', rather than 'was recog-
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1452 b 5 nized’ by him; and also (if I am not mistaken) in ἀνεγνωρίσθησαν in 16, 1455 a 3. A third sense has been found for ἀναγνωρίσας in 17, 1455 b 21, on which see note.

b 6 ἵφιγένεια: comp. 16, 1454 b 32. The reference is to Eurip. Iph. Taur. 727 sqq.

τὸ Ὄρεστη is probably not a dative of the agent but equivalent to πρὸς τὸν Ὄρεστην.

b 7 ἐκείνου is to be taken as a genitive after the ἀναγνωρίσεως that follows in b 8 (comp. τυχῶν b 3, and θατέρου b 4). For a genitive depending on a following genitive compare ἐκάστου in 18, 1456 a 6 (v. ad loc.), and Plato Rep. 534 B λόγου ἐκάστου . . . τῆς οὐσίας [comp. Campbell, Rep. of Plato 2 p. 185].

b 9 περὶ ταῦτ’ ἐστί. There is no reason to delete the preposition. The μιθός being a μίρησις πρᾶξεως (comp. esp. 10, 1452 a 13), two parts of the μιθός (the περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις) are said to relate to certain portions of the πρᾶξις, i.e. to the kind of incidents already considered in the preceding statement (10, 1452 a 12—11, 1452 b 8). The μιθός in fact has a περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις because the πρᾶξις which it represents is conceived as having them. It will be observed that the ‘simple plot’ of 10, 1452 a 12 is now tacitly set aside, no doubt on account of its inferior dramatic value (v. 13, 1452 b 31).

b II εἴρηται, ‘has been already described, or explained;’ comp. 25, 1460 b 24 τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται.—De anima 2. 8, 420 b 21 τὸ δ’, αὖτων ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρησαται.—Eth. N. 4. 7, 1127 a 18 οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἴδον ἤν καὶ λύπην ὁμολογεῖτε εἴρηται.

πάθος δ’ ἐστι πρᾶξις κτε. The term πάθος requires definition because of the variety of senses attaching to it. In ordinary language it often involves the idea of great suffering, and has the concrete sense of a great trouble or affliction of body or mind: Metaph. Δ 21, 1022 b 19 πάθος λέγεται . . . αἱ βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοωσίες καὶ κακίσεις, καὶ μάλιστα αἱ λυπηραὶ βλάβαι. ἔτι τὰ μεγάλη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται (comp. Bon. Ind. 557 a 26). The sense the present definition gives the word was probably one already established in theatrical usage (see on 6, 1450 a 34). The πάθος is, just like the ἀναγνώρισις and the περιπέτεια, one of the incidents of the play and as such part of the πρᾶξις or action. Aristotle defines it accordingly as a πρᾶξις of a certain kind, a πρᾶξις φθαρτικῆς ὀ δυνηρά. Apart from the theatre the terms πάθος and πρᾶξις are natural opposites (comp. 1, 1447 a 28 and Eth. N. 5. 7, 1132 a 9).
II. 1452 b 5—12. 1452 b 14

πρὰξες φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὁδυνηρά κτέ.: compare the enumeration of 1452 b II

'things piteous' (ἐλεεινά) in Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 4 ὡσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὁδυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἑλεεινά, καὶ ὡσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὡσον ἦ τύχῃ αἰτία κακῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων. ἔστι δὲ ὁδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ φθαρτικὰ βάνατοι καὶ αἰκία σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γήρας καὶ νόσου καὶ τροφῆς ἐνδεει κτέ.

ἐν τῷ φανερῷ βάνατοι: i.e. violent deaths on the stage, before the 12 eyes of the spectators, such as Horace condemns in A. P. 185 (comp. Tumlirz, Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristo-
telles, p. 16).

περιωδυνίαι signifies bodily agonies, as the context shows; comp. Eth. E. 1. 5, 1215 b 18 πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστι τακαῦτα τῶν ἀποβα-νόντων, δι' ᾧ προϊήται τὸ ἔξω, ὅλον νόσους περιωδυνίας χειμῶνας.

ὡσα τοιαύτα serves to include the less physical forms of pain. b 13

In the Oedipus Tyrannus, which Aristotle so constantly holds up as the perfect model of a tragedy, the πάθος is the mental anguish of Oedipus (O. T. 1317 sqq.) much more than the physical horror of his self-inflicted blindness.

Bernays (Zwei Abhandl. p. 167) and Bernhardy (Gr. Litt. 2. 23 b 14
p. 236), as well as most of the recent editors of the Poetics, agree with Ritter in rejecting chapter 12 as an interpolation. The reasons advanced by Ritter against it are threefold:—(1) that it breaks the continuity of the main discussion; (2) that it gives us a string of names and definitions of the external accidents of Tragedy, which it was not at all necessary for Aristotle's purposes to consider—' non nisi nuda nomina exhibitent, quorum descriptio non ex fine tragoeidiae proposito, non ex interna eius forma et constitutione, id quod decet philosophum, sed ex habitu illius externo petitur'; (3) that the form of the conclusion, a mere repetition of the opening sentence, betrays the hand of an interpo-
lator. These arguments, however, which are hardly so conclusive as has been supposed, ignore a good many points which have to be taken into account in the general balance of probabilities.

(1) There is the mark of style; the terminology in κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἀ διαφεύτας κεχωρισμένα is Aristotelian, and the brevity of these clear-cut definitions can hardly be said to be un-Aristotelian.

(2) Aristotle may very well be conceived to have felt that the 'parts' κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν were not only of great technical importance but also too obvious and too recognized to be passed over in silence; and further that, as certain of them (πρόλογος and ἐπει-
σόδιον) had been already mentioned in the book, a short note
explaining what they were meant to be expected. (3) Besides this, it has to be borne in mind that the very term 'parts', in the present sense of the word, had actually appeared in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449 b 25 ἡδονμένω λόγῳ χωρίς ἐκαστῷ τῶν εἰδών ἐν τοῖς μορίοις. In the analysis also of Tragedy in 6, 1450 a 7 ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ πάσης τραγῳδίας μέρη εἶναι ἓκε, καθ' ὁ ποιά τις ἕστιν ἡ τραγῳδία, the only motive for the qualifying clause καθ' ὁ ποιά τις ἕστιν ἡ τραγῳδία is to distinguish the parts under consideration from another series of parts of a different kind—the μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποσῶν of the present chapter. It is clear that Aristotle was already thinking of these latter; and the clause added prepares us, as it were, for a more formal recognition of them.

The doubt as to the genuineness of this chapter is often supposed to be confirmed by the difficulty of reconciling one or two of its definitions with the known facts of the Drama as seen in the works of the three great tragedians. If we look at the structure of our surviving Greek tragedies, certain of these definitions are either inadequate or untrue. 'It is not true to say that the stasimon is distinguished from the parodos by the absence of anapaests and trochaics. Anapaests are far from being universal in the parodos, while they occur not uncommonly at the beginning of stasima... and in the Medea one of the stasima (1081-1115) is anapaestic throughout. Again, the ordinary trochaic metre is frequently found in stasima, while trochaic tetrameters are equally unknown both to the stasima and the parodie of tragedy' (Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks p. 356; comp. Westphal, Prolegomena zu Aeschylus Tragödien p. 57). The question, however, on which so much ingenuity has been expended, admits of another answer if one remembers Aristotle's purpose in writing. His work is, in intention at any rate, a practical treatise, an Art of Poetry, not a record of learned research; and it was written for the benefit of the men of his own day, and with reference to the theatrical conditions of the time. Although he thinks that in certain particulars the existing practice of the stage should be reformed by a return to that of the older dramatists, the general assumption in the Poetics is the theatre as it was in the middle of the Fourth Century. One of the chief difficulties a student of the older Drama finds in this chapter is in a point relating to the Chorus. We do not know much of the economy of the later Tragedy; but one thing is fairly ascertained, that the chorus was no longer what it had been in the age of Sophocles and Euripides.
Aristotle himself tells us (18, 1456 a 28) that its songs, instead of forming a more or less integral part of the play, had degenerated into mere lyrical intermezzi (ἐμβάλμα). This, however, can hardly have been the only change it had undergone. The probability is that the dramatic dance also had been curtailed, and that, when once in its place in the orchestra, the chorus simply sang its pieces without any accompanying dance. What the comic poet Plato (fr. 130 Kock) said of the choruses of his day:

\[ \text{ὡστε ἔτι ὀρχοῖτ' εὖ, θέαμ' ἢν νῦν δὲ ὄργων οὐδὲν,} \\
\text{ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἀπὸπληκτοι στάθην ἐστῶτες ὁρύνονται,} \]

was presumably as true of those of Tragedy as of the rest in Aristotle's age. If it was true of Tragedy, however, the new state of things would naturally imply a new technique in the treatment of the χορικά; the so-called στάσιμα would be what their name in fact suggests, stationary songs, as opposed to the πάροδοι or entrance-songs; and there would accordingly be no place in them for verses in a metre of movement. The definition of the στάσιμον, therefore, as a μέλος ἁνευ ἀναπαύστων καὶ τροχαίων may not be quite so paradoxical as it seems at first sight (comp. Westphal l.c. p. 64). The difficulty we find in this instance seems to be really due to the grammarians having transferred the word στάσιμον from the later to the earlier Tragedy, where the position of the 'sung parts' (as Aristotle calls them) was the same, though their structure and dramatic importance were not the same. This conclusion is confirmed by the way in which the ancients dealt with this chapter. The explanations of πάροδος, στάσιμον, etc., in the grammarians (to be seen in Westphal l.c. and elsewhere) reproduce the definitions in the text, but with modifications manifestly due to a desire to re-shape them into conformity with the actual facts of the great Drama, that of Sophocles and Euripides. 'Duodecimni capitii circumscriptione cum hauad quaquam ad omnes tragocidas quadraret, pars eorum qui postea id genus tractarunt eam additis alis notionibus amplificare, pars eam vocibus accuratus terminatis emendare, pars eam aliquo modo varietati rerum quae apud poetas obversatur adaptare studuerunt, unde hauad paucae dissensiones manarunt' (L. Schmidt, De parodi et stasimi nominibus p. viii). This may perhaps be taken as evidence not only for the antiquity of the definitions in this chapter (comp. Consbruch, Comm. in honorem Gu. Studemund p. 223), but also for their having made their appearance in a work of considerable authority at the time.
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1452 b 15 προτέρον: in chap. 6.

Eis & diaireitai: Metaph. Δ 25, 1023 b 12 mēros légetai éna mēn trópon eis ðiairethêi án òo poson ðpòwsoin.

b 18 ἀπαντῶν. The sense of this sentence seems to be rightly understood by Tyrwhitt (who is here only following Goulston): 'Atque hae quidem communnes sunt tragoeidarum omnium; propriae vero quarundam sunt e scena cantus et κόμμων, sive planctus.' For the neuter ἀπαντῶν comp. τάν in 6, 1450 a 13 and εἶ ñallou εἶs άλλοι in 18, 1456 a 31. Hermann with less probability supposes χαρευτῶν to be understood (comp. Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks p. 361). Others, understanding δραμάτων, imagine Comedy as well as Tragedy to be meant.

taüta. It is not clear whether this refers to all the parts mentioned, or only to the two chorica, the pároδος and στάσιμον. I incline to the second alternative, notwithstanding the arguments that have been urged against it (Klein, De partibus formisque quibus tragoediam constare voluerit Aristoteles p. 5). Aristotle is thinking primarily of the parts sung; and by a very natural association of ideas he passes from the parts sung by the chorus first to the lyrical passages sung by an actor (or actors), and then to the dirges sung by an actor (or actors) and the chorus in conjunction.

tá ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς, the solos (μονῳδίαι), duets, and trios sung by the characters on the stage. These dramatic lyrics are recognized in Probl. 19. 15, 918 b 26, and contrasted with the songs of the chorus: τά μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς οὐκ ἀντίστροφα, τά δὲ τοῦ χοροῦ ἀντίστροφα: ο μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτῆς ἀγωνισθής καὶ μιμητής, ο δὲ χορός ἦττον μιμεῖται (see also Probl. 19. 30, 920 a 8—48, 922 b 16). Comp. Suidas Μονῳδία. ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς ψῆθ ἐν τοῖς δράμαισι. καὶ μονῳδεῖν τὸ θρηνεῖ. μονῳδία λέγεται ὅταν εἶς μόνος λέγη τὴν ψῆθ καὶ οὐχ ὄμοι δροσὸς.

b 19 πρόλογος. The term, which appears several times in Aristophanes, is used in the sense the present definition gives it in 5, 1449 b 4, and in Rhet. 3. 14, 1415 a 8 τά τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμα δεὶ λαβεῖν ὅτι ταῦτα δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι καὶ τῶν ἔπων τά προοίμα . . . (a 18) καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλουσί περὶ (οὐ) τὸ δράμα, καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που.

b 20 ἐπεισόδιον may be compared with εξόδων (from ἔξοδος); it seems to be derived from ἐπεισόδος, in the sense the word has in Sophocles O. C. 729 ὥρα των ἐμάς ὄμματον ἐλήφωτας φῶβον νέωρη τῆς ἐμῆς ἐπεισόδου ("my coming in upon you"). This seems to me a more
probable explanation than those noted by Haigh, Tragic Drama 1452 b 20 of the Greeks p. 353.

πάροδος. For the definitions of it in the grammarians see 22 J. Aschauer, Ueber die Parodos und Epiparodos in der griechischen Tragödie p. 5. As the negative part of the definition of στάσιμον, ἀνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίον, must be supposed to differentiate it from the parodos, it seems clear that in the view of the writer of this chapter anapaestic and trochaic passages were not out of place in the parodos. In the existing Greek tragedies, however, trochaic passages are all but unknown in the parodi, though they are common enough in Comedy: there is no instance of them in Sophocles or Euripides, and apparently only one in Aeschylus (Persae 155). All this points to the conclusion (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 64) that it is a later form of Tragedy that Aristotle is thinking of, and that the practice of the tragedians in this matter had changed since the time of Euripides. For the actual use of troochoics in the tragic parodi there is some faint evidence in Schol. Aristoph. Ach. 204 γέγραπται δὲ τὸ μέτρον τροχαίκον πρόσφορον τῇ τῶν διωκόντων σπουδῇ. τάντα δὲ ποιεῖν εἰώθαιν οἱ τῶν δραματῶν ποιμαὶ κομικοὶ καὶ τραγικοὶ, ἐπειδὼν δρομαίοις εἰσάγωσι τοὺς χοροὺς, ἢν ὁ λόγος συντρέχῃ τῷ δράματι.

λέξις ἔλη. Ever since Twining's time there has been a tendency 23 to press the meaning of λέξις, and distinguish it from μέλος (comp. K. O. Müller, Kleine deutsche Schriften i p. 510); it is supposed to stand for recitative, or to be a general term including recitative and song. This interpretation is hardly reconcilable with the language of the adjacent definitions. (1) The definition of the στάσιμον, as a μέλος ἀνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίον, presupposes the possibility of a μέλος with anapaests and troochoics; (2) the definition also of ἐπεισόδιον, as that which is ἡμιαίδεις ὁλον χωρικόν μελών, will not apply to the first ἐπεισόδιον, if the parodos which precedes it is not to be regarded as a μέλος (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 58). λέξις ἔλη is to be compared with the μέρος ὁλον in the preceding definitions of πρόλογος, ἐπεισόδιον and έξωδος. The traditional reading λέξις ὁλον χοροῦ involves a distinction between the entire chorus and individual χορευταί, which would probably have had very little meaning in Aristotle's day, when the chorus had practically ceased to take a serious part in the action of the play.

στάσιμον. For the origin of this technical sense of the word it is usual to refer to Aristophanes Vesp. 270 ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ στάτας ἐνθάδ, ἄνδρε, ἄδοντας αὐτῶν ἐκκαλεῖν, as showing that
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1452 b 23 στάσιμον meant the song sung when the chorus had taken up its position in the orchestra; and to Ran. 1280 μή, πρῶν γ’ ἄν ἀκούσῃς χάτεραν στάσιν μελῶν—where the Scholiast explains στάσιν μελῶν by στάσιμον μέλος ὁ ἄδουσιν ἱστάμενοι οἱ χορευταί. The interpretation, however, of this second passage is by no means clear, as στάσις μελῶν may very well mean a 'set of songs', a σύστημα μελῶν. The general sense of the adj. στάσιμος is 'without movement' or 'action' (＝ ἀκίνητος), and hence 'steady', 'stable', 'quiet'. The στάσιμον, accordingly, should be the 'stationary song', as distinct from the πάροδος, a song of movement. This is exactly what Plato Comicus implies in his description of the chorus of his time (see above); and it is in accordance with the statements of the grammarians, e.g. that in Schol. Eurip. Phoen. 202 τοῦτο τὸ μέλος στάσιμον λέγεται ὅταν γὰρ ὁ χορὸς μετὰ τὴν πάροδον λέγη τι μέλος πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνὴκον ἀκίνητος μένων, στάσιμον λέγεται τὸ ἄσμα, and that in Schol. Soph. Trach. 216 τὸ μελδάριον οὐκ ἔστι στάσιμον ἀλλ’ ὣπο τῆς ἱδόνης ἀρχούνται. If we may suppose that in Aristotle's time the chorus after the πάροδος stood motionless in its place in the orchestra, the songs in this part of a tragedy would be rightly termed στάσιμα; and the absence of anapaests and trochaics would be a good formal mark of distinction between them and the πάροδος.

b 24 ἀναπαίστου: not the foot itself, but the verse or verses made up of it.

τροχαῖον: trochaic verse or verses, in the same way as ἵμβος often means an iambic verse. The reason for the exclusion of the trochaic tetrameter is that, as one of the κινητικὰ μέτρα, it has a special fitness for the dance (see on Poet. 4, 1449 a 21).

b 30 τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις, i.e. in the discussion in chaps. 7–11, which dealt with the μῆθος in general and its unity of structure. Aristotle now turns to the question of the particular form of μῆθος required to produce the emotional effect of Tragedy (pity and fear).

b 31 μὴ ἀπλῆν ἄλλα πεπλεγμένην: see the explanation of these terms in 10, 1452 a 12–18. The finest kind of tragedy involves a complex plot, because the element of surprise (comp. 9, 1452 a 4, and 14, 1454 a 4) in the complex plot accentuates the tragic impression (comp. 6, 1450 a 33 and 9, 1452 a 4). It may be observed, as an instance of Aristotle's inconsistency in matters of language, that in 13, 1453 a 13 the ἀπλοὶς μῆθος is the opposite of the ἀσπλοῖς, not (as here) of the πεπλεγμένος μῆθος.

b 32 φοβερῶν καὶ ἕλεεινῶν εἶναι μιμητικὴν: as was assumed in the definition of Tragedy (6, 1449 b 27), and again in 9, 1452 a 2 and
12. I452 b 23—13. I452 b 32

II, I452 a 38. φοβερά καὶ ἠλεεινά (scil. πράγματα) is a comprehensive designation for the incidents distinctive of Tragedy, just as γέλοια describes those of Comedy. A tragic scene may be either φοβερόν, ‘alarming’, suggestive of coming evil or danger to the hero, or ἠλεεινόν, ‘piteous’, a representation of his anguish and suffering. Fear (the opposite of hope) relates to the future; pity to evil or suffering actually present and before us. In Aristotle’s time the definition of fear was ‘expectation of coming evil’, προσδοκία κακοῦ (Eth. N. 3. 9, I115 a 9), or προσδοκία μέλλοντος κακοῦ (Plato Laches 198 b); or, as he puts it in Rhet. 2. 5, I382 a 21, λύπη τις ἡ παραχῇ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἡ λυπηρῶ. In pity on the other hand the evil or suffering, instead of being possible and prospective, is actual and before our eyes as it were: Rhet. 2. 8, I385 b 13 ἐστῶ δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἡ λυπηρῶ (comp. Tumlinz, Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 15). The distinction between the φοβερά and ἠλεεινά in a play may be seen in the Oedipus Tyrannus, in which we are gradually prepared for the piteous incidents of the catastrophe by a series of premonitions of coming evil in the earlier scenes. The sympathetic interest we are thus made to take in the fortunes of the tragic hero depends, according to Aristotle, on one condition, his being more or less like ourselves (ὁμοιός), i.e. neither exceptionally good nor exceptionally wicked. This ethical similarity is what renders fear for another possible with us, as we are told in the context, I3, I453 a 5 φόβος περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων; and in the Rhetoric the same is said of pity: Rhet. 2. 8, I386 a 24 τῶν ὁμοίων ἔλεοῦσι ... κατὰ ἡθή. It would be easy, if it were worth while, to amplify the present statement by further illustrations from the corresponding chapters of the Rhetoric (2. 5 and 2. 8). The general point of view, however, in the two discussions is not the same. The pity and fear of the Rhetoric are the pity and fear of the judges whom the rhetor is addressing; it is part of his art to work, it may be, on their fears, and deter them from an adverse decision by showing how injurious its consequences may be to them and theirs. But the apprehension the tragic poet arouses in us is not of this personal description; it is a disinterested fear for another, the danger that arouses it being that of the hero, not that of the audience in the theatre. The point being so obvious, it is strange to see a diametrically opposite view taken by a critic of such distinction as Lessing. ‘Aristotle’s fear (he tells us) is not the fear which the impending evil of another arouses in us for
that other; it is the fear that arises for ourselves from our likeness to the sufferer; it is the fear that the misfortunes, which we see hanging over him, may befall ourselves; it is the fear that we may ourselves become the pitied object’ (Hamb. Dram. St. 75). The rhetoric of Lessing’s statement may perhaps conceal the underlying confusion of thought: he has confused our fear that something will happen with our recognition of the possibility that something may happen to us. This latter is the general condition of all sensibility to pity and fear; but it is not a πάθος, and cannot, therefore, be identical with either of these emotions (comp. Tumilriz l.c. p. 7; Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. 2. 28 p. 783). Lessing has an equally paradoxical view of the Aristotelian ἔλεος—one inspired, if I am not mistaken, by Hobbes rather than by Aristotle himself. He thinks that according to Aristotle ‘the feeling of pity is impossible without fear for ourselves... fear is a necessary ingredient in pity’ (Hamb. Dram. St. 77); one of his modern followers even goes so far as to assert that the Aristotelian pity is only ‘a disguised fear’ (‘eine verkappte Furcht’, Döring, Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 310). This rapprochement of the two feelings is not warranted by the texts in the Rhetoric. A distinction between them is implied not only in the present, but also in other passages of the Poetics; comp. ἔλεος καὶ φόβος (6, 1449 b 27; 14, 1453 b 12), ἡ ἔλεος ἐκεῖνη, ἡ φοβική (11, 1452 a 38), οὕτε ἔλεος οὕτε φόβον (scil. ἔχοι ἄν, 13, 1453 a 3), φοβερόν καὶ ἐλεημόνον (9, 1452 a 2; 13, 1452 b 32; 14, 1453 b 1), οὕτε ἐλεημόνον οὕτε φοβερόν (13, 1453 a 1).

1 The logical weakness of Lessing’s reasoning at times may be seen from his interpretation of Rhet. 2. 5, 1382 b 26, where the enumeration of φοβερά is summed up in a brief formula, ὡς 'ἅπλως εἰσὶν, φοβερὰ ἐστιν διὰ ἐφ’ ἐτέρων γινόμενα ἡ μίλλοντα ἐλεημόνα ἐστιν—speaking generally, one may say that all evils are fearful, which arouse pity when they befall or are about to befall others’. On the strength of this Lessing tells us that with Aristotle pity necessarily involves a feeling of fear: ‘So dachte Aristoteles von dem Mitleiden, und nur hieraus wird die wahre Ursache begreiflich, warum er in der Erklärung der Tragödie nächst dem Mitleiden, nur die einzige Furcht nannte. Nicht als ob diese Furcht hier eine besondere von dem Mitleiden unabhängige Leidenschaft sey... sondern weil, nach seiner Erklärung des Mitleids, dieses die Furcht nothwendig einschliesst; weil nichts unser Mitleid erregt, als was zugleich unsere Furcht erwecken kann’ (Hamb. Dram. St. 75). But the fact that a particular kind of evil (e.g. a painful death) is in one relation a cause of fear and in another of pity is not enough to show the substantial identity of the two feelings, or to prove that one of them includes the other. Aristotle’s φοβερά ἐστιν διὰ ἐλεημόνα ἐστιν is not an analysis of the feeling of φόβος, but merely an attempt to determine the kind of facts to which it relates.
6). It will be seen from the instances just quoted that in the formula ‘pity and fear’, pity comes first, whereas in the corresponding formula φοβερά often precedes ἐλεευά. The explanation may perhaps be this, that Aristotle (like Plato) assumes a tragedy to be a picture of human suffering (πάθος); so that the excitement of pity is its primary and essential purpose, the element of fear coming in as a sort of secondary matter, to quicken our sympathy with the tragic hero, and prepare us for a catastrophe. In a play like the Oedipus Tyrannus, for instance, which Aristotle has so constantly in mind, the φοβερά precede the ἐλεευά and lead up to them; but the great tragic interest is in the later scenes, in which Oedipus becomes an object of pity.

πρῶτον μὲν is answered by οἰς' αὗ in 1453 a 1 (comp. Plato b 34 Symp. 219 Ε; Laws 935 Α).

The connexion between the main points in the discussion in this and the next chapter is as follows. After laying down (1) the general rule that, if a tragedy is to arouse pity and fear in us, the tragic hero must be a man of a certain type of character (13, 1452 b 34), Aristotle adds (2) that the tragic effect is enhanced by the play having an unhappy ending (13, 1453 a 12), and (3) weakened by a ‘double plot’, in which the unhappiness of certain of the personages is balanced by the happiness of others (13, 1453 a 30); and (4) that stories of horror in which kinsmen are involved have an especial tragic interest and value (14, 1453 b 14). This last leads him off (5) into a discussion on Discovery and its place in a play (14, 1453 b 26); the conclusion being (6) that, where kinsmen are concerned, the best form of tragedy is one in which a timely Discovery prevents the actual perpetration of the contemplated deed of horror (14, 1454 a 4).

ἐπιεικεῖς, the opposite of μοχθορούς in a 36; in ordinary usage ἐπιεικής is often synonymous with συνιδαῖος or χρηστός (comp. 15, 1454 b 13), and opposed to φαῖλος (comp. 26, 1462 a 2) and similar terms (Bon. Ind. 271 b 36). The sense we are to attach to the term in this passage is shown by the equivalent that replaces it in 13, 1453 a 8 ἄρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαίωσίνῃ. Aristotle tells us that a man of great worth and virtue is not sufficiently like ourselves (.SetInt) for the purposes of Tragedy, because his sufferings will create an overpowering feeling of indignation or disgust instead of pity. It is difficult to reconcile his present view with what he tells us elsewhere of the tragic hero (see on 13, 1453 a 16), or his present use of the term ἐπιεικῆς with that in 15, 1454 b 13.
Besides this, according to the Rhetoric it is quite possible for one who is ἐπιεικὴς to be an object of pity: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385 b 34 κἂν οἴονται τινας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν (scil. ἐλεοῦσιν). All this may perhaps show that strict consistency of language is not always to be expected even in Aristotle.

μιαρόν: as an offence to our moral or religious feelings; comp. 14, 1453 b 39, 1454 a 3.

The situation having no πάθος, actual or prospective, does not arouse any kind of tragic emotion; it does not appeal to our 'philanthropy', or our pity, or our fears. It is assumed here that τὸ φιλάνθρωπον has some sort of tragic value, but not the same as τὸ ἔλεεινον or τὸ φοβερὸν. τὸ φιλάνθρωπον is that which appeals to the φιλάνθρωποι. The φιλάνθρωπος, or tender-hearted man, is able to feel a certain commiseration even for the wicked in misfortune; this feeling, however, is not pity proper, since it lacks the moral basis of all pity, the belief that the misfortune is not deserved. This interpretation of τὸ φιλάνθρωπον accords with the use of the term in the context (1453 a 3; comp. 18, 1456 a 21), as well as with the ordinary Greek conception of φιλανθρωπία, 'fellow-feeling', 'kindliness', 'tender-heartedness' (comp. L. Schmidt, Ethik der Gr. 2 p. 277). A certain affinity between φιλανθρωπία and pity is recognized in Rhet. 2. 13, 1390 a 19, where the tender-heartedness of the young is said to make them easily moved to pity: ἐλεητικῷ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντες εἰσίν ἄλλοι διὰ ταῦτα τοῖς νεοὶς οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίας, οἱ δὲ διὰ ἀσθένειας (comp. Tumliriz L.c. p. 13). A very different sense has been attached to the word by Twining and others, who suppose that the situation described as φιλάνθρωπον is one that satisfies our sense of poetical justice, a true lover of mankind being bound to rejoice at the punishment of evil-doers. Any one who remembers what φιλανθρωπία meant to a Greek, will at once see the improbablity of this somewhat artificial rendering of τὸ φιλάνθρωπον in Aristotle.

μεταπίπτειν: comp. the use of μεταβάλλειν in 7, 1451 a 14 (and passim), and that of μεταβαίνειν in 18, 1455 b 27.

περί τὸν ἀνάξιον. περὶ = 'in the case of', i.e. as we say, 'for'; the preposition enables Aristotle to join φόβος and ἔλεος in the same construction. For this use of περὶ comp. Eth. N. 3. 9, 1115 a 22 εἰ τις ὑβρις περὶ παῖδας ἢ γνωακα φοβεῖται.—Plato Rep. 539 ά ἵνα μὴ γίνηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοῦς πριακοντούτας σοι.—Lysias 168, 39 περὶ τοῦς οἰδὲν ἔχωντας κακὸν ἐλεημονέστατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι.
13. 1452 b 34—1453 a 10

1452 b 13 ἐστώ δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τίς ἐπὶ φαινο- 1453 a 4
μεν ψευ ψευ ἤθερική ἢ λυπηρό τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὁ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται.

δυστυχοῦντα: for the participle see Goodwin, Synt. of Gr. Moods and Tenses 829 (b). Another instance of the construction will be found in 14, 1453 b 23.

περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. This disinterested fear, which rests, just like a 5 pity, on a basis of sympathy, is not recognized in the Rhetoric, where the point of view from which the emotions are considered is different (see on 13, 1452 b 32). The antithesis in the text, ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν ἀναξίων ἐστώ δὲ περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, is too strongly put, since pity also is περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, as one may see from Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 24 καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἔλεουσι κατὰ ἥλικιάς, κατὰ ἔθη, κατὰ ἔξεις, κατὰ ἀξίωμα, κατὰ γένε.

δι’ ἀμαρτίαν τινά: a 16 δι’ ἀμαρτίαν μεγάλην. ἀμαρτία in the a 10 Aristotelian sense of the term is a mistake or error of judgement (error in Lat.), and the deed done in consequence of it is an ἀμαρτημα (erratum). In the Ethics an ἀμαρτημα is said to originate not in vice or depravity but in ignorance of some material fact or circumstance: Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135 b 12 τὰ μὲν μετ’ ἁγνοίας ἀμαρτημάτα ἐστίν ὅταν μὴτε ὅν μὴτε δ’ μὴτε φ’ μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξεις; ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ ποιεῖν ἢ οὐ ποιεῖν ἢ ὑπ’ ἀρχήν ἢ ὅταν μὲν οὐν παραλόγως ἢ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως ἀνευ δὲ κακίας, ἀμαρτημα (comp. Rhet. 1. 13, 1374 b 6). This ignorance, we are told in another passage, takes the deed out of the class of voluntary acts, and enables one to forgive or even pity the doer: Eth. N. 3. 2, 1110 b 31 οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαράσις ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἄκουσαν ἀλλὰ τῆς μοιχηρίας, οὐδ’ ἢ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην), ἀλλ’ ἢ καθ’ ἐκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἢ πράξεις ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη (comp. Thuc. 1. 32. 5). In thus making the tragic story turn on an ἀμαρτία Aristotle is probably thinking more immediately of the Oedipus Tyrannus (comp. 14, 1453 b 29). It is strange that the ἀμαρτία or ἀμαρτία μεγάλη, of which Aristotle is speaking, should have been taken by Tumlirz (l. c. p. 25) and others to mean not an error of judgement, but some ethical fault or infirmity of character, like those indicated in 15, 1454 b 12. The Sophoclean Oedipus is a man of hasty temper (comp. O. T. 807), but his ἀμαρτία was not in that, but in the ‘great mistake’ he made, when he became unwittingly the slayer of his own father.
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1453 a 12 ἀνάγκη ἃρα κτέ. is a corollary to what has just been said on the construction of the καλλίστῃ τραγῳδία; two other forms of Tragedy, which had often been adopted by poets, are pronounced to be of inferior tragic quality and value.

τὸν καλῷς ἔχοντα μοῦθον: comp. the expressions in the context, τὴν σύνθεσιν τῆς καλλίστῃς τραγῳδίας (13, 1452 b 31), and ἢ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστῃ τραγῳδία (13, 1453 a 22).

13 ἀπλοῦν . . . διπλοῦν: see on 13, 1452 b 31. The meaning of διπλοῦς in this connexion is explained later on, in a 31.

16 ἦ βελτίωνος μᾶλλον ἦ χείρονος. No reason is given for this significant addition, but the intention of it is clear enough; it is an attempt to bring the present conception of the tragic hero as being ὀμοιος, like ourselves, of only average character and virtue, into line with that in certain other statements about him. Apart from this chapter, in fact, the general assumption in the Poetics is that the tragic hero should be not like the average man, but better than that—βελτίων ἦ καθ' ἡμᾶς (2, 1448 a 4, 18; 16, 1454 b 9; comp. 25, 1460 b 34). For the purposes of the present chapter, however, which deals with the emotional effect of Tragedy and its conditions another and a somewhat different conception of the tragic hero is required; if we are to pity him and fear for him, he must be, like Oedipus and the pathetic characters in Euripides, a personage of a very human type, one like what we are ourselves. It would take some discussion to reconcile the two views, and explain away the inconsistency of language into which Aristotle has drifted.

17 τὸ γεγονόμενον: Meteor. 1. 14, 352 b 19 δήλοι δὲ τὸ γεγονόμενον.—2. 8, 367 a 11 τεκμήριον δ' ἐστί . . . καὶ τὸ γεγονόμενον περὶ ταύτας τὰς νῆπιοι.—De resp. 21, 480 b 26 μαρτυρεῖ τὸ γεγονόμενον.—Pol. 7. 14, 1334 a 5 μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γεγονόμενα τοὺς λόγους.—Xenophon Hiero 9. 3 ὃς δὲ ταύτα καλῶς ἔχει, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γεγονόμενα (= 'quod vere sit, die Erfahrung': Sauppe, Lexil. XenoPh. p. 25).

α 18 ἀπηρίθμουν: perhaps a metaphor from the counting of money, in which each coin has to be accepted and allowed to pass as good. ἀπαριθμεῖν nova significatione dicit . . . est ergo ἀπαριθμεῖν recevoir, mettre en conte, el approuver'. (Casaubon, in Musei Oxon. litt. conspectus i p. 28.) In HSt. it is rendered by 'narrare', and in Liddell and Scott by 'recount'.

α 20 Ἀλκμέωνα. On this (the Attic) form of the name see HSt. s. v. and Meisterhans, Gr. a p. 35. It survives in Αε in Rhet. 2. 23, 1397 b 3 and it is implied in Ἀλκμεωνίδης, the form the patronymic always has in the Ath. Pol.
Euripidē. Aristotle’s conclusion as to the best form of Tragedy enables him to say a good word for Euripides, who had been blamed by critics for the unhappy ending of many of his plays. He insists that the procedure of Euripides is right, and points in confirmation to the eminent success of his plays on the stage, where in spite of all his faults Euripides is acknowledged to be the most moving and the most tragic of the tragedians. With this we may compare the estimate of Euripides in Quintilian io. i. 68 in affectibus vero cum omnibus mirus, tum in ipsis qui in miseratione constant facile praecipimus. There is a long discussion of this passage by Neidhardt, Diss. Halenses 3 p. 279.

αὐτὸ: the object after ἔγκαλοῦντες, and preparative to ὅτι τοῦτο δρᾶ. For the construction comp. Eth. N. 4. 1, 1120 b 17 ἔγκαλεῖται τῷ τίχῳ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξων ὄντες ἱκτωρ πλουτοῦσιν.—9. 8, 1168 a 32 ἔγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἴων ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει.

tοῦτο δρᾶ: comp. 23, 1459 a 29 and Bon. Ind. 205 a 42.

ἀγώνων: see on 6, 1456 b 18.

τραγικῶταται: i.e. as arousing most directly the two distinctively tragic emotions of pity and fear (comp. 13, 1452 b 33 τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοιαύτης μμισθεός ἐστίν). Similarly in the context (a 29) Euripides is termed τραγικῶτατος τῶν ποιητών, because he is the greatest master of the art of arousing these same emotions (comp. Neidhardt l. c. p. 281).
aὶ τοιαύται = αἰ εἰς δύστυχαν τελευτῶσαί.

ἂν καταρθοθώσων. The proper management Aristotle has in mind is often supposed to be that of the actors, stage-managers, etc., responsible for the execution of the piece. This interpretation, as was long ago pointed out by Düntzer (Rettung d. aristot. Poetik p. 159), makes the clause a superfluity, since it is obvious that, to succeed on the stage, every play requires fairly good acting and an adequate presentation. After ἂν καταρθοθώσων we have to supply ἕπο τοῦ ποιητοῦ (comp. εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, scil. Euripides, in the next line); the sense is that the poet, having chosen a good tragic subject, must handle it with all due skill and care to secure a satisfactory result (comp. 14, 1453 b 25). καταρθοθὼν is practically synonymous with εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, the term which replaces it in the context (a 29).

tὰ ἄλλα. An admission that Euripides, though a master of a 29 emotional effect (τραγικῶτατος), is not always equally admirable in his treatment of the other points in a tragedy. His artistic shortcomings are often noted in the Poetics. His plots are directly
or indirectly criticized in 14, 1453 b 28, in 15, 1454 b 1, and in 16, 1454 b 31; his characters in 15, 1454 a 28–32, and in 25, 1461 b 20; and his choruses in 18, 1456 a 27.

οίκονομεῖ. This seems to be the first instance of the use of the word in literary criticism. In the grammarians and writers on style οἰκονομία (οίκονομεῖν, οἰκονομικός, etc.) is the regular technical word for the disposition of the materials and management of the various points in an oration or a poem (v. HSt. s.v., and Trendelenburg, Gramm. gr. de arte poëtica iudiciorum rel. p. 91 and p. 149).

a 31 ὑπὸ τινῶν. A reference perhaps to the critics who are said to have disapproved of the sad ending of so many of the tragedies of Euripides (supra a 24).

σύστασις ἢ διπλὴν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα. Aristotle has to use the periphrasis σύστασιν ἔχουσα instead of the simple συνεστῶσα, since διπλὴ συνεστῶσα would not have conveyed the sense required. Though there is a certain inelegance in this juxtaposition of σύστασις and σύστασιν, the reading is sufficiently certified by the very similar repetition of φύσις in several Aristotelian passages: De part. an. 2. 8, 653 b 33 ὑ τῶν ὀστῶν φύσις . . . σκληρὰ τὴν φύσιν οὕσα. — De gen. an. 5. 5, 785 a 23 φύσει λευκοτέραι αὐτῶν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πτερῶν φύσιν. — Eth. N. 7. 15, 1154 b 20 φύσει δ᾽ ἤδεα, δὲ ποιεῖ πράξει τῆς τοιάσσεθα φύσεως, and in the Platonic Epinomis 990 ν ὦκ ἂν μάϊσσα ποτὲ πᾶσα φύσις ἰκανή γένοιτο θεωρῆσαι μή θαυμαστῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως (comp. Lobeck on Sophocles Aj. 277, cited by Vahlen).

a 32 καθάπερ ἢ ὀδύσσεια: see the synopsis of the Odyssey in 17, 1455 b 16–23.

καὶ τελευτῶσα κτὲ. explains διπλὴν τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα, as is sometimes the case with the second of two words or clauses coupled by τε καί (v. Ast, Lex. Plat. 3 p. 365, and Torstrik on De anima 1. 2, 405 a 27).

a 34 θεάτρων: comp. 4, 1449 a 9 πρὸς τὰ θέατρα.—Plato Laws 700 έ τὰ θέατρα ἐξ ἀφώνων φωνῆσετ’ ἐγένοντο. — Aristoxenus ap. Ath. 632 β τὰ θέατρα ἐκβεβαιβάρωται. θέατρον, in the sense of ‘the audience’, is common enough, but the above quoted passages show that the word may be used in the plural also, in the sense of ‘the audiences’. The audiences in these days, says Aristotle, are too weak to like the strong situations of the great Tragedy.

a 35 καὶ εὕχην ποιοῦσε τοῖς θεαταῖς: Plato Gorg. 502 ἀ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς.
The submission and the prophecy, and the proximate word, αὐτή. Bäumlein, Gr. Partikeln p. 308 (followed by Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 179), quotes a very similar passage from Isocrates 4, 130 εἰστι δ' οἷς οἶνον τ' ἀποτρέπειν, and explains the position of the negative as due to a desire to avoid the collocation οὗτ' εἰστι (i.e. οὗ δὲ εἴστη). αὐτή ((pow.) is the subject with its gender assimilated to that of the predicate (v. on 6, 1450 a 4).

ἄπο τραγῳδίας ἥδωνή: 'the pleasure of Tragedy', as we should say (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 336). For this use of the preposition comp. Top. 1. 15, 106 a 37 τῇ ἄπο τοῦ πίνειν ἥδων. — Eth. N. 10. 2, 1173 b 28 αἰ ἄπο τῶν καλῶν ἥδων. — Plato Rep. 582 b τῆς ἄπο τοῦ εἰδέναι ἥδων. For the absence of the article see Bon. Ind. 546 a 51.

κωμῳδίας οἰκεία. The conclusions of the Orestes and Alcestis of Euripides were said to verge on Comedy (v. Trendelenburg, Gramm. gr. de arte poetica iudiciorum rel. p. 36).

ἐκεῖ γὰρ κτέ. The reference is probably to the Orestes of Alexis or some other comedy on the same subject (comp. Kock, CAF. 2 p. 358).

"Εστιν μὲν οὖν κτέ. Aristotle now passes on to the second of the two points announced at the beginning of chap. 13, πῶθεν έσται τὸ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον (13, 1452 b 29).

δύεως: see on 6, 1449 b 33. We may suppose him to be thinking of such theatrical artifices as the fearful appearance of the Furies in the Eumenides, and the rags and tatters of certain of the heroes of Euripides.

πρῶτερον, 'naturally prior', i.e. better, as in Aristoph. Ran. 76 b 3 and Plato Lach. 183 b. This sense of prōtērōn is recognized in Cat. 12, 14 b 6 εἰδοθα δε καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐντυμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰκότων ἐν τούτων πρῶτερον φάσκειν παρ' αὐτῶς εἶναι. Compare also the use of πρῶτη in a 30 and a 33.

ποιητοῖ εἰμείνοις. As the poet is an imitative artist in language, a μιμητής ἐν λόγῳ (v. on 1, 1447 a 28), it follows that the poetic effect has to be produced by language, and not by means other than language.

ὁρᾶν: i.e. ὁρᾶν τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα. On Plato Phaedr. 251 a) experienced in moments of intense fear or horror. This may arise even from the mere thought of something horrible: De motu an. 7, 701 b 22 δῶ καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται.
COMMENTARY

1453 νοήσαντες μόνον. And it is often said to arise from what one hears: Aeschylus Ag. 1242 τὴν μὲν Θεάτου διάτα παίδεων κρεών έννια καὶ πέφρακα.—Sophocles El. 1408 ἢκουστά διότι τοῦσ είσε ἤρξα.—Trach. 1044 κλώνοι' ἐφρέ.α.—Plato Rep. 387 b τά πέρι ταῦτα ἐνόματα πάντα τά δεννυ τέ καὶ φοβερά ἀποβλητέα, Κωκυτούς τε καὶ Στήγας καὶ ἑνέρους καὶ ἀλῆβαντας καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτον τοῦ τύπου ἐνόμαξόμενα φρύτεων δή τοιεὶ ὃς τοίς ἀκόοντας.

b 8 ἀδεχύντορος: see on 6, 1450 b 17. In such instances the effect depends too much on the σκενοποιούς (or costumier), and too little on the poet himself.

χορηγίας. The word has been taken to mean 'adminiculum' (Valla), 'impendium' (Paccius), 'choragi opera et sumptus' (Heinsius), 'suppediatio aliena' (Tyrwhitt), 'expensive apparatus' (Twining, Hermann), 'apparatus' (L. and S.), and 'Unterstützung durch äussere Mittel' (Ueberweg, after Vahlen, Beitr. 2 p. 20). This last rendering, which is practically the same as Tyrwhitt's, is probably right. It applies the contrast between the means supplied by the poet himself, and those which are outside his art and have to be furnished by others; and it is also in accordance with Aristotle's use of χορηγία and χορηγεῖν in the Ethics and Politics (v. Bon. Ind. 852 b 52 and 60). Thus in Eth. N. 10. 8, 1178 a 24 he says τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἡ ἐπ' ἑλαττὸν δέεται (scil. ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἀρετῆ), and in I. II, I I O I a 15 (comp. 10. 9, 1179 a 11) τὸν κατ' ἀρετῆν τελείων ἑνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοὺς ἰκανὸς κεχορηγημένον. More than one, however, of the recent interpreters of the Poetics seem to have assumed (with Heinsius) that in a discussion on matters theatrical χορηγία must be supposed to retain its original theatrical sense, that of the service of a choreus. The answer to this is that we constantly find Aristotle even in the Poetics using the technical terms of the theatre in the more general sense they had or had acquired in ordinary language. Instances of this are ἀγωνίζεσθαι (24, 1460 a 9), συμμαχίζεσθαι (18, 1456 a 26), προταγωνιστῆς (4, 1449 a 18), ἐπεισόδιον (17, 1455 b 23), ἐπεισοδιοῦν (17, 1455 b 1), ἐπεισιοδοθῆς (9, 1451 b 34), ἀπὸ μηχανῆς (15, 1454 b 2), ἐκ περιπετείαι (16, 1454 b 29), ὑποκριτικά (20, 1457 a 21). It seems to be agreed too that the duties of the choreus were mainly, if not entirely, with the chorus, and that he had nothing to do with the make-up of the actors (A. Müller, Gr. Bühnendarühermüder p. 336).

b 9 τὸ θεταόδες. The reference here is to the appearance of certain of the more monstrous creations of Greek mythology. Such
abnormal personages required on the stage a peculiar make-up and special masks: Pollux 4. 141 τὰ δὲ ἐκσκευά πρόσωπα Ἀκτάων ἔστι κερασφόρος . . . ἦ Ἀργος ποινόφθαλμος, ἦ Εὐάπτη ἦ Χείρωνος ὑπαλλαττομένη εἰς ἵπτον παρ’ Ἐφριπτίδη (comp. Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 204). In existing plays we have a clear instance of a personage of this kind in the βοῦκερως παρθένος, Io, in Prom. 588 (comp. 674), and in the Furies in the Eumenides, who are said to look more like Gorgons than women (Eum. 48). The prominence of such figures in the dramas of Aeschylus was noted by the ancients: Vita Aeschyl (p. 2 Dind.) ταῖς τε γὰρ ὀφεῖται καὶ τοῖς μέθοις πρὸς ἐκπλήξιν τερατώδη μᾶλλον ἦ πρὸς ἀπάτην κέχρηται.

to τερατώδες on the stage may be ϕοβερόν, and thus a means—
though an illegitimate one (supra b 7)—of producing a tragic effect (ϕόβος). When it does not serve this dramatic purpose (τὸ τερατωδὲς μόνον), however, it is out of place in Tragedy, since the pleasure it gives us is not the true tragic pleasure, which depends on the excitement of pity and fear (τὴν ἄπτ' ἐλέον καὶ φόβου ἠθονὴν b 12), and on that alone. Aristotle does not stop to explain our pleasure in τὸ τερατώδες, but it is easy to supply the omission, if one remembers that anything of the nature of a τέρας is marvellous (θαυμαστόν; comp. Herodotus 4. 28 and Plato Hipp. mai. 283 c), and that the marvellous is recognized by Aristotle (τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ, 24, 1460 a 17) as one of the great causes of human pleasure (see on 9, 1452 a 4).

κουνοῦν = κουνὸν ἐχουσιν (Bon. Ind. 400 a 39).

φανερόν. The argument here may be thus restated: A play is essentially a μίμησις πρᾶξεως (6, 1449 b 36 and passim); if it is to arouse pity and fear, therefore, it must do that through the ἕλεενά καὶ φοβερά in its πρᾶξεις (ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν), not through merely material accessories supplied ab extra by others (comp. supra b 7).

tοῦτο: i.e. τὸ ἔλεενὸν καὶ φοβερόν. For similar instances of this allusive use of the neuter of the demonstrative, which is so common in all Greek (Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 35), see 13, 1453 a 24; 17, 1455 a 26; 24, 1460 a 8.

τοῖα οὖν δεινά ἢ τοῖα οἰκτρά. Aristotle amends his question b 14 τοῖα δεινά by the alternative τοῖα οἰκτρά. The tragic poet is not concerned with δεινά in general, but only with those calculated to arouse pity (οἰκτρά). ἦ = vel potius; as in De anima 2. 5, 417 a 5 ὦν ἐστιν ἢ αἰσθησις καθ’ αὐτά ἦ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τοῦτοι (v. Pacius ad loc. and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 297). As Aristotle proceeds to show, the deed of horror (τὸ δεινὸν) may be either actual or only
1453 b 14 contemplated; and if actual, it may be either within the play itself, and identical with the πάθος (v. 11, 1452 b 11), or anterior to the action of the play, and distinct from the πάθος. In the Oedipus Tyrannus, for instance, the deed of horror, the slaying of Laius, takes place before the opening of the play, the action of which is made up (1) of a series of φοβερά (alarming incidents) leading up to the catastrophe, and (2) a πάθος, which consists in the agony and remorse of Oedipus (see on 11, 1452 b 13).

b 16 τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις = τὰς δεινὰς πράξεις. With such actions there are three possibilities: the parties concerned (the slayer and the slain, for instance) may be either (1) friends, or (2) enemies, or (3) indifferent to each other; in all three situations there is something δεινὸν, but it is only the first that is felt to be especially piteous; it is therefore at once δεινὸν and οἰκτρὸν, and thus eminently adapted for the purposes of Tragedy (ταῦτα ζητητέον b 22).

b 17 ἀν μὲν οὖν ἔχθρος ἔχθρον, scil. τοιαύτα ποιεῖ, understood from the preceding εἶναι . . . τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις. In many instances the ellipse is not so easily supplied, e. g. in Rhet. 1. 6, 1363 a 27 (ἀγαθά ἐστι) καὶ τὰ ίδια καὶ ἀ μηθείς, καὶ τὰ περιττα.—Rhet. 2. 23, 1397 b 20 καὶ ὅτι εἰ μηθεὶ Θρησκεύων ἠδύκησέν, οὐδὲ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ μηθεὶ οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδὲ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ Πάτρωκλος ᾿Εκτωρ, καὶ ᾿Αχιλλέα ᾿Αλέξανδρος (comp. Vahlen on the present passage).

οὐδὲν ἀλευνόν, scil. ποιεῖ. There is nothing in the deed then to call forth pity either for the doer or the sufferer. That the doer of the deed may sometimes claim our pity, is not distinctly said, but it is clear from the instances which follow, Orestes, Medea, Oedipus, etc.; it is incidentally recognized also in the analysis of 'the involuntary' in Eth. N. 3. 1, 1109 b 31 ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐκουσίων ἐπαίνων καὶ ψυχῶν γυναικῶν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀκουσίων συγγνώμης, ἐνιότε ἐδὲ καὶ ἔλεον (comp. 3. 2, 1110 a 1).

b 18 μέλλων, scil. ποιεῖ, just as in b 21 μέλλῃ = μέλλῃ ἀποκτείνειν. The alternative οὖτε μέλλων is added because pity may be aroused by the spectacle of impending, as well as by that of actually present anguish: Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 b 1 τὰ γεγονότα ἢ ἔρπτ᾽ ἡ μέλλουσα διὰ ταχέων ἐλευνόσερα (comp. 2. 5, 1382 b 26).

πλὴν κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος: i.e. in this, as also in the following case (οὔτε ἀν μηθετέρως ἔκοντες), the spectacle of suffering humanity may arouse a certain human feeling (akin to pity) for the sufferer (see on 13, 1452 b 38), but it is not, in the proper sense of the term, 'piteous', since the moral condition of pity is wanting; we cannot say that the man ought not to suffer (comp. 13, 1453 a 4).
When the parties, however, are related to one another (ὁταν δ' ἐν 1453 b 18 ταῖς φιλίαις ἔγγενητι τὰ πάθη), the evil comes from a quarter from which it was not to be expected, and the situation is 'piteous' as well as horrible; comp. Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 11 (ελεείνον ἐστί) τὸ δὲν προσήκειν ἄγαθον τι πράξει [ὑπάρχαι Vahlen] κακὸν τι συμβῆναι.

ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις. φίλα here practically means 'cognatio' (comp. b 19 Bon. Ind. 818 b 10).

η τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. As defined in II, 1452 b II πάθος includes b 21 other forms of suffering besides violent deaths.

τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν ἀποθανοῦσαν, 'the slaying of Clytaemnestra.' b 23 For this use of the participle see on 13, 1453 a 4 (δυστυχώντα). On the alternative spelling Κλυταιμνήστρα see Roscher's Lex. s.v. and Vitelli, Studi Italiani i p. 239. There is hardly a trace of it in the MSS. of Homer (Ludwich, Homerica I–V p. 5; comp. Wilamowitz, Commentariolum grammaticum IV p. 11).

αὐτὸν: emphatic as in 9, 1451 b 36; 21, 1457 b 34; 24, 1460 a 6. b 25 εἰρίσκειν is followed by an infinitive in 14, 1454 a 11 εἴρον . . . παρασκεύαζειν, and (in the middle) in Eurip. Med. 195 οἴδεις λύτας ἄφροφο μοῦση καὶ πολυχόρδοι φῶτας παιῶν.

εἰδότας καὶ γιγνώσκοντας, scil. πάρττοντας. Instead of saying b 28 ἔστι γίνεσθαι τὴν πράξεων ὑπ' εἰδότων καὶ γιγνώσκοντων, Aristotle introduces the qualification in the clause with ὅσπερ, which thus becomes a substantive part of the statement (comp. II, 1452 a 23; 18, 1456 a 27; 21, 1457 b 24).

γιγνώσκοντας: Rhet. 2. 1, 1378 a 14 ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας.—Demosth. io. 17 ταῦτα τοῖνυν ἐκαστὸν εἰδότα καὶ γιγνώσκοντα παρ' αὐτῷ κτε. 

Εὐριπίδης: see on 6, 1450 a 25. 


ὁ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους: comp. 15, 1454 b 8. Sophocles is b 31 named because there were others who had dramatized the Oedipus story (Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 967) as well as Sophocles.

μὲν οὖν: see on 22, 1458 a 25. 

ἐξω τοῦ δράματος: 15, 1454 b 7 ἐξω τῆς τραγῳδίας.—17, 1455 b 8 ἐξω τοῦ μύθου.—24, 1460 a 29 ἐξω τοῦ μνηματος. There is a reference to this form of dramatic construction in Eth. N. 1. 11, 1101 a 32 τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προιτάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις.

ὁ Ἀλκμήν ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος: Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 777 and 964. b 33 τὰ τραυματὰ Ὄδυσσεῖ: another name perhaps for the Ὄδυσσεῖς ἀκανθοπλήξ of Sophocles (Nauck l.c. p. 230).

ἀναγνωρίσατα, scil. τὴν φιλίαν, as in b 31 (see on 16, 1454 a 32). b 35
COMMENTARY

1453 b 38  τό τε γὰρ μιαρὸν κτέ.: i. e. it offends our moral sensibilities (see on 13, 1452 b 36) as a sin against the laws of natural affection; and it is untragic also, through the absence of the element of suffering.

1454 a 1  ποιεῖ ὀμοίως, said of a dramatic personage, recalls the idea of γινώσκοντα μελλῆσαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι in 1453 b 38.
   ἐν Ἀντιγόνη: Soph. Ant. 1231.
   τὸν Κρέοντα ὁ Αἰμων, scil. τοῦτο ποιεῖ, i. e. μέλλει ἀποκτεῖνει ἀποκτεῖνει δὲ οὖ (comp. a 6), as is implied in Goulston's paraphrase, 'Creontem patrem Haemon sciens perimere conmere est, nec perfect tamen.' The ellipse is not unlike that in ἀν μὲν οὖν ἔχθροσ ἔχθρον in 1453 b 17.

a 2  βέλτιον, scil. τοῦ γινώσκοντα πρᾶξαί.

a 4  ἐκπληκτικόν. Ἐκπληξία is a very general term for the loss of self-possession that may result from a mental shock. In use, however, it often has the more special sense of extreme surprise; the definition of it in fact in Top. 4. 5, 126 b 17 is θαυμασιώτης ὑπερβάλλον, 'admiratio exsuperans' (Pacius). The Discovery is said both here and in 16, 1455 a 17 to be 'astounding', just in the same way as a περιπέτεια—which in a play is so intimately connected with the Discovery—is said in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371 b 10 to be θαυμαστῶν. The affinity of sense between ἐκπληκτικόν and θαυμαστῶν is indirectly shown by the fact that Aristotle describes the 'pursuit of Hector' in the Iliad in one place as θαυμαστῶν (24, 1460 a 14), and in another as ἐκπληκτικόν (25, 1460 b 25). I cannot agree with Tumlirz (Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 34), who supposes that, as used in the Poetics, the terms Ἐκπληξία and Ἐκπληκτικόν denote the excitement or tension with which the audience awaits the Discovery.

κράτιστον = poitissimum. Aristotle's view of the construction exemplified in the Iphigenia in Tauris is presumably this, that the full effect of Tragedy is attained in the most artistic way, without the adjunct of physical suffering, and with the minimum of offence to our moral sensibilities. His ultimate preference for this construction is intelligible enough in itself; and we have been prepared for it to some extent by his recognition throughout this chapter of the legitimacy of a situation like that in the Iphigenia, in which the deed of horror, though contemplated, is not actually carried out (comp. μέλλων 1453 b 18, μέλλῃ b 21, μέλλοντα b 34). The criterion which now determines the relative value of these
possible situations in Tragedy is a moral one, their effect not on *1454 a 4*
the emotions, but on the moral sensibility of the audience. The first of the four situations is set aside as μυαρόν, 'moral
offensive' (*1453 b 38*); the second (τὸ γνωσκόμενα πράξει; see on *a 2*)
also is μυαρόν; the third just avoids being that (*1454 a 3*), because
the unholy deed is done in ignorance; the fourth, however, in
which a timely Discovery saves us from the rude shock to our
moral feelings which is inevitable even with the third kind of plot,
is pronounced to be κραίτστων. This seems to be the rationale
of the present classification, and the explanation of the discrepancy
between the statement in the text and that in *i 3*, *1453 a 24*. In
chap. *i 3* Aristotle was thinking only of the emotional effect of
tragedy as produced by the most obvious means; here he comes
to see that the same effect may be produced in a finer form without
their aid. It is his somewhat tardy recognition of the necessity of
avoiding τὸ μυαρόν that has caused this change of view.

**ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ:** a play of Euripides (*Nauck, TGF.* p. *497*). *a 5*
It is referred to in Eth. N. 3. 2, *111 a 11* οἴηθεῖ ὅ ὄν τις καὶ τὸν
πίθυν πολέμιον εἶναι δόπερ ἢ Μερόπη.

**ἐν τῇ ἰφιγενείᾳ:** comp. *17*, *1455 b 9*.

**ἐν τῇ Ἑλλη:** Nothing more seems to be known of the play *a 8*
(*Nauck* p. *837*).

**διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο** reverts to what was said as far back as *1453 b 19*—*a 9*
*22*; the whole of the intervening statement (*1453 b 22* τοῖς μὲν
οὖν—*1454 a 8* ἄγεινόρισεν) is a digression. Other digressions of
considerable length are found in chap. *i* (see on *1*, *1447 b 11*),
in chap. *9* (see on *9*, *1451 b 27*), in chap. *15* (see on *15*, *1454 b 9*),
and in chap. *22* (see on *22*, *1458 a 31*).

**πάλαι:** in *13*, *1453 a 19*. Aristotelian instances of πάλαι in a
back-reference may be seen in An. post. *2*. *19*, *100 a 14* (comp.
*13*, *97 b 7*), in Phys. *8*. *3*, *254 a 16* (comp. *253 a 32* and *b 10*), in
*1281 a 42*).

**ζυτωτές:** comp. Metaph. *Θ 6*, *1048 a 30* διο ζυτωτές καὶ περὶ *a 10*
τούτων δεύλαμεν.—*Xenophanes* Fr. *18* (*Diels*) οὐτὸι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς
πάντα θεοὶ ἄθροι ὑπέδεικνυμί, ἀλλ' ἁρύνῳ ζυτωτές ἐφευρέσκοντος
ἀμενον. Quintilian (5. 10. *120*) has a very similar observation on
the discovery of the various forms of argument in oratory: *Neque
enim artibus editis factum est ut argumenta inveniremus, sed dicta sunt
omnia antiquam praecipierentur, mox ea scriptores observata et collecta
ediderunt.*
COMMENTARY

1454 a 12 ἀναγκάζονται: comp. 9, 1452 a 1. They are obliged to keep to these well-known stories (comp. 9, 1451 b 23), because they have not the art to discover or invent new ones equally fitted for the purposes of Tragedy.

a 13 τὰ τοιοῦτα... τάθη: see 14, 1453 b 19–22.

a 17 χρηστά. χρηστός, which, as Aristotle tells us in the context (a 20), may be applied to anything good of its kind, is replaced in b 13 by ἐπιεικής; it is equivalent to σπουδαῖος as used in 2, 1448 a 2, the common opposite of both being φαίλος or ποιηρός.

a 18 ὤσπερ ἔλεξθη: in 6, 1450 b 8.

a 21 τὸ μὲν χεῖρον: Pol. 1. 5, 1254 b 13 τὸ ἀρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρείττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον.—H. A. 9. 1, 608 b 8 ὤσπερ γυνὴ ἅλυσρὸς ἐλεμονέστερον καὶ ἀραδικρὺ μᾶλλον, ἐτί δὲ φθευρέστερον καὶ μεμψιμορότερον καὶ φιλολογοῦντο καὶ πληροκιοῦντο· ἄττι δὲ καὶ δύσθυμον μᾶλλον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἀρρενοῦ καὶ δύσελτος καὶ ἀναδέστερον καὶ ψευδέστερον κτλ. In the Politics we are told that owing to the weakness of the rational faculty in them, the virtue of which women are capable is not so high as that of a man (Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 20). Rhet. 1. 5, 1361 a 6 summarizes the Greek idea on this point: θηλείων ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἄνω ἀνελευθερίας.

ἄλως φαῖλον. In the Politics, where the slave is viewed as a being of the very lowest intellectual and moral capacity, Aristotle allows him only the bare modicum of virtue required to enable him to do his work: ἀρετῆς δεῖ ταῖς μικρὰς καὶ τοσαῦταις ὁποῖς μὴ τε ἀκολούθην μὴ τε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων (Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 35).

a 22 τὸ ἀρμόττοντα, scil. τὰ ἡθο πούρσαι (see on a 24 τρίτον τὸ ὅμων). In the individual character there must be nothing at variance with that of the class to which the individual belongs; in a woman, for instance, there should be nothing 'unwomanly'. The opposite of ἀρμόττον in a 30 is ἀπερεπέτες καὶ μη ἄρμοττον. This same use of the term is occasionally found in later criticism, e.g. in Schol. Soph. El. 126 τὸ 'ἐι μοι βέμις τάδ' αὐδᾶν' λιαν ἥδικοι καὶ ἀρμόζον γυναικῖς.

a 23 γυναικείῳ, scil. ἡθεῖ; comp. Plato Laws 790 a γυναικεία τε καὶ δούλεια ἡθεί. ἡθος in this connexion practically means a 'character', i.e. one of the personages, just as it does again further on in 24, 1460 a 11. An approximation to this sense is found in Plato, who uses the word now and then for a man or other creature possessing character: Phaed. 81 ε ἐνδότον ἐστίν δι [scil. αἱ ψυχαι], ὦσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιοῦτα ἡθος, ὅποι ἀττ' ἀν καὶ μεμελετηκώς τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, οἶνον τοῦ μὲν γαστρομαργίας... μεμελετηκότας... εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων
14. 1454 a I2—15. 1454 a 26

γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι [v. Stallb. ad loc.].—1454 a 23

ἀνδρείαν. On the ἀνδρεία of women see Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 22 and 3. 4, 1277 b 21. In the present passage, however, Aristotle finds a certain incongruity in the idea of an ἀνδρεία γυνῆς, as though the affinity of ἀνδρείας with ἀνδρεῖς were still felt.

δεινής has been rightly explained by Günther (Grundzüge der a 24 trag. Kunst p. 280) as meaning 'clever', i.e. 'clever in speech and argument' ('tüchtig im Reden', 'beredt')—a quality which according to Greek notions was quite out of place in a woman (Pol. 1. 13, 1260 a 30; 3. 4, 1277 b 23). That this rather than 'terrible' is the meaning of δεινής here is shown by the illustration in a 31, ἡ τῆς Μελανίττης ἤγος, where the reference is to the δεινότης or rhetorical 'cleverness' of the speech put into the mouth of Melanippe by Euripides.

τὸ ὄμοιον, scil. τὸ ἤθος ποιήσαι, as is implied in the clause of interpretation, τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτερον τοῦ χρηστόν τὸ ἤθος καὶ ἄρμόττον ποιήσαι. Instead of saying ὄμωια, to correspond with ἄρμόττοντα in a 22, Aristotle lapses into the singular ὄμοιον, through the influence, as it would seem, of the singular in ἀνδρείων μὲν τὸ ἤθος in the context. In the absence of an example in a 28 sqq. to illustrate the neglect of this canon, the meaning of ὄμοιον is not very clear; but a hint of it may be gathered from the language in the analogy in 1454 b 10 ὄμοιοις ποιοῖτες καλλίους γράφοντες, where ὄμοιοι (said of a portrait) means 'like the original'. This may very well be the sense of ὄμοιον in the present passage; the literary portrait produced by the poet should be 'like the original', i.e. like what the personage in question is in history or legend (comp. 1454 b 12). The fact of ὄμοιος being used in a somewhat different sense in 2, 1448 a 6, 12 and 13, 1453 b 5 only shows how inattentive Aristotle is at times to uniformity of language.

ὡσπερ εἰρηται, 'in the present sense of this term (ἀρμόττον)'. a 25

ὄμολόν: i.e. the character should always remain the same, without change or modification in the course of the play. The canon reappears in Horace A.P. 126 servetur ad inum [scil. persona] qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet. The logical scheme of these four canons of character may be presented thus: the ἤθος of the dramatic personage should be (1) χρηστόν, not inconsistent with goodness of disposition; (2) ἄρμόττον, not inconsistent with the ἤθος of the class to which the personage belongs; (3) ὄμοιον, not Q 2
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1454 a 26 inconsistent with the received idea of the particular personage; (4) ὑμαλῶν, not inconsistent with itself.

ἀνώμαλος τις. Aristotle is perhaps thinking of Achilles, as a character subject to sudden changes of mood; comp. fr. 168 (Teubn.) 'Αριστοτέλης φησὶν ἀνώμαλον εἶναι τὸ Ἀχιλλέως ἠθος, and Eustathius on Il. 24, 569 (v. Roemer, Bavarian Academy, Sitzungsb. 1884 p. 297).

ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων, as the explanatory καὶ τοιοῦτον ἠθος ὑποτιθεῖσ shows, means the original of the dramatic portrait, the personage as known from history or legend.

a 29 μὴ ἀναγκαῖον: 'not required for the purposes of the story'. The gratuitous ποιημα of Menelaus in the Orestes is noted again in 25, 1461 b 20; the Scholiast also on the Orestes more than once draws attention to the evil nature Euripides has given him (τὸ κακόθες τῆς γνώμης). On the reading ἀναγκαῖον see J. of Phil. 14 p. 46. I am not able to quote an Aristotelian instance of ἀναγκαῖος as a feminine, but it is certainly good Attic, and common enough in Plato. Though Aristotle's tendency was to treat such adjectives as of three terminations, his practice varied in the case of several (e.g. βέβαιος, ἑκούσιος, ἑλευθέρος, ἔδως, τέλεος), if our existing texts are to be trusted.

a 30 ὁ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεώς: comp. τῆς Μελανίππης in the next line. The article has to be restored in like manner before Ὀδυσσεώς in 16, 1454 b 26 and Ὀρέστης in 16, 1454 b 31. In all other passages in the Poetics—and they are very numerous—the rule laid down by Fitzgerald (Selections from the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, p. 163) as to the use of the article in Aristotle with the names of dramatis personae is duly observed. The same is true of the Nicomachean Ethics (see my Textual criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 52), and Politics. In the Politics ὁ Σωκράτης is regularly used for the Socrates in Plato's dialogues, and in 2. 4, 1262 b 11 ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης means the Aristophanes in Plato's Symposium, The rule in fact is observed in twenty passages in the Politics, and ignored in two only, in 8. 3, 1338 a 28—where we may restore ὁ Ὀδυσσείς, and in 8. 7, 1342 b 23—where the true reading is probably τὸ Σωκράτης. Similarly in the Rhetoric there are at least eighteen instances of the observance of the rule and but two exceptions, viz. 2. 23, 1400 a 27—where we may restore ὁ Ὀδυσσείς (comp. 3. 15, 1416 b 1 and b 12), and 3. 14, 1415 b 30—where the correction ὁ Σωκράτης is confirmed by the parallel 1. 9, 1367 b 8.
mind has been often supposed to be a tragedy of Euripides. But there is apparently no mention elsewhere of a tragedy with this title by Euripides (comp. Wilamowitz, Analecta Eurip. p. 159), and the language in 26, 1461 b 32 seems to point rather to a dithyramb. All discussion has been set at rest by Gomperz's recovery among the Vienna papyri of a fragment of some ancient critical treatise, which mentions the θρήνος of Ulysses (i.e. a portion of the Scylla) as the work of the dithyrambic poet Timotheus: εἰςον δὲ τινὶς οἷς οὐ δὲν μὲν προτίθενται οὐ μεμοῦνται [δὲ], ἄλλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καλῶς, εἰ τυχάνουν ἐνέχοντες ἔννοιαν καὶ παράδειγμα παρ' ἡμεῖν αὐτοῖς, ὡσπερ καὶ Τειμόθεος ἐν τῷ θρήνῳ τοῦ 'Οδυσσέως εἰ μὲν τινὰ μεμεῖται καὶ τὸ ὄρομα των οἴδεν, ἄλλ' οὖ τῷ 'Οδυσσεί (v. Gomperz, Vienna Academy, Anz. der phil. hist. Classe 1886, v; comp. Wilamowitz, Timotheos π. 111). To this Aristotle appends a second instance, one from a tragedy, as though conscious of the first being not quite to the point.

ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥήσις, in the Μελανίππη ἡ σοφῆ of Euripides (Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 509). The rationalistic argument put into her mouth against the popular idea of monsters (τέρατα) was in Aristotle's view (see on δεινὴν a 24) an exhibition of cleverness out of place in a woman.

ἥ ἐν Αὐλίδι ἵππηνεια: Iph. Aul. 1211 sqq. and 1368 sqq. a 32

χρή δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθεσιν κτέ. There should be a unity of character just as there should be a unity of action in every play. This incidental reference to the action reminds Aristotle of a point (the use of the μυχανῆ) which had not been considered in his general theory of the plot in chaps. 8-11.

τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός: comp. especially 9, 1451 a 38 and 10, a 34 1452 a 24.

ἥ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός, scil. εἶναι (Bon. Ind. 239 a 22; see on 24, a 35 1459 b 9).

λύσεις: see 18, 1455 a 24, 1456 a 9, where the λύσις (the un-ravelling, or dénouement) is distinguished from the δέσις or πλοκῆ (the knotting, or intrigue). This is the first appearance of these terms in this sense, though they may be presumed to have been already well established in the technical language of the theatre (see on 10, 1452 a 15).


μυχανῆ. On the mechanical contrivance, whereby a god or other personage was suddenly brought on, or removed from
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1454 b I the stage, see Haigh, Attic Theatre p. 209. Aristotle regards a dénouement effected by such means as an inartistic way out of the difficulty, or else allowable only in certain exceptional cases (b 3–6). A similar view of the μηχανή is implied in Plato Crat. 425 D οἱ πραγματοποιοί, ἐπειδὰν τι ἀπορώσω, ἐπὶ τὸς μηχανῆς κατα-
φέγγουσι θεοῖς αἰροντες. From this theatrical use the term is sometimes metaphorically extended to matters apart from the stage, when a difficulty is solved by means which savour too much of artifice or miracle. Thus even in the present context (b 2) the sudden appearance of Athene in II. 2. 166 is said to be ἀπὸ μηχανῆς; and in Metaph. A 5, 985 b 18 reason is said to come in as a deus ex machina in the cosmogony of Anaxagoras: 'Αναξα-
γόρας τε γάρ μηχανή χρήται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐς ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτῶν.

2 τὰ περί τῶν ἀποτόπλου: II. 2. 155; comp. Porphyry on II. 2. 144, p. 26 Schrader: ἡ 'Αθηνᾶ παραγίνεται ἀπὸ μηχανῆς [so cod. Townl.] ὥσπερ καθένοντα τὸν Ὄδυσσεα ἐγείροντα. His note on II. 2. 73 (where Agamemnon tries the feeling of his army) is worth quoting as a typical attempt to reconcile Homeric practice and Aristotelian theory: διὰ τί ὁ Άγαμέμνων ἀπεπερατό τῶν Ἀχιλλών, καὶ οὕτως ἐπραξεν ὡς το οὐκ ἦν τὰ ἐναντία συμβήναι ἢ ἐβουλεύετο; καὶ τὸ κόλπον ἀπὸ μηχανῆς. ἡ γάρ 'Αθηνᾶ ἐκόλυων· ἐστὶ δὲ ἀποτόπλου τὸ μηχανῆμα λύειν ἄλλως ἐνα μὴ ἐς αὐτῶ τοῦ μέθον. φησὶ δὲ ὁ 'Ἀριστο-
τέλης (Fr. 142 Teubn.) ποιητικοῖν μὲν εἶναι τὸ μεμεισθαι τὰ εἰσῳδή γίνεσθαι καὶ τοιοῦτον μάλλον τὸ κακόν τοὺς παρεισάγειν εἰκός δὲ καὶ ἐκ λοιμοῦ πεποτημένοις καὶ τῷ μῆκε τοῦ χρόνου ἀπανδήματα ... μὴ εἰθὶς παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ξέσον άλλ' πειραθηναι ἢ γέγοναι δειν οὕτως ἐχοναιν ... ἢ δὲ λίταις οὐκ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς ὅταν γὰρ διὰ τῶν εἰκότων γίγνεται, οὔ μηχανὴν τοῦτ ἐστιν, ἀμ' [ἡ ἀλλ'] ὅτε προάδηθε 
θεοῦ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ εἴπων διὰ εἰκός ἢν αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι εἰς θεῶν ἀνέθηκε τὸν Ὄδυσσεα διανοηθήναι ταῦτα δρᾶν ὃ πράξει εἰκὸς ἐστιν (p. 24–25 Schrader).

Ἀλλὰ μηχανῇ κτε.: 'μηχανῆ breviter dicit pro θεῷ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς' (Ritter). This clause (which ends apparently with θεοῖς ὅραν in b 6) is a digression within a digression; Aristotle remembers

1 Instead of καὶ ποιητῶν (for which various corrections have been proposed) I would restore καποίτων (v. J. of Phil. 28 p. 252). The sense is: 'Though as a rule it is artistic to represent what is usual, and inartistic (ἀποτόπθον) to introduce hazardous situations (κακόντων), still under the circumstances there is a certain propriety and probability (ἐκεῖδε εἰς) in the Homeric story.' If this view is correct, the quotation from Aristotle's Απορ. Ομ., does not end at the words κακόν των παρεισάγειν, as is supposed by Rose and Heitz.
that the appearance of a god on the stage may be necessary for a certain purpose, to reveal matters of interest which lie outside the play itself as being either anterior or subsequent to the action of the piece. This may be taken as a tacit apology for the procedure of Euripides, who opens several of his plays with a prologue delivered by a god to explain the historical antecedents of the situation, and concludes others with a sort of epilogue, in which a god announces the future fortunes of the personages (see Haigh, Tragic Drama p. 246–7). A distorted reminiscence of this statement may be recognized in the Horatian precept, A. P. 191 nec deus interstit nisi dignus vindice nodus inciderit.

ἀλογον is a general term for that which cannot be seen to be either necessary or probable (see above I 454 a 36 ἀναγκαίον ἢ εἰκός), in other words for that which does not admit of explanation, that which we find unaccountable. It is of frequent occurrence in the later chapters of the Poetics (see esp. 24, 1460 a 28 and 25, 1461 b 14). The clause continues the statement in I 454 a 37–b 2. No improbability can be allowed within the story (ἐν τοῖς πραγμασιν) of the play, unless it happens to be in the part only presupposed and not actually presented on the stage (ἐξω τῆς πραγμα- διας). Bonitz (Ind. 343 a 32) seems to take a different view of the clause, connecting it with that which immediately precedes it, μηχανῆ χρηστέων κτῆ. The rule in the text is repeated in very similar terms in 24, 1460 a 27.

μὴ δὲν εἶναι, scil. δὲν, understood from a 37.

ἐξω τῆς πραγμαδίας: see on 14, I 453 b 32.

τὸ ἐν τῷ οἰδίποδι: see 24, 1460 a 29.

ἐπεὶ δὲς κτῆ. At this point Aristotle returns to the subject of the ἡθος, which according to his theory (I 454 a 17–26) should be at once χρηστά, ἀρμοτοντα, ὁμοις, and ὀμαλά, in order to meet any doubt that may arise as to the possibility of an ἡθος being at once χρηστός and ὁμοιον. He shows that the corresponding difficulty has been solved in a sister art, that of the portrait-painter, who without sacrificing the likeness makes a man look handsomer than he is (ὁμοιοις ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφοντες); so that, if the painter can do this, there is no reason why the literary artist also should not be able to represent a tragic personage truthfully, with any infirmities of character which form part of the received idea of him (δρυίους καὶ πάθιμους καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἡθῶν b 12), and at the same time as a good man (ἐπιεικείς b 13).

βελτιώνων: see 2, I 448 a 4, 11, 18.
1454 b 9  ἡμᾶς, 'we poets', as is shown by what follows in b 11 ὄτω καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν. Aristotle speaks as though his hearers were poets, and studying the art of poetry for practical purposes. The Poetics in fact, whatever else they may be, are a practical treatise on Poetry; and the assumption throughout is that one is to learn from them how to write a good poem. Similarly in Rhet. 1. 8, 1366 & 12 ἡμᾶς means 'we orators' (δεῖ νῦν τὰ ἡθη τῶν πολιτείων ἐκαστὶς ἔχειν ἡμᾶς).

b 10 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι. Aristotle might no doubt have said ὅσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι. Vahlen illustrates the construction from Soph. el. 16, 175 & 27 συμβαίνει δὲ ποτε καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασι καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐνίοτε συνεθεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τοῖς ἐλέγχοις εἰσόδες παρ' ὁ δὲ λόγος συμβαίνει συνετά διαλύεται τὸν λόγον ἀποροδῶμεν, and other parallels in Aristotle (v. Bon. Ind. 546 b 25).

b 12 ὁργίδου καὶ ῥαθύμους, 'too quick or too slow to anger'; the contrast is like that between ὅς ὧν and ῥαθύμοι in Eth. E. 8, 5, 1240 a 1 ἄνοικοι χαίροσιν, ὅπως ἀνθρώπων ἐνεργοῦοι καὶ ὅς ῥαθύμοις. καὶ ταλία τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχοντας is added in order to include all similar defects of character, i.e. defects which are not incompatible with a general goodness of disposition.

b 14 [παράδειγμα σκληρώτητος]. For the reason for bracketing the two words see J. of Phil. 14 p. 47. If they are not an ordinary 'adscript', they may possibly represent a marginal note by Aristotle himself to indicate that a second instance, one of σκληρώτης [obstinacy ?], was to be added. According to Galen (t. 18. 2 p. 879–880 K.) notes of a very similar description were to be found embedded in the text of Hippocrates.

'Ἀγάθων: perhaps, as Tyrwhitt suggests, in his Telephus (Nauck, TGF. p. 764).

b 15 διατηρεῖν. This quasi-imperatival use of the infinitive (without δεῖ or χρῆ) is common enough in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 343 & 22). For the compound διατηρεῖν comp. Eth. N. 10. 8, 1178 a 13 διατηροῦντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐκάστῳ.—Aeschines in Cies. 6 ὅταν διατηρηθῶσιν οἱ νόμοι.—Philemon 94. 6 Kock ὃς γε ταύτα πάντα διατηρεῖ. At this point Aristotle sums up by saying that the rules laid down for the μῦθος and ἡθη in a play must be observed throughout by the poet. But besides these general principles of construction, it is necessary in practice to consider the spectators (comp. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. p. 204) and the impression (αισθήσεις) the work is likely to make on them when presented on the stage, as it is easy to produce a bad impression through some fault of practical stage-craft. This seems to be the sense of the present
passage; Aristotle, however, avoids details, and refers to another writing of his for a fuller explanation of his precept. The incident mentioned in 17, 1455 a 26 may perhaps be taken as an instance of the kind of fault he has in mind.

τὰ παρὰ τὰς ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθοῦσας αἰτθῆσεις. For παρὰ in a sense approximating to that of διὰ see Bon. Ind. 562 a 10 and Bernays, Dialoges des Aristot. p. 138. αἰτθῆσεις means the impression produced on the spectators, i.e. as we should say, the stage-effect of a play. The qualification, however, τὰς ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθοῦσας τῇ ποιητικῇ, limits the responsibility of the poet to that part of the stage-effect which directly depends on his own art (ἀκολουθοῦσας τῇ ποιητικῇ); so far as it depends on that of others —actors, costumiers, and the like—it is not within his province (6, 1450 b 17). This interpretation, which is as old as Victorius, is much more probable than that of Bernays and others, who suppose the reference in the text to be to the business of the costumier and stage-manager. Throughout the Poetics Aristotle resolutely ignores all such matters as outside the art of poetry proper; and it is inconceivable that he should have given them any special attention in a work like the dialogue περὶ ποιητῶν (ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις). For the plural αἰτθῆσεις comp. ὕψεις in 6, 1450 a 13, b 20, and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3 2.1 p. 17.

ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις: i.e. in the now lost dialogue περὶ b 18 ποιητῶν, as Bernays following Victorius has shown (Dialoge des Aristot. p. 27; comp. Bon. Ind. 226 b 35). The reference must be to a work (1) by Aristotle himself, (2) published and written for publication, and (3) on a kindred subject.

This and the next two chapters form a sort of Appendix; b 19 they discuss a series of special points and rules of construction which had been omitted in the sketch of the general theory of the μύθος. If these afterthoughts seem out of place here, it is to be remembered that there is an even stronger instance of matter out of place in 15, 1454 a 37. An excursus on the different forms of Discovery is justified not only by the great dramatic interest of the Discovery (6, 1450 a 33), but also by the important part it plays in 14, 1453 b 30.

εἴρθαι πρότερον: II, 1452 a 29.

ἡ πλειότητι χρώται: Pol. 7.11, 1330 b II ois γὰρ πλείστοις χρώ— b 20 μεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκια, ταῖτα πλείστον αμβλαλετά πρὸς τὴν ύγιέαν.—Hippocrates 1 p. 40 K. ois εἴθυσαι ὁ ἄνθρωπος πλείστοις τε καὶ αἱ ἡρώθαι.
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λόγχην κτέ. From some unknown play (Nauck, TGF.2 p. 855); the allusion is to the mark said to have been visible on the Σπαρτόι of Thebes. The accusative λόγχην Aristotle seems to regard as an instance of attractio inversa, since he continues the construction by saying ἀστέρας instead of ἀστέρες.

b 23 Καρκίνος: Nauck, TGF.2 p. 797. For the ellipse of the verb (ἐπούσθη) see on 14, 1453 b 17.

ἐπίκτητα: De gen. an. i. 17. 721 b 29 οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ σύμφυτα προσευκτότες γίνονται τοῖς γονεῖσιν οἳ παῖδες ἄλλα καὶ τὰ ἐπίκτητα. οὐλάι σὲ γὰρ ἐξόντων τῶν γεννησάντων ἢ ὡς τις ἐγχος ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις τῶν ἐκγόνων τὸν τύπον τῆς οὐδῆς, καὶ στιγμα ἐχόντος ἐν τῷ βραχίον τοῦ πατρός ἐπεσήμανεν ἐν Ἀχαλκόδων τῷ τέκνῳ ... τὸ γράμμα. οὐλάι: as in Od. 19. 392 and Eurip. El. 573.

τὰ δὲ ἔκτος. The term in the New Comedy for tokens of this kind was γνωρίσματα (see on 17, 1455 a 20).

b 25 ἐν τῇ Τυροί: a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.3 p. 272). With οἷον, we have to understand ἤ ἀναγνωρίσθη δίκαιο— the construction changing, as sometimes happens when a second instance of not quite the same order is introduced by οἷον; comp. De anima 2. 10, 422 b 5 σημειώνει τὸ μήτε καταίσχον ὡσταν τὴν γλῶσσαν αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε λαίνω ἤγριων: αὐτὴ γὰρ ἄφη γίνεται τοῦ πρῶτον ἠγριῶν, ὡστέρ ὂταν προγενημάτας τις ἄγριοι χυμοῦ γενείται ἐπέρω, καὶ οἷον τοῖς κάμφοις πικρὰ πάντα φαινεῖται διὰ τῇ γλώσσῃ πλήρει τοιαύτης ἤγροντας αἰσθάνεσθαι.—Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 18 διὸ δέ Λανθάνει ποιύνασα, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖ άλέγειν πεπλασμένος ἀλλὰ πεφυκότως: τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τοῦνατόν ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβολεύοντα διαβάλλοντα, καθάρε ὄπρος τοῖς οἷοι τοῖς μερευμένοις, καὶ οἷον ἡ Θεοδώρος φωνὴ πέπονε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὄπνοιμον: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος έσοκεν εἶναι, αἰ δὲ ἄλλοτρια.

b 27 ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ: Od. 19. 386-475.

b 28 ὑπὸ τῶν συβοτῶν: Od. 21. 205-225. The distinction Aristotle finds between the two instances is this: whereas the scar is seen by Euryclia by accident and in the natural course of things, with the herdboys Ulysses directly points to it πιστεως ένεκα, in order to convince them of the truth of his disclosure: Od. 21. 217 καὶ σήμα ἄριφραδες ἄλλο τι δεῖξο, ὅφρα μ. ἐν γνώτων πιστοθήτων τ' ἐνι θυμῷ, οὐλήν, τῆν πατέ με σῆς ἡλικε λεικώ ὄντε. In one of his lost writings, perhaps the Απορήματα 'Ομηρικά, Aristotle criticized this Discovery as resting on an error of logic: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ, φασίν, ἐπιλαμβάνεται τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἀναγνωρισμοῦ, λέγων ὡς ἄρα κατὰ τὸν
6. 1454 b 22-37

παρηγ. τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ πᾶς οὐλήν ἕχων 'Οδυσσεύς ἔστω (fr. 208 1454 b 28
Heitz; Porph. in Od. p. 126 Schrader).

πίστεως ἔνεκα, scil. χρώμανα τοῖς σημείοις.

ἐκ περιπέτειας: 'repentino quodam casu' (Victorius), as in b 29
Polyb. 32, 22. οὐ τίχη τὸ πλεῖον συνεργώ χρώμενος οὔτε ἐκ περιπέ-
τειας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀγχυρίας καὶ φιλοσοφίας. The ordinary inter-
pretation of αἰ ἐκ περιπέτειας, 'quae ex peripetia oriantur' (Tyrwhitt),
makes it refer to the περιπέτεια or turn in the story, and
assumes the Discovery in the Odyssey to be consequent on the
Peripety, whereas it is rather one of the means to it. It is to be
remembered (1) that περιπέτεια is not always a term of the theatre
in Aristotle (see on 11, 1451 a 22); and (2) that even in the Poetics
he is very apt to use such terms in the sense they bore in ordinary
speech (see on 14, 1453 b 8 χρονιγίας).

ἐν τοῖς Νίπτροις: Od. 19, 392 (comp. 26, 1460 a 26). On this, b 30
the earliest mode of citing Homer, see Bergk, Gr. Litteratur-
geschichte i p. 496.

ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι 'Ὀρέστης: 'manifestum fecit se esse Orestem' b 32
(Ritter), as the context shows, ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς,
ἐκεῖνος δὲ αὐτὸς λέγει κτῆ.; comp. the parallel in 17, 1455 b 9 βίοσθαι
μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν ... εἰπὼν ὅτι κτῆ. For the senses of ἀναγνω-
ρίζων in the Poetics see on 11, 1452 b 5.

διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, scil. ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ἰφιγένεια. The reference
is to Iph. Taur. 727 sqq.

αὐτὸς λέγει: Iph. Taur. 800 sqq. In Aristotle's view this latter b 34
Discovery is very like that in Od. 21. 205: just as Ulysses points
his scar to convince the herdsmen, so Orestes, to convince his
sister (comp. 808 ἐχεῖς τι τῶν ὁμοίως μοι τεκμήριων;), makes a statement
showing his familiarity with their family history and the old home
in Argos (comp. 822 ἄ δὲ ἐδοὺ αὐτῶς, τάδε φράσε τεκμήρια).

διό τι ἐγγὺς. Wahlen restores διό ἐγγὺς τι, which is no doubt the b 35
more usual order when τι is connected with an adverb. But there
are certainly some instances of the order in the text, e.g. Thuc.
7. 57. 1 οὐ κατὰ δίκην τι μᾶλλον.—Xen. Hiero 1. 21 ἦ οὖν ὅρας
τί τοὺς τυράννους ὅδιον . . . ἱόντας;—Cyr. I. 6. 11 οἶει τι, ἔφη,
ὑπὸ τοῦτο ἐναὶ αἰσχρόν;—Plato Prot. 327 β οἶει ἄν τι, ἔφη,
μᾶλλον κτῆ.

Τηρεῖ: Nauck, TGF.² p. 257.

ἡ τῆς κερκίδος φωνῆ, the actual expression of Sophocles (as it b 36
would seem) is to be compared with the Euripidean ἱστόστονα
πενῆματα, κερκίδος ἀοίδου μελέτας in Aristophanes Ran. 1315—
where the allusion is to the humming-sound of the shuttle in its passage to and fro (comp. Dict. of Antiq.\textsuperscript{3} 2 p. 767). In κερκίδος φωνή, however, there is a suggestion that the shuttle told Philomela's story for her; comp. Achilles Tatius 5. 5 ή γάρ Φιλομήλας τέχνη σωπώσαν εύρηκε φωνήν ἐφαίνει γάρ πέπλων ... καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν [scil. Πρόκυνα] δὲ τέτοιον τῇ κερκίδα λαλεῖ. In Aristotle's view a disclosure by such means as these is quite as inartistic as that of Orestes in the Iphigenia (800).

\[\text{διὰ μνήμης, τῷ αἰσθέσαται τι ἴδοντα. Vahlen (omitting the comma) supposes this to be the same as τῷ διὰ μνήμης αἰσθέσαται τι ἴδοντα, and explains it thus: 'τῷ αἰσθέσαται ... non tam percipiendo significat quam offerendo obticiendo quod sensibus percipi possit, ut quae in exemplis dicuntur κλαίσαι, δακρύσαι.' τῷ αἰσθέσαται τι ἴδοντα accordingly has been taken to mean 'when the sight of some object awakens a feeling' (Butcher), or 'indem ein Anblick schmerzliche Empfindungen wachruft' (Gomperz). It is more natural, however, to take τῷ αἰσθέσαται in the sense of 'by becoming conscious of' (comp. Bon. Ind. 754\textsuperscript{a} 43 for the aorist), and as an equivalent for τῷ μνησθήναι. The connexion between the two terms may be seen from De mem. 1, 450\textsuperscript{b} 18 ὃ γὰρ ἑνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος τοῦτο [i.e., the impression left by experience] καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτον. In default of a word corresponding to our 'consciousness', Aristotle has to use αἰσθητικ and αἰσθάνεσθαι in lieu of it (Bon. Ind. 21\textsuperscript{a} 1; comp. my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 65). In the illustrations which follow the emphasis is on the participles ἴδον and ἀκούν ... καὶ μνησθεῖ, not on ἐκλαίσθεν and ἐδάκρυσθεν; the actual manifestations of the awakened memories (ἐκλαίσθεν, ἐδάκρυσθεν) are only the accidents, which happen to be found in the instances under consideration. ἴδοντα is a circumstantial participle (comp. μεταβαλοῦσα in 4, 1449\textsuperscript{a} 14). It is loosely put for 'seeing or hearing' (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr.\textsuperscript{3} 2. 2. p. 570).]

\[\text{1455\textsuperscript{a} 1} \text{ ἐν Κυπρίῳ: Nauck, TGF.\textsuperscript{2} p. 775. Nothing more is known of the play.}\]
\[\text{a 2} \text{ ἐν Ἀλκίνου ἀπολόγῳ: Od. 8. 521 sqq. (comp. 8. 83 sqq.). In Rhet. 3. 16, 1417\textsuperscript{a} 13 the designation covers the ground of Od. 9–12. See on 1454\textsuperscript{b} 30 for this mode of citing Homer.}\]
\[\text{a 4} \text{ ἐν Χοιφόροις: Aesch. Choeph. 168–234 (comp. Eurip. El. 520). Electra reflects on what she sees, and concludes that it is her brother Orestes who has come home. It will be observed that in} \]
the other instances of ἀναγνώρισις ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ the discovery is made by the party who overhears the reflexion of the other.

ὁ Ὀρέστης. For the article compare Herod. i. 68 συνεβάλλετο ἀρκετά τῶν Ὀρέστεων... τοῦτον εἶναι.

Πολυίδου. It is agreed that this was the Attic form of the name ᾽Αριστοτέλης (Kock, CAF. i p. 508; Schulze, Qu. Epicae p. 111). As literary criticism was part of the business of a sophist, the probability is that this suggestion of the ‘Sophist Polydus’ was propounded in some critical discussion on the technique of the dramatists; it is quite unnecessary to suppose him to have been also a dramatic poet (with Welcker, Gr. Trag. 1043), or to identify him with a certain dithyrambic poet of the same name (with Bernhardt, Gr. Litt. 2 p. 756). Aristotle reverts to this suggestion in 17, 1455 b 10.

Τυδεῖ: Nauck, TGF. 803. Nothing more is known either of this or of the other two plays mentioned, the Φιλωδαί (Nauck p. 841) and Ὄδυσσεος ψευδάγγελος (Nauck p. 839). It is impossible to say who the personage here referred to was (comp. Tyrwhitt on 11, 1452 a 27).

ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ: comp. 14 ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ. Vahlen, who connects this directly with συνθέτῃ, supposes the two factors in the Discovery to be a συλλογισμός on the side of the one, and a παραλογισμός on the side of the other of the two parties: ‘quae [scil. ἀναγνώρισις] ut ex simplici unius ratiocinatione prodire, ita composita esse potest alterius ex syllogismo, paralogismo alterius’ (comp. also the discussion in his ‘Zur Kritik Aristotelischer Schriften’ p. 16). The illustration, however, from the Ὄδυσσεος ψευδάγγελος does not seem to imply anything more than an erroneous inference by one party (παραλογισμός ὁ θατέρων) from some statement made by the other. The reasoning in this instance Aristotle appears to regard as the illogical parallel to that in the Choeperoroe: just as the recognition of Orestes by Electra came about through a συλλογισμός on her part, so that of A by B, the two personages in the Ὅδυσσεος ψευδάγγελος, is supposed to come about through a παραλογισμός on the part of the latter. The fallacy to be found there may have arisen from the ambiguity of the word ‘know’. A having said ‘I shall know the bow’, B may have taken this to mean that he would ‘know it again’ (ἀναγνωρισμόντος)—which was not true (comp. δ ὦχ ἐωράκει). In our ignorance of the play and its plot it is idle to speculate further as to the way in which the actual Discovery may have been worked
1455a 13 out in it. The present is one of many passages showing Aristotle's affection for the forms of logic even when dealing with matters of poetry (see on 16, 1454 b 28).

θατέροι: comp. I, 1452 b 4. The error in the text of Ας (θεάτρου) is the converse of that in the inferior MSS. of Plato's Laws 659 Α (θατέροι for θεάτρον).

a 15 ὁς δὴ κτῆ. Both text and interpretation here are in the highest degree doubtful. ὁς δὴ ἐκεῖνον ἀναγνωριστος seems to be practically an object-clause after ποιήσαι; for this use of the gen. absol. with ὁς see Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3. 2 p. 93, or Goodwin, Synt. of Gr. Moods and Tenses § 917 (comp. Lobeck on Soph. Aj. 281). After ἀναγνωριστος we may understand τὸ τόξων, from τὸ τόξων ἥφι γνώσεσθαι in the preceding line—the distinction between γνώσεσθαι and ἀναγνωριστος being like that between λήψις and ἀνάληψις in De mem. 2. 451 a 20 οὔτε γὰρ μνήμης ἐστὶν ἀνάληψις ἢ ἀνάμνησις οὔτε λήψις.

διὰ τούτου ποιήσαι. ποιήσαι here may perhaps have the sense of 'suppose' or 'assume' (comp. Herod. 7. 184; Xenoph. An. 5. 7. 9; Ast, Lex. Plat. 3 p. 136). The comma usually placed after τούτου has been removed in order that διὰ τούτου may be connected with ποιήσαι, so as to mean 'through' or 'in consequence of this statement'; comp. the use of διὰ in Soph. el. 1, 165 a 1 ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν ἐστὶ τεθεῖτον ὡστε λέγεων ἔτερον τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων. If the comma is retained, ἀναγνωριστος διὰ τούτου must mean either 'would reveal himself by this' (see on 11, 1452 b 5), or 'would recognize him by this'. Butcher, keeping παραλογισμὸν, and reading with Bekker and the Aldine ἐποίησε instead of ποιήσαι, translates the clause thus: 'This remark led Odysseus to imagine that the other would recognize him through the bow, thus suggesting a false inference.'

a 18 οἶνον τὸ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπωδι: comp. 15, 1454 b 7 οἶνον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίπωδι—where a certain incident in the story of the O. T. is said to be ἄλογον, just as here another is said to be ἐκός. That the Discovery in the O. T. is probable was shown in 11, 1452 a 26 (δηλώσας δέ ἢν).

τῇ ἰφιγενείᾳ: Iph. Taur. 582.

a 19 ἐπεθεῖαι γράμματα is 'dare epistolam' (comp. Iph. Taur. 770 ἐπιστέλλει), not as Bon. Ind. 281 a 44 says, 'addere epistolam'. The dative of the person to whom is omitted, for reasons which a reader of the play will easily understand. It is omitted also for the sake of brevity in Herod. 3. 43 γράψας δὲ ἐς Λέγεντον ἐπέθηκε
6. 1455 a 13—17. 1455 a 22

(scil. τῷ βυβλίῳ), which Valckenaer explains as meaning ‘tradidit epistolam in Aegyptum perferendam’.

αἰ γὰρ τοιαύται μόναι κτέ. The difficulty in this clause is obvious, and it has long been recognized. Vahlen's explanation is as follows: ‘haec planissima sunt quamquam a Spengelio prave intellecta. neque enim hoc voluit illas agnitiones unicas esse quae careant indiciis et monilibus, sed hoc dicit: hae ἀναγνώρισεις per se solae sunt (constant) sine illis extrinsecus adminiculis ascitis. et haec quidem sic universe significantur verbis τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ περὶ δεραίων, quoniam ea nunc non attinebat singillatim per suas species referre.’ The real crux of the passage, however, is in σημείων; as used at the beginning of the chapter, in the account of the first species of Discovery (ἡ δὲ τῶν σημείων ἀναγνώρισις, 1454 b 21), the term denotes a visible mark or token; but the absence of a σημείον of that description is obviously not peculiar to this fifth and best Discovery — ἡ ἐκ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. Twining plausibly suggests that Aristotle may be using σημείον in a more general sense, and that it denotes here—as it might very well do—anything that serves as a ‘sign’ in the less artistic forms of Discovery. Thus in the second of these the statement of Orestes is a sort of σημείον; in Euripides it is actually described as a τεκμήριον (see on 1454 b 34). The same may be said of the tears (ἐκλαυσθεν, ἐδάκρυσθεν) in the third species of Discovery. As for the fourth (ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ), to judge from the instances, it may depend on a sign (comp. τεκμήριον, Aesch. Choeph. 205), or it may result from a reflexion overheard, which thus serves as a sign. In comparison however with that in the O. T. or Iphigenia, all these forms of Discovery are in Aristotle's judgment more or less artificial (comp. πεποιημένων), and thus of inferior artistic value.

δεραιων: comp. Eurip. Ion 1431 δέραια παιδί νεογόνῳ φέρειν.— a 20

Menander (Lefebvre, Fragments d'un MS. de M.) 'Επιτρέποντες 28 κάκκείμενον παιδάριον εὖρον νήπιον ἔχον δέραια καὶ τοιούτοις τινα κόσμον.—86 δὸς μοι, γύναι, τὰ δέραια καὶ γνωρίσματα.—Alciphron Ep. 3. 63 μετὰ τῶν σπαργάνων δέραια τινα καὶ γνωρίσματα περιβείσαι.

δεὶ δὲ τοὺς μόθους κτέ. This begins a series of supplementary a 22

rules for the guidance of the dramatic poet in practice. When writing his play in the study he must (1) see the various incidents in it as it were, so as to anticipate the impression they are likely to produce on the stage; and also (2) feel to some extent the
various emotions of his personages, if his picture of emotion is to be convincing (1455 a 23–34). After these five further rules are added in the course of this and the following chapter.

συναπεργαξοθαι: comp. a 30 συναπεργαξόμενον, and Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 31 ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαξομένους σχῆματι καὶ ἔσθητι καὶ ὅλως τῇ ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι. συναπεργαξοθαι, 'to finish off', stands in the same relation to ἀπεργαξοθαι as συμπληρῶν and συντελεῖν to πληροῦν and τελεῖν. It is to be remembered that in Aristotle's view (6, 1450 a 36; 9, 1451 b 28) the language is but a secondary matter by comparison with the μύθος. Plutarch's story of Menander's mode of working may be worth quoting: De gloria Ath. 4, 347 ὥς λέγεται δὲ καὶ Μενάνδρῳ τὼν συνήθων τις εἰπέων: 'Εγγύς οὖν, Μενάνδρε, τὰ Διονύσια, καὶ σὺ τὴν κωμῳδίαν οὖν πεποίηκα; τὸν δὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐγγύς κρῖναι τὴν κωμῳδίαν ὕστορίαν γὰρ ἡ διάθεσις [= 'the plan']: δεὶ δ' αὐτὴ τὰ στιχίδια ἐπάσαι.

1 23 πρὸ ὃμμάτων τιθεμένον: De mem. 1. 450 b 4 ὁ νοῦν, κἀν μὴ ποσόν νοη, τίθεται πρὸ ὃμμάτων ποσών, νοεί δ' οὐχ ἃ ποσόν.—Probl. 40. 14, 957 a 22 τὸ τε ἐνυπνιόν ἐστὶν ὅταν διανοοῦμενοι καὶ πρὸ ὃμμάτων τιθεμένοι ὑπὸς ἐπέλθη (comp. Bon. Ind. 509 b 30).

οὖτω repeats the idea of πρὸ ὃμμάτων τιθεμένον; what follows, ἐναργέστατα ὅρων κτλ., is added as an explanation.

ὁρῶν. Vahlen retains the article before ὅρων, and supposes an hyperbaton like that in 6, 1449 b 23. The article, however, is certainly not wanted, and may easily be explained as a dittographe.

26 Καρκίνῳ. The play referred to is assumed on the strength of this statement to have been entitled the Amphiarus. Nothing more is known of it than what Aristotle here tells us, that the incongruity of a certain incident in it was observed and resented by the audience.

27 ἐξ ἑροῦ ἀνήμη: 'e templo exibat' (Paccius), 'e fano exiit' (Victorius), 'e templo ascenderat' (Tyrwhitt), 'had left the temple' (Twining), 'ex delubro redibat' (Ritter), 'was on his way from the temple' (Butcher), 'hatte das Heiligtum bereits verlassen' (Gomperz).

δ μὴ ὅρων' ἄν τὸν θεατὴν κτλ. The sense is: If the incident had not been visibly before them, as part of the action of the piece (τὰ πραττόμενα), the incongruity would not have been noticed by the audience (τὸν θεατὴν: see on 26, 1461 b 28); but they could not help observing it when actually put before their eyes on the stage. To guard against this kind of mistake, therefore, the poet
should in his mind's eye see his various incidents beforehand, so as to anticipate the impression they will make in the theatre. In the same way we are told in another place (24, 1460^a 15) that the absurdity in the Pursuit of Hector in the Iliad would be observed on the stage, though it passes unnoticed in the poem.

οὐς δὲ δυνατὸν: comp. a 23 ὡς μᾶλλον.

τοῖς σχῆμασιν: the attitudes and gestures in which great emotion finds expression. The meaning here is apparently this: If the poet is to portray great emotion convincingly, he must feel it himself; and if he feels it, he cannot but express it to some extent in gesture as well as in word. Aristotle, therefore, does not agree with the theory that the poet should write in cold blood, and that poetry is a matter of pure art and intellect; his view rather is that some emotional excitement is one of the conditions required for a strong and convincing picture of passion. With this we may compare the Horatian maxim, Si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi (A. P. 102), and that of Pope (Eloisa to Abelard 366), 'He best can paint 'em [i.e. their woes] who can feel 'em most'; or the perhaps even weightier dictum of Wordsworth (Pref. to Lyrical Ballads), 'It will be the wish of the Poet to bring his feelings near to those of the persons whose feelings he describes, nay, for short spaces of time, perhaps, to let himself slip into an entire delusion, and even confound and identify his own feelings with theirs.' How consonant all this is with the actual experience of many great imaginative writers may be seen from the evidence cited by Biese, Das Metaphorische in der dichterischen Phantasie p. 24 (Berl. 1889). In the Carpentariana p. 193 a story is told of Domenichino as showing that the same emotional excitability is not unknown even among painters: 'Le Dominiquin avoit coutume de jouer, pour ainsi dire, le rôle de toutes les figures qu'il vouloit représenter; & de dire tout haut ce que la passion qu'il leur donnait, pouvait inspirer. Lorsqu'il peignoit le Martyre de S. André, le Carache le surprit comme il étoit en colere, parlant d'une voix terrible & menaçante; & il travailloit pour lors à un Soldat qui menace le Saint. Après que l' enthousiasme fut passé, le Carache courut l'embrasser, & lui avoua qu'il avoit été ce jour-là son Maître; & qu'il venoit d'apprendre de lui, la véritable manière de réussir dans les expressions.'

πιθανότατοι ... εύ τοῖς πάθεσιν: Quintilian 6. 2. 27 In iis a 30 quae verismilitia esse volemus, sinus ipsi similes eorum qui vere patiuntur affectibus. In the next clause χειμαίνει ... καὶ χαλεπαίνει

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1455 a 30 . . . ἀληθινώτατα explains πιθανώτατοι, and ὁ χειμαζόμενος καὶ . . . ὁ ὀργιζόμενος corresponds with οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν. For the meaning of πιθανός see on 9, 1451 b 16.

ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως. The same use of ἀπὸ is found in Eth. N. 4. 4, 1122 b 13 ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης διατάγης τὸ ἐργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.—Meteor. 2. 3, 359 a 7 ὦστε τὰ πλοῖα ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀγωγίμων βάρους ἐν μὲν τοῖς ποταμοῖς ἀλγόν καταδύνειν, ἐν δὲ τῇ θαλάσσῃ μετρίως ἔχειν.—Mech. 22. 854 b 7 ὦστε γὰρ ἂν πλείον ἀπέχῃ τοῦ ὑπορχλίου ὁ μοχλός, ὁ ἰοῦν κινεῖ καὶ πλείον ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσχύος τῆς αὐτῆς.

a 31 ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν: De insomn. 2, 460 b 3 ὑπὸδος ἀπατώμεθα περί τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὀντές, ἄλλοι δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον ὁ δεῖλος ἐν φῶβῳ, ὁ δ' ἐρωτικὸς ἐν ἐρωτί.

χειμανιν . . . χαλεπανιν are intransitive (comp. HSt. s.v. χειμαίνω). The usual interpretation is that of Victorius, who makes them mean 'fluctuare facit alium' (or 'excitat fluctus in animis auditorum') and 'ad iram commovet'. As far, however, as the present passage is concerned, any such reference to the feelings of the audience is out of place; the poet is not supposed to make them angry (for instance), but to put before them a picture of anger which they can accept as sufficiently like reality (see on 19, 1456 b 1). The clause in fact is only an amplification of the πιθανώτατοι οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰςων which precedes it.

χειμαζόμενος: comp. infra b 21 χειμασθεῖσ. The subst. χειμῶν is similarly used of mental distress or agitation in Epicurus, p. 62, 18 Usener, λύται πάσο τῆς ψυχῆς χειμῶν, where it is the opposite of ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξία (comp. Lobeck, Phryn. p. 387, and the Index to Meineke's FCG. p. 1148).

a 32 ἀληθινώτατα, which qualifies χειμανιν as well as χαλεπανιν, is emphatic, as its position shows. It is stronger than πιθανώτατα, the word which Aristotle might very well have used in this context.

διὸ εὐφυοῦς κτέ. Aristotle's curt and allusive statement needs some little expansion to bring out his meaning. It may perhaps be rewritten thus: the imaginative power of identifying oneself for the time with one's personages, which poetry demands, is a matter not of art, but of nature and temperament; it requires a natural gift or else a touch of madness in the poet's mental constitution. This natural gift consists in a certain impressionability of soul; and the illusions of madness arise from a distempered form of the same quality.

εὐφυοῦς. εὐφυής (more fully εὐφυῆς πρὸς τι) is a general term
for one with a natural gift and aptitude for something, as distinct from one who acquires a power by training or study; comp. 22, 1459 7, and Top. 3. 2, 118 22 φιλοσοφείν άρνούμεθα, ἵνα εὐφνεῖς εἶναι δόξωμεν. The word is of frequent occurrence in Plato, as well as in Aristotle, and it is occasionally found in Isocrates also. In the present passage the poetic imagination is tacitly assumed to be a matter of nature, and to be the outcome in some instances of a healthy, and in others, of an unhealthy nature. The alternative εὐφνοῖς ἡ μανικοῦ might be largely illustrated from Probl. 30. 1, where the connexion between 'great wit' (as Dryden calls εὐφνία and madness is considered at length. The writer of the Problem (one of Aristotle's immediate followers, as it would seem) shows that they have a common physiological basis—that the 'melancholic temperament' underlies all exceptional ability, and that a more or less morbid form of it is to be seen in madness, and in certain states of mind akin to madness, e.g. enthusiasm and 'ecstasy'; comp. esp. Probl. 30. 1, 954 34 τολχοί δὲ καὶ . . . νοσήμασιν ἀλλάζονται μανικοῖς ἡ ἐνθυσιαστικοῖς, οἶνον Σίβυλλαι καὶ Βάκιδες καὶ οἱ ἐνθεοί γίνονται πάντες . . . Μαρακὸς δὲ ὁ Συρακούσιος καὶ ἀμείων ἥν ποιητής, ἄτρε ἐκποίησι. A close relation between genius and madness is implied also in Rhet. 2. 15, 1390 26 καὶ ἐνότε ἢ ἡ ἄγαθον τὸ γένος, ἐγγίζονται διὰ τινος χρόνου ἀνδρὲς περιτοί, καπειτα πάλαι ἀναδιώσων' εξίσωσι δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφνα ['clever', 'quick-witted'] γένε εἰς μανικώτερα ἥθη . . . τὰ δὲ στάσιμα ['steady', 'painstaking'] εἰς ἀβελτητέαν καὶ νοβρότητα.

ἡ μανικοῦ. The alternative here is a rationalistic recognition of the ancient idea of the poet being 'possessed' and 'inspired' at the moment of poetic creation. Plato plays on this idea in his 'praise of madness' in Phaedr. 245 A ὅς ὅ ἄν ἄνευ μανίας Μονσών ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεῖς ὅς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελῆς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μανικέων ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦτος ἰσμανής; and he returns to it in other dialogues (comp. Apol. 22 b, Meno 99 c, Ion 533 ε sqq., Laws 719 c). For the survival of the notion in later literature see W. H. Thompson's note on Phaedr. 245 A.

οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δι. The singulars which precede are practically equivalent to plurals, εὐφνῶν . . . μανικῶν (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3. 2. 1 p. 86).

ἐπιλαστοί, 'capable of assuming a variety of moods', i.e. as we should say, 'impressionable' or 'emotional'; comp. the Platonic ἀπαλή ψυχή in Phaedr. 245 A τρίτης δ' ἀπὸ Μονσῶν κατοκωχὴ τε
1455 \(a\) 33 καὶ μανιά, λαβοῦσα ἀπαλὴν καὶ ἐβαστὸν ψυχὴν, and the explanation of Hermias (p. 98 Couveur) ἀπαλὴν δὲ λέγει τὴν εὔπλαστον καὶ εἰσπαθὸς ἔχονσαν πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ θείου. The word is properly used of material substances which, instead of being hard and rigid, are easily made to take various shapes; comp. De gen. an. 3. 11, 761 \(a\) 32 πολύμορφα τὰ ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ μᾶλλον ἔστι τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ τὸ· τε γὰρ ὑγρὸν εὐπλαστὸτέραν ἔχει τὴν φύσιν τῆς γῆς (also Plato Rep. 588 b). A metaphorical extension of meaning, not unlike that in the text, is found in Plato Laws 666 b ἐπίκοιρον τῆς τοῦ γῆρου αἰσθηρότητος ἐδωρήσατο τὸν οἰνὸν φάρμακον, ὡστε ἀνηβαίνῃ ἡμᾶς καὶ δυσθυμίας λύθην γέγενσθαι, μαλακῶτερον τ᾽ ἐκ σκληροτερὸν τῇ γῆς ψυχῆς ὅθεσο, καθάπερ εἰς τῷ σίδηρον ἐνέθετα, γιγνόμενον, καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι. This impressionability of soul, which marks the poetic genius (ἐὔφυς), may be explained on the principles set forth in Probl. 30. 1, where the melancholic temperament is said to show itself in a certain variability of mood (ἀνώμαιλοι εἰσιν οἱ μελαγχολικοί), and a general capacity for strong feeling (ἡ φύσις δὴ ἔποιευσα πρὸς τὰ πάθη).

\(\text{a 34} \) ἐκστατικὸς describes the extreme form of the emotionalism of the melancholic temperament; some of the ‘melancholic’ are apt to be so completely carried away by their feelings as to be actually beside themselves for the time. According to Probl. 30. 1 a tendency to this description of ‘melancholy’ was observable in most of the poets (τῶν περὶ τὴν ποιήσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι, 953 \(a\) 28); a certain Maracus of Syracuse—like our own Christopher Smart and others—was said to have been at his best in moments of derangement, Μαρακὸς ὁ Συρακοῦσιος καὶ ἀμείων ἡν ποιήσις, ὅτ᾽ ἐκσταίη (954 \(a\) 38). Among Aristotelian instances of ἐξασταθεῖαι, ἐκστασίας, and ἐκστατικός, as terms of mental pathology, the following may be noted: De gen. et corr. 1. 8, 325 \(a\) 19 οὐδὲνα γὰρ τῶν μαυρομένων ἐξεστάται τοσοῦτον ὡστε τὸ πῦρ ἐν εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸν κρυόσταλλον.—Η. Α. 6. 22, 577 \(a\) 12 ἐξέσταται καὶ μαίνεται.—Cat. 8, 9 \(b\) 36 ἦ τε μαυρᾶ ἐκστασίας καὶ ἦ ὑγρᾶ καὶ τὰ ποιῶν [scil. ποιῶντες]; ποιῶν γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται, ὑγρὰλοι τε καὶ μαυρόν.—Probl. 30. 1, 953 \(a\) 17 ἦ περὶ τοῦ παῖδος ἐκστασίας [said of Hercules slaying his children in his madness]. —\(\text{a 22} \) ὁ μὲν [i. e. Ajax] ἐκστατικὸς ἐγείεντο παντελῶς.—\(\text{b 14} \) τῶν μελαγχολικῶν ὤσιν ἐκστατικοῖ.—Theophrastus H. P. 9. 13, 4, ἔχεσται ἐκστατικὸς in the active sense of producing ἐκστασις: γιόντα τοίς τῶν γλυκειῶν [scil. riζῶν] αἰ ἔχεσται καθάπερ ἦ ὁμοία τῷ σκολόμφῳ περὶ Τεγέαν, ἦν καὶ Πάνδυεος ὁ ἀνδραμοστοιος φαγὼν ἔργαζόμενος ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἐξέστη· αἱ δὲ θανατηφόροι κτε. This technical
use of these words is perhaps another proof of the influence of the language of Hippocrates (v. Foes, Oeconomia Hippocratis s.v. ἔκτασις) on that of Aristotle and his school.

ἔκτασικός, the reading of the MS., is surely impossible in a context like the present. ἔκτάζεων denotes to 'scrutinize' or 'examine', i.e. to exercise one's critical faculty on something. It is clear, however, as any reader of Probl. 30. I must see, that Aristotle is not thinking here of the critical but of the imaginative power of the poet, and that he wishes to distinguish two forms of it, one springing from a healthy, and the other from a more or less morbid state of mind. An instance of the corruption of ἐκτασικός into ἔκτασικός is found in the MSS. of Aspasius' commentary on the Nic. Ethics, p. 136. 3 ed. Heylbut. Mr. A. O. Prickard has pointed out to me a similar corruption in Longinus 38. 5 (ἔκτάσεως for ἐκτάσεως).

τοὺς τε λόγους: comp. 24, 1460 a 27. A new point is introduced in the same way in 24, 1460 a 26 (προαιρεῖσθαι τε δὲ), and in several places in the later Books of the Nicomachean Ethics (e.g. 8. 1, 1155 a 11, 16 ; 9. 1, 1164 b 1, etc.). This is the third of Aristotle's supplementary rules (see on a 22). It will be observed that he now changes his construction, infinitives taking the place of the preceding participles, just as though he had begun by saying δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάντα καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργαζόμενον ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὄμματον τίθεσθαι ... καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργάζεσθαι. For λόγος in the sense of the argument in a play or poem comp. 17, 1455 b 17 and 24, 1460 a 27 (also Aristoph. Pax 148, and Hesychius λόγος ἡ τοῦ δράματος ύπόθεσις).

ἐκτίθεσθαι καθέλω: i.e. to set out in a general form, to reduce it to its simplest terms by ignoring its accidents, its personal and other accessories. On the logical or philosophic use of ἐκτίθεσθαι in Aristotle see Vahlen, Beitr. 2 p. 83 and Poste's Sophistici Enlenchi p. 153 (comp. Maier, Syllogistik des Aristoteles 2. 2 p. 142).

ἐπεισδοδίον, scil. τῶν λόγων, as in Rhet. 3. 17, 1418 a 33 δὲ τῶν λόγων ἐπεισδοδίου ἐπαίνου. It means to work in the accessory incidents (ἐπεισοδία; see on 9, 1451 b 33) into the story as outlined in the preliminary sketch.

τῇ θεῷ. The goddess meant is Artemis, to whom Iphigenia had been offered in sacrifice (τυθείσης τινὸς κόρης b 3) at Aulis.

ἀνελεῖν ὧθεῖς ... ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ. The reading here was practically settled long ago by Dünzter (Rettung d. Aristot. Poetik p. 180). Aristotle is merely reproducing in his own form the statement in
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1455 b 7 Iph. Taur. 82, where Orestes, in an address to Apollo, is made to say: ἐλθὼν δὲ ὁ ἱππότης πώς τροχηλάτου μανίας ἂν ἐλθοῦμ' ἐσ τέλος πόλων τ' ἐμῶν· σὺ δ' ἐπισ [ἀνείλεν ὁ θεός] ἐλθέων Ταυρικής μ' ὀροὺς χθονός [= ἐλθεὶν ἐκεί], ἐνθ "Ἀρτεμίς σῇ ἐγγύνοις βωμοῖς ἔχει, λαβεῖν τ' ἀγαλμα θεᾶς ... λαβόντα δ' ... Ἀθηναίων χθονὶ δοῦναι. This incident in the previous history of Orestes is outside the actual story or plot of the Iphigenia (ἐξω τοῦ μύθου); all that is really essential for the dramatic situation is that τῷ ἀδελφῷ συνεβή ἐλθεῖν τῆς ιερείας.

b 8 ἐξω τοῦ μύθου, which seems to have been explained by the adscript ἐξω τοῦ καθόλου, is equivalent to ἐξω τοῦ δράματος (see on 14, 1453 b 32), outside the action of the piece.

b 9 ληφθείς = συλληφθείς (comp. Bremi on Lysias in Eratosth. § 16). ἀνεγνώρισεν, scil. ὁ Ὀρέστης (see on 11, 1452 b 5).

b 10 Πολύδος: see on 16, 1455 a 6.

b 12 ὑποθέσα τὰ ὀνόματα: 9, 1451 b 13 τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ἑποτιθέασιν. The proper names are required to serve as a basis for the story, and impart to it an appearance of reality. Aristotle seems to speak for the moment as though the whole story, names and all, were of the poet’s creation, as it was in the New Comedy and in certain tragedies (9, 1451 b 11, 19). If the stories, however, were traditional, the chief names were generally part of the tradition, and taken over from it by the dramatist. A reason for the retention of historic names in Tragedy has been given in 9, 1451 b 15.

b 13 ἐπεισοδιών: comp. b 1 ἐπεισοδοῖς καὶ παρατείνειν.

ὅπως δὲ ἔσται. Another, perhaps the only other Aristotelian instance of this quasi-imperative, is in Rhet. 3. 18, 1419 b 6 ὅπως ὁ σὸν τὸ ἀρπόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται. Aristotle addresses his audience (see on 15, 1454 b 9), as he does in the concluding paragraph of the Sophistici Elenchi (33, 184 b 3), and exhorts them to bear in mind the rule he is pointing out.

οἰκεία: appropriate to the person. The madness of Orestes in the Iphigenia is a return of that which seized him just after the murder of his mother (Iph. Taur. 83); his purification also is naturally suggested by his guilt as a matricide (Iph. Taur. 1031 sqq.).


b 18 παραφυλαττόμενον: comp. the use of φυλάττειν in Hom. Od. 4 670 ὃφρα μιν αὐτῶν ἑλόντα λοχύσομαι ἴδε φυλάξω ἐν πορθμῷ.
autōs δὲ. In Aristotle, just as in other writers, a δὲ is occasion-
ally used after a participial clause to mark a contrast between the
two parts of the sentence (see my Textual Criticism of the Nic.
Ethics p. 34).
χειμασθείς: comp. 17, 1455 a 31.
ἀναγνωρίσας τινάς; autōs. On behalf of the amended reading
(ὁτι instead of τινᾶς) it may be noted that in 25, 1461 b 1 Αε
has τι instead of ὁτι. The language here is a reminiscence of
that in Od. 21. 207, where Ulysses reveals himself to the
herdsman: ἐνδὼν μὲν δὴ ὁδοιοῦ τιμῆς ἡμῖν κακά τολλά μογίςας
ηλιθον—the Homeric κακά τολλά μογίςας being represented
by Aristotle's χειμασθείς, ἡμιθον by ἀφικνήται, and ὁδοιοῦ τιμῆς ἡμῖν
by ἀναγνωρίσας ὁτι autōs. Twining (followed by Vahlen, Beitr. 2
p. 86; comp. Berlin Academy, Sitzungsberichte 1898, p. 2661)
adopts a suggestion of Castelvetro's, that ἀναγνωρίσας τινᾶς (the
traditional reading) may be taken to mean 'making himself known
to some of his people'. The interpretation, besides being against
Aristotelian usage (see on 16, 1454 b 32), requires us to take autōs
with ἐπιθέμενος, and gives it an undue degree of emphasis. There
is no point in saying that Ulysses attacked the suitors 'himself';
and it was not true that he attacked them 'by himself' or 'alone'
(comp. Aristot. fr. 176 Teubn.). This difficulty was not felt by
either Castelvetro or Twining, as the reading in the texts of their
time was not autōs but autōs.
εὐώδη: comp. the use of σωτηρία in b 12, 14. The double b
ending of the Odyssey has been formally recognized already, in
13, 1453 a 32.
to ὑδαίν: the peculiar or characteristic part of the Odyssey, as b
23 distinct from the 'episodes', or accessories.

1 Vahlen (in this paper in the Sitzungsberichte) points to an instance of
ἀναγνωρίσας τινᾶς, in the sense of 'cause some one to recognize' in Diodorus
Sic. 4. 59. 6 κατορθώσας δὲ τα προειρήμενα [scil. Theseus'] καθήντησεν εἰς τὸς
Αὖθνας καὶ τὸν Αἰγέα διὰ τῶν συμβίλων ἀνεγνώρισεν. This solitary instance,
however, occurring as it does in an author like Diodorus, and in a passage
which is certainly not free from difficulties, is hardly sufficient to show that
the word may have had the same sense and construction in Aristotle; the
sense given it is too abnormal, too unlike the Aristotelian use of the word
in other passages in the Poetics and elsewhere, to be accepted as probable.
Vahlen thinks the simple γνωρίσαν also is used in the same way in Plutarch
Theseus 12 τοῦ δὲ ὑδάτος ἡσαζότερο καὶ συναγγείων τῶν πολίτων
ἐγνώρισα, ἥτις λεγομένοις διὰ τὴν ἀνδραγαθίαν. It seems to me that the
object after ἐγνώρισα in this passage is τῶν ὑδάτον (comp. Meursius, Theseus
c. 8), and that ἐγνώρισα means either 'introduced him' (comp. Plut. Fab.
Max. 21) or 'acknowledged him',

17. 1455 b 7-23 247
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1455 \textsuperscript{b} 24 "Εστι δὲ πάσης τραγῳδίας κτλ. The fourth of these supplementary rules. The complication and dénouement are of such paramount importance, that two tragedies with the same sort of complication and dénouement should be regarded as substantially the same, however different they may be in other respects. It is quite possible to succeed in the one point and fail in the other; but they are both of equal moment, and require equal attention from the poet. This view of the drift of the paragraph assumes that the sentence δίκαιον ... κρατεύσθαι in 1456 \textsuperscript{a} 7–10 should follow after μέχρι τοῦ τέλους in 1455 \textsuperscript{b} 32. A mere definition of δέσις and λούσις would have no place in these chapters, unless it were made to lead up to some practical precept, such as we have in δει δε ἀμφοτερον κρατεύσθαι in 1456 \textsuperscript{a} 10.

δέσις ... λούσις: see on 15, 1454 \textsuperscript{n} 37.

\textsuperscript{b} 25 ἐξωθεῖν: see on 14, 1453 \textsuperscript{b} 32.

ἐνα τῶν ἐσωθεῖν πολλάκις. It is not necessary to transpose πολλάκις and insert it after the preceding τα μεν ἐξωθεῖν. The δέσις, says Aristotle, comprises not only the presupposed part of the story (τα ἐξωθεῖν, or τα προπετραγγελα), but also in many instances (πολλάκις) some portion of the action within the play. In the Iph. Taur. the δέσις extends as far as l. 391. In the O. T. on the other hand the entire δέσις is presupposed, the λούσις beginning with the opening scene.

\textsuperscript{b} 29 Λυγκεῖ: see on 11, 1452 \textsuperscript{a} 27. The Lyceus is cited as an instance of a play with a δέσις partly presupposed and partly within the limits of the action of the piece.

\textsuperscript{b} 30 τοῦ παιδίου, Abas, the child of Lyceus and Danaus’ daughter Hypermnestra.

\textsuperscript{b} 32 τραγῳδίας δε εἰδὴ κτλ. The fifth of the supplementary rules. There are four species of Tragedy—each arising apparently (like the species of Democracy in Pol. 4. 12, 1296 \textsuperscript{b} 27) through the prominence in it of some one of the several elements in a play. Aristotle insists that for an ideally good tragedy all these elements of interest are wanted, and that in so critical an age none can be neglected with impunity (μᾶλα μὲν οἷν ἄπαντα δεὶ περιστασιὰ ἐχεῖν κτλ. 1456 \textsuperscript{a} 3). The species he is now talking of, or at any rate three out of the number, were probably no discovery of his; terms like πεπλεγμένη τραγῳδία, παθητικὴ τραγῳδία, and ἡθικὴ τραγῳδία may very well be supposed to have been already sanctioned and current in the technical language of the theatre (comp. on 9, 1451 \textsuperscript{b} 33). If the περιπέτειαι and ἀναγνώρισις are
the whole thing' (as we say), the play is πεπλεγμένη; if the element of πάθος is especially prominent, it is παθητική; if it is mainly a portraiture of character, it is ἤθική; and if it depends largely on the 'spectacle', it is 'spectacular'. This last species Aristotle recognizes as a fact, but as there was no derivative from ὁψις corresponding to our 'spectacular', he has to change his form of expression and speak not of the fourth 'species', but of the fourth element (τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὁψις), with instances, however, (αὐτὲς Ἐρακίδες κτλ.) relating to the species of drama in which the element of ὁψις was prominent (see J. of Phil. 14 p. 50). These four elements have been already considered, though not quite so directly as Aristotle's language would imply. The περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις, which are assumed to go together (comp. II, 1452 a 32), and the πάθος have been distinguished already as elements in the μύθος (comp. II, 1452 b 9); and they are counted here as two parts of the play because each is the prominent factor in a distinct species of tragedy. Two other parts are mentioned, the ἤθις and the ὁψις, apparently for the same reason. If nothing is said of the remaining 'parts' of Tragedy, the reason is obvious; there was no existing species of Tragedy that could be described as consisting mainly of διάνοια or λέξις or μελοποιία. Vahlen and others assume a lacuna in b 34 (after ἀναγνώρισις), on the supposition that Aristotle must have had something to say about the ἀπλῆ τραγῳδία. The ἀπλῆ τραγῳδία, however, is not a species in Aristotle's present sense of the term; and if we are to find a place for it in the text, the same logic would require a recognition of the ἤθις τραγῳδία (6, 1450 a 25), as being the logical opposite of the ἤθικη τραγῳδία in the passage before us. The insertion too, which is due to a desire to bring the present statement into line with that in 24, 1459 b 8, makes it necessary to adopt a highly improbable correction, τερατώδεσ, in the context (1456 a 2).

τοσαύτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέξθη. In lieu of τὰ μέρη Tyrwhitt suggests τὰ μοίδων, and Ueberweg τὰ μίδων or τῶν μίδων—which would mean, if I understand Tyrwhitt's note correctly, that the ἤθικη τραγῳδία is based on ἤθικος μεθος. This, however, can hardly be right, if one remembers the sharp distinction drawn between ἤθος and μεθος in 6, 1450 a 4. The present passage, due allowance being made for the Aristotelian brevity of expression, is intelligible enough in itself; the difficulty is to bring it into harmony with what is said elsewhere in other parts of the book. τοσαύτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέξθη, no doubt, implies a previous
1455 a 32 statement, which it is impossible to find in the earlier chapters; and the passage in 24, 1459 b 9 implies that a ἀπλὴ as well as a πεπλεγμένη πραγματικά had been recognized among the four species of Tragedy in the passage before us. Difficulties of this kind it is better to acknowledge than to remove at the cost of reforming the text. The truth is that Aristotle is more human than we commonly suppose—that his memory is sometimes at fault, and also that he sometimes writes down what occurs to him at the moment, without stopping to reflect whether it is quite reconcilable with what he has said elsewhere. Though there are chapters in the Poetics, more especially in the early part, which are models of careful drafting, I think it clear that, as the work advances, the statement is not always equally admirable, and that it would require a great deal of revision to make it consistent throughout. The difficulty in the reference τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔλεγθη is not unlike that in ὥσπερ πρότερον ἐφηται in 6, 1450 b 13, and ὅπερ ἐφηται πολλάκις in 18, 1456 a 10.

b 33 ἡ μὲν πεπλεγμένη κτέ., appositional to the preceding ἐδή τέσσαρα (comp. 16, 1454 b 20; 21, 1457 a 31).

b 34 παθητική. No definition is given, as though the term (as also ἡθική in the next line) were sufficiently understood without one.

1456 a 1 Αἰάντες: see Nauck, TGF.² p. 963 for a list of plays entitled Αἰας.

'Ιξίονες: see Nauck p. 965.

Φθιώτιδες, a play by Sophocles (Nauck p. 282).

a 2 Πηλέως. The reference is perhaps to the Peleus of Sophocles (Nauck p. 239) rather than that of Euripides (Nauck p. 554).

τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὅψις is closer to the MS. reading than Schrader's τὸ δὲ τετράτῳδες, which has been so generally approved by recent editors. The unmeaning οὐσ of the MS. here, and again in 21, 1458 a 5¹, is but one remove from ὅψις as it might be written in an uncial MS. (ΟΗΣ = Ο+ΙΩ). The illustrations no doubt refer to the 'kind' instead of the 'part' brought into prominence in the kind. A certain formal incongruence, however, is not uncommon with instances introduced by οὖν (comp. 16, 1454 b 25; 25, 1461 a 24; Eth N. 4. 4, 1122 a 27; Rhet. 3. 3, 1405 b 35).

¹ See J. of Phil. 14 p. 50. The οὐσ of the MS. in the second instance has been supposed to represent ΟΠΣ, and in this way ὅψις. In early inscriptions ψ may appear as φ or ησ (Meisterhans, Gr.³ p. 3; Hoffmann, Gr. Dialekten 3 p. 612); but, as far as I am aware, there is no trace of this mode of writing in the manuscript tradition of a classical author.
Aristotle is often content to note the fact, and leave us to see its logical relation to what precedes.

Φορκίδες, a satyric drama by Aeschylus (Nauck p. 83).

Προμηθεύς, probably another satyric drama by Aeschylus (Nauck p. 62). There is a good deal to be said, however, in favour of Bergk’s suggestion (Kl. Schr. 2 p. 753) that the plural Προμηθεύς should be restored in the text.

δόσα ἐν ἀδου. The reference may perhaps be to plays like the Ψυχαγωγαί of Aeschylus (Nauck p. 87). In these last instances, owing to the nature of the subject and situation, the ὄψις, the make-up (see on 6, 1449b 33) of the strange personages introduced, may well be supposed to have been a great feature in the play. Aeschylus, who was an innovator in matters of stage-apparatus (Sommerbrodt, Scenaica p. 183), is said to have made large use of this device: Vita Aeschyli (p. 2 Dind.) ταῖς τε γὰρ ὄψεις καὶ τοὺς μύθους πρὸς ἐκπλήξειν τερατώδη μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀπάτην κέρκυται.

μάλιστα μὲν οὖν κτῆ. A reminiscence of Aristotle’s language here may be traced in Polybius 16. 20. 2: δίδ δὲ διόμισε βέν περισσότερος πάνων κρατεῖν τόν τῆς ἱστορίας μερόν καλόν γὰρ ἐδὲ μὴ τούτῳ δυνατόν, τῶν ἀναγκαστῶν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτῇ πλείστην ποιεῦσθαι πρόονοι.

ἐκάστου is masculine, ‘each of his various predecessors’—the genitive being dependent on ἴδων as in 5, 1449b 16, 13, 1452b 33, and 19, 1456a 35. For the hyperbaton see on 6, 1449b 23.

δίκαιον κτῆ. This and the next sentence (πολλοὶ — κρατεύονται) are probably out of place (see above, on 18, 1455b 24).

Ἄλλην καὶ τήν αὐτήν λέγειν. The point here, the conditions under which two tragedies may be said to be the same or not, is very like that in De anima 2. 4, 416a 5 χρῆ τὰ ὅργανα λέγειν ἑτέρα καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ἐργοῖς, and in Pol. 3. 3, 1276a 18 πῶς ποτὲ χρῆ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν ἄλλην ἑτέραν.

οὖδεν ἵσως τῷ μύθῳ, ‘ob nihil aequae ac ob fabulam’ (Tyrwhitt). The dative οὖδεν is to be taken with λέγειν in the sense of ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of’; comp. De anima 2. 4, 416a 5 (quoted above).—De sensu 7, 447b 24 φαίνεται γὰρ τό μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν ὡς ψυχῇ οὖδεν ἑτέρω λέγειν ἄλλην ἢ τῷ ἁμα.—Eth. N. 3. 12, 1117b 32 τῷ ὡς τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται.

The construction in ἵσως τῷ μύθῳ (‘equally with the story’) is normal (Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3. 2. 1 p. 411); but I am not able to point out an exact parallel. It may be compared, however, with
that in Eth. N. 1. 4, 1096 a 23 τάγαθον ἵσαγώς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι, and in Plato Parm. 150 λ ἃ ἂν τὸ ἐνὶ δὲ ὁδὸν αὐτῶ τεταμένη; and with the use of ὁμοίως in Pol. 3. 11, 1282 b 8 ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῖς νόμοις φαίνεται ἡ σοφοδαιών ἐναι, and elsewhere. ἵσαγως has the sense of 'equally' in Pol. 4, 14, 1298 b 23 (Bekker), in Plato Laws 805 A, and in Demosth. 10. 74 (v. Weil ad loc.).

τοῦτο δὲ (=τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ) introduces an explaining clause of similar form in De gen. et corr. 1. 6, 323 a 17 οὗ γὰρ οἷον τε πάν τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν, εἰπερ τὸ ποιοῦν ἀντιθέτομεν τῷ πάσχοντι τοῦτο δ' οἷς ἡ κάνησας πάθος.

9 ἡ αὐτὴ. Aristotle, thinking only of the identity of the two tragedies, omits to recognize the possible alternative ἡ ἄλλη (comp. 19, 1456 b 4).

κρατείσθαι = 'obtineri'. Vahlen illustrates this use of the word from Pol. 7. 13, 1331 b 37 δει δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀμφότερα κρατείσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις, and Dion. Hal. 5. 556 τίς δὲ σαφηνείας καὶ τίς ἑναργείαις ἀμφότεροι κρατεῖν ἀπεφηνάμεν. Comp. also Polyb. 16, 20. 2 (quoted above on a 3).

χρῆ δὲ κτῆ. The sixth of Aristotle's supplementary rules.

εἰρητι πολλάκις. Though some hint of this may perhaps be discerned in 5, 1449 b 12 and 17, 1455 b 15, the reference here is clearly one of Aristotle's oversights (see on 18, 1455 b 32); it is not true that he has more than once laid down the rule μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποτουκόν σύστημα πραγμάδιν. πολλάκις, 'more than once', is the opposite of ἀπαξ (comp. Meteor. 2. 3, 356 b 27) as well as of ὅλγακις, just as πολλά is the opposite of ἕν as well as of ὅλγα (Metaph. I 6, 1056 b 23).

μεμνήσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. For the conjunction Vahlen quotes Eth. N. 1. 7, 1098 a 26 μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρῆ καὶ τῶν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοιώς ἐν ἀπασίν ἐπιξηπτεῖν.

σύστημα, scil. πραγμάτων. The μηδος or story has been repeatedly described as a σύστασις πραγμάτων (v. 6, 1450 b 15, 32, b 32, etc.).

ἐποτοικόν δὲ λέγω τὸ πολύμυθον, scil. σύστημα. The common punctuation (with a full stop before, and a comma after it) makes this clause the beginning of a new sentence. It is clear, I think, that it is a parenthesis, and that the illustration οἷον εἰ τίς κτῆ. (comp. 26, 1462 b 2) refers back to the principal statement, μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποτουκόν σύστημα πραγμάδιν in a 11. For other illustrations at some distance from the statements to which they relate see on 7, 1451 a 2.
polýμυθον. The assumption here is that the story in the Iliad is a polýμυθον σύντημα, one with a plurality of stories in it (comp. 24, 1462 b 8). It is not easy to reconcile this with what we are told in a later chapter (23, 1459 a 30) where the unity of story in the Iliad is emphasized.

όσοι πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὀλην ἐποίησαν. We do not know to whom Aristotle is referring; it is just possible that Agathon may have been one of the number. For the tragedies entitled Ἰλίου πέρσις (or simply Πέρσις) see on 23, 1459 b 6.

'Ἀγάθων. Aristotle's sense of the importance of Agathon is shown by his many quotations from him (Bon. Ind. 4 b 5), as well as by the present and other references in the Poetics (9, 1451 b 21; 15, 1454 b 14). The context (a 21) implies that the pathos in Agathon's situations was not always of the most legitimate kind; and in the next paragraph (a 29) he is said to have set a bad precedent in the treatment of the Chorus. But whatever his artistic shortcomings may have been, we have evidence enough even in Aristophanes of his success with his own generation. There is a good deal of point, therefore, in what Aristotle is saying in support of his rule (μην ποιεῖν ἐποτοικὸν σύντημα τραγῳδίαν), that 'even Agathon failed' when he neglected it.

ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ, 'in this, and in this alone'—a pregnant use of like that in De somno 2, 455 a 27 διὸ καὶ πάσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις . . . καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀφὴ μόνη πάσιν.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι. I cannot think it necessary to bracket these words (with Susemihl). As περιπέτεια, which is the mark of the 'complex' story (10, 1452 a 16; comp. 11, 1452 a 32), is directly suggestive of it, ἐν ταῖς περιπέτειαις is practically equivalent to ἐν τοῖς πεπλεγμένοις πράγμασι. Aristotle adds καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς πράγμασι, in order to make his statement cover the whole ground by including both forms of plot. The failure of these unsuccessful poets, he says in effect, was really due not to any fault of execution, but to an initial mistake in their choice of subjects; they forgot the limitations of the Drama, and undertook to dramatize a story too long and too complex for the purposes of the stage.

ὦ βουλονται, 'the effects they desire'. The kind of effect, which is explained in the next clause (τραγικόν γὰρ τούτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον), may not be of the best order; but it is that which, in their anxiety to please their public, they wish to produce.

τραγικόν γὰρ τούτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. For the change of number in τοῦτο comp. 19, 1456 a 35; it is the converse of that in 17.
1456 a 21 1455 a 33 (comp. Bon. Ind. 490 b 17). Aristotle's theory is that the tragic situation should be ἐλεεύνον—which implies that the sufferer does not deserve his misfortunes (13, 1453 a 4); he incidentally admits, however, that it may be only φιλάνθρωπον (see on 13, 1452 b 38), as it is, for instance, when the sufferings of the wicked are put before us in such a way as to arouse a certain commiseration or human feeling for the sufferers. The later Tragedy would seem to have affected this inferior form of tragic motive.

ἐστιν δὲ τοῦτο κτὲ. The illustrations which follow were probably taken from actual plays. The tragedies Aristotle has in mind must have involved a strong περιπέτεια with all the interest and excitement attending it; they failed, however (we are told), in spite of this and other attractions (comp. στοχάζοντα δὲ βούλοντα διάμαστως), through an initial mistake in their subject, which was one more fitted for an epic than a play.

a 23 ἐστιν δὲ τοῦτο εἰκός: comp. 25, 1461 b 15. The reference is to the sophistical saying of Agathon (fr. 9 Nauck ²), τὰ χ' ἄν ο εἰκός ἀυτὸ τοῦτ’ ἐλέατο λέγων, βροτοῦσι πολλά τυχχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα, which Aristotle has examined in Rhet. 2. 24, 1402 a 10. There is some variation of text here, as another reading, ἐστιν δὲ τοῦτο (καὶ) εἰκός, is believed to underlie the Arabic Version. With the καὶ the clause adds a further point in favour of these unsuccessful plays: the kind of incident just mentioned is said to be 'probable also'. Without the καὶ the clause involves a criticism or condemnation, not unlike that in 13, 1453 a 35 (ἐστιν δὲ οὐχ αὐτὴ κτέ.), 'this is probable, however, only in Agathon's non-natural sense of the word'. A qualification of this kind (introduced by ὁσπερ or καθάπερ) is found more than once in this same chapter (a 17 and a 27), and again in 21, 1457 b 24; comp. also Metaph. Β 2, 998 b 2 ὁπεταί γὰρ τῷ κανόνι οὐ κατὰ στιχμὴν ὡς κύκλος ἀλλ᾽ ὡσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοῖς γεωμέτρασ.—Rhet. 1. 5, 1361 b 4 πολλοί γὰρ ἐγιαίωνοσ ὡσπερ Ὑβριδικός λέγεται.

a 25 καὶ τὸν χορὸν κτέ. The seventh and last of these practical rules. It reappears in the well-known precept of Horace A. P. 193 Ἀκτορὶς παρτὶς χορὸς οἰκίουν οἰκίου defendat, ne quid mediocris intercinar acer, quod non proposito conducat et haereat apte.

a 27 Εὐρυτὶδῆ. For the dative (conventionally rendered by ἀριστ) comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 8 οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἄδει καὶ κιβαρίζει τοῖς τούτοισ.—Plato Rep. 389 ε ὁλα καὶ Ὄμηρος Διομήδης λέγει.—Laws 706 D Ὄδυσσεῦς γὰρ αὐτῷ [scil. Ὄμηρῳ] λοιδορεῖ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα. The tacit assumption here is perhaps this, that the choral songs in
Euripides, though no mere ἐμβολία (like those in the later Drama), were not always very closely connected with the action of the piece. A tradition of this criticism survives in the grammarians. The chorus in Phoen. 1019 the scholiast condemns as irrelevant: πρὸς οἴδεν ταῦτα ἐδει γὰρ τὸν χορὸν οἰκτίσασθαι τὸν βάναυσον τοῦ Μενοικέως ἣ ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν εὐφυξίαν τοῦ νεανίσκου. Αλλὰ περὶ Οἰδίπου καὶ τῆς Σφήγγος διηγεῖται τὰ πολλάκις εἰρημένα. A more general condemnation is found in the scholiast on Aristoph. Ach. 443: καὶ διὰ τούτων τὸν Εὐριπίδην διασύρει. οὔτοι γὰρ ἐστάγει τοὺς χοροὺς οὔτε τὰ ἀκόλουθα φθεγγομένων τῇ ἐποθέσει, ἀλλ' ἱστορίας τινὰς ἀπαγγέλ- λοντας, ὡς ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, οὔτε ἐμπαθώς ἀντιλαμβανομένους τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ ἀντιπάπτοντος. The Roman poet Accius also must have been of the same opinion, to judge from the mutilated fragment of his Didascalia in Nonius 178, 23, sed Euripidis, qui choros temerius in fabulis ** **.

τὰ ἀδόμενα: the choral, as opposed to τὰ λεγόμενα, the spoken parts of the play. In [Demosthenes] 60. 9 τῶν τῶν ἀδομένων πουτᾶς is a way of describing the lyric poets; comp. also Plato Rep. 398 δ οὐκοῦν ὅσον γε αὐτοῦ λόγος ἔστιν, οἴδεν δήπου διαφέρει [scil. τὸ μέλος] τοῦ μὴ ἀδομένου λόγου.

ἐμβολία: 'carmina intercalaria' (Budaebus). The word is usually a term of chronology, as in Herod. r. 32 and 2. 4. With the grammarians it seems to have meant 'interpolated': Hesychius ἐμβολία ἐπή τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν γραμματικῶν ὡς ἀλλότρια καὶ νόθα ἄθετο-μένα. Cicero has the very similar word ἐμβολίων in Ep. ad Q. Fr. 3. 1, 24, in the sense of an 'insertion' or 'interlude' (v. Ernesti, Lex. tech. gr. p. 118).

Twining's note on this passage is well worth quoting: 'It is curious to trace the gradual extinction of the Chorus. At first, it was all; then, relieved by the intermittence of dialogue, but still principal; then, subordinate to the dialogue; then digressive, and ill connected with the piece; then borrowed from other pieces at pleasure—and so on, to the fiddles and act-tunes, at which Dacier is so angry.'

λέξεως καὶ διανοιας. This is the usual order of the two terms in the Poetics (ν. 6, 1450 a 9, 14, 29 and 24, 1459 b 16). The only instance of the reverse order, which is that of their logical importance (6, 1450 b 12; comp. Rhet. 2. 26, 1403 a 36), is in 24, 1459 b 12 ἐτι τὰς διανοιας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἐχειν καλῶς. For the meaning of διάνοια see on 6, 1450 a 6.

κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν: comp. Phys. 4. 14, 222 b 31 τὸ βάττων καὶ a 36
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1456a 36 βραδύτερον κατὰ πάσιν ἐστὶ μεταβολήν. In Bon. Ind. 369a 28 κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν is explained as equivalent to διανοητικά.

dúsa ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κτῆ. In the Rhetoric three kinds of speech are recognized, according as the aim of the speaker is (1) to gain the confidence of his audience by creating in their minds a favourable idea of himself and his general credibility; or (2) to work on their feelings; or (3) to convince their reason: Rhet. 1. 2, 1356a 1 τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἐστίν' αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ ἤθελ τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀκροατήν διαθείναι πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι κτῆ.

The present summary notes the second and third of these three εἴδη, but ignores the first, though there is certainly nothing to exclude that sort of speech from the rhetoric of Tragedy.

a 38 πάθη. The instances διὸν ἔλεον ἢ φόβον κτῆ. are added, because up to this point πάθος has usually meant ' suffering ' or ' calamity ' (11, 1452 b 11).

b 1 ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργήν ἢ δοκαί. According to Tumlirz (Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 28) this shows that Aristotle supposes Tragedy to arouse anger and other emotions as well as pity and fear in the mind of the spectators. There is no such reference here to the spectators; the effect meant is that on the hearer on the stage. One might just as well say that the arguments put into the mouth of a personage (τὸ τὲ ἀποδεικνύναι κτῆ.) are addressed to the spectators, and not to some other personage in the play. The rhetoric of the speaker in a tragedy is dramatically directed to the hearer on the stage, i. e. to another of the dramatis personae. When Plato says of Euripides ἐπίσταται... ὑποτεσσαρά... τοῖς ἑκτρίσ καὶ τούναντιον αὖ φοβερῶς καὶ ἀπειλητικῶς (Phaedr. 268 c), he does not suppose him to threaten the hearers of his pieces.

μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα, scil. παρασκευάζειν. The clause is an afterthought, as its logical place would be after τὸ τὲ ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν. The corresponding formula in Isocrates 42 c is τὰ τε μεγάλα ταπεινὰ ποιῆται καὶ τοῖς μικρῶς μέγεθος περιθείναι; and in the Rhetoric αἰσχών καὶ μειονίων: Rhet. 2. 26, 1403a 20 τὸ δ' αἰσχῶν καὶ μειονίων ἐστιν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ὡσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἁθικὸν. The reading μικρότητας is retained by Vahlen, who defends the change of number by quoting (among other instances) De part. an. 4. 5, 679 b 37 διαφέρει τῇ θέσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσι.—680a 29 ἐν τῷ ψίχει καὶ ταῖς ἀλαίαι.—Plato Laws 734 a μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει καὶ πυκνότησιν.—
It is difficult, however, to explain the change of number with two words so closely related as μεγέθος and μικρότης, and in a formula so technical as the present. The sense also of the plural μικρότητας is obscure, as it does not seem to fall under any of the heads recognized by Bernhardy, Synt. p. 62 or Kühner, Gr. Gr. 8 2. 1 p. 17.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν: comp. 15, 1454 a 18 ὁ λόγος ἡ ἡ πράξις. b 2

Aristotle is quite aware that there is a rhetoric of action as well as a rhetoric of words. The διάνοια of the dramatis personae may be shown in their acts; they may do things, just as they say things, with a view to exciting pity, fear, etc., or with a view to creating an idea that something is or is not true, etc.; and whichever mode of expression be used, they have to follow, according to Aristotle, the same method and principles.

ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδέων δεῖ χρῆσθαι, scil. τῇ διανοίᾳ, or τοῖς τῆς b 3
diānoias μέρεσιν. For the meaning of ἰδέα see on 7, 1450 b 34.

ἀπὸ denotes here the logical starting-point.

μεγάλα ἡ εἰκότα. Aristotle might have expressed himself more b 4
fully by saying μεγάλα ἡ μικρὰ ἡ εἰκότα ἡ ἀπίθανα (comp. on 18, 1456 a 9).

ἀνευ διδασκαλίας = ἀνευ λόγου, ‘sine docentis opera’ (Tyrwhitt) b 5
it is explained by what follows, τί γὰρ ἂν εἰ ἥ τοῦ λέγοντος ἐργον ;
The party instructed or informed here is one of the dramatis personae, who learns the mind of another either through some act of his, or through some statement by him in words.

τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, scil. ἐλεενά, δεινά, μεγάλα κτέ.

παρὰ τῶν λόγων. For the preposition comp. b 13 and 15, b 6
1454 b 15.

ἐι φαὐνίτο ἡ δέοι. The traditional ἐι φανοῖτο (which would have b 7
to be taken as equivalent to ἐι μὲλλοι φαϊνεσθαι) is against the rule laid down by Madvig, Gr. Synt. p. 119 Eng. tr. There is not much to choose between Vahlen’s ἡ δέοι and Castelvetro’s ἡδήν.

ἡ δέοι, however, is somewhat nearer the manuscript reading ἡδέα, and much more probable than either Tyrwhitt’s ἡ δέε or Spengel’s ἡ διάνοια. It means ‘in the required light’, i.e. as ἐλεενά, or δεινά, etc. If things appear of themselves in this light, without the aid of the rhetorical art of the speaker, the speaker is not wanted. The present remark may be compared with that in 6, 1450 b 8 ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον κτέ.

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν. Having briefly considered the διάνοια, b 8
the intellectual or rhetorical power revealed in the speeches of the

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dramatic personages, Aristotle passes on to their λέξεως, the diction or language in which they are made to express themselves. This point he investigates under three heads:—(1) the parts or constituents of the diction as a whole; (2) the various kinds of names in it; and (3) the limits within which unusual names or forms of names are admissible in poetry. Before entering on this line of discussion, however, he sets aside a matter which might perhaps seem germane to his subject, the elocutionary element in the spoken language. The word βαδίζει, for instance, according to one's tone in uttering it, may mean 'he walks', or 'does he walk?'; and δειδε may be uttered as a command ('sing!') or as a prayer. These and similar distinctions, in Aristotle's view, belong to the language as spoken rather than to the language as written, and thus come within the province of elocution (ἔποκρητική) rather than that of poetry or literature proper.

τὰ σχῆματα τῆς λέξεως means literally the different 'attitudes' or turns of meaning given to the language when it comes to be actually spoken. The same idea underlies the expression σχῆμα τα λέξεως of the grammarians, as one may see from Cicero Orator 83 Verborum collocationem illuminat itis luminibus quae Græci quasi aequos gestus orationis σχῆμαtα appellant.—Quintilian 9. i. 13 Si habitus guidam et quasi gestus sic [sic. σχῆμα] appellandi sunt. σχῆμα = 'gestus' occurs in 17, 1455a 29 and 26, 1462a 3 (comp. 1, 1447a 27). Aristotle's σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, however, must not be identified with the σχῆμα τα λέξεως or 'figures of speech', as we call them, of later writers. A 'figure of speech' is a literary artifice, a deviation from the simple and usual mode of expression for purposes of literary effect; Quintilian defines it as a conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerte ratione (9. 1. 4), or as an oratio a simplici rectoque logendii genere deflexa (9. 3. 3; comp. Ernesti, Lex. techn. gr. p. 338). In a 'figure of speech', as compared with the simple form of expression (e.g. 'Macedonia's madman' and 'Alexander'), we have a difference of words without any difference of sense; whereas in the Aristotelian σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως we have the same words and a different sense—the difference of sense resulting from a difference of some kind in the mode of enunciation.

ὕποκρήτικης. ἔποκρητικῆς, the Latin pronunciatio, means 'delivery' or 'elocution'. In the Rhetoric two styles of oratory are distinguished, the 'graphic' style in which the sense is fully expressed by the actual language, and the 'hypocritic' style, which requires
certain artifices of elocution to bring out the meaning: Rhet. 3. 12, 1456 b 10

The ἀρχιτεκτων is properly the master-builder, who knows the scheme of the whole work and directs the artisans and others under him: Plato Polit. 259 ε ἀρχιτεκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ ἄρτος ἐρματικός ἄλλ' ἐρματων ἄρχον . . . παρεκόμενος γε ποι γνώσων ἄλλ' οὐχειρωργίαν. Aristotle recognizes a similar distinction in other arts, even in medicine: Pol. 3. 11, 1282 a 3 ἰατρὸς δ' τε δημιουργός καὶ δ' ἀρχιτεκτονικός. The 'architectonic' form of ὑποκριτικό involves a knowledge of its rationale and general principles, as distinct from the empiric knowledge possessed by rhapsodists, actors, orators, and other practitioners.

οἶνον τί ἐντολή κτέ. refers back to τὰ σχῆματα τῆς λέξεως in b 9 (comp. on 7, 1451 a 2). The classification in the text originated with Protagoras, who is said to have distinguished four (or perhaps seven) fundamental differences in our mode of speech: Diog. Laert. 9. 53 διεῖλε το τόν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέταρτα, εὐχωλὴν ἐρωτησίαν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολήν—οἱ δὲ εἰς ἐπτά, διήγησιν ἐρωτήσιν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολὴν ἀπαγγέλαν εὐχωλὴν κλήσιν —, οὕς καὶ πυθμέναι εἰπε λόγων.

—Quintilian 3. 10 Protagoram transceo, qui interrogandi respondendi mandandi precandi, quod εὐχωλὴν dixit, partes solas putat. It will be seen that Aristotle has arranged the σχῆματα in pairs; one kind of speech may be made by a difference of intonation to mean either a command or a prayer, another either a simple statement or a threat, another either a question or an answer, and so forth with the rest. Aristotle's instances may be compared with those in Dion. Hal. 5. 46 R. τὰ μὲν Ὀς ἀποφαινόμενοι λέγομεν, τὰ δ' ὡς πυθανόμενοι, τὰ δ' ὡς εὐχωλοί, τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπιτάπτοντες, τὰ δ' ὡς διαποροῦντες, τὰ δ' ὡς ὑποτιθέμενοι, τὰ δ' ὡς αἴλλως πως σχῆματιζόντες.

παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνώσιν κτέ. The argument here comes practically to this: That these σχῆματα τῆς λέξεως are something outside the art of Poetry itself is shown by the fact that ignorance of them is not one of the usual charges brought by hostile critics against a poet; Protagoras' criticism on the first line of the Iliad may be dismissed as too trivial to deserve attention.

1 οἱ δὲ = οἱ δὲ φασιν, 'according to others', as it so often does in the grammarians.
COMMENTARY

1456b14 ἑπιτίμημα: see on 25, 1460b6.
καὶ ἄξιον: Pol. 2.11, 1272b32 ὁ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἶπεῖν (comp. Riddell, 'Digest of Idioms' § 132).

b16 ἀειδέ. The imperative as such merely expresses a bidding (κελεύειν), but a tone of authority may turn it into a command (ἐπιτάττειν; comp. Schmidt, Handbuch der lat. u. gr. Synonymik p. 51). Protagoras professed to understand Homer's ἀειδέ in this dictatorial sense of the imperative, on the assumption that it was to be read as 'ἀειδέ!'. Aristotle's answer is that if ἀειδέ gets this sense, it is through the fault not of the poet but of the reciter. An echo of the criticism ascribed to Protagoras survives in Schol. Ven. A on II. 1.1, where ἀειδέ is said to be an instance of the poetic use of the imperative for the optative: ὃτι κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἑτον ἀδειαν ἃ συνήθειαν λαμβάνει [i.e. Homer] τὰ προστακτικὰ ἀντὶ εἰκτικῶν.

b20 τῆς δὲ λέξεως κτέ. This whole chapter has been condemned by Ritter and others as an interpolation; and it must be admitted that, according to our notions of the divisions of knowledge, the matter in it belongs to grammar and philology rather than to an Art of Poetry. Aristotle's divisions, however, are not always quite the same as ours, as his relegation of the theory of the simple sounds in language to 'metric' in the De Partibus (2.16, 660a7) is enough to prove. The writer of the chapter takes the same view of the simple sounds, and tells us that they need not be discussed at any length in a book like the Poetics. The main difficulty, accordingly, is in his assumption that in some way or other the other 'parts of speech' come within the scope of a work on poetry. He may perhaps have thought that some analysis of language in general was logically required as a preparation for the theory of poetical language in the next two chapters, which are unquestionably germane to the main subject of the book. And apart from this one has to remember the historical connexion between grammar and poetry in Greek antiquity. Grammar seems to have originated in Greece in the criticism and interpretation of poetry; its relation to poetry was felt and acknowledged even in the time of Dionysius Thrax, who begins his treatise with the definition, γραμματικὴ ἐστιν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῖσαι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων (p. 5 Uhlig). That certain matters of grammar come under the cognizance of poetry is implied apparently in De interpr. 4, 17a5, when a distinction is made between the logical and the extra-logical
forms of statement: οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι] ἀφείσθωσαν. ἁπτομένη γὰρ ἡ ποιητικὴς οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις (comp. Pacius ad loc.). The *a priori* objection, therefore, to this chapter is not quite so conclusive as it might seem at first sight. The chapter itself, whether an original part of the Poetics or not, has more than one mark of date about it. ἄρθρον and πτωχὸς have not yet acquired their usual sense of ‘article’ and ‘case’; λόγος still retains its peculiarly Aristotelian meaning, and the definitions of ἄρθρον, σύνθεσις, ὄνομα and ῥῆμα seem to have been framed with conscious reference to it (see on 1457 a 10); the general terminology and logical forms throughout the chapter are Aristotelian; and there are also several isolated points and allusions which would be wholly unintelligible if it were not for the parallels and illustrations we are able to find in the unquestioned writings of Aristotle.

ἀπάντησις, ‘taken as a whole’, as opposed to the parts into which it may be divided; comp. Meteor. 4.1, 379 b 5 ἣ θάλασσα κατὰ μέρος μὲν διαφορομενή τάχα σήμερα, ἀπάντα δ’ οὖ.—Plato Theaeet. 147 e τον ἄρθρον πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν.—Gorg. 502 c εἴ τις περιέλθη τῆς ποιητικῆς πάσης τό τε μέλος κτέ.—Laws 737 e δύο μέρη τοῦ παντὸς ἄρθρου. The Latin omnis is used in just the same way in Caesar B. G. 1. 1 Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.

τὰ μέρη. Aristotle’s μέρη τῆς λέξεως is an anticipation of our ‘parts of speech’; but the term covers more ground; his list of μέρη comprises three distinct kinds of ‘parts’: (1) the elements into which words are analyzable (στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή); (2) the various kinds of words (σύνθεσις, ἄρθρον, etc.); and (3) the λόγος—the actual λέξεις being a series of λόγοι. It includes, therefore, all the elements of language in every stage of analysis, from the simplest sounds to the proposition. It is only under the second of the above heads, i.e. in his classification of words, that Aristotle deals with the ‘parts of speech’ of later grammar. This passage is cited by Ammonius on the De Interpretatione: λόγου μὲν ταῦτα [i.e. articles, conjunctions, etc.] οὖ μέρη, λέξεως δὲ μέρη, ἡς καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς μέρος, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ποιητικῆς εἴρηται (p. 12 Busse); and there is more than one reference to it in Boethius on the same book: Aristoteles in libris quos de poetica scriptit locutionis partes esse syllabas vel etiam coniunctiones tradidit (2, p. 6 Meiser).

—in opere vero de poetica non eodem modo dividit locutionem, sed omnes omnino locutionis partes adposuit, confirmans esse locutionis partes elementa syllabas coniunctiones articulos nominas casus verba
orationes. locutio namque non in solis significatiuis vocibus constat, sed supergradiens significationes vocum ad articulatos sonos usque consistit (2, p. 8).

The classification before us which distinguishes words into σύνδεσμοι, ἄρθρα, δόματα, ρήματα and πτώσεις, is an advance on that in the lost Aristotelian work known as the τέχνης τῆς Θεοδόκτου συναγωγῆ (fr. 127 Teubn.), which recognized only three kinds of words, δόματα, ρήματα, and σύνδεσμοι. This lost book is mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian in their sketches of the history of the 'parts of speech'; but they both ignore the present chapter of the Poetics. The omission, instead of justifying Ritter's athetesis of the chapter, merely shows that the Poetics were but little read in certain periods of antiquity.

That the word has to be transposed is shown by the position of the explanation in the following statement about it (14577 a 6).

στοιχεῖον: comp. Metaph. Α 3, 1014 a 26 στοιχεῖον λέγεται εἰς τὸ σύγκειται πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχοντος ἀδιαρέτου τῷ εἰδεί εἰς ἀλλο εἰδος· οἷον φωνῆς στοιχεία εἰς δῶν σύγκειται ἡ φωνή καὶ εἰς ἀ διαρείται ἐσχάτα, ἐκείνα δὲ μηκέτι εἰς ἄλλας φωνας ἐτέρας τῷ εἰδεί αὐτῶν. στοιχεῖον was properly a letter of the alphabet; it was Plato (v. Eudemus ap. Simplic. in Phys. Ι p. 7. 13 Diels) who gave it the philosophical sense of 'element', which it so often has in Aristotle. The present definition shows the influence of the philosophical associations connected with the word; a στοιχεῖον is defined as an indivisible voice-sound capable of serving as a constituent, or element, in an intelligible voice-sound (συνθετή φωνή). In thus describing it as a 'sound' Aristotle implicitly distinguishes it from the γράμμα, or written symbol which stands for the sound (comp. Metaph. Β 4, 1000 a 2); the distinction, however, is very far from being generally observed in Aristotle (see Diels, Elementum p. 33). The two terms are treated as synonyms in Plato Crat. 426 d.

συνθετή. The alternative reading συνθετή has been accepted by several editors, as also by Steinthal (Gesch. d. Sprachwissenschaft 1 p. 253) and Diels (Elementum p. 33). The main argument in favour of συνθετή is that, as defined in b 34, the syllable is a φωνή συνθετή, and that the syllable is viewed in sundry Aristotelian passages (Bon. Ind. 702 b 39) as a synthesis of στοιχεία. This is true enough. But it has to be remembered on the other side that Aristotle often speaks of the στοιχεία as στοιχεία φωνῆς (Bon. Ind.
20. 1456\textsuperscript{b} 20–25

702\textsuperscript{b} 35)—where φωνή means the same thing as the συνετή φωνή\textsuperscript{1456\textsuperscript{b} 23} of the present passage. And if we assume συνετή to be the original reading, the excepting clause (οὐ πάσα δὲ κτέ.), which puts the ‘indivisible sounds’ of the brutes into a different category, is irrelevant. Aristotle’s argument here seems to be something like this: In the utterances of the brutes there are indivisible sounds, but these ‘noises’ of theirs are directly significant in themselves (De interpr. 2, 16\textsuperscript{a} 29); they are not στοιχεῖα φωνῆς, because they do not combine as elements to form a φωνή συνετή. The indivisible sounds, on the other hand, in human speech exist as elements in speech, and they have no meaning in themselves; the meaning in human speech is in the words and propositions—not in the ‘elements’ which analysis reveals in them (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 3 p. 220). φωνή συνετή is perhaps the nearest Aristotelian equivalent for our term ‘word’. It may be taken as including not only the φωνή σημαντική, the word that stands for something, but also the φωνή ἄσημος—words like ἄμφε, περί, μέν, δέ, etc. (Aristotle’s ἄρθρα and σύνδεσμοι), which stand for nothing by themselves, though they have a certain significance in their place in intelligible human speech.

tαύτης δὲ μέρη κτέ.: Plato Crat. 424 C ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὖτος δεὶ\textsuperscript{b} 25 πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνῆντα διελέσθαι, ἐπειτὰ τὸν ἐτέρων κατὰ εἴδη τὰ τέ φωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα· οὕτως γὰρ ποὺ λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ τὰ αὐτῷ φωνῆντα μὲν οὖ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα;—Phil. 18 B ἐπείδη φωνῆν ἀπειρὸν κατενόησεν ἐν τε τὸς θεὸς ἐντε καὶ θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὥσι λόγος ἐν Ἀριστοτλ Θεόθ τινα τούτων γενέσθαι λέγων, δς πρῶτος τὰ φωνῆντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οἷς ἐν ὧν ἄλλα πλέον, καὶ πάλιν ἐτέρα φωνῆς μὲν οὖ, ἄφθογγον δὲ μετέχοντα τινῷ, ἄρθρῳ δὲ τίνα καὶ τούτων ἐναὶ τρίτον δὲ εἰδώς γραμμάτων διετήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα φωνὰ ἥμων· τὸ μετὰ τούτο ἐβεβρεῖ τὰ τά ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἐκάστον, καὶ τὰ φωνῆντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτῷ πρῶτον, ἴσως ἄρθρῳν αὐτῶν λαβών εἰν τε ἐκάστῳ καὶ ἐξυμπαι στοιχεῖον ἐτόνω·

Here Plato’s μέσα are Aristotle’s ἰμέφωνα. In later theory the ἰμέφωνα and ἄφωνα of Aristotle come under the more general designation of ‘consonants’, σύμφωνα: Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 100 τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν [sic. τῶν στοιχείων] φωνάειν προσαγορεύονοι τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, καὶ φωνάεινα μὲν ἐπτά, a e i o u o, σύμφωνα δὲ τὰ λοιπά \ldots 102 τῶν δὲ συμφώνων τὰ μὲν ἰμέφωνα ἐστὶ κατ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ δὲ ἄφωνα.

φωνήν. The word had been already used by Euripides, fr. 578 ed. Nauck\textsuperscript{2} ἄφωνα φωνήντα συλλαβάς τιθέει ἐξηγοῦν ἀνθρώπους
\[\textit{γράμματ}' \varepsilonίδεναι. \] It may be observed that both Plato (\textit{Theaet.} 203 b) and Aristotle (\textit{Metaph.} N 6, 1093 a 13) recognize the vowels as being seven in number.

\[\textit{άνευ προσβολῆς}: \text{ the opposite of } \textit{μετὰ προσβολῆς} \text{ in the next line.} \]

The difference between the vowels and consonants is that the latter imply a certain \textit{προσβολή} as the condition of their becoming audible, whereas no such \textit{προσβολή} is required to make the vowels audible. The sense of the word \textit{προσβολή} as here used is far from clear. It has been taken to mean \textit{additio} (Valla), \textit{adiectio} (Facchius), \textit{ictus} (Victorius), \textit{percussio} (Robortello), and \textit{allitis} (Goulston); Castelvetro, who renders it by \textit{percossa}, confesses that he does not know what it means. The idea of most interpreters is that the term refers in some way or other to the physical mechanism of speech; to the impact of the tongue, for instance, on the parts within the mouth, or something of that sort. Twining, who translates it by \textit{articulation} (with Batteux), tells us in a note that it is 'literally \textit{percussion}: i.e. of the tongue against the palate or teeth, the lips against the teeth or against each other, and all other modes of consonant articulation'. In support of this physiological interpretation Vahlen (\textit{Beitr.} 3 p. 224) quotes De part. an. 2. 16, 660 a 2 \(\delta \) \textit{λόγος} \(\delta \) \textit{διὰ} \textit{τῆς} \textit{φωνῆς} \(\varepsilon \kappa \textit{τῶν} \textit{γραμμάτων} \textit{σύγκειται}, \textit{τῆς} \(\delta \varepsilon \textit{γλῶττις} \mu \kappa \textit{τοιαύτης} \textit{οὐκύς} \mu \kappa \delta \kappa \textit{τῶν} \textit{χειλῶν} \textit{ύγρων} \textit{οὐκ} \textit{ἀν} \textit{ην} \textit{φθέγγεται} \textit{τὰ} \textit{πλείον} \textit{τῶν} \textit{γραμμάτων}; \textit{τὰ} \textit{μὲν} \textit{γάρ} \textit{τῆς} \textit{γλῶττις} \textit{εἰσὶ} \textit{προσβολαί}, \(\tau \) \(\delta \varepsilon \textit{συμβολαί} \textit{τῶν} \textit{χειλῶν} \); and argues to show that \textit{προσβολή} may be used here in a sense wide enough to include the \textit{συμβολή} \textit{τῶν} \textit{χειλῶν}, as well as the \textit{προσβολή} \textit{τῆς} \textit{γλῶττις}, of the De Partibus. This view, however, is open to more than one objection. (1) It is hard to see how, in the absence of some explanation in the context, \textit{προσβολή} can stand for \textit{προσβολή} \textit{γλῶττις}, or can be taken to include the notion of \textit{συμβολή} \textit{χειλῶν}. (2) Such a reference to the physiology of articulation would be out of place in the definition; the differences in the mechanism of articulation are a separate point, which Aristotle recognizes apparently for the first time in another section further on in the chapter (b 31 \textit{ταύτα} \(\delta \) \textit{διαφέρει} \textit{σχῆμασι} \textit{τε} \textit{τῶν} \textit{στόματος} \kappaα \textit{τῶν} \textit{στόμων}). I think that Valla was probably right in taking \textit{προσβολή} in the sense of \textit{additio} or \textit{adiectio}, i.e. as equivalent to \textit{προσβήκη}—the word actually used by Lucian in a very similar context to mark the distinction between the vowels and semivowels (Iud. Voc. 5, 88 R.). It may be observed, too, that \textit{προσβάλλειν} and \textit{προστιθέναι} are synonyms in Autoláchanes fr. 206 Kock. The general
sense, then, according to this view of προσβολή, will be that the vowels are audible by themselves (ἀνευ προσβολῆς); whereas the semivowels and muted (the consonants) require the support or addition of a vowel (μετὰ προσβολῆς) to make them audible. This was certainly the distinction in later grammar: Dionysius Thrax p. 11 Uhlig σύμφωνα δὲ λέγονται ὅτι αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ φωνῆν οὐκ ἔχει, συντασσόμενα δὲ μετὰ τῶν φωνηέντων φωνῆν ἀποτελεῖ.— Sextus Emp. Adv. math. i. 102 ἄφωνα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ... μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων συνεκφωνούμενα.—Diomedes 418 P. mutae dicitae quod per se sine ad minimum vocalium non possunt enuntiari.

ημίφωνα: Aristoxenus (quoted below).—Dionysius Thrax p. 12 Uhlig ημίφωνα δὲ λέγεται [ὅτι] παρόσον ἦττον τῶν φωνηέντων εἴσφωνα καθέστηκεν ἐν τοῖς μνημοσίᾳ καὶ σημαίοι.—Sextus Emp. Adv. math. i. 102 ημίφωνα μὲν ὅσα δὲ αὐτῶν ῥοῦζον ἢ σχιμών ἢ μνημῶν τινα παραπλήσιον ἠχον κατὰ τὴν ἐκφωνησιν ἀποτελείν πεφυκότα.—Diomedes 416 P. Semivocales dictae quod dimidium eius potestatis habent: etsenim per e se enuntiantur, sed per se nec syllabam nec plenam vocem faciunt. Plato only knows the semivowels as τὰ μέσα (v. supra on b 24).

ἐχον φωνῆν ἀκουστήν. Apart from the vowels the semivowels have some sort of sound as noises, not a distinctly audible voice-sound (φωνὴ ἀκουστή) like the vowels; this it is that distinguishes them from the mutes, which have no sound at all by themselves. Comp. Plato Theaet. 203 β τὸ τε σύγμα τῶν ἄφωνων ἑστὶ, ψόφος τις μόνον οἷον συριττόνης τῆς γλώττης’ τοῦ δ’ αὐτ’ βήτα οὔτε φωνῆ οὔτε ψόφος, οὔτε τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων.—Aristoxenus ap. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 72 R. τῶν μη φωνηέντων ἂ μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὰ ψόφους ὅπως οὐκ ὅτι τινα ἀποτελεῖν πέφυκε, μοῦζον ἢ σχιμών ἢ μνημῶν ἢ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων ἠχῶν δηλοτικοῖς, ἢ ἐστὶν ἀπάθης ἁμορα φωνῆς καὶ ψόφου, καὶ οὖχ οἷα τε τῇ χειρότερα καθ’ ἑαυτὰ διὰ ἧ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν ἄφωνα τινα ἐκάλεσαν, θάτερα δὲ ημίφωνα.

ἄφωνον. In the definition μετὰ προσβολῆς serves to distinguish the mute from the vowel; the idea of it, however, is repeated in a more explicit form in μετὰ τῶν ἄχοντων τινὰ φωνῆν. The expression τῶν ἄχοντων τινὰ φωνῆν is wide enough to include the semivowels as well as the vowels. The semivowels are audible by themselves, though only as noises (comp. Plato Phileb. 18 c ἑτερα/φωνῆς μὲν οὖ, φθόγγον δὲ μετέχοντα τινος); and a semivowel is sufficient to make a mute audible, though only as a noise—not as a φωνῆ ἀκουστή. Aristotle carefully chooses his words, therefore, in saying γνώμενον ἀκουστόν; since ἔχον φωνῆν ἀκουστήν, 'with
an audible voice-sound’, would have been true only of the combination of a mute and a vowel.

\[b^2 \text{31 ταύτα δὲ διαφέρει. Of the five differences here noted the first and second relate to the physiological mechanism of speech; the remainder come under the head of προσφοδία—a term which with the ancients included breathing and accent, as well as quantity (see on 25, 1461}^a 22).

\[\text{σχήμασίν τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόπων. Plato (Tim. 75 d) is aware of the function of the teeth, lips, and tongue in the formation of speech, and has also described (Crat. 426 ε) the various movements of the tongue in the utterance of certain letters (comp. Xenophon Mem. I. 4, 12). From Alexander’s comment on Metaph. N 6, 1093}^a 23 (p. 883 Hayduck) we learn that these points in the physiology of speech had long before this engaged the attention of Archinus, the statesman to whom Athens owed the introduction of the Ionic alphabet in 403 (see Usener, Rh. Mus. 25 p. 591).

\[\text{For the σχήματα τοῦ στόματος comp. De audib. 800}^a 16 ἀναπνόμεν ὤ τὸν μὲν ἀέρα πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα καὶ τὰς φωνὰς ἐκπέμπομεν ἀλλοιας διὰ τῶν ὑποκεμένων ἀγγείων διαφοράς . . . ταύτα δὲ ἔστιν ᾗ τε ἀρτηρία [i. e. wind-pipe] καὶ ὁ πνεύμων καὶ τὸ στόμα. πλείοτην μὲν οὖν διαφορὰν ἀπεργάζονται τῆς φωνῆς αἰ τε τοῦ ἀέρος πληγαί καὶ οἱ τοῦ στόματος σχηματισμοῖ.}

\[\text{For the τόποι τοῦ στόματος as factors in articulation see more especially H. A. 4. 9, 535}^a 28; De part. an. 2. 16, 660}^a 1; 3. 1, 661}^b 14; and Metaph. N 6, 1093}^a 23 (with Alexander’s note).

\[b^2 \text{32 δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι . . . καὶ τῷ μέσῳ. The καὶ τῷ μέσῳ in the next line belongs equally to each of the three pairs of opposites, and not merely to the last of them.}

\[\text{The meaning of δασύτης and ψιλότης in speech may be seen from De audib. 804}^b 8 δασεῖα δ’ εἰσί τῶν φωνῶν ὅσας ἐσωθὲν τὸ πνεῦμα εἰθέως συνεκβάλλομεν μετὰ τῶν φθόγγων, ψιλαὶ δ’ εἰσί τοι διανειμένοι ὅσαι γίνονται χώρις τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκβολῆς; and from Dion. Hal. 5 p. 85 R. ταύτα [i. e. τὰ ψιλά] μὲν γὰρ τὴν εὐατὸν δύναμιν ἕχει μόνην, τὰ δὲ δασεῖα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος προαθήκην. ψιλός, ‘without addition’ (see on 1, 1447}^a 29), means in this connexion ‘without aspiration’. The threefold distinction in the text, as applied to the mutes, passed on to the grammarians, and became an accepted part of grammar (comp. Dion. Thrax p. 12 τούτων [scil. τῶν ἀφώνων] ψιλὰ μὲν τρία, ἐ ὑ, δασεῖα δὲ τρία, θ ἑ χ, μέσα δὲ τούτων τρία, ἐ ὑ δ’ μέσα δὲ ἐιρηται ὅτι τῶν μὲν ψιλῶν ἕστι δασύτερα, τῶν δὲ δασείων ψιλότερα, and Priscian 549 P.); and it still appears in our familiar}
division of mutes into aspiratae, mediae, and tenues—where the \textit{tenues} represent the ψιλά of the Greeks.\footnote{This technical use of \textit{tenuis} may be traced back to Lascaris, who naturalized it among the moderns; but it is not easy to see how Lascaris came by it. He may possibly have remembered the language of the pseudo-Sergius 4 p. 526 Keil: \textit{Crassitudo [i.e. δαρόνη] in spiritu est . . . nam omnes voces aut aspirando facinus pinguiores aut sine aspiratu pronuntiando tenuiores.}}

μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι. The intermediates (μέσα) in quantity are the three dichronous vowels α, ὦ, ν: Dion. Thrax p. 10 τῶν δὲ φωνήστων μακρὰ μὲν ἐστὶ δύο, ἣ καὶ ὦ, βραχέα δὲ δύο, ἥ καὶ ὦ, διχρόνα δὲ τρία, ἀ ὦ διχρόνα δὲ λέγεται, ἐπεὶ ἐκτείνεται καὶ συντέλλεται.—Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 100 τῶν δὲ φωνήστων τρεῖς λέγονται διαφορὰς: δύο μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φῶςει μακρὰ λέγουσι τυχανέας, τῷ ἡ καὶ τῷ ὦ, ὑσάριθμα δὲ βραχέα, τῷ ἠ καὶ τῷ ὦ, τρία δὲ κοινὰ μήκους τε καὶ βραχύτητος, ἀ ὦ, ἀπερ δίχρονα καὶ ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀμφίβολα καὶ μεταβολικὰ καλουσίν: ἐκαθὼν γὰρ αὐτῶν πέντεν ὅτε μὲν ἐκτείνεσθαι ὅτε δὲ συντέλλεσθαι (comp. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 74 R., and Aulus Gellius 16. 18. 5).

διύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι. A third kind of difference is to be seen in the differences of accent. Accent with Aristotle is a part of \textit{prosφοδία} (see on \textit{b} 31), but he has no special name for it; the word \textit{tónos} in Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 \textit{b} 29 relates to the tone or key in which something may be said, and not, as is sometimes supposed (e.g. by Cope), to the syllabic accent in words. Aristotle's intermediate accent is clearly that conventionally indicated by a circumflex, as standing between the acute and grave, and having thus something of the nature of both. This was the received view of the phonetic value of the 'circumflex' in antiquity, though the names by which it was known referred to the form of the mark rather than the nature of the accent itself; comp. the pseudo-Sergius, 4 p. 531 Keil Ammonius Alexandrius qui Aristarchi scholae successit δεύβαριν vocal, Ephorus autem Cymaeus περίσσων, Dionysius Olympii [read: Olynthius] δεύβων, Hermocrates Iasius σύμμελετον, Epicharmus Syracusius κεκλασμένην; verum ea nunc ab omnius περισσωμένη Graece vocatur, apud nos flexa, quoniam primo erecta rursus in gravem flectitur. For further illustrations of the notion of the circumflex in antiquity see Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. fragmenta p. 13, and Wilmanns, De Varronis libris grammaticis p. 187. It is to be observed that (like Plato Crat. 399 a) Aristotle ignores the circumflex in the passage in Soph. el. 23, 179 \textit{a} 14 εὶ παρὰ προσφῶιαν δεξιὰν [scil. ὁ λόγος ἐστι], ἡ βαρεία προσφῶια λύσις,
1456 b 33 ei δε παρὰ βαρέων, ή δέξια, and speaks as though the only substantial difference in accent were that between acute and grave. His view of it in fact was probably very like that ascribed to the Peripatetic Athenodorus in the pseudo-Sergius, 4 p. 529 Keil Athenodorus duas esse prosodia, pululit, unam inferiorem, alteram superiorem; flexan autem (nam ita nostra lingua περσιωμένην vocamus) nihil aliud esse quam has duas in una syllaba.

b 34 [ἐν] τοῖς μετρικοῖς: comp. infra b 38. The preposition has to be bracketed, as there is no hint of a book on metre, actual or contemplated, by Aristotle himself (comp. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 753). He leaves the subject to the μετρικοί, just as he does in the parallel in De part. an. 2. 16, 660 a 7 ποιας δε ταύτα [sic. τὰ γράμματα] καὶ πόσας καὶ τόνας ἔχει διαφόρας, δὲ πευτάνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν μετρικῶν. The theory of metre, in its primitive form, took cognizance of many matters which we should relegate to grammar or phonology. It started, like grammar, with the στοιχεία or elementary sounds in language (Longinus Prol. in Hephaest. p. 142 Gaisf. τοὺς περὶ μέτρου λόγου πολλοὶ πολλαχῶς ἰρέαντο, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὁς Φιλόξενος); and, as the passage in the De Partibus intimates (comp. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 74 R.), it dealt with the whole question of the number and nature of these elements.

συλλαβή. As here defined a συλλαβή is a combination of a mute and a 'letter with a sound', i.e. either a vowel or a semivowel (see on b 28), to make the mute audible. An instance of the first combination is ΒΑ (see Metaph. Ζ 17, 1041 b 13); of the second ΓΡ (comp. Metaph. Ν 6, 1093 a 22), where the Γ becomes audible at any rate as part of a complex 'noise'. In the further combination ΓΡΑ we have an articulate, as well as an audible, sound—a φωνὴ ἀκουστὴ, not a mere ἀκοντῶν. Aristotle, however, does not stop to note the difference. The meaning given to συλλαβή in the Aristotelian definition is apparently the proper technical sense of the term: Dionysius Thrax p. 16 Uhlig συλλαβή ἐστι κυρίως σύλλαβας συμφώνων μετὰ φωνήντων ἡ φωνήντων, οἶνον καὶ, βοῦς· καταρχηστικὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐς ἐνόφ φωνήντων, οἶνον ἃ, ἢ (see also Charisius 2 P., and Marius Victorinus 2470–5 P.). In ordinary speech, however, the term was often used to denote the units of sound or 'syllables' (as we say) into which a word, a foot, or a verse is divisible. Plato, for instance, speaks of ΣΩ as the 'first syllable' in Socrates (Theat. 203 c), and of words as 'made up of syllables' (Crat. 424 E συλλαβῶς συντιθέντες, ἐς δὲν τὰ τε ὑνόματα καὶ τὰ ἰματα συντιθενται); words also like ἕω and ἕα etc. were said to
be disyllables, trisyllables, etc. Aristotle has lapsed into this use of the term even in the Poetics, in 21, 1458 a 2, where the α in Πηλαμαδηω is regarded as a συλλαβή ἐμβεβλημένη (see note on the passage); and it is by no means uncommon in other Aristotelian writings; see Cat. 6, 4 b 33; De interpr. 4, 16 b 31; De gen. an. 1, 18, 722 a 32; Metaph. N 6, 1093 b 1; Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 31 (comp. Bon. Ind. 710 b 45; and for the general history of the term Schmidt, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 126).

It is to be observed that Aristotle ignores the φωναί συνθεταί called diphthongs; for the ancient view of them see Blass, Aussprache b p. 20.

φωνήν ἔχωντο includes the semivowel as well as the vowel (see on b 28).

καὶ γάρ τὸ ΓΡ ἁνευ τοῦ Α = τὸ γάρ ΓΡ καὶ ἁνευ τοῦ Α. b 36

τῆς μετρικῆς: see on b 34. As the foot is made up of syllables, the theory of the συλλαβή belonged to metre just as much as to grammar: Aristides Quintil. 1. 20, p. 28 Jahn ἄρχη μὲν οὖν ἡ τῆς μετρικῆς ὁ περὶ στοιχείων λόγος; εἴθ' ὁ περὶ συλλαβής, εἴθ' ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὁδών, εἴθ' οὐτός ὁ περὶ μέτρων.—Longinus Prolog. in Heph. p. 142 Gaisf. τοῦ δὲ περὶ μέτρων λόγον πολλαὶ πολλαχῶς ἤρεστο, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὅς Φιλόζενος, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέτρων ὤρου, ὡς Ἡλέδωρος, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἡφαιστώι κατακολουθήσομεν ἀπὸ συλλαβής ἄρχαμενοι. By τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς Aristotle probably meant not only the familiar distinction of syllables into long and short, but also the finer differences the ancient theory of rhythmic recognized in the times of syllables, when the time of the consonant or consonants in them is taken into account (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr. b 1. 1 p. 300).

σύνδεσμος. The traditional text of this and the following section (that on the ἄρθρων) is confessedly corrupt. Twining finds a good deal of it unintelligible (comp. Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft b 1 p. 263); and Vahlen, besides bracketing ἡ φωνή—μέσου in 1457 a 8–10, has to assume two lacunas, one after συνθέσθαι in 1457 a 2, and another after δηλοῖ in 1457 a 7.

At this point Aristotle passes from the constituents of words (letters and syllables) to actual words; and he begins by noting this distinction: some words are φωναὶ ἁσημοι, and others φωναὶ σημαντικαὶ; these latter being the nouns and verbs in language, which have a meaning of their own and stand for something even when uttered by themselves. The σύνδεσμοι and ἄρθρα, however, are said to be φωναὶ ἁσημοι; i.e. they convey no meaning when
uttered by themselves. If we may provisionally take them to represent in some way the little connexive words in language, the question arises as to the nature of the two kinds of connexives and the distinction Aristotle wished to draw between them. It will be observed that he describes them by reference to their position and function in the complex φωνή σημαντική, called a λόγος a little further on in the chapter (1457a 23). It is necessary, therefore, to go back to his idea of λόγος, and consider the various forms of λόγου which he either recognizes or may be presumed to have recognized. λόγος in the present sense of the term has no exact English equivalent, though 'speech', 'discourse', or 'phrase' is sometimes conventionally made to stand for it. According to the definition in 1457a 23 it is a significant combination of significant words, e.g. of two (or more) nouns, or verbs (including what Aristotle would call their πτώσεις), or of a verb and a noun, or of a noun and a verb. A λόγος, in Aristotle's sense of the term, does not necessarily involve predication. The instance he gives in 1457a 25 of a non-predicative λόγος is a definition, that of ' man', e.g. ἡμών πείζων δύπων—where the combination of the three nouns is equivalent to ' man', and may replace it as one of the terms of a proposition. This form of λόγος is the λόγος ἀναμαθής of Ἀν. post. 2. 10, 93b 31. Under this same head we may include certain other forms of expression, e.g. βαδίζει χαίρων (a combination of two verbs), and οἰκονομι νήτου (a verb + a noun). A more complex instance of the same type would be a combination like ὀι Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνι, where the terms are combined into one by the copulative, and οἰκονομι περὶ δυσμάς, where the terms are hyphened together by the preposition 1 (comp. Hartung, Lehren der Alten über die Dichtkunst p. 284). The other form of λόγος is that which involves predication—the λόγος ἀποφαντικός of the De Interpretatione (4. 17a 2 seqq.). If we may work out the hint in De Interpretatione 5, 17a 20, we may divide the λόγοι of this description into two kinds, the simple and the composite, and take the example in 1457a 28, Κλέων βαδίζει, as the type of the simple predicational λόγος. It is not so easy to find an Aristotelian instance of the composite predicational λόγος; but its nature is indicated in general terms in the passage in the De Interpretatione: it consists of two or more simple predicational λόγοι combined in some way or

1 With the Stoic grammarians the prepositions were classed originally under the σύνδεσμοι, and afterwards distinguished from the others as προθετικοί σύνδεσμοι.
other into one single λόγος. How, then, and by means of what kinds of words is this combination effected? The De Interpretatione ignores this question. We may perhaps supply the omission, however, by reflecting for a moment on the structure of complex sentences and observing the different relations of the parts or members to the whole. In some instances the simple λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί are merely co-ordinated, and held together by copulative or similar conjunctions, as in Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθηται, Κλέων μὲν βαδίζει Σωκράτης δὲ κάθηται, Κλέων βαδίζει ἄλλα Σωκράτης κάθηται (comp. συνδέσμων εἰς in 1457 a 30); in others they are subordinated to one another, and form a sort of organic whole knit into one by words which indicate relation and interdependence. This last point in the theory of the λόγος would have to be recognized in any grammatical analysis of the sentence and its construction. I venture to suggest that it may have been actually present in Aristotle's mind at the time of framing his definitions of σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον, and that it is to be found in the text, if it be permissible to restore it in some such way as this:

σύνδεσμος δὲ ἐστι φωνή ἄσημος, ἢ οὕτε κωλύει οὕτε ποιεὶ φωνήν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειώνων φωνῶν πεφυκαίν συντίθεσθαι [καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου], ἢν μὴ ἀρμάττει ἐν ἄρχῃ λόγου τιθέναι καθ’ αὐτὸν, οἷον μὲν, δὴ, τοῖς, δὲ. ἢ φωνῆ ἄσημος ἢ ἐκ 5 πλειώνων μὲν φωνῶν μίας σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκε μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνὴν, ὁδὸν τὸ ἄμφι καὶ τὸ περὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ἄρθρον δ’ ἐστὶ φωνή ἄσημος, ἢ λόγου ἄρχην ἢ τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῦ [οἷον τὸ ἄμφι καὶ τὸ περὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ἢ φωνῇ ἄσημος ἢ οὕτε κωλύει οὕτε ποιεῖ φωνήν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειώνων φωνῶν], πεφυκαί τίθεσθαι 10 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου.

The words bracketed after συντίθεσθαι in l. 2 I suppose to be a repetition in the wrong place of those after τίθεσθαι in l. 9; and the clause ἢ φωνῇ—φωνῶν in ll. 8—9 to have come in through a repetition of the beginning of the definition of σύνδεσμος in l. 1 (comp. Dünzter, Rettung d. aristotelischen Poetik p. 194). It will be seen also that the illustration οἷον τὸ ἄμφι—τὰ ἄλλα is assumed to be out of place where it stands, and is transferred to l. 6, so as to form part of the second definition of σύνδεσμος—a view which has been anticipated by Hartung. Two kinds of σύνδεσμος, then, are recognized in the text as amended. The first is said to consist of the connexive words whose presence in a λόγος does not affect
the coherence of the terms. There is no difficulty in illustrating this point; if Κλέων and βαδίζει are combinable terms, the combination of them in the proposition Κλέων βαδίζει is neither hindered nor helped by the insertion after the first word of a μέν, a δὲ, a δὴ, or a τοῖ. Little words of this description are what the grammarians called 'expletives'. Though they stand at the beginning of the λόγος, they are not an integral part of it; they belong to it not per se (καθ' αὐτόν), but per accidens, and only serve to indicate a relation to some other λόγος before or after it. In contradistinction to these Aristotle recognizes a second species of σύνδεσμος (I. 4), one that is a real and constitutive part of the λόγος into which it enters. This function, as I have endeavoured to show above, in the general survey of the possible forms of λόγος, is fulfilled by the prepositions and the copulative conjuctions. Aristotle's σύνδεσμος, therefore, whatever else it may signify, may be taken to include the preposition, the copulative conjuction, and also certain particles. The sense of the word ἄρθρον is more difficult to determine owing to the absence of examples to illustrate its meaning. The term must clearly denote a particular kind of connective required for a particular kind of λόγος. The kind of λόγος Aristotle had in mind may perhaps be inferred from the fact that the ἄρθρον in it is said to indicate the beginning, or end, or dividing-point in its structure. Such a λόγος may be assumed to be a composite proposition, and moreover one of a more complex form than that in Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθηται and the like. The two constituent propositions in it are either intimately connected by being related in such a way that the one is the beginning and the other the end of the whole; or they are in some way divided or separated one from the other. With this we may compare the definition of the 'period' in Rhet. 3. 9, 1409 Α 35 λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἄρχην καὶ τέλειην αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. As a conjectural interpretation of this statement it may be suggested (1) that the ἄρθρα which mark the beginning of the proposition represent the conditional and causal conjuctions, together with the relative pronouns and adverbs; (2) that those marking the end are the final and illative conjuctions; and (3) those marking the separation or division in the proposition, the disjunctives. The kinds of proposition which involve the use of such words as these are ignored in Aristotle's logical writings, but it seems to me that he may very well have had something to say of them in an analysis like that.
in the present chapter of the forming and constituents of ordinary 146b 38

speech. I am not aware of the names that may be found in
be taken for what it is worth, and with many allowances, as an attempt to
reconstruct the rough draft of an old lost chapter of Peirce's

20. 1456 b 38-1457 a 7

Both ὁδηγός and ὀδηγούσα were terms taken by grammar from
document de articulo (Jahrb. f. class. Philol. Suppl.-Bd. V. 5)
metaphorical extension of the sense it has in the De Partibus: 3. 10, 6 72 b 14 τοῦ διαρμοῦν χάριν ἑστι (scil. τὸ διάζωμα) τοῦ τε περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν τὸν καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν.

a 9 πεφυκὼς τίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου does not necessarily mean any more than this, that some of the ἀρβρὰ have one and others another of these three possible places in the complex form of λόγος. πεφυκὼς τίθεσθαι implies that the rule is general and not always observed in practice.

a 10 ὁνομα. In this definition συνθετή differentiates the ὁνομα from the στοιχείων, σημαντική from the ἀρβρῶν and συνδεσμος, ἀνευ χρόνου from the ῥήμα, and what remains (ἃς μέρος οὐδὲν κτλ.) from the λόγος. In a λόγος (e. g. ζῷον πεζὸν δυστον, ου Κλέων βαδίζει) the parts retain their several meanings; whereas in an ὁνομα, if the parts happen to have a meaning, it is lost in the word into which they enter; Θεόδωρος for instance denotes a certain man, not a kind of gift: De interpr. 2, 16 a 19 ὁνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φωνή σημαντική κατὰ συνθήκην ἀνευ χρόνου, ἂς μηδὲν μέρος ἑστι σημαντικῶν κεχωριμένων ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτῷ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὃςπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἵππος.

The general term ὁνομα must be taken to include not only the nouns, but also the adjectives, the personal and demonstrative pronouns, and possibly even the article as a kind of pronoun—in fact all the declinable parts of speech except perhaps the relatives, which may have been classed among the ἀρβρα. A verb also apart from a subject, as a mere name for an action, may be called an ὁνομα, as it is for instance in 21, 1457 b 25; 22, 1458 b 20; 25, 1461 a 31; comp. De interpr. 3, 16 b 19 αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα ὁνόματα ἑστι [scil. τὰ ῥήματα] καὶ σημαίνει τι (ἱστησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἥρμησεν), ἄλλ᾽ εἰ ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ οὖντο σημαίνει. It is a ῥήμα proper only when actually said of a subject, as the predicate of a proposition.

a 12 οὐ χρώμεθα: comp. 21, 1457 a 33 πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος. The construction in the clause may be seen from Vahlen's paraphrase, ἐν τοῖς διαλοίς οὐ χρώμεθα τῷ μέρει ἤγοιμενοι καὶ αὐτῷ καβ᾽ αὐτὸ σημαίνειν. The participial ὅς καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ σημαίνον is an acc. absolute like those in 3, 1448 a 37 and 26, 1462 a 10.

a 13 τῷ Θεόδωρῳ: i.e. ‘the word Θεόδωρος’; comp. infra a 28 ο Κλέων, ‘the word Κλέων’,—Plato Crat. 392 ν τῶν Ἀστυνακτα, ‘the name Astyanax’; for the similar Latin usage v. Wilkins on Cicero De Oratore 2, 193. In the De interpr. we have the more scholastic form of expression with a nominative, ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος.
20. I457 a 7–18

τὸ δῶρον: i.e. the word δῶρον implied in ὶδὼρος. As the parallel in the De interpr. is ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος τῷ ἔτος οἴδεται αὐτῷ καθέναν στημαῖνε, it has been proposed to restore here τὸ δῶρον for τὸ δῶρον. The two cases, however, as Düntzer reminds us, are not quite similar, since δῶρον does not exist as a separate word, as ἔτος does, and there would therefore be no point in saying of it that it is without meaning (οὐ στημαίνει).

ῥήμα: De interpr. 3, 16 b ῥήμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσημαίνον χρόνον, a 14 οὐ μέρος οἴδεται στημαίνει χρώσι, καὶ ἐστιν δὲ τῶν καθέναν ἐτέρου λεγομένων στημαίν. λέγω δ' ὅτι προσημαίνει χρόνον, οἶδαν γὰρ μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ῥήματι προσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν . . . 16 τὸ ὑψιανὲν ἢ τὸ ὑψιανὲν οὗ ῥήμα άλλα πρώτως ῥήματος διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸν παράντα προσημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ τῶν πέρτες. In this passage (though not in De interpr. 10, 16 b 13) the past and future tenses of the verb are set aside as πρώτως, the verb in the logical theory of predicating being always in the present (comp. Mansel, Prolegomena Logica p. 273). It is to be noted that in these instances of verbs, the verb is in the third person singular of the present; the reason for this is that a proper name like Κλέων or Κόρικος is tacitly assumed to be its subject. With Plato, it may be observed, the ῥήμα includes the predicative adjective as well as the verb (v. Crat. 399 a).

προσημαίνει. Boethius, In Aristot. de Interpr. 2 p. 66 Meiser, a 17 translates this by consignifical, thus identifying its sense with that of the later word συνσημαίνει.

πρώτως, as a term of grammar, has not yet acquired the special sense of 'case' which it has in the grammarians; and there is no equivalent for it in our modern terminology. We may perhaps translate it by 'modification' or 'mode'. Given a word, a noun or a verb, with a certain meaning, a πρώτως of it embodies that meaning with some secondary idea superadded. It does not necessarily involve a difference of form; βαδίζει; as a question, is a πρώτως of the affirmative βαδίζει, 'he walks', and δῶρον as an accusative a πρώτως of δῶρον as a nominative. In most instances, however, a πρώτως is distinguished from the original noun or verb by some difference of form, e.g. by a difference of termination. Under the general ead of πρώτως Aristotle includes the following species of words:—

1) the oblique cases of all nouns, as compared with the nominative, e.g. Φίλων etc. from Φίλων (De interpr. 2, 16 a 33). (2) The nominative also of common nouns; it is a πρώτως through the idea of number which it suggests: thus ἄνθρωπος is 'a man', and
COMMENTARY

1457 a 18 ἀνθρωποι 'several men'. (3) The forms involving a distinction of gender, e.g. οἷς, αὕτη, τούτο and the like (Soph. el. 14, 173 b 27). (4) The paronymous adjectives, e.g. χαλκώς from χαλκός (Rhet. 3. 9, 1410 a 32), ἀνδρείος as compared with the substantive ἀνδρία (Rhet. 1. 7, 1364 b 36; Cat. 1, 1 a 14). (5) The comparatives and superlatives as compared with the positive adjectives, e.g. βέλτιστος from ἄγαθός (Top. 5. 7, 136 b 30). (6) The adverbs as compared with the corresponding adjectives, e.g. δικαίος from δίκαιος (Top. 1. 15, 106 b 29; 5. 7, 136 b 15). (7) The past and future tenses of the verb (De interpr. 3, 16 b 16); and presumably also the forms embodying distinctions of person, number, voice, etc. To these must be added (8) τὰ ὑποκριτικά, the modifications of sense words may acquire through differences in the mode of enunciation. This synopsis of the different uses of the term in Aristotle may be sufficient to show that πτώσεις with him is a logical rather than a philological conception, and that it is only in certain of its applications that it corresponds to our declension or inflexion or derivation. It is the sense rather than the word itself that is conceived as derivative; a πτώσεις takes its meaning, i.e. the fundamental part of it, from the primary word; and the idea of this latter is involved in any explanation we give of the πτώσεις; Φίλωνος for instance means 'of Φίλων', and γραμματικός means 'possessing γραμματική'—both being accordingly πτώσεις; the one of Φίλων and the other of γραμματική. With Aristotle's use of πτώσεις we may compare Varro's equally heterogeneous instances of 'declinatio': a Ierentius Ierenti, ab equo equo, al homine hominculis, a mamma mammoseae, a prudentia prudens, e pugnando et currando pugiles et cursores (L. L. 8, 14).

a 21 ἀνθρωπος: Phys. 3. 7, 207 b 8 ἀνθρωπος εἰς ἀνθρωπος καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ.

τὰ ὑποκριτικά: see on 19, 1456 b 10.

a 22 ἐπιτάξιν: see on 19, 1456 b 16.

βάδιζε: to be read as βάδιζε!, i.e. as a dictatorial imperative.

a 23 λόγος. The definition is framed to distinguish a λόγος from ar ὁνομα; see above on a 10, and comp. De interpr. 4, 16 b 26 λόγοι δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντική κατὰ συνθήκην, ἢς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικὸ ἐστι κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ' οἷ' Ὀ κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις λέγω δὲ, οἰνον ἀνθρωπος σημαίνει μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οἰχ' ὅτι ἐστὶν ἢ οἰκ' ἐστων ἀλλ' ἐστι κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐὰν τι προστεθῇ. The clause ἢς ἐνα μέρη καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι refers to the nouns and verbs (with their πτώσεις) as the significant parts of all λόγοι; the σύνδεσμο
and ἀρθρα are φωναί ἀσημοι. For the meaning of λόγος and the various forms of λόγιοι see on 20, 1456 b 38 (also Bon. Ind. 433 b 48).

οὗ γάρ ἀπας, κτδ. An indirect reproof, perhaps, to Plato, who seems to speak as though λόγοι were always in the form of a proposition: Soph. 262 λ οὐκοίν εἰς ἄξομάτων μὲν μᾶνον συνέχως λεγομένων οὐκ ἐστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὗ τοῦ ῥημάτων χωρίς ἄξομάτων λεγόμενων.

ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀριστός: e.g. ζητόν πεζόν δίπον (Top. 1. 7, a 26 b 103 a 27) or ζητόν ἑπιστήμης ἔκτικον (Top. 5. 2, 130 b 8).

ἐνδέχεται ἀνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον. This is the λόγος ἄνωματῶς of An. post. 2. 10, 93 b 31—a combination of words that may serve as an equivalent for a name, and take the place of one as a term in a proposition (comp. De interpr. 11, 21 a 29). It may be a more or a less exact equivalent; the most exact is what Aristotle calls a definition (comp. Metaph. Z 4, 1030 a 14).

eἰς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος δικαίος. That a λόγος, in spite of its composite nature, has a certain unity in it is tacitly assumed in the definition in a 23 λόγος δὲ φωνῇ συνθετῇ κτδ. This unity, as the text implies, is not of the same order in all kinds of λόγιοι. A definition (a λόγος without predication) is one, because the combination of terms in it signifies and stands for one thing (ἐν σημαίνει), just in the same way as a name may do. The proposition also, e.g. Κλέων βαδίζει, is one because the combination of terms describes a single act or fact (comp. De interpr. 5, 17 a 16 ὃ ἐν δηλόν λόγος), and admits of only one assertion or denial. On the other hand in a composite λόγος consisting of two or more propositions with copulative or other coordinating conjunctions to connect them together, the formal unity of the whole is due to this conjunction of the parts, the several propositions which compose it. The Iliad is an extreme instance of such a λόγος. This point, the difference in the unity in these two kinds of λόγιοι, is more than once noticed by Aristotle elsewhere in very similar terms: De interpr. 5, 17 a 8 ἤτι τὶ δὲ εἰς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικός κατάφασις, ἐστα ἀπόφασις: οἱ δὲ ἀλλοί [scil. λόγος ἀποφαντικοί] πάντες συνδέσμως εἰς ... ἄτι τὶ δὲ εἰς λόγος ἀποφαντικός ἢ ἐν δηλόν ἢ συνδέσμως εἰς, πολλαὶ δὲ οἱ πολλὰ καὶ μη ἐν ἢ οἱ άπονοοτοί.—An. post. 2. 10, 93 b 35 λόγος δὲ εἰς ἄτι διχώς, ὃ μὲν συνδέσμως, ἄτιπον ἢ Ἰλαία, ὃ δὲ τῷ ἐν καθ ἐν δηλόν μη κατὰ συμβεβηκός.—Metaph. H 6, 1045 a 12 ὃ δὲ ῥημάτος λόγος ἐστίν εἰς οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἢ Ἰλαία, ἄλλα τῷ ἐνός ἴναι (comp. also Metaph. Z 4, 1030 b 9).
I457 a 29  ἐκ πλείων, scil. λόγων.

a 31 ἀπλοῦν ... διπλῶν: see 20, I457 a 12, and De interpr. 2, 16 a 19 (quoted above on 20, I457 a 10). In the De Interpretatione (2, 16 a 23) the general term for a compound is συμπλεγμένον ὅνομα.

The Rhetoric has more than one reference to this chapter on the species of names: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 36 οἷς ἀπαντᾷ ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἄστιν εἰπεῖν ἄκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἄλλ' ὅσα περὶ τουαίτης ὤς λέγομεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἰρήνια ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.—3. 2, 1404 b 5 τῶν δ' ὤνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπευθῆν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τὰ ἄλλα ὄνομα ὅσα εἰρήνια ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.
— b 26 ὄστων δ' ὤνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ ὦν ὁ λόγος συνεστηκέν, τῶν δ' ὤνομάτων τουαίτ' ἔξωτων εἴδη ὅσα τεθεωρητα ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῶν; τούτων γλώττας μὲν καὶ διπλώς ὄνομας καὶ πεποιημένοις ὀλγακῖς καὶ ὀλγαχῶς χρηστέοι ... τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκείον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόναι χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψυλῶν λόγων λέξιν.

a 33 ἐκ σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσμοῦ. Aristotle is probably thinking here of words like ἀμφιλογος, περιβλέπειν, σύνδικος, ὑποπτος, etc., compound of a noun or verb (or a πτώσις of the same) and a preposition, which is in his classification a φωνὴ ἄσμος.

a 35 μεγαλειωτῶν is all but identical with the reading in Αε, μεγαλωτῶν, and simpler than Tyrwhitt's μεγαλειών ὁς or Vahlen's μεγαλείων ὅν. A μεγαλειωτὸν ὅνομα would be a name that has been 'made grand', an exaggerated or amplified name. Though a verb μεγαλειών is not found in extant literature, it is a legitimate derivative from μεγαλείων, which is sometimes used of words (e.g. in Xenophon Mem. 2. 1. 34); and it is presupposed in the LXX. word μεγαλείωμα. After μεγαλειωτῶν we may supply ὅν = e.g. For similar instances of the omission of ὅν see 25, 1461 a 26; An. pr. 1. 4, 26 a 8; De gen. et corr. 2. 5, 332 b 14; Eth. N. 5. 8, 1133 a 7; Rhet. 3. 5. 1407 a 38; 3. 6. 1408 a 6 (etc.).

In lieu of μεγαλωτῶν (or μεγαλιωτῶν) the Arabic version is said to imply Μασσαλωτῶν—a reading which has met with the approval of Diels (Berlin Academy, Sitzungsbd. 1888 p. 53) as well as others. An expression like τα πολλα των Μασσαλωτων, however, is certainly not free from difficulty. The general view seems to be that it is practically equivalent to τα πολλα των Μασσαλωτικων; so that Aristotle is to be credited with the statement that the majority (τα πολλα) of the proper or other names in use at Massilia were of the abnormal type described in the text. There is, as far as I know, no hint of anything of the kind in any ancient writer; and it is to my thinking too im-
probable to be believed without very distinct evidence. The recent translators, who accept the new reading, must have felt the difficulty, as they tone down the expression by a free rendering of τὰ πολλά, making the clause mean either 'like so many Massilian expressions' (Butcher), or 'wie jene massalitischen Namen' (Gomperz). It has to be remembered also that it was hardly necessary for Aristotle to go as far as Marseilles for instances of such names. They were certainly not unknown in Athens (Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen 2 p. 29); and to judge from their appearance in Plautus, they must have been common enough in the later Attic Comedy.

'Ερμοκαικόζανθος: a compound of three river-names, Hermus, Caicus, and Xanthus (comp. Dindorf in HSt. s.v., and LeRonne, Étude des noms propres grecs p. 62). After this the Greek text must have lost something, as the Arabic version, as translated by Margoliouth, renders the passage by Ερμοκαικόζανθος, ἐπενεξάμενος Διὰ πατρί. I hesitate to adopt this very attractive conjecture, though it has been accepted by both Butcher and Gomperz, because the context seems to me to suggest rather a second instance of the same kind of word, a τετραπλοῦν ὄνομα of some sort. Some such compound as ἐπενεξενοὺς, if one may venture to invent the word, would represent the general sense of the Arabic. As these abnormal compounds were characteristic of the Dithyramb (see on 22, 1459a 9), and not uncommon in Comedy, it is difficult to see why Aristotle should have had recourse to what would seem to be an epic or a mock epic for an instance of a τριπλοῦν ὄνομα.

ἀπαν δὲ ὄνομα κτέ. The present survey of the vocabulary of poetry may be compared with that in Isocrates 190 ὃς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλὰ δηδονται κόσμου· καὶ γὰρ ἄτριόν τ' ἀττιόν ... δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τῶν τεταγμένων ὄνυμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔνεοι, τὰ δὲ καυνῶς, τὰ δὲ μεταφορᾶς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπέον ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἰδεσι διαποιήκαται τὴν ποίησιν.

κύριον. The κύριον ὄνομα is the established and familiar term for a thing, as distinct from the γλώττα, the μεταφορά and the other ἔννοια ὄνυμα (see on 22, 1458a 22). In actual usage, however, the κύριον ὄνομα is more especially opposed to the metaphor. As the metaphor is an ἀλλότριον ὄνομα (infra 7), the κύριον ὄνομα is much the same thing as the οἰκεῖον or 'proper' name for the thing; comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404b 31 τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον (= i.e. τὸ
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1457 b I oikeioν] καὶ μεταφορά μόναι χρήσωσι πρὸς τήν τῶν ψελών λόγων λέξεων. Hence it is that in Latin prōπē often represents the κύριος, and prōpria nomina the κύρια ὄνοματα of Greek writers. Horace has an attempt at a more literal translation of the latter term in A. P. 234 Non ego inornata et dominantia nomina somum verbaque, Pisones, salyorum scriptor amabo. In Isocrates 190 d—e the designation for the words in common use, in contradistinction to those belonging more especially to poetry, is τὰ τεταγμένα or τὰ πολιτικὰ ὄνοματα.

b. 2 κόσμος. The term reappears in 22, 1458 a 33. As Aristotle's explanation is lost (see on b. 33), the technical sense to be attached to it is a matter of conjecture. In Isocrates 190 d (see above on b. 1) the metaphor, the strange word, and the coined word are grouped together under the general head of κόσμοι; and Aristotle himself in the Rhetoric (3. 2, 1404 b 5 and 1405 a 14) uses the verb κόσμεων in an equally wide sense, to denote the embellishment of style by means of metaphor and other unusual forms of expression. In the present passage, however, it is clear that the term κόσμος must have a special meaning, since instead of including the γλῶττα, the μεταφορά, etc., it is expressly distinguished and made to stand apart from them. The only positive hint we have in the Poetics of the sense of the term is in 22, 1459 a 11, where it is said to be allowable not only in epic poetry, but also in oratory and in the iambic parts of Tragedy: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ίαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξει μιμεῖσθαι ταῦτα ἀρμότται τῶν ὄνομάτων ὄσοι κἂν ἐν λόγοις τις χρήσατο· ἐστι δὲ τὰ τουαίτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορά καὶ κόσμος. Aristotle is generally supposed to be referring to the epitheton ornans; in support of which interpretation Tywhitt and others point to the use of κόσμος in Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 13 μηδ' ἐτι τῷ εὐτελεί ὄνοματι ἐπὶ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν ὁμοίως γὰρ ἠν λεγει καὶ εἰ ἐπείειν ἄν πότινα συκῆ. This passage in the Rhetoric, however, does not justify this view. πότινα is regarded there as a κόσμος, not because it is a certain kind of epithet, but because it is a γλῶττα (v. on b. 4), and therefore one of the unusual words which according to the Rhetoric (3. 2, 1404 b 5) serve to embellish the style. An epitheton ornans need not be of this kind; in γάλα λευκὸν, for instance, the epithet is a κύριον ὄνομα. As the κόσμος, according to the classification in the text, is a special kind of word, distinguished from the κύριον ὄνομα on the one side and the γλῶττα, μεταφορά, etc., on the other, we may perhaps suppose it to be the ornamental synonym, a word,
for example, like Ἡφαίστος for Achilles, Ὄλεθρος, 21. 1457 b 1–6
for one who causes destruction—the kind of word which in the
ancient classification of tropes came under the heads of synec-
doche, antonomasia, and metonymia (comp. Volkmann, Rhetorik
der Gr. u. Röm.² p. 421–5). If Aristotle’s κόσμος does not include
such synonyms, he has ignored what he elsewhere (Rhet. 3. 2,
1404 b 39) knows to be an important element in the poetic
vocabulary. Cicero De Oratore 3. 167 distinguishes between the
‘coined’ word, factum verbum (Aristotle’s πεποιημένον ὄνομα),
the ‘transferred’ word, translatum verbum (i.e. μεταφορά), and the
‘ornamental equivalent’, ornandi causa proprium propri pro-
commutatum; this last being apparently identical with the κόσμος of
the Poetics. We must not forget that Aristotle recognizes some words
as being more beautiful than others: Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 b 6 καὶ ἀπὸ
cαλῶν [scil. δὲ μεταφέρειν]. κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος τὸ μέν. ὡσπέρ
Δεινόμενοι λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημανωμένῳ [i.e. either in its
sound or in its associations], καὶ Ἀλκῆς δὲ ὀσφαίτω—with which
we may compare the definition of Theophrastus (ap. Demetr. De
eloc. 173), κάλλος ὀνόματος ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀκοὴν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ὀφίν
ἐνδὶ ἢ τὸ τῇ διανοια ἐντιμον (v. Rabe, De Theophrasti libris περὶ
λέξεως p. 44). It would be strange if this very obvious artifice of
poetical expression were overlooked by Aristotle in a book like the
Poetics.

γλ contraseña. The term is sufficiently general to include foreign,
b 4
dialectical, and also obsolete words—all words (or senses) in fact
which require explanation, because outside the limits of ordinary
Attic Greek (comp. Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 33 τῶν ὄνομάτων ὀφέλασιν
[i.e. the tragedians] ἄσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον ἐστιν). For instances
in the Poetics see 22, 1458 b 21 and 25, 1461 a 10; others are to
be found in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 7, where the use of γλ contraseña in prose
is said to be a frigid affectation: μὴ δὲ [scil. αἰτία ψυχρότητος] τὸ
χρησθαι γλώτταις, οὖν Λυκόφρων Ξέρξην τέλωρον ἄνδρα, καὶ Σκίρων
σύνις ἀνήρ, καὶ Ἁλκιάδας ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως
ἀπαθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκράτω τῆς διανοίας ὅργῃ τεθηγμένον.

μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ: De caelo 1. 3, 269 b 26 ἀνάγκη δὲ πᾶν τὸ b 5
φερόμενον ἢ κάτω ἢ ἄνω ἢ κοινότητι ἐχεῖν ἢ βάρος ἢ ἄμφω, μὴ πρὸς
tὸ αὐτὸ δὲ.

σίγυνον. The gloss in Hesychius is σίγυνον τὰ ἐξετὰ δόρατα, ἃ b 6
τοῖς δόλουδοροις ἄκονται (comp. Schol. Plat. Amat. p. 87 R. and
Apoll. Rh. 2. 99). The word exists in a variety of forms (HSt.
s.v. σιβύνη). That it belonged to the Cyprian dialect is said also
by Herodotus 5. 9 σιγύνας δ' ὑν καλέοντι Αἴγυπτι . . . τοὺς καπήλους, Κύπριοι δὲ τὰ δόρατα, and by Schol. Apoll. Rh. 2. 99 σιγύνους δὲ καλοῦσιν οἱ Κύπριοι τὰ ἀκόντα. I suspect we should restore σιγύνος in the present passage, as there seems to be no trace elsewhere of a neuter form. Herwerden also (Lex. gr. suppl.) tacitly assumes σιγύνος as the nominative in Aristotle.

metaphorad. metaphoréin, said of a word, means to transfer it from its proper object to another more or less like that (v. 22, 1459 a 8 and Bon. Ind. 462 a 1). The substantive metaphorad has two meanings, (1) the abstract sense of transference (e.g. in the present passage, and infra b 30), and (2) the concrete sense of the word in its transferred or metaphorical application (e.g. supra b 1; 22, 1458 a 22, 25, 33, etc.).

Metaphor, according to Aristotle, consists in transferring a word from the object to which it is appropriate to another kind of object more or less like it; comp. 22, 1459 a 8, and Top. 6. 2, 140 a 9 ἡ metaphorad ποιεῖ πως γνώριμον τὸ σημαίνωμεν διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα· πάντες γὰρ οἱ metaphoréontes κατὰ τινα ὁμοιότητα metaphoréοντων. Four kinds of similarity are noted in the text, that between genus and species, that between species and genus, that between species and species, and that between a thing and its analogue—where there is a similarity of relations. The present classification of metaphors is assumed in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 3 and 3. 10, 1410 b 36.

λέγω δὲ, scil. ἐπιφοράν, or metaphoráν.

In the present passage, however, the indefinite τι is the subject of the infinitive, in the same way for instance as in Phys. 5. 1, 224 a 23 τὸ τούτον τι μεταβάλλειν (intr.), and in Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 12, 13. It is just as much the subject as τοῦτο is in Eth. N. 3. 7, II 14 b II τὸ καλὸς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἥ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἀν ἐν ἐαυτῷ. Compare also Metaph. Θ 4, 1047 b 13 τὸ γὰρ σὲ ἐστάναι νῦν ψεύδος μὲν, οὐκ ἀδύνατον δὲ. The traditional rendering of ἐστάναι τι is 'a kind of standing' (stare aliquod, or stare quoddam in the old versions), but it has not the sanction of Tyrwhitt and Hermann, who translate ἐστάναι τι simply by stare; which shows that they were not insensible to the grammatical objection against making the τι qualify an infinitive. See infra on b 16 (ἀφελεῖν τι).

Τῇ δὲ μυρίᾳ Ὀδυσσεύς κτέ.: Il. 2, 272.

ἀπ' εἰδοὺς: Rhet. 3. II, 1413 a 14 καὶ αἱ παρομοίαι metaphorai ἀπ' εἰδοὺς ἐπ' εἰδός εἰσίν· οἶδον ἃν τις ὃς ἁγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγά-
γηται ἐτα βλαβῆ, ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιος φησι τὸν λαγώ. ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ ἠρημένων πετῶνθασιν. See Rhet. 3. 10, 1410 b 14 and II, 1411 b 26 for other instances of this description.

The two quotations in the text, which have been supposed to be fragments either of some epic poet (Kinkel, EGF. p. 72) or of a parodist (Brandt, Parod. gr. rel. p. 112), were probably both of them from the Ἰαθαρμοῖ of Empedocles. The second, τεμων ἀτειρεῖ χαλκῶ, is, as Vahlen has pointed out, identical with part of the Empedoclean line (fr. 143 Diels), preserved by Theo Smyrnaeus: Arithm. p. 20 Gelder (=p. 15 Hiller) ἦ τῶν πολιτικῶν [Πλατωνικῶν Hiller] λόγων παράδοσις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐξεὶ καθαρμῶν τιν... ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κρηνῶν ἀπὸ πέντε ἀνυμωτά φησιν ἀτειρεῖ χαλκῶ δεῖν ἀπορρύπτεσθαι, ὦ δε Πλάτων ἀπὸ πέντε μαθημάτων δεῖν φησι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κάθαρσιν. The exact form of the verse of Empedocles is perhaps irrecoverable, but it is not difficult to see that Theo’s ἀνυμωτά is a prosaic substitute for the τεμων preserved by Aristotle (comp. Diels, Hermes 15, 173). ἀτειρήσ— a favourite epithet with Empedocles (v. Diels, Index p. 232)— is a reminiscence of Homer. The same may be said also of χαλκῶς, if it meant, as it probably did in Empedocles (v. Bullialdus ad loc. p. 128 ed. Gelder), a brazen urn, such as was used in certain rites. Aristotle elsewhere refers to Empedocles in a way which implies that his poems might be assumed to be familiar to every one (v. on b 24). As he regards him as a master of metaphor (μεταφορικὸς fr. 70; see on I, 1447 b 18), there is a special propriety in his quoting instances of metaphor from the writings of Empedocles.

ἀφελεῖν τι. The recent interpreters seem to agree in supposing this to mean ‘a kind of removing’ (anferre aliquid in Lat.), though a very different view was taken of it by Victorius, Heinsius, Goulston, Tyrwhitt, Hermann, and Ritter, who represent it by anferre aliquid or anferre quiddam. The now usual rendering implies that the infinitive is treated as an ordinary substantive, with the indefinite pronoun attached to it in the same way as in ἰδονύτις, γένεσις τις, and the like. There is no recorded instance of this construction in classical Greek. In the parallels in the Sophistici Elenchi (22, 178 a 12 sqq.) the τι in τοιείν τι, τάσχειν τι, and aισθάνεσθαι τι is assuredly (as Pacius saw) the object after these verbs. Aristotle’s assumption is that a generic may be supplanted by a specific term, when it comes to be applied to a special kind of object. Thus ἔστάναι, said of a ship, is
supplanted by ὁρμεῖν, and ἄφελεῖν, said of water, by ἀρύσται. If he had had the instance cited in b 27 before him here, he might very well have said τὸ ὀπέρειν ἀφιέναι τί ἐστι—where the τί would have represented the accusative, τῶν καρπῶν, of the later passage.

τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον (comp. Metaph. I 4, 1070 b 17) replaces the κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον in b 9, ἐπιθορὰν being again understood. Analogy or proportion is thus defined in Eth. N. 5. 5. 1131 b 31, ἡ ἀναλογία ἵστης ἐστὶ λόγων καὶ ἐν τέταρτοις ἐλαχίστοις. In the statement in the text the general form of analogy, Β: Α:: Δ: Α, is illustrated by an example:—φιάλη (Β): Δίονυσος (Α):: ἀστίς (Δ): Ἄρης (Β). Metaphor consists in giving the φιάλη (Β) the name belonging to its analogue (Δ), viz. ἀστίς, or vice versa. This transference of a name, as Aristotle proceeds to tell us (καὶ ἐνίσχυ τὸ προστιθέασιν, b 19), is sometimes softened by an explanatory addition to the word in its new application. The addition may be either (1) positive or (2) negative. Thus instead of simply speaking of the shield (Δ) as a cup (Β), we may (1) add the term to which the shield is properly related (C), i.e. Ares, and thus call the shield the ‘cup of Ares’ (Β + C); or (2) we may add a negative epithet, to show that the word is used in a non-natural sense, and describe the shield as ‘a cup that holds no wine’ (φιάλη ξῖνος). A string of metaphors from analogy is quoted in Rhet. 3. 10, 141ο b 36 τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν εἰδοκιμοῦσα μάλιστα αἱ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ὡσπέρ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἡφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὡσπερ εἰ τις τὸ ἔρα ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἔξελοι κτλ. The use of such metaphors, as serving for instance to give life to a description of things inanimate, is considered at length in Rhet. 3. 11; comp. esp. 3. 11, 1411 b 32 ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιών εἰδοκιμεῖ οἷον ἐν τοίνυς, “ἀὕτη ἐπὶ διάπεδοντε κυλινδοῦτα λᾶς ἀναλίθα”, καὶ “ἐπικα οὐσίως”, ... καὶ “ἀἵματι στερνόν διέσευσεν μαμάωσα”. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἐμφυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦτα φαίνεται τὸ ἀνασχυτείν γὰρ καὶ μαμάν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσήψε διὰ τῆς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀνασχυτεῖν πρὸς τὸν ἀνασχυτεῖν τούτων.  

b 18 ἐρέι: comp. infra b 21, 23, and ἐφηκεν and λέγει in the context (b 15, 20). The subject, if one must be supplied, is ‘the poet’, just as in the parables in the Topics it would be ‘the disputant’.

b 19 προστιθέασιν. Instead of the metaphor pure and simple, i.e. ‘cup’ for shield, they add on to it the term to which the proper word (i.e. shield) supplanted by the metaphor (i.e. cup), is relative. The shield being relative to Ares, the metaphor be softened
by describing it as 'the cup of Ares'. In the Greek here ἄνθ' o'u 1457 b 19 λέγει—τὸ ἄνθ' o'Ú λέγει τὴν μεταφορὰν, 'the original term supplanted by the metaphor'; and it has to be taken as the subject of the ἐστὶ in πρὸς ὅ ἐστι; the clause, therefore, might have been thus given: προστιθέασιν τὸ πρὸς ὅ ἐστι τὸ ἄνθ' o'Ú λέγει τὴν μεταφορὰν; comp. Castelvetro's rendering in his Basel edition), 'aggiungono la cosa a che ha riguardo quello, in iscambio di che dice'; and Tyrwhitt's, 'adjicium illud, ad quod relativum est id, pro quo translatum dicit.' The distinction here described, between the metaphor with a qualifying addition (positive or negative) and the metaphor without it, is recognized in Rhet. 3. 11, 1412 b 32 αἱ εἰκόνες ... τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορὰς ἀλλ' γὰρ ἐκ δυνῶν λέγονται, ὡσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορὰν: οἷον ᾧ ἀστίς, φαμέν, ἐστὶ φιάλη Ἀρεως καὶ (τὸ) τόξον φόρμιξ εὖ ἄρδος. οὔτω μὲν οἷον λέγοντοι οἷος ἀπλοῦν, τὸ δ ἐπείν τὸ τόξον φόρμιξ ἄρδε ἀπλοῦν. For the singular λέγει v. supra on ἐρεὶ, b 18. For the difference of number in προστιθέασιν comp. 4, 1448 b 17; 26, 1461 b 30; Eth. N. 5. 8, 1132 b 34 ἡ γὰρ τὸ κακὸς ζητοῦσιν εἰ δὲ μηδὲ δουλεία δοκεῖ ἐναι, εἰ μηδὲ ἀντιποιοῦσει (see Vahlen on 26, 1461 b 30, and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3, 1 p. 87).

ἐρεὶ τοῖνυν κτῆ.: Rhet. 3. 4, 1407 a 14 (Roemer) ἀλλ' δὲ δὲ τὴν b 21 μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ἀνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα [καὶ ἐπὶ] τῶν ὀμογενῶν οἷον εἰ ᾧ φιάλη ἄσπις Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην Ἀρεως. φιάλη Ἀρεως was the bold metaphor of the dithyrambic poet Timotheus (fr. 16 Bergk=22 Wilamowitz). The idea was doubtless suggested by the similarity of shape between a shield and the φιάλη which Dionysus sometimes had in his hand in ancient art.

ἡ ὀσπέρ 'Εμπεδοκλῆς. The actual words of Empedocles, which Aristotle supposes us to know, are not to be found among his extant fragments; all that can be said of them is that they must have been something like γῆρας ἡμέρας but different from that in point of phraseology. The metaphor in Emped. 20. 5 Diels, περὶ ὕμμοιν βίοι, is not sufficiently like this to be what Aristotle had in mind. This allusive way of referring to something supposed to be known to the reader is not uncommon in Aristotle; see 17, 1455 b 9 (ἐ̄φ' ὡς Εὐρυπίδης), 25, 1460 b 36 (ἐτυχεῖν ὀσπέρ Ξενοφάνει); comp. Metaph. Γ 5, 1010 a 5 οὕτω γὰρ ἀρμόττει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἡ ὀσπέρ 'Επίχαρμος εἰς Ξενοφάνην.

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1457 b 25 δυσμάς βίου: Plato Laws 6, 770 Α ἐν δυσμαῖς τοῦ βίου.

δόμα κείμενον, an existing or established name, as in Top. 6, 2, 140 a 3 ἐτε ἐπὶ μὴ κείμενοι ὄνομασι χρήται, οἷον Πλάτων ὀφρυσκον τὸν ὀφθαλμον, ἢ το τοιούτου συνθετέκε, ἢ τον μελένον ὀστεογενές· πᾶν γὰρ ἄσφας ὁ μή εἰσοθέ; comp. also Top. 2, 1, 109 a 28 εἰςι διότι [scil. καὶ ἀμαρτία], ἢ τῷ ἀυτίδεσθαι ἢ τῷ παραβιάντεν τὴν κειμένην λέξιν . . . οἱ τοῦ ἄλλοτρίως ὄνομασι τὰ πράγματα προσαγορεύνοντες, οἷον τὴν πλάτανον ἀνθρωπον, παραβιάνοντες τὴν κειμένην ὄνομασίῶν (comp. Bon. Ind. 380 b 31).

Metaphor is often a way of supplying the deficiencies of ordinary language (Meteor. 4, 3, 380 a 18, b 28; Rhet. 3, 2, 1405 a 36; Quintilian 8, 6, 5, 18). In the present passage Aristotle reminds us that, if one of the terms in an analogy has no special name of its own, it may still be described in just the same way as in the preceding instances (ὁμοίως λεχθήσεται), i.e. by a metaphor softened or explained by the mention of that to which the nameless thing or act is relative. Thus the sowing (B) of seed (A) on the part of the husbandman is analogous to the scattering (D) abroad of light or flame (C) on the part of the sun. This act of the sun has no special name; but we may metaphorically call it "sowing" (B), and then qualify the metaphor by adding the term to which the act (D) itself is relative, viz. "flame" (C), and speak of the sun as "sowing flame"—σπείρων φλόγα (B + C). σπείρων φλόγα is a qualified metaphor on exactly the same lines as φιλή "Ἀρεως (see on b 16); the only difference is that in the one case there is an ὄνομα κείμενον for the thing meant (viz. ἀπειρός), whereas in the other such a name does not exist in actual language.

b 27 ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνώνυμον: for the preposition, comp. Pol. 3, 1, 1275 b 30 ἀνώνυμον τὸ κοινόν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ. Aristotle’s use of ἀνώνυμος has been already considered (on 1, 1447 b 9).

b 28 πρὸς τὸν ἡλίον. Aristotle, unconsciously passing from one sense of ἡλίος to another, is now using it as the prosaic equivalent for the word φλόγε in the poetical quotation in the next line, i.e. in the sense of sunshine or sunlight, the meaning ἡλίος has in Herodotus 8, 23 ἀμα ἡλίω σκόνημεν πᾶσα ἡ στρατῖη ἐπέπλεε ἀλῆς ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀρτέμισιον, and in several well-known expressions.

b 29 πρὸς τὸν καρπόν. Castelvetro’s πρὸς τὸν ἀφιείτα τὸν καρποῦ, which has been accepted by several editors, rests on the assumption that the analogy in Aristotle’s mind was simply that between sowing (B) on the part of the husbandman (A), and the nameless
act, the emission of light (Δ), on the part of the sun (C). In 1457b 29 that case the epithet θεοκτίσται in the quotation must be taken to represent the addition required to soften the metaphor.

Διό εἰρηται: comp. ὅθεν πετοῦται and ὅθεν εἰρηται in 25, 1461a 28, 29. Quotations similarly introduced will be found in Rhet. 2. 9, 1387a 33, and in 2. 10, 1388a 7, 15. That in the text was perhaps from a tragedy (Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 856).

ἔστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ κτ.: see above on b 16.

προσαγορεύοντα τὸ ἀλλότριον, scil. ὄνομα, as in Pol. 4. 7, b31 1293a 39 πέμπτη δ' ἐστίν [scil. πολιτεία] ἢ προσαγορεύεται τὸ κω农作物 πασῶν. The more usual construction in Aristotle is προσαγορεύειν ὄνοματι. In saying προσαγορεύοντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποδήσῃ τῶν οἰκείων τι he seems to have fallen into a false antithesis. φιάλη, in the illustration, is ἀλλότριον in relation to the shield, and ὀνόματι negatives something οἰκείων in relation to a cup. Words like ὀνόματι come under the general designation of στερήσεις (Bon. Ind. 699 b 42). The free use of them in the metaphors of poetry is noted in Rhet. 3. 6, 1408a 6 ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὄνοματα οἵ ποιοῦται φέρουσι, τὸ ἀχρόδον καὶ τὸ ἄλωρον μέλος· ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν. εἰδοκιμεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μεταφοράις λεγόμενον ταῖς ἁνύλογον, οἷον τὸ φάναι τὴν σάλπιγγα εἶναι μέλος ἄλωρον. The instance in Rhet. 3. 11, 1413a 1 is φόρμιγξ ἀχρόδος, a way of describing a bow.

πεποιημένον. A πεποιημένον ὄνομα is a word coined by the b33 poet for the occasion, and in this respect unlike the words hitherto considered (the κύριον ὄνομα, the γλώττα, and the μεταφορά), which are parts of an already existing vocabulary. Such coinage of new words was termed ὄνοματοστοία (Volkmann, Rhetorik 2 p. 425).

καλούμενον: comp. 21, 1458a 6 ὄνομαξομείνον.

τίθεται. For the middle comp. H. A. 7. 12, 588a 9 διό καὶ τὰ b34 ὄνοματα τότε τίθεται, ὡς πιστεύοντες ἡδὲ μάλλον τῇ σωτηρίᾳ.—Rhet. 3. 13, 1414b 15: δὲ ὅτι εἰδός τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορὰν ὄνομα τίθεσθαι.

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνιαία εἶναι τοιαύτα, to be understood from τίθεται in the preceding line; comp. Top. 6. 2, 140a 3 (quoted on b 25), Rhet. 3. 3, 1406a 7 (quoted on b 4), and Eth. N. 6. 7, 1141a 9 τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδι-
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1457 b 35 δομευ, οἶον Φείδιαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποίων [scil. λέγομεν].

We do not know where Aristotle found the word, and there is no evidence for the form of the nom. sing.; the correction of Victorius, ἐρνυγας, assumes it to have been ἔρνυξ, like ἀντυξ; but it is just as likely that it was ἔρνυγη. An explanation of the word survives in Hesychius: ἐρνυτας [sic]. ἐρνη. βλαστήματα. κλάδου. The form in Hesychius, with a τ instead of a γ, has been defended by Meineke as the acc. pl. of a Cretan word ἐρνυς (= ἔρνος) supposed to be implied in Ἐπιρνύτος, a Cretan name for Zeus according to Hesychius s.v. (see note in M. Schmidt’s ed.). Aristotle’s view of it, however, is that it is a coined word, not a γλώττα as a Cretan word would be; it is to be remembered too that he shows himself elsewhere (25, 1461 a 14) not wholly unfamiliar with the Cretan dialect.

ἀρητῆρα. The reference is no doubt to the use of the word in Il. 1. 11 οὐνεκα τὸν Χρυσῆν ἠτίμασεν ἀρητῆρα. Hesychius has the same explanation: ἀρητῆρα ἑρεά.

ἐπεκτεταμένον κτέ. The three kinds of word remaining for consideration are abnormal only in form. As they are substantially the same as the usual words, they are said to be intelligible to all (22, 1458 b 4), i.e. they do not require explanation as a γλώττα might do. The ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα is the ordinary word lengthened out in one or other of two ways, either through the lengthening of a syllable normally short, or through the insertion of an extra syllable. Aristotle’s standard being Attic, he regards πόλης for instance as a lengthened form of πόλεως. ἐπεκτείνεως has this same sense in Metaph. Δ 4, 1014 b 17 εἰ τις ἐπεκτείνεις λέγοι τὸ ν (in the word φύσις).

1458 a 4 Πηλείδου. The reading of Λε, Πηλέος, is retained by Vahlen, who marks a lacuna after the word. M. Schmidt fills up the assumed gap by the following restoration: τὸ Πηλέος (Πηλήος καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου) Πηλημάδω. It is quite as easy, however, to suppose Πηλέος to have got in by assimilation to the preceding πόλεως (or πόλεως, as it is in Λε); and it must be admitted that a second instance of this sort of lengthening is hardly wanted. As regards Πηλημάδω for Πηλείδου, Aristotle’s view apparently is that the -ά- in it is epenthetic, a συλλαβή ἔμβεβλημένη (v. on 20, 1456 b 34). Its other deviations from the normal word (-ης = -εις, and -εω = -ευ) would be, according to ancient theory, instances of
diářeis, 'resolution', with a lengthening of vowels in the resolved 1458 a 4 diphthongs.

άφηρημένον. As the άφηρημένον is the opposite of the ἐπεκτεινόμενον ὄνομα (v. supra a 1), we may take the term to include (1) a word with a shortened vowel, and (2) a word shortened by the omission of a syllable, whether in the beginning, middle, or end of it, i.e. a word which in the terminology of the grammarians has suffered άφαιρεσις, συγκοπή, or ἀποκοπή. Aristotle's examples, however, κρ, δῶ, δψ, are all instances of ἀποκοπή—the term he himself uses with reference to this class of words in 22, 1458 b 2; comp. Strabo's (364 Cas.) explanation of Μέσση in II. 2. 582: ἐνοι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἀποκοπήν δέχονται τὴν Μεσσήνην . . . παραδείγματι δὲ χράνται τοῦ μὲν ποιητοῦ τῷ κρ καὶ δῶ καὶ μάς, καὶ ἐπὶ 'ήρος δ' Αὐτομέδων τε καὶ 'Αλκίμος', ἀντί τοῦ 'Αλκιμέδων . . . παρ' Ἐμπεδοκλῆι δὲ 'μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων δψ', ἡ δψις. It is clear that Aristotle's άφηρημένον ὄνομα covers a wider ground than the άφαιρεσις of the grammarians, and that it must include their ἀποκοπή and συγκοπή. In the preliminary statement in 21, 1457 b 2 the shortened word is termed the ἑφηρημένον, not the άφηρημένον ὄνομα. In the interests of uniformity—which one can hardly suppose Aristotle to have ignored in a matter so technical as this—one must either read άφηρημένον in 21, 1457 b 2 (with Spengel), or restore άφηρημένον throughout the present section. Some of the grammarians seem to have used άφαιρεσις (v. HSt. s. v.) for the dropping of a letter in the middle of a word.

μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων δψ: Empedocles fr. 88 Diels. The a 5 reading of the MS. οὖτος (see on 18, 1456 a 2) must represent ὄψις, a gloss on ὄψ (comp. Strabo 364, quoted above on a 4).

ἐξηλαγμένον. The 'changed' word is in regard to some one part of it the invention of the poet. To that extent, therefore, it has a certain affinity with the 'coined' word, the πεποιημένον ὄνομα (21, 1457 b 33).

δειπνηρόν κατά μαζόν: II. 5. 393 (comp. Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. a 7 4, p. 677 D, and Athenaeus 423 ε).

αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὄνομάτων κτέ. Up to this point names have been a 8 viewed in reference to their origin, sense, or form. Apart from these aspects, however, they may also be classified according to their gender, and distinguished as masculine, feminine, and neuter. This classification of names according to gender will be seen to be founded on the terminations of the nominatives in Attic. The primary distinction between masculine and feminine termi-
nations seems to have been generalized from the names of objects in which there is a visible distinction of sex, and more especially from the names of men and women (comp. Aristoph. Nub. 682). Thus nouns ending in the consonants Ν, Ρ, Σ, Ψ, Ξ are regarded as normally masculine, because names like Δων, Νέστωρ, Πάρμης, Πέλαψις, Κάραξ, are names of males; those ending in the vowels Η, Ω, and Α (long or short) are normally feminine, because Ἐλένη, Κλεώ, Ἡρα, Μοῖσαι are names of females. The names of sexless things (the neuters, as we call them) Aristotle terms τὰ μεταξύ, because as a class these words occupy an ambiguous position, their final letters being sometimes those of the masculines and sometimes those of the feminines. Thus δενδρον, ἢτορ, τείχος, as ending in the consonants Ν, Ρ, Σ, have what Aristotle regards as masculine terminations; whereas κάρα, τέρμα, etc., have feminine ones; the other neuters also, μέλο, γόνις, etc., as ending in vowels, show a certain affinity with the feminines. This seems to be the rationale of the present scheme of genders; and it is in essentials the same as that of the grammarians, though theirs no doubt is both fuller and more systematic, and leaves fewer facts to be treated as anomalies or exceptions (comp. Dionysius Thrax p. 15 Uhlig). Aristotle’s classification is based on that of Protagoras, who distinguished nouns into masculine, feminine, and σκεῦη (Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 b 7 Προταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὄνοµάτων διήρεσα καὶ θηλεια καὶ σκεῦη)—the last of the three terms meaning with him not ‘things’ but ‘names of things’, as it does also in Aristotle, in Soph. el. 14, 173 b 39 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηλείων ὄνοµάτων ὄσαίτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγοµένων μὲν σκεῦων ἐχοντων δὲ θηλειας ἦ ἄρρενος κλῆσιν. In Soph. el. 14, 173 b 19 we are told that Protagoras said it was a solecism to make μύρις and πτηλῆς feminine, evidently because he thought Σ and Ξ to be normally masculine terminations, just as Aristotle does. Aristophanes, Nub. 658, ridicules this new ὄρθοτεσία of Protagoras in the matter of gender. Sulpio is said to have disputed the propriety of speaking of Athenes as a θέος: μὴ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὴν θεὸν ἀλλὰ θεών θεοῦς δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ἄρρενας (Diog. Laert. 2. 116).

This may seem an overstatement, as there are neuters which have these endings (see 9 17). The explanation is to be found in Aristotle’s view of the neuters: he does not conceive them as having terminations peculiar to themselves, but as holding an intermediate position between the two main classes, some of them having a masculine and others a feminine termination.
εκ τῶν φωνήντων is equivalent to a partitive genitive (comp. 1458 a 11 Pol. 5. 1, 1302 a 4; Rhet. 1. 9, 1367 a 36; 10, 1369 b 7). Van Cleef, Index Antiphontae p. 58, has noted several instances of this use of εκ in Antiphon.

τῶν ἐπεκτεινομένων εἰς Α, 'in Α among the vowels capable of being lengthened'. The remaining dichronous vowels (see on 20, 1456 b 32), I and Y, are said a little further on to be found in the terminations of neuters (a 15).

τὸν ... πλῆθη. πλῆθη is 'numbers', as the plural of πλῆθος, numerus or summa. It is hardly necessary, therefore, to restore πλῆθει from certain of the apographs.

οὐδὲ εἰς φωνήν βραχύ. It is to be remembered that there is no a 15 Greek noun ending in E or O. A neuter pronoun, like τοῦτο or τοιοῦτο (comp. Herodian 2 p. 764 Lentz), would be in Aristotle's classification (see on 20, 1457 a 18) not an ὅνομα proper but a πτώσις ὅνοματος.

τρία. No mention is made here of κίκλων which Plato had used in Tim. 60 a. This and sundry other words of the same order (see Lobeck, Phryn. p. 288) may perhaps have been in Aristotle's view not sufficiently naturalized to require recognition.

πέντε. The old editions (with some few of the apographs) a 16 explain this by adding τοῦ πῶν τοῦ νάπτυ τοῦ γόνυ τοῦ δόρυ τοῦ ἄστυ after πέντε. The nouns ending in Y are certainly more than five in number (comp. Herodian 1 p. 354 Lentz). We may perhaps suppose Aristotle to have arrived at this number by ignoring words like γλαυφ, δάκρυ, μέθυ, μῶλυ, φίτυ as antiquated, and taking account only of those which formed part of the existing Attic vocabulary.

τὰ δὲ μεταξ' see above on a 8. Our word 'neuters', which represents the οὐδέτερα of the grammarians, points to the difference between the neuters and the masculines and feminines; Aristotle's τὰ μεταξ' to their resemblance; they are said to occupy an intermediate position, because in their terminations some of them resemble the masculine and others the feminine nouns; they have in fact no distinctive terminations of their own.

εἰς ταῦτα καὶ Ν (καὶ Ρ) καὶ Σ. The text, as thus amended, acknowledges the neuters ending in Ρ (ὑδωρ, ἀπαρ, etc.); but it apparently says nothing of those ending in Α (κυμα, ποιημα, κάρα, etc.). It has been proposed accordingly to insert καὶ Α after ταῦτα, so as to complete the list of neuter endings (comp. Herodian 2 p. 646 Lentz τελικά οὐδέτερων ὅνομάτων εῖς, α, ι, ν, π, σ, υ).
It is just possible to keep to the traditional text here, by supposing that in a statement so loosely drafted as this ταῦτα was meant to recall not only the two vowels (I and Y) just considered, but also Α, which has been described in the preceding context (α 12) as one of the ἐπεκτεινόμενα or dichronous vowels. In that case ταῦτα will stand allusively for τὰ ἐπεκτεινόμενα, and include Α as well as I and Y.

a 18 λέξεως: 6, 1450 b 13 λέγω δὲ ... λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν. In this chapter Aristotle does not deal with style in general, but only with the portion of it which relates to the choice of words, the ἐκλογῇ ὄνομάτων of the grammarians; his aim is to describe the poetic vocabulary, and determine the limits to the use of exceptional words and expressions in poetry. This chapter is referred to in Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 28, where the language of oratory is contrasted with that of poetry: ἕτερα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. ήδη δὲ τὸ συμβαίνων ὀφθὲ γὰρ οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιόντες ἔτη χρώνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὀστέρ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἄρμαβεον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὄνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὡσα παρά τῷ διάλεκτῳ ἐστιν, οἷς δ' οἱ πρώτον ἐκόσμησαν, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξάμετρα ποιόντες, ἀφείκασιν διὸ γελοιοῦν μμείναιτα τούτους οὗ αὐτὸ ποιήτικα χρόνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. ὑστε φανερὸν ὡτι οὐχ ἀπαντά ὡσα περὶ λέξεως ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀκριβολογηθέντο ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὡσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἰας λέγομεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἰρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

λέξεως ἀρετῆ κτ.: Rhet. 3. 2. 1404 b 1 ὁρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετῆ σαφῆ εἶναι (σημειοῦ γὰρ ὃ τὸ λόγος, ἢν μὴ δηλοῦ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἔργον), καὶ μήτε ταπεινήν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄξιομα ἀλλὰ πρεποῦσαν ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἱσως οὐ ταπεινή, ἀλλ' οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ. τῶν δ' ὄνομάτων καὶ ἰημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινῆν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τάλλα ὀνομάτα ὡσα εἰρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς' τὸ γάρ ἔξαλλάζει ποιεῖ φανετοῦντα σεμνοτέραν.

a 20 ταπεινή. For ταπεινή as the opposite of σεμνή (α 21) comp. Rhet. 3. 2. 1404 b 3, 8, Isocrates 35 c, and the antithesis between τὸ ταπεινὸν and τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς in Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1423 a 31. Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 15 R. finds an instance of manness of diction even in Homer, in the language in Od. 16. 1–16: διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων τε καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὄνομάτων πέπλεκται πᾶσα ἡ λέξις, οἷς ἄν καὶ γεωργῷ καὶ βαλαττουργῷ καὶ κηροτέχνῃ καὶ πάσι ὁ μηδεμίων ὡραν τοῦ λέγειν εὖ ποιούμενον εἷ ἐτοίμων λαβών ἐχρῆσαι. λυθέτοις γοῦν τοῦ μέτρου φαῦλα φανεῖται τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἄξολα: οὔτε γὰρ μεταφορά τινες ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐγενεῖς ἐνεπερι οὔτε ἐπαλαγαί
οὐτε καταχρῆσεις οὐτε ἀλλη τροπικὴ διάλεκτος οὐδεμία, οὐδὲ δὴ γλώττιος. 21. Ι. 458 a 16—22. Ι. 458 a 24
τα πολλαὶ τινες οὐδὲ ξένα ἡ πεποιημένα ὀνόματα.

Κλεοφόρωτος: see on 2, 1448 a 12.

Σθενέλου. This Sthenelus is presumably the tragic poet mentioned more than once by Aristophanes (Vesp. 1313 and fr. 151 Kock). It is doubtful whether a single line of his has come down to us (Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 762).

ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ιδιωτικὸν: Rhet. 3. 3. 1406 a 15 ἐξαλλάττει γὰρ τὸ εἰωθὸς [scil. τὰ ἐπίθετα], καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν. It will be observed that Aristotle is now using ἐξαλλάττειν in a large sense, to denote all possible deviations from the ordinary forms of expression (πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον, a 23), instead of restricting it to the kind of deviation presented in the ξηλλαγμένον ὀνόμα (21, 1458 a 6).

τὸ ιδιωτικὸν = τὸ εἰωθὸς οὐτὶ τὸ κύριον; but the point of view is not quite the same. τὸ ιδιωτικὸν is the language of the ordinary man, the prosaic as opposed to the poetical mode of expression; the antithesis of ιδιωτὸς and ποιητής is already in Plato (Phaedr. 258 d, Symp. 178 b, Laws 890 λ). Isocrates 203 d has ιδιωτικὰ ὀνόματα, but in a different sense.

ξενικὸς. In Plato (e. g. in Crat. 401 b, 417 c) a ξενικὸν ὀνόμα is a non-Attic word or form, what Aristotle calls a γλώττα (see on 21, 1457 b 4); Isocrates 190 d (quoted above on 21, 1457 b 1) uses ξένα ὀνόματα in the same sense. Aristotle's ξενικὰ ὀνόματα, however, is a wider term; it comprises all the various deviations from the usual form of expression (πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον a 23)—the metathesis, the ἐπεκτεταμένον ὀνόμα, etc., as well as the γλώττα. In the Rhetoric also τὸ ξενικὸν is the general opposite of τὸ εἰωθὸς: Rhet. 3. 3. 1406 a 15 ἐξαλλάττει τὸ εἰωθὸς, καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν.—3. 12, 1414 a 26 τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικὸν. The attraction such unfamiliar words have for us is explained in Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 8: τὸ ἐξαλλάξει ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν [scil. τὴν λέξιν]· ἀπεργή γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἀνθρώποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολιτείας, τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχουσι καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν. διὸ δὲ ποιεῖ ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον: ἀναιματώσῃ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσὶν, ἦδο δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν.

Ἀπανταὶ τοιαῦτα is an exaggeration, like ἀπαντῶν in 1, 1447 b 22. a 24
All that Aristotle really means is that too much metaphor, or an undue proportion of strange words makes the sentence an enigma or a 'barbarism'. τοιαῦτα = ξενικὰ, οὐ ἐκ ξενικῶν.

This passage is quoted in a fragment attributed to Longinus (Rhet. Gr. 1, 325 Spengel): ὅτι ὃ Ἀριστοτέλης τοὺς πάντα μετάφρασε αὐτόγματα γράφειν ἔλεγεν.
COMMENTARY

1458 a 25 μὲν οὖν 'saepe usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explications, Bon. Ind. 540 b 42; comp. 14, 1453 b 32, and Vahlen's note on the present passage.

αινημα. The puzzle in a riddle Aristotle explains as arising from the presence of metaphors, i.e., of words used in a transferred sense. The element of metaphors in riddles is noted again in Rhet. 2, 1405 b 4 καὶ ὁλως ἐκ τῶν εὖ γνημέων ὑστε μεταφοράς λαβέων ἐπικεκές (metaphorai γάρ αἰνιττονται), ὡστε δήλον [ἡ δηλοῦν] ὅτι εὖ μετενήφηκατ. — 3, 11, 1412 a 24 καὶ τῷ εὖ γνημένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἴδεα. μάθησις γάρ καί λέγεται μεταφορά [ἡ μεταφορά]. Quintilian also (8, 6, 14) speaks of the riddle-like effect of too much metaphor: 'Ubi modicus autem aliquo opportunus eius usus illustrat orationem, ita frequens et obscurat et audieo complect, continuus vero in allegorias et aeignamata exit.

a 26 τὸ γάρ is practically no more than γάρ in this and many other Aristotelian passages (comp. Bon. Ind. 750 a 5, and Kühner, Gr. Gr. a 2. 2 p. 244).

Άδεα: equivalent here to οὐσία (see Waitz, Org. 2 p. 406).

a 28 τὸν ὄνομάτων. ὄνωμα has been used before this as a generic term including the metaphor, etc., as well as what Aristotle calls the κύριον ὄνωμα (see 21, 1457 b 1). When opposed, however, to the metaphor, as in the present passage, it may easily mean the name (as we say) for the thing, i.e., its proper name, its κύριον ὄνωμα. It recurs in this more specific sense in 22, 1458 b 2 and b 16. It is not so absolutely necessary, therefore, to adopt the emendation of Heinsius, τὸν ἐκ τῶν κύριων ὄνομάτων, or the reading which the Arabic Version is believed to imply, τῶν ὄνωμάτων. For other instances of the same use of general terms in a restricted sense see on 1, 1447 a 29 (ἡ τοῖς μέτροις).

a 29 κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφορῶν, scil. σύνθεσιν. The correction μεταφορῶν seems to be required not only by the form of the antithesis, κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὄνομάτων σύνθεσιν, in the preceding line, but also by the meaning. It is the combination of metaphors that produces the sense of impossibility (comp. ἀδύνατα συνάψαι a 27) which is of the essence of an αἰνημα.

ἀνδρ' εἶδον κτέ.: a line traditionally ascribed to Cleobulina, fr. 1 Bergk. The riddle is partially explained in Rhet. 3, 2, 1405 a 35 οὖ σάρκωθεν δὲ καὶ ἓλλ' ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὑμοκείων μεταφέρειν τὰ ἀνώνυμα [ἔπι] τὰ ἀνώνυμα [ἡ] ἐν οἷς ἔν τῷ αἰνιάματι τῷ εὗδομοιντὶ "ἀνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα". ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἢτι δ' ἀμφω
πρόσθεσις τις κόλλησιν τούνν ἑπε τὴν τῆς σικύνας προσβολήν. Ι458.a 29
χαλκός, as a name for what we conventionally call a 'cupping-
glass', is a metaphor derived from the material of which the
instrument was often made in antiquity. Celsus 2. 11 has a
description of the brazen cupping-glass and its mode of action:
Aenea [scil. cucurbitula] altera parte patet, altera clausa est . . .
in aeneam linamentum ardens conicitur, ac sic os eius corpori aptatur
imprimiurque donec inhaeret . . . ubi inhaesit, si concisa ante scal-
pello culis est, sanguinem extrahit; si integra est, spiritum (comp.
Aristot. Probl. 9. 9-12, 890 b 7-37; Mayor on Juv. 14. 58; and
the monograph of K. P. I. Lampros, Περὶ σικυόν καὶ σικνάσεως,
Athens 1895).
κολλήσαντα: a metaphor ἄτ’ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἴδος (see 21, 1457 b 13). a 30
For the tense of the participle see Goodwin, Syntax of Greek
Moods and Tenses § 148.
εκ τῶν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός: a mere repetition of the ἐὰν γὰρ ἐκ
γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός in a 25, and brought in also without syntac-
tical connexion with the context. The words may be the residue
of a longer statement now lost, or a stop-gap to disguise a lacuna,
or a rough note by Aristotle himself to indicate a point to be
worked out at length at some future time.
βαρβαρισμός is the opposite of ἐλληνισμός. ἐλληνιζεῖν in Aris-
totle (v. Bon. Ind. 238 b 53) means to speak Greek like a native,
i.e. correctly, and βαρβαρίζειν to speak it like a foreigner, whether
through the use of 'strange words' (γλώτται), or through that of
strange or unauthorized forms of words. That βαρβαρίζειν had
this wide sense is clear from the explanation of σολοκυζεῖν ('to
speak incorrectly') in Soph. el. 3, 165 b 20 τέταρτον δὲ σολοκυ-
ζεῖν τοιεῦν, τούτο δ' ἐστι τὸ τοιεῦσα τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν, ἐκ τοῦ
λόγου τῶν ἀποκρινόμενον (comp. Bon. Ind. 688 a 54). In later
theory, however, 'barbarism' denotes more especially a faulty use
of particular words, and 'solecism' a fault of construction or
syntax: Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 210 βαρβαρισμός ἐστι παρά-
pτωσις ἐν ἀπλῇ λέξει παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν, καὶ σολοκυζαμός
ἐστι παράπτωσις ἀσυνήθης κατὰ τὴν ὀλην σύνταξιν καὶ ἀνακόλουθος
v. Volkmann, Rhetorik² p. 396). Quintilian (1. 5, 8) distin-
guishes three senses of 'barbarismus' in Latin: Barbarismum
pluribus modis accipimus: unum gente [?genus], quale fit si quis
Afrum vel Hispanum latinae orationi nonen inserat . . . alterum
genus barbarismi accipimus quod fit animi natura . . . tertium est
illud vitium barbarismi cuius exempla vulgo sunt plurima, sibi etiam
quisque fingere potest, ut verbo cui libebit adiciat litteram syllabam ve
el defrathat, aut etiam aliam prō alia aut eandem alio quam rectum est loco ponat.

ι 31  δει ἀρα κεκρασθαί πως τοῦτος, scil. τὴν ἱέξων; the language of poetry should have some admixture of unusual words or forms in it. Similarly in the Rhetoric a certain combination of familiar and unfamiliar words is said to be an element of pleasure in a speech: Rhet. 3. 12, 1414 a 25 καὶ τὸ ἤδειαν [scil. τὴν λέξιν εἰσα] τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει ἂν εὖ μιχθῇ, τὸ εἴωθος καὶ ἔσενικὸν. In the text τοῦτος refers back to the ἔσενικα in a 22; all from ἄλλα ἀν της in a 23 to βαρβαριμοῦς in a 31 is digression. For the qualifying πως in this connexion comp. Probl. 30. 1, 954 b 27 εἰ δὲ πως κραθωσί.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει, scil. τὰτα, i.e. τὰ ἔσενικά. The οἴνων prefixed to the list of ἔσενικά which follows is that the appositional and explanatory οἴνων, ἐνεπε or scilicet (comp. Bon. Ind. 502 a 7). There is a reference to this place in Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 5: τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινύν δὲ ἄλλα κεκοσμημένα τὰλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἰρηται εὖ τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

ι 34  εἰδῆ, scil. ὀνομάτων.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ μέρος συμβάλλεται: Isocrates 156 b οἱ γὰρ ἐλάχιστον μέρος τὰ γένε ταῦτα συμβάλλεται πρὸς εἰδαμονίαν.—Hippocrates 1 p. 525 Κ. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον μέρος συμβάλλεται ἀστρονομίη ἐς ἱερικῆς.

ι 1  συμβάλλεται. The singular verb may be explained by supposing the real subject to be τὰ ἐπεκτεταμένα καὶ ἀποκοκεμένα καὶ ἐξηλαγμένα ὀνόματα rather than the various processes they exemplify. Other instances of a singular verb with several subjects in the plural will be found in Kühner, Gr. Gr.3 2. 1 p. 81. The anomaly in the present instance is not so harsh as it might have been, as the verb precedes its subjects, and is also at some distance from them: it may be illustrated also by the common use of ἔστι, ἐν, and γένεσαι followed by a plural subject (see Kühner, Gr. Gr.3 2. 1 p. 68). Vahlen quotes a similar construction with δοκεῖ in H. Λ. 4. 9, 536 a 17 δοκεῖ δὲ . . . ὅσπερ λέγων φαίνεσθαι οἱ ὀφθαλμοί.

ι 5  ὅστε οὐκ ὄρθως ψέρουσιν κτῆ. In this long digression, which extends to ἐκείνος δὲ τοῦτο ἐγγέλει in 1459 a 4, Aristotle insists on the literary value and effect of the various poetical forms of expression, and defends their use by the poets. He first answers the critics of the epic (b 7-31), and then those of the tragic diction (b 31-1459 a 4).

ι 7  τὸν ποιητήν, the poet, whoever he may be. It is evident, how-
ever, that Aristotle is mainly concerned with Homer (comp. Bon. 1458 b 7
Ind. 609 b 57); the licences he considers are all epic licences; and
the instances quoted in b 9—10 were presumably meant to caricature
the Homeric hexameter. It was generally admitted that
Homer was ready enough metri gratia to take great liberties with
language (see Ludwich, Aristarchos Homerische Textkritik 2 p. 127;
Schulze, Qu. epicae p. 3). Throughout this chapter Aristotle is
thinking quite as much of the epic poet as of the tragedian, though
his theory of the Epic is still to come (in 23—24).

Εἰκλείδης ὁ ἄρχαῖος. Nothing further is known of him. As
a surmise, which must be taken for what it is worth, I would
suggest that he may possibly be the Euclid who was Archon in the
year 403, when the reformed alphabet was officially adopted at
Athens. At that moment considerable attention seems to have
been devoted to questions of phonetics (see on 20, 1456 b 31);
and the anomalies and licences of Homeric metre may very well
have been one of the facts to which the reforming party pointed in
proof of the need of a fuller alphabet.

ὅς ῥάδιον ποιεῖν = ὁς ῥάδιον ὅν ποιεῖν. For the omission of ὅν
see Goodwin, Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses 875. 1.

ἐκτείνειν. From the definition of the ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα in 21, 8
1457 b 35 it is clear that Aristotle is referring not only to the
lengthening of a short vowel but also to the insertion of an extra
syllable in a word.

ἰαμβοποιήσας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει. The sense of these words and
their connexion with the lines which follow have been a difficulty
with the interpreters from the days of Victorius, who gives up
the passage in despair. Goulston renders them by ‘qui etiam
in ipsa oratione soluta iambca confecit’; Tyrwhitt by ‘in ipsa
oratione soluta cavillo facto’; M. Schmidt by ‘ihr Verfahren in
seinem eigenen Ausdruck persiflirte’; Ueberweg by ‘er legt den
Spott in die Redeform selbst (durch Sylbenverlängerung) hinein’.
Vahlen's interpretation (which is practically the same as Tyrwhitt's)
is ‘iambum sive carmen probosum et cavillatorium faciens mero
sermone pedestri (in purer prosâ)’. It is not so easy to see how
ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει can mean the same thing as ἐν ψιλῇ λέξει; nor is
ἰαμβοποιήσας quite the same thing as ἱαμβον ποιήσας. Perhaps
the simplest solution of the difficulty is to transpose ἱαμβοποιήσας,
placing it after ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει, and then take the two lines of
parody which follow as its object. ἱαμβοποιών τι may very well
mean to ‘write, or say, something as an ἱαμβοποιός’ (i. e. as a
caricaturist), just in the same way as δραματοποιεῖν τι means to 'describe as a δραματοποιός' (4, I 48 b 37), and λογοποιεῖν τι to 'describe as a λογοποίος'.

'Επιχάρην κτέ. This and the next quotation are given as specimens of prose which by a liberal use of epic licences may be made to read as verse. By the artifice of lengthening two short syllables 'Επιχάρην εἴδον κτέ. becomes an hexameter—the lengthening required with 'Επιχάρην being like that in ἐπίτονος in Od. 12. 423. βαδίζειν, it may be observed, is not an epic word. How the second instance was to be read as a verse is not equally clear, the text here being obviously corrupt. If we may suppose ἐλλέβορον to be a scribal error for ἐλλέβορον, the parodist may have proposed to read this as ἐλλέβορον.

Μαραθώνδε. The accentuation in Ας (Μαραθώνα δὲ) is in accordance with the rule of Apollonius and Herodian (La Roche, Homeriche Textkritik p. 221).

b II φαίνεσθαι πας χρώμενον: De gen. et corr. 1, 10, 328 b 10 φαίνεται γάρ πως καὶ μικτὰ ἤρεμα. A visible use of these artifices is one thing and a discreet use of them (τὸ μέτρον, b 12) another. For the antithesis comp. Pol. 5. 11, 1314 b 28 περὶ τε τῶς ἀπολαύσεις τῶς σωματικῶς [scil. δὲ] τοῦντιον ποιεῖν ἢ νῦν τινί τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν οὐ γάρ μόνον εὐθὺς ἐσθίεν καὶ συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο πράττοντες, ἵνα εὐθαμίονας καὶ μακάριοις θανατίσσων ἅλλα μάλιστα μὲν μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιούτοις, εἰ δὲ μη, τὸ γε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις διαφεύγειν. In the Rhetoric Aristole lays down the same rule for oratory: the orator must use all the arts of language, but with discretion, so as not to allow his use of them to become too apparent: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 18 διὸ δὲ λανθάνειν τοιούτας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένος ἅλλα περιφέρεται (comp. also 3. 7, 1408 b 4).

tοῦτω τῷ τρόπῳ, scil. τῆς διαλέκτου; comp. ὁ ἐπιτιμώντες τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου in b 6, and τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μετα- φορᾶς χρήσθαι in 21, 1457 b 50. Vahlen, who supplies ἐπεκτάσεις after χρώμενον, takes τοῦτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ as equivalent to τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

b 12 τὸ δὲ μέτρον. If the traditional reading, τὸ δὲ μέτρον, be retained, we have to understand μέτρον in the sense of 'measure' or 'limit'. The objection to this interpretation is that μέτρον has the sense of 'metre' in the immediate context (b 16), and that any other sense would be somewhat confusing in a passage dealing with 'metrical' licences. τὸ μέτρον, on the other hand, is certified
by more than one parallel in the Rhetoric: Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 b 32 1458 b 12 εἰλαβεσθαι δὲ δὲ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ μέτρον.— 3. 3, 1406 a 16 ἀλλὰ δὲ στοιχάζεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μειζόν ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ εἰκή λέγειν ἣ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εἰ, ἥ δὲ τὸ κακὸς. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμιντος ψευδᾶ φαίνεται οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρηστὰ ἀλλ’ ὅσ ἐδιδάματι τούτων ἐπιθέτοις, αὐτῶ πυκνῶς καὶ μειζοῦ καὶ ἐπιδήλως. In another passage, Rhet. 2. 14, 1390 b 8 ὅσα δ’ ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἥ ἐλλεποῦσι, τούτων τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον, we find Aristotle passing from the idea of τὸ μέτρον to that of τὸ ἀρμόττον just as he does here in the context (b 15).

κοινὸν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν: Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 36 τὸ δ’ εἰκαίρος ἢ μὴ εἰκαίρος χρησαίον κοινὸν ἀπάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστίν.

ἀπρεπὸς. In the Rhetoric an unsuitable metaphor is said to be b 14 one of the faults which make the style of an orator ‘frigid’ : Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 5 τὸ ψευδῶν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίνεται εἰς γὰρ καὶ μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῦν (χρωνται γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖ) αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἀγαν καὶ τραγικὸν.

ἐπίτυρες ἐπὶ τὰ γελοια. ἐπὶ τὰ γελοια, which has been bracketed (by Gomperz), seems to be wanted to keep up the parallelism with what is said in b 5 sqq. on the subject of the epic licences, which Euclid had parodied and turned to ridicule. Aristotle’s reply to Euclid is that it is quite possible to misuse metaphors, etc., for the same purpose, ἐπὶ τὰ γελοια (comp. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 5, quoted above). The comparative ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα would be more in accordance with usage (comp. Stallb. on Plato Symp. 214 e).

τὸ δὲ ἀρμοττότων. This is considered (1) in reference to these b 15 epic licences (ἐπεκτασις, ἀποκοπή, ἑξαλλαγή), and (2) in reference to the use of metaphor, etc. (b 17).

ἀσον διαφέρει: Isocrates 87 c καίτω µ’ οὐ λέληθεν ἀσον διαφέροντι τῶν λόγων εἰς τὸ πείθεν οἱ λεγόμενοι τῶν ἀναγγειωσκομένων.

ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπῶν θεωρεῖσθαι: because these metrical licences are so b 16 marked a feature in the epic diction (see on b 7). The proof here is not unlike that by which Isocrates 191 a shows the literary value of metre: οἱ μὲν μετὰ μέτρων καὶ πυθμῶν ἀπαντα πωςον, οἱ δ’ οὐδενὸς τοῦτον κωμωνοιν δ’ ὄσαντ’ ἔχει χαρᾶ, ὡστ’ ἀν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἐχῇ κακῶς, ἄμως αὐτας ταῖς εἱρθυμαι καὶ ταῖς συμμετραίς ψυχαιρουσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. γνοῖ τ’ ἀν τις ἐκεῖθεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν ᾧ γὰρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εἴδοκι- ματων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοικις καταλίπτης, τὸ δ’ μέτρον διαλύση, φανήσεται πολλ’ καταδεικτερα τῆς δύσης ὅσ νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν.
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1458 b 16 τῶν ὀνόματων: i.e. the normal words, the words themselves, as distinct from the ἐπεκτάσεις, etc., of them (see above on a 28).

b 18 ἰδέων. For ἰδέα = ἔδος, 'species', see Waitz, Org. 2 p. 416, and Bon. Ind. 338 b 34. In De caelo i. 7 Aristotle says, within the space of a few lines, πεπερασμένων ἰδέων (274 a 32) and ἰδέας πεπερασμένας (b 2) without perceptible difference of meaning.

b 20 ἐν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα. A verb taken by itself, i.e. apart from a subject, may be termed an ὄνομα (see on 20, 1457 a 10).

b 21 κύριον εἰωθότος. Though κύριον and εἰωθός ὄνομα are often used as synonyms, there is a certain difference between them, as the εἰωθός ὄνομα may be a metaphor. ἐσθελε in the line of Aeschylus (b 23) is the word in general use (τὸ εἰωθός), but it is a metaphor, and therefore not a κύριον ὄνομα (see on 21, 1457 b 1) in the stricter sense of the term. By comparison with θοιγάτα, however, it is the κύριον ὄνομα. Aristotle gets out of the difficulty by terming it the κύριον εἰωθός, the usual κύριον, because it has by custom and use come to be treated as a κύριον ὄνομα, and is no longer felt to be a metaphor.

b 22 εὑτελές. The epithet is applied to a certain kind of word in Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 13 (see on κόσμος, 21, 1457 b 2), and in the passage from Dionysius quoted above on a 20.

Αἰσχύλος: Nauck, TGF. 2 p. 81 and 618.

b 24 θοιγάτα, which is not uncommon in poetry, is regarded by Aristotle as a γλωττα (see on 21, 1457 b 4). It is explained in Hesychius, θοιγάτα αἰωχείται.

b 25 νῦν δὲ μ᾽ ἐὼν κτέ.: Od. 9. 515 νῦν δὲ μ᾽ ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἄκκις.

ἄεικής. The traditional text of the Poetics has ἄειδής, and that of Homer ἄκκις—with an ancient variant, however, ἄεικής. The restoration of ἄεικής in the quotation, as the reading which Aristotle must have had before him, is believed to be confirmed by the Arabic Version. ἄειδής is open to two objections: (1) it is the word actually used in b 27 in Aristotle's metaphrasis of the Homeric line; (2) it is also a late word, and in the sense which it seems to bear here, that of 'unsightly' or 'ugly' (= δυσειδής), not to be found in pre-Aristotelian Greek. On the other hand, if the old poetical word ἄεικής had to be interpreted as an epithet of a person, ἄειδής in its later sense might very well be chosen to represent it.

b 29 δίφρον ἄεικελιον κτέ.: Od. 20. 259. Several of the manuscripts of the Odyssey read παραθεῖς in lieu of καταθεῖς.
The passage is a page from a Greek text, discussing the works of the playwright Aristophanes and the language used in his plays. The text excerpts include references to the terms "tragic actors" and "metrical language," and it notes the changes in language from spoken to written over time. The text also references the work of earlier scholars discussing the language and expression in poetry.

The passage is a discussion of the language and expression in drama, specifically focusing on the distinction between spoken and written language, and how this distinction evolved over time. It also touches on the use of language in rhetoric and oratory, and the role of the playwright in shaping language usage.

The text is a critical analysis of the language used in Aristophanes' plays, and how it differs from the language used in other forms of writing. It highlights the importance of understanding the context and setting in which the language was used, and how this understanding can inform our interpretation of the text.
With this use of μεταφορικός, i.e. as applied to a person, Vahlen compares that of ἐνθυμητικός in Rhet. i. 1, 1354 b 22, etc., and of συνλογιστικός in Top. 8. 14, 163 b 30.

7 εὐφυίας τε σημεῖόν. εὐφυία means a gift of nature, i.e. an aptitude not to be acquired by education or study; see on 17, 1455 a 32, and comp. Eth. N. 3. 7, ΙΙΙΙ 14 b 6 φύναι δει ὅστερ ὅψων ἔχοντα ἥ κρινει καλῶς καὶ το κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἄγαθον αἰρήστηται. καὶ ἐστίν εὐφυής, ὃ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν. τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ δ' παρ' ἐτέρων μη ὁνὲν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὁνὲν ἐφ' ὁποίουν ἐξεῖ, καὶ τὸ εὗ καὶ τὸ καλὸς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἀν ἐνευφυία. The originality shown in metaphor is noted also in Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 9 καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἐστίν αὐτὴν παρ' ἄλλου. This power, according to Aristotle, depends on a rapid and intuitive perception of similarity in difference, i.e. of the resemblances between things not obviously alike; comp. Rhet. 3. ΙΙ, 1412 a 10; δεὶ δὲ μεταφέρειν ... ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἶνον καὶ εὖ φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ τὸ ὁμοιόν καὶ εὖ πολὺ διέχοντι θεωρεῖν εὐπτόχοι. For the kinds of similarity underlying metaphors see 21, 1457 b 7.

eὐ μεταφέρειν. Aristotle is apparently setting aside far-fetched metaphors (Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 35; 3. 3, 1406 b 8), in which the underlying resemblance is not so real and clear as it should be.

8 τὸ τὸ δμοιον θεωρεῖν. For other instances of concurrence of identical forms of the article see Soph. el. 13, 173 b 15; Meteor. Ι. 3, 341 a 30; De resp. 2, 471 a 7; Metaph. N 2, 1089 a 14.

tῶν δ' δοματων κτῆ. A very similar distinction is made in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 1: χρησιμοτάτη ἡ διπλή λέξις τοῖς διηθυμαμβοσιοῖς: οἷον γὰρ ψοφοδέσ: αἱ δὲ γλώσσα τοῖς ἐπιστοῦν: σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αἰθάδες: ἡ μεταφορὰ δὲ τοῖς ιαμβεῖοι: τοῖτος γὰρ νῦν χρώται.

9 τοῖς διηθυμαμβοῖς: comp. the fr. of Philodemus published by Gomperz (Vienna, Sitzungsberichte 123 p. 66): τό μακροσκόνθετον ἀνιῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ ἡ τοῖς ἑπετεῖ ... ἀλυπων δ' ἐν τῷ διηθυμαμβῷ.—Demetrius De eloc. 91 ἀριστεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνθετα ὀνόματα, οὐ τὰ διηθυμαμβικὸς συγκείμενα, οἷον θεοτράτους πλάνας, οὐδὲ ἀστρων δορύπυρον στρατόν, ἀλλ' ἐυκότα τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς συνθείας συγκείμενοι.

10 τοῖς ἥρωικοῖς: comp. 23, 1459 b 34.

tοῖς ιαμβεῖοι: i.e. the tragic dialogue (v. 4, 1449 a 24).

12 λέξιν μεμείσθαι. Instead of its usual sense of diction or language, λέξις in this passage must mean (like διελεκτος in 1458 b 32) the spoken as distinct from the literary language. The present statement, therefore, is in harmony with that in
Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 33, where Tragedy is said to have learnt to reject words outside the ordinary spoken language (ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτών ἐστὶν). With this use of λέξεις we may compare that of λέξεις, λεκτικῶν μέτρων, and λεκτικὴ ἀρμονία in 4, 1449 a 23–8; and also that of λόγως in Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 30 ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων ἐς τὸ λαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων τούτων μέτρων ἀρμονίας τοις ἄλλοις. Goulston renders λέξεις here by vulgaris sermo; Bonitz (Ind. 427 b 31) by sermo pedestrīs, on the assumption that it stands for ψυλή λέξεις, as it no doubt sometimes does. In 4, 1449 a 23 λέξεις is the opposite of 'song'.

ἐν λόγῳς has been taken to mean 'in common speech, or conversation' ('in familiari colloquio', Goulston), 'in prose' ('oratio pedestrīs', Bon. Ind. 433 b 20), and 'in speeches' ('in orationibus', Tyrwhitt). Though it is not always possible to determine the exact meaning of a word like λόγος (v. on 4, 1449 a 17), the balance of probability is rather in favour of Tyrwhitt's 'in orationibus'. Aristotle's meaning would seem to be this, that the tragic dialogue (ἐν ἑαυτοῖς) is limited to the same species of words as oratory (ἐν λόγῳς)—those found in the language of common life (λέξεις), viz. the κύριον, the μεταφορά, and the κόσμος. The appropriateness of the κύριον and μεταφορά for oratory is distinctly affirmed in the Rhetoric, and for the same reason, that they are in common use: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 31 τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόνα χρησιμοὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψυλῶν λόγων λέξιν· σημεῖον δὲ, ὅτι τούτοις μόνοις πάντες χρωίται, πάντες γὰρ μεταφοράς διαλέγονται καὶ τῶς οἰκείους καὶ τῶς κυρίουs (comp. Isocrates 190 ε). The reference in the text to the language of 'speeches' may serve to remind us of the fact that even in Aristotle's time the theory of literary prose was still studied mainly in connexion with oratory, and as part of the art of Rhetoric. According to the canon here laid down by Aristotle, the highly-coloured diction of Aeschylus would be inappropriate in Tragedy; and he tells us elsewhere that it was eschewed by the dramatists of his time: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 33 τῶν ονομάτων ἀφείκασα [i.e. the tragedians] ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτών ἐστιν, οἶς δ' οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκόμισαν... ἀφείκασαν. From the days of Euripides in fact (comp. Aristoph. Ran. 939) the language of Tragedy had been approximating to that of ordinary life; and in Aristotle's age there was probably no very serious difference between it and that of the Comedy of the period.

κόσμος: see on 21, 1457 b 2. The parallel in the Rhetoric (3. 2, a14 1404 b 31, quoted above) ignores the κόσμος.
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1459 a 15 τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μιμήσεως. A tragedy is something to be acted, an epic something to be recited or read. This makes a fundamental distinction between them, though Aristotle admits that as a work of literature a tragedy is quite possible without performance on a stage (6, 1450 b 18; 26, 1462 a 12, 17).

a 17 περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς κτέ. The natural division in the matter of this and the next chapter would be at 24, 1459 b 17, so as to make διαφέρει δὲ the beginning of the second half of the discussion. Throughout these two chapters Aristotle has Homer constantly in view; if he mentions other epic writings, it is only to show their artistic inferiority to the Iliad and Odyssey. The general intention of the present statement is to bring the Epic under the rules of construction laid down for Tragedy. Though the enumeration of the points of agreement and difference between the two is so much longer than that in 5, 1449 b 9-20, it ignores one characteristic of the Epic, its being a μίμησις σπουδαίων—on which no little stress was laid in the earlier chapters (3, 1448 a 26; 4, 1448 b 38 sqq.). Taking this for granted, it would seem, Aristotle proceeds to insist (1) that a good epic must conform to the tragic rule of Unity of story (1459 a 18-b 7); (2) that epic poetry divides into the same species as Tragedy (1459 b 8-10); and (3) that it involves the same literary elements (1459 b 10-17). After this he passes on to its points of difference, its length (b 17-31), its metre (b 31-1460 a 4), its form (a 5-11), and its greater tolerance of ἀλογια (a 11-b 5). A valuable discussion on Aristotle’s theory of the Epic will be found in Schoemann’s Opuscula (3 p. 30). For traces of Aristotelian ideas in later Greek writers see Adam, Die Aristotelische Theorie vom Epos (Wiesbaden 1889).

περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς. περὶ = ‘as for’, or ‘as regards’ (comp. Metaph. H 6, 1045 a 7).

διηγηματικῆς, scil. μιμήσεως, understood from a 15 (comp. 24, 1459 b 33, and the note on 1, 1447 a 27 αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν). The καὶ that follows is the appositional καὶ (= i. e.), which is so common in Aristotle.

ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς may be compared with 6, 1449 b 21 τῆς ἐν ἐξαιρέτους μιμητικῆς. ἐν μέτρῳ, ‘in verse (= ἐν λόγῳ ἐμέτρῳ), is the opposite of ἐν τῷ πράττειν, just as in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449 b 26 δὲ ἀπαγγελίας (scil. μιμουμένων) is the opposite of ὀρχήστων.

a 18 συνιστάναι δραματικοῦ. A predicative adjective after συνιστάναι
is found also in 24, 1459b14, 1460a34, and in Plato Phaedr. 1459a18
268 d τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ
συνισταμένην. For the construction συνιστάναι περὶ μιᾶν πράξιν
comp. 8, 1451a28 περὶ μιᾶν πράξιν οἷς λέγομεν τὴν Ὄδυσσειαν
συνιστάτων. δραματικοῦ, which means properly 'such as is re-
quired for a drama' (comp. 4, 1448b35), is explained by what
follows (καὶ περὶ μιᾶν πράξιν κτλ.) as referring more especially to
the Unity of the dramatic story. Aristotle now definitely applies
to the Epic the rule of Unity laid down for Tragedy in chaps. 7-8;
its applicability, however, has already been assumed in the
digression on the Epic in 8, 1451a19-29.

ὁπερ ἥσον ἐν ὅλον. If it is permissible to restore ὅλον (ὁν) here, a20
the expression will be equivalent to ὁσα ἐν ὅλον ὁπερ ἥσον (see
Bernhardy, Syntax p. 337, and Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 202 b).
For the meaning of ἥσον see on 7, 1450b34.

καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις θείναι is another instance of a21
parallelismus antitheticeus; it is the negative complement of the
precept in a18 δεί τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι δραματικοῦ, the construc-
tion being δῆλον δι᾽ ἃ δεί τοὺς μύθους . . . συστάται δραματικοῦ . . .
καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας [scil. αὐτοῖς] ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις θείναι. For the
position of δῆλον comp. De sensu 3, 440b14 ὃτι ἀνάγκη μεγαλεῖνων
καὶ τὰς χρώας μίγνυσθαι, δῆλον, καὶ ταύτῃ τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι κυρίαν τοῦ
πολλάς εἶναι χρώας. ὁμοίας θείναι may very well mean 'to regard
as like them' (comp. Bon. Ind. 761a27). According to this view
of the text, the general sense of the passage is shortly this: Epic
stories should be in structure like those of Tragedy (δραματικοῦ),
and not, as is so often supposed (see 8, 1451a21 and 9, 1451b4),
like the records of ordinary history. This latter point, how-
ever, Aristotle puts in a somewhat different form, 'One must not
assume our ordinary histories to be like them'; he inverts the
order of the terms, in fact, as he sometimes does in comparisons
introduced by ὁμοίος (see Vahlen ad loc., and my Textual Criti-
cism of the Nic. Ethics p. 63). The reading εἶναι, which I have
altered into θείναι1 (on the assumption that ΕΙΝΑΙ represents
ΘΕΙΝΙΑΙ), makes him say that our ordinary histories should not be
like tragedies or epics, as though there were something in the
practice of the historians that he wished to set right. The
absurdity of such a notion was felt by one of the Renaissance
correctors and by Dacier; but the correction they proposed, καὶ μὴ
ὁμοίας ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις εἶναι, is to my mind too artificial, and

1 The same correction was made by Francken in Lysias 10, 18.
1459 a 21 too great a departure from the reading of the MS., to deserve a place in the text. In saying ἰστορίας τὰς συνήθεις Aristotle seems to be aware of there being exceptions to the rule. We have been told in 9, 1451 b 30 that a poetical subject may sometimes be found in history.

a 23 ενὸς χρόνου: comp. b 1 περὶ ἑνα χρόνον. Aristotle's conception of a history is that it is a sort of chronicle (see on 9, 1451 a 36) recording all the various occurrences within a certain period of time, however loose and separate they may have been in themselves. As an instance of such a disconnected event he cites Gelo's defeat of the Carthaginians in 480; it happened about the same time—Herodotus 7, 166 says on the same day—as the Battle of Salamis, but it obviously had no connexion with that battle, or with the issue of the Persian War. And the same would have to be said, if it had taken place just before or after Salamis (ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις a 27). In this way Aristotle reasserts the point on which he has insisted in the earlier chapters (8, 1451 a 27; 10, 1452 a 20), that two events may come in succession without forming part of one single action.

a 25 ἐν Σαλαμίνι: Rhet. 2. 22, 1396 a 12 τὴν ἐν Σαλαμίνι ναυμαχίαν. Comp. Thuc. 1. 57, Isocrit. 112 λ., Aeschines in Ctes. 222 for this use of the preposition.

a 29 τοῦτο δρώσιν ὡς ἰστορίας τὰς συνήθεις τιθέασι (v. a 21).

a 30 ἡ δη: 8, 1451 a 23 sqq.

a 33 εὐσώφροσνος: see on 7, 1451 a 4.

a 34 ἡ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα κτέ. Vahlen supposes ἐδει or ἀναγκαῖον ἦν εἶναι to be understood from the ἐμμελεῖ ἐσχῆσαι in the preceding clause. The sense of the passage is clear enough: The Trojan War was a real whole in itself (ἐχωντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος = δολον; v. 7, 1450 b 26); but Homer declined to deal with it in its entirety (τοιεῖν δολον), through a feeling apparently that it was too long for his purpose (λίαν μέγας; comp. 7, 1451 a 5), or if not too long (τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα), too full of matter through the variety of incident in it (καταπεπληγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ). The explanation of the grammatical difficulty may perhaps be that Aristotle has lapsed into obliqua oratio. Λίαν γὰρ ἔν μέγας κτέ. is virtually oratio obliqua, like the clause of explanation in 3, 1448 a 33.

μετριάζοντα is intransitive, as it generally is in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 463 b 23). For the dative with it comp. Pol. 5. 11, 1314 b 33 μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιούτοις.

The use of episodes as giving an element of variety in the Epic is noted again in 24, 1459 b 30. An echo of Aristotle's approval of Homer's episodes survives in Eustathius on II. 3. 230, p. 409, 20 R.: οὕτως εὐμηχάνως ὁ Ὀμήρος τάς ἔσω τε [τῇ ἔσω] τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ ἱστορίας ἐπεισοδίας τῇ ποιήσει καὶ ταῖς μεθοδοῖς αὐτὴν καταποκύλλει τῶν ἀφηγήσεων, and in the Schol. on Od. i. 284: τῆς Ὀδυσσείας οὐκ ἔχοντος τῆς αὐτῆς ποικιλίαν ικανῆν τὸν Τηλέμαχον ἐξελθένι εἰς Σπάρτην καὶ Πύλον ποιεῖν, ὅπως ἀν τῶν Ἰλιακῶν ἐν παρεκβάσει πολλὰ λευχεῖν διὰ τοῦ Νέατορος καὶ τοῦ Μενελάου (comp. the second Schol. ad loc.: ὑπόθεσιν αὐτῆν [scil. τῆς ἀποταμίας Τηλέμαχον] πεποίηκεν δια τοῦ τοῦ γεγονός ὑδρούς καὶ ἐξαλλαγῆς ιδέων, ὅν μὴ μονότροπος ἡ τῆς ποιήσεως ὁ τρόπος).

περὶ ἕνα ποιοῦν κτῆ.: i.e. they write just like chroniclers (comp. a 23) or biographers (comp. 8, 1451 a 21). In some of the inferior epics, however, there is, says Aristotle, a certain Unity of story; but it is not of the right kind (comp. 8, 1451 a 28 περὶ μιᾶν πρᾶξεως δια μιᾶν λέξος), as the action there consists of a plurality of parts (παλμερη), each of them easily detached from the rest of the work. The consequence is that several tragedies may be made out of a single epic of this type; whereas the Iliad or Odyssey does not supply materials for more than one or two. This
emphatic assertion of the Unity of action in the Homeric epic, and of its affinity in this respect to Tragedy, is not quite in harmony with what we read elsewhere in the Poetics. In 18, 1456 a 13 the story of the Iliad is said to be a πολύμυθον σύστημα, one with a plurality of stories in it, and therefore incapable of being successfully dramatized in one single tragedy. And in 26, 1462 b 8 we are expressly told that the action in the Iliad and Odyssey is made up of several actions (ἐκ πλειώνον πράξεων) and of many parts (ἐξει πολλὰ τωαίτα μέρη); in other words, it is conceived to be a μία πράξεως πολυμερής, and not so unlike that of the inferior epics as is assumed in the present passage.

1  μίαν πράξιν = περὶ μίαν πράξιν (comp. 8, 1451 a 28).

δα Κύπρια ποίησας: Herodotus 2. 117 δηλοὶ ὅτι ὁ Ομήρος τὰ Κύπρια ἔπειτα ἔστι ἄλλα ἄλλοι τόνω.—Athenaeus 334 β ὁ τὰ Κύπρια ποίησας ἔπη, ἐπεὶ Κύπριος τίς ἐστιν ἡ Σταυρίνος ἡ δαίμον ὑπὸ ποτὲ χαίρει ὄνομαζόμενος. For the ancient ideas as to the authorship of the Κύπρια see Welcker, Ep. Cycl. 1 p. 279 (comp. Wilamowitz, Phil. Untersuch. 7 p. 337).

2  τὴν μικρὰν Ἴλιαδα = ὅ τὴν μικρὰν Ἴλιαδα (comp. Bon. Ind. 109 b 48). The book is treated as anonymous even by Pausanias (3. 26, 7 and 10. 26, 2) and by several of the grammarians who quote from it (comp. Wilamowitz l.c. p. 341).

3  Ἰλιάδος, 'a poem like the Iliad' (see on 4, 1448 b 38).

4  ἦ δύο μόναι. The reference here is apparently rather to the Odyssey with its διπλὴ σύστασις (13, 1453 a 31); the double story would supply a subject for two tragedies, one dealing more especially with the fortunes of Ulysses, and the other with those of the Suitors.

ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαί. Welcker, Gr. Trag. p. 873, gives a list of the plays supposed to be based on stories in the Κύπρια. An abstract of the poem survives in the Chrestomathy of Proclus (Kinkel, EGF. 1 p. 16).

τῆς μικρᾶς Ἴλιάδος πλέον ὀκτώ. The names in Aristotle's list of possible tragedies are sufficient indication of the ground covered by the Μικρᾶ Ἴλιάς as he knew it; it is clear that the poem must have taken up the story of the war at the death of Achilles, and carried it down to the departure of the Greeks after the sack of Troy. The Fragments also show that it must have included the last scenes of the war and the division of the spoils. Some difficulty may perhaps be felt from the fact that the abstract in Proclus (Kinkel l.c. p. 36) makes the Little Iliad end somewhat
abruptly with the admission of the Wooden Horse within the walls, and that, to complete the record of the war, he subjoins an abstract of what he regards as a distinct poem, an 'Iliou πέρσις sometimes ascribed to Arctinus. In all probability this 'Iliou πέρσις was only the concluding part of the Little Iliad under another name (comp. Wilamowitz l.c. p. 350).

οφλων κρίσις: Proclus l.c. ἡ τῶν ὀφλων κρίσις γίνεται καὶ b 5 'Οδυσσεύς κατὰ βούλησιν 'Αθηνᾶς λαμβάνει, Δίας δ' ἐμμανῇς γενόμενος τὴν τε λείαι τῶν Ἀχαίων λυμαίνεται καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀναρέει. Besides the existing Ajax of Sophocles, there was a ὀφλων κρίσις by Aeschylus (Nauck, TGF.² p. 57), based presumably on this section of the Little Iliad.

Φιλοκήτης: Proclus l.c. μετὰ ταῦτα 'Οδυσσεύς λαοχίσας 'Ελευνον λαμβάνει, καὶ χρήσαντος περὶ τῆς ἀλώσεως τοῦτον Διομήδης ἐκ Λήμνου Φιλοκήτην ἀνάγει ιαθεῖς δὲ οὕτω ὑπὸ Μαχιῶνος καὶ μονομαχίσας Ἀλεξάνδρῳ κτείνει. Several lost plays are recorded as bearing this title (Nauck l.c. p. 968; Welcker, Kl. Schr. 4, p. 180); and we still have the Philoctetes of Sophocles.

Νεοπόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος: Proclus l.c. καὶ Νεοπόλεμον 'Οδυσσεύς b 6 ἐκ Σκύρου ἀγανῦ τα ὀπλα διδωσι τα τοῦ πατρός καὶ Ἀχιλλεὺς αὐτὸ φαντάζεται. Εὐρύπυλος δὲ ὁ Τηλέφου ἐτίκορος τοῖς Τρωί παραγίνεται, καὶ ἀρατείνονται αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνει Νεοπόλεμος. Α Νεοπόλεμος is mentioned in Suidas' list of the plays of Nicomachus (v. Welcker, Gr. Trag. p. 1015, and Kayser, Hist. Trag. Gr. p. 316). There is no record of Εὐρυπυλὸς as the title of a tragedy.

πτωχεία, Λάκαναι: Proclus l.c. 'Οδυσσεύς τε αἰκασάμενος ἑαυτὸν κατασκόπος εἰς 'Ιλιον παραγίνεται καὶ ἀναγνωρισθέει ὅπῃ 'Ελευνὸς περὶ τῆς ἀλώσεως τῆς πόλεως συντίθεται, κατείς τε τινα τῶν Τρώων ἐπὶ τῶς ναός ἀφικνείται. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα σὺν Διομήδῃ το Παλλάδιον ἐκκαθιζε ἐκ τῆς 'Ιλιον. The story of Ulysses entering Troy in the guise of a beggar is briefly told in Od. 4. 247 ἄλλω δ' αὐτῶν φωτὶ κατακρύπτων ἰμάκε δέκτη, δὲ οὐδὲν τοιός ἐν ἐπὶ νησίν Ἀχαϊῶν. τῷ οἴκελος κατέδυ Τρώων πόλων κτῖ; and referred to in Eurip. Rhes. 503 ἤδη δ' ἀγυρής πτωχείαν έχουν στολὴν εἰσήλθε πύργους (comp. Plautus Bacch. 936). There is no tradition of πτωχεία as the title of a tragedy. Λάκαναι was the name of a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF.² p. 210), turning apparently on the carrying off of the Palladium, with which Helen seems to have been associated in some form of the legend (v. Roscher's Lexicon i, 1944); the title was no doubt taken from the chorus of Laconian women, whom we may suppose to have been brought in as Helen's handmaids.
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1459b 6 Ἰλίου πέρσεις: one play certainly is mentioned as having this title, the Ἰλίου πέρσεις of Iophon. There was also a Πέρσεις Ἡ Πολυνέεα attributed to Nicomachus, and a Πέρσεις attributed to Cleophon (comp. Meineke, Hist. Com. Gr. p. 497).

b 7 ἀπόπλοιος may very well have been the title of a play, but if it was, no record has come down to us of one so named. The closing scene of the war, the division of the spoils and the fate of the Trojan captives, was naturally fitted for Tragedy, as one may see from the abstract in Proclus of the final section of the Ἰλίου πέρσεις: ἔπειτα ἐμπρήσαντες τὴν πόλιν Πολυνέειν σφαγάξονι ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τάφον. καὶ Ὑδυσσέως Ἀστυάνακτα ἀνελόντος Νεοπτόλεμος Ἀνδρομάχην γέρας λαμβάνει [comp. Μικρᾶ Ἰλ. fr. 18] καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ λάφυρα διανέμονται. Ἀρμοφόν ὡς καὶ Ἀκάμας Ἀθηναίου ἐπόντες ἠγοραὶ μεθ’ εαυτῶν [comp. Μικρᾶ Ἰλ. fr. 17]. ἔπειτα ἀποπλέωσιν οἱ Ἐλλήνες. Welcker (Gr. Trag. p. 179) suggests that ἀπόπλοιος may possibly have been an alternative title for the Polyhexa of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF. p. 245), the scene of which, as we know from Strabo (10, 470 Σοφολύης ποιήσας τὸν Μενέλαον ἐκ τῆς Τροίας ἀπαρέων σπείδοντα ἐν τῇ Πολυνέεῃ), was placed at the time of the departure of the Greek host. Whether we accept this suggestion or not, it seems pretty clear from the position of the title in Aristotle’s list that the ἀπόπλοιος must have related to the concluding act of the war, and not (as Vahlen thinks) to the withdrawal of the Greek fleet to Tenedos before the treachery of Sinon.

καὶ Σίνων καὶ Τρῳάδες. Having thus run over the eight sections of the Μικρᾶ Ἰλιάς and mentioned a tragedy, actual or possible, in connexion with each, Aristotle appends two additional names to show how easily the list might be enlarged. The first is a Σίνων—the name of a play of Sophocles (Nauck, TGF. p. 251); the second a Τρῳάδες—the name of a still extant play of Euripides. Λ Σίνων proves the possibility of more than one tragedy on the seventh section of the poem; and a Τρῳάδες proves the same of the eighth. One can hardly doubt that Aristotle means the existing play of Euripides, the scene of which is placed at the time of the ἀπόπλοιος or departure from Troy (comp. Troad. 18 πολὺς δὲ χρυσὸς Φρύγια τε σκυλεύματα πρὸς ναῦς Ἀχαιῶν πέμπτειν: μένωνι δὲ πρύμνηθες οὐρον, ὡς δεκαστόρω φρύγω ἄλοχους τε καὶ τέκνα εἰσόδοςιν ἀσμενοί). έτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη κτέ. As a further point of resemblance Aristotle observes that epic poetry divides into the same species as Tragedy; and he illustrates this in b 14 by noting the difference between the
Iliad and Odyssey. This statement about the four species is not quite consistent with that in 18, 1455 b 32 (where see note); as there was no such thing as a 'spectacular' epic, Aristotle makes out the parallelism by recognizing the ἀπλὴν ἐποτοῦα as a distinct species of epic. The difficulty here is like that in τοσαῦνα γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλέχθη in 18, 1455 b 32 (where see note); we have to admit that Aristotle has been carried away for the moment by his desire to find coincidences and correspondences.

δει ἐξειν, 'must necessarily have', 'in the nature of things has', or 'involves'. ἐξειν stands in a certain antithesis to κέχρηται in 12 (comp. 6, 1450 a 13); epic poetry has in it these various possibilities; and they are all to be seen in actual use in Homer.

ἀπλὴν, scil. δει εἰναι. δει is easily supplied from what precedes, just as it is in 15, 1454 b 13 (where ποεῖν = δει ποιεῖν), and in Rhet. 3, 14, 1414 b 26 (where ἐκδουναι = δει ἐκδουναι: comp. Bon. Ind. 146 a 50). The ellipse of εἰναι may perhaps seem more difficult to explain; it is, however, occasionally found in Aristotle not only after δει (comp. 25, 1460 b 34, and Bon. Ind. 239 a 16), but also in other constructions, as Vahlen shows in his note on this passage. A very strong instance of the omission of εἰναι is that in Eth. N. 7. 14, 1153 b 2 ἥ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλώκες κακόν, ἥ δὲ τῷ τῷ ἐμποδιστικῷ [scil. εἰναι].

καὶ τὰ μέρη κτὲ. This has been assumed from the first (see 5, 1449 b 16), and needs no demonstration. Aristotle, however, avails himself of the opportunity to add that a good epic, just as much as a tragedy, requires not only a story but also a powerful story, one with elements of surprise and suffering in it; and that the language and thought in it also demand the same care as in Tragedy. After this, reverting to the four μέρη indicated in b 10, he reminds us that they are all to be found in perfection in Homer (ὁς ἀπασιν Ὀμήρος κέχρηται, b 12): (1) as regards the μῦθος, the Iliad is a story of suffering (παθητικῶν), and the Odyssey a story of surprises (πεπλεκμενῶν); (2) as regards the element of ᾨδος, the Odyssey is full of character (ἦθικῆ); while as regards (3) the λέξις and (4) the διάνοια, Homer's two poems confessedly surpass everything of the kind in these matters.

καὶ γὰρ περιπτειὼν δει καὶ ἀναγγείλισεν, as is the case with the complex tragedy (comp. 10, 1452 a 16; 13, 1452 b 31).

ἐτί τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἐξειν καλῶς. Aristotle adds as an afterthought (ἐτί) that a good epic requires not only an effective story, but also effective language. In the speeches in an epic the
same rhetorical art is wanted as in a play (τὰς διανοιάς ἐχεῖν καλῶς); and the diction, both in the speeches and elsewhere (comp. 24, 1460 b 3), demands the same care and elaboration (τὴν λέειν ἐχεῖν καλῶς). It may perhaps be thought that Aristotle was logically bound to recognize the element of ἕθος also, so as to remind us in some way or other of the rules laid down in chap. 15 as equally applicable to the ἔθη in a good epic. To supply the supposed omission Bursian wished to restore in the text ἔτι (τὰ ἔθη καὶ) τὰς διανοιάς καὶ τὴν λέειν ἐχεῖν καλῶς. The difficulty arises from a misconception of the clause beginning καὶ γὰρ περιπετείων δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνώρισεων καὶ παθημάτων, which is taken as a proof of the existence of the four μέρη in an epic—a point which hardly needed demonstration (see 5, 1449 b 16). The real purpose of the clause is to make us see the possibility of a πεπλεγμένη and a παθητικὴ ἐποποιία, as assumed in b 9. A similar explanation of the ἕθικα ἐποποιία is not equally necessary (see on 18, 1455 b 34); and if it were, it would require a fuller statement than is supplied by Bursian's insertion.

pró̂tos καὶ ἱκανῶς. For the combination of adj. and adv. comp. 24, 1460 a 9 ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλγακις.—Eth. N. 8. 1, 1155 a 8 μάλιστα καὶ ἐπανευσώτατα.—Hippocrates I p. 557 K. ὀλγακίς καὶ ἁσθενεά.—Isocrates 36 ν ἐκόντας καὶ προβῆμως.

καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐκάτερον: a reminiscence perhaps of Plato Hipp. min. 363 B ἐκάτερον γὰρ τῶν ποιημάτων τὸ μὲν εἰς Ὁδυσσέα ἐφὶ πεπλεγμένα τὸ δ’ εἰς Ἀχιλλέα. It will be observed that Aristotle does not find every perfection in one poem; in his view the Iliad is παθητικῶν, without being πεπλεγμένων or especially ἕθικων, and the Odyssey πεπλεγμένων and ἕθικων, without being especially παθητικῶν. καὶ γὰρ καὶ = etenim et'.

ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διδοῦ. Ἀγνοσcitur Telemachus ab Nestore, a Menelao, ab Helena. Agnoscitur Ulysses a Cyclope, a Phaeacibus, ab Euryclea, a subulcis, a Telemacho, a procis, a Penelope, denique a patre' (Hermann).

ἥθικη: a characteristic noted by Longinus 9. 15 as showing the Odyssey to have been the work of Homer’s later years: προσατεομέσθω τα κατὰ τὴν Ὅδυσσειαν, ὅπως ἃ σοι γνώριμον ὡς ἀπακρφ τοῦ πάθους ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις συγχαρθὺς καὶ ποιητάς εἰς ἕθος ἐκλίνεσθαι. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ποι ἐν τῷ περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ὅδυσσεος ἠθικῶς αὐτῷ βιολογούμενα οἰκίαν, οἰκεὶ κοιμοῦσα τῷ ἔστιν ἠθικολογούμενην. For the change of gender (παθητικῶν ... ἕθικῆ) comp. Eth. N. 4. 3, 1121 b 13 ἃ δ' ἀνελεύθερα ἀνώτατος τ' ἔστιν ... καὶ συμφνέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
πρὸς γὰρ τούτοις κτέ. Aristotle now passes on from the con-
struction (comp. b I 4 συνέστηκεν) to the literary execution of the
two Homeric poems. We should expect here καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κτέ,
to correspond with the preceding καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων κτέ. The
clause is apparently a reason for something which, though unsaid,
was present in Aristotle’s mind—something like καὶ ἄλλα ἔχει ἀγαθά.
Another instance of the same type is in 24, I 460 b 4 (comp. Bon.
Ind. I 46 b 15, and Waitz, Org. 2 p. 470).

λέξει. The graphic vigour of Homer’s metaphors, for instance,
is recognized in Rhet, 3. II, I 41 I b 31.

καὶ διανοία refers more especially to the rhetorical skill in the
speeches in Homer. Cicero says of him that he is ornatus in
dicendo ac plane orator (Brutus 40); Quintilian also (10. 46)
eulogizes his mastery over all the arts of rhetoric.

πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν: the subject is not ‘Homer’ (as is generally
assumed) but ‘these two poems’, understood from τῶν ποιημάτων
ἐκάτερον in b I 4. There is no need, therefore, to restore πάντας
(from sundry apographs), or to take πάντα as practically equivalent
to πάντας.

διαφέρει: comp, 5, I 449 b II.

συστάσεως, scil. τῶν πραγμάτων.

ὁ εἰρημένος, in 7, I 45 I a 3. The epic story must be εἰσύνοπτος
(comp. 23, I 459 a 33), and not of a length which would make it
impossible for the mind to take it in in its entirety; it must be
a whole but not too long a whole. This condition, Aristotle adds,
will be fulfilled (ἐπὶ δ’ ἀν τοῦτο), if one’s epic is of about the length
of a trilogy, and thus considerably shorter than the Iliad
and Odyssey. Here again he shows himself mindful of the practical
purpose of his treatise; he evidently thinks that an epic on the
old Homeric scale of length would prove too great a strain on
the memory and attention of the literary public of his own time.
Apollonius Rhodius may have been mindful of Aristotle’s view
when he limited his Argonautica to four Books.

ἐπὶ δ’ ἀν τοῦτο: Top. 8. 1, I 56 a 9 ἐπὶ δ’ ἀν τοῦτο, ἐ τις μὴ μόνον
τὸς ἀναγκαίας [scil. προστάσεις] ἄλλα καὶ τῶν πρὸς ταῖτις χρησίμων
τυπὸ συλλογιζομεν (comp. also An. post. I 3, 97 b 33; Rhet. 3. 8,
I 408 b 31).

πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλήθος πραγματικών κτέ. ‘Res ipsa unius poetae
tragoedias una trilogia comprehensas intelligi postulat. Hae
crpretation quum mensurum aptam comparationem continet,
tum alia etiam ratione ad epicae poeseos naturam accommodata
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1459\ b 21 est. Eo facilius enim tres unius poetae tragocidae coniungi potuerunt, quod his trilogiis saepe perpetuitas quaedam argumenti continebatur, cuius illustre exemplum in superstitus fabulis habemus Aeschyli Oresteam, e deperditis novimus Philocis Pandionidem... et Aeschyli Lycurgiam' (Hermann). On this subject see Haigh, Attic Theatre\ a p. 13.

b 25 τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς κτὲ. An indirect recognition of the Unity of Place as a fact in normal Greek Tragedy. Only one part of the story, that immediately connected with one single place (represented by the stage) and one set of persons (represented by the actors), can be told in a play; whereas an epic may include incidents occurring at one and the same time in other places and in connexion with other personages.

b 27 ἐστὶν πολλὰ μέρη ἀμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα corresponds with διὰ τὸ...

b 28 ὅγκος = weight, as suggestive of dignity or importance (comp. on μέγεθος, 4, 1449\ a 19). A little further on (b 35) the adj. ὅγκωδος is applied to the hexameter, as a weighty or impressive metre. In Rhet. 3, 6, 1407\ b 26 Aristotle—without defining the term—has a discussion on 'weightiness' of style (ὁγκος τῆς λέξεως) and the kind of language which produces that effect.

ὡστε τούτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν κτὲ. The advantage its length gives the Epic over Tragedy is twofold, (1) greater grandeur of scale, and (2) greater variety of incident. If we bracket the article before it, ἀγαθὸν becomes a quasi-predicate, as in Rhet. 2, 20, 1394\ a 2 καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τούτῳ, ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ὄμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπῶν, λόγους δὲ ῥᾴδιον. ἀγαθὸν in the sense of 'an advantage' occurs in Rhet. 1, 2, 1356\ b 18 ἐκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ έἶδος τῆς ρητορικῆς. For the preposition comp. Plato Rep. 462\ a τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν... εἰς τόλμεος κατασκευή.— Xenophon Cyr. 2, 1, 27 ἀγαθὸν... εἰς τὸ μῆτα ταράττεσθαι.

b 29 τὸ μεταβάλλειν = εἰς τὸ μεταβάλλειν. μεταβάλλειν, being followed by ἐπιστοδοιν, is probably transitive, 'to produce a change of mind or mood' in the hearer, as it is for instance in Probl. 30, 1, 953\ a 39 ἵδοι δ' ἀν τις ὅτι παντοδαποῖς ἀπεργάζεται [scil. ὅ οἶνος], θεωρῶν ὃς μεταβάλλει τοῖς πίνοντας. The sense may be illustrated by the use of the verb in Pol. 8, 5, 1340\ a 22 (where it is intransitive), μεταβάλλομεν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροῳμένων τοιοῦτων [i.e. certain rhythms and airs]—which is explained by what follows (b 40), ἦ τῶν ἀρμονίων διάστρεκε φύσις ὡστε ἄκοιντας ἀλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν.
επεισοδίου, scil. τὴν πολύσων; comp. 23, I459 a 36, and note on I459 b 30

17, I455 b 1.

ἀνόμοιος ἐπεισίδιος. The episodes supply an element of variety breaking the monotony of the story. ἀνόμοιος means 'dissimilar', 'unlike one another', as in the formula πολλὰ καὶ ἄνομοι in II. A. 4. 1, 523 b 12 (comp. Plato Tim. 83 c), and in Phys. 3. 5, 205 a 19 εἰ δ' ἄνομον τὸ πᾶν, ἄνομοι καὶ οἱ τόποι.—Pol. 3. 4, 1277 a 5 εξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πόλις.

τὸ γὰρ ὄμοιον κτὲ. The necessity of change is explained in Rhet. i. ii, 1371 a 25: τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἤδυ' εἰς φόνις γὰρ γίνεται μεταβάλλειν τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ [= τὸ ὄμοιον] δει ἀπερβολὴν τοιεὶ τῆς καθεστώτης ἔξως. οὐδεν εἴρηται "μεταβολή πάντων γλυκί". Comp. also Cicero De Inv. i. 41 Variare autem orationem magno opere operetil; nam omnibus in rebus similitudo est satietatis mater.

ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἡμοκεν. The iambic is said to have become established in Tragedy in the same way (see 4, I449 a 24). Similarly in Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 37 experience is said to have led to the rejection of the flute as part of a liberal education: ὅστερον δ' ἀπεδοκιμάσθη [scil. ἡ αὐλής] διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον δυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν συντείνον.

διγγαμίκην. The editors prefer the reading of sundry apographs, διγγαμικήν, the form which appears in the context, b 36, and in 23, I459 a 17. There is no reason, however, why Aristotle should not say διγγαμτίκη μέμησις, as διγγαμτίκος is certainly a good Aristotelian word (v. Eth. N. 3. 13, 1117 b 34). He shows perhaps too little regard for uniformity in such matters. Thus we find him speaking in b 34 of the ἡμωκόν, and a few lines further on (I460 a 3) of the ἡμῶν μέτρον; and in the Rhetoric ἔνως and ἔνωκός are both used of language without perceptible difference of meaning (v. Bon. Ind. 493 a 45, b 24).

στασιμωτάτων: comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b 9 (quoted on I460 a 1), b 34 and 8. 7, 1342 b 13 περὶ δὲ τῆς δομιστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης σύνης.

γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα: comp. 22, I459 a 9. b 35

περίττη γὰρ καὶ ** ἡ διγγαματίκη μέμησις τῶν ἄλλων. Before b 36

ἡ διγγαματίκη some such word as ταύτη or ταύτας seems to have dropped out; the point apparently is this, that epic goes beyond all other kinds of poetry (περίττη τῶν ἄλλων) not only, as has been already shown, in the matter of length, but also in the admission of γλώτταi and μεταφοραί; the clause, therefore, as emended, comes in naturally enough to confirm the preceding statement, γλώτταs
1459 b 36 καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα. Vahlen acquiesces in the traditional text, and explains it thus: 'non recipit δινηγματικὴ μίμησις aliiud metrum quam heroicum: nam heroicum est metrum gravissimum ac ponderosum maxime, eximia autem etiam narrativa imitatio prae ceteris'. It seems to me that this explanation, besides assuming περιττή γὰρ to stand for περιττῇ δὲ, hardly does justice to the καὶ before ἡ δινηγματικὴ. For the gen. τῶν ἄλλων, due to the comparative sense of περιττῇ (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr. a 2. 1, p. 391), comp. Xenophon Cyr. 8. 2. 21 τῶν ἀρκούστων περιττᾶ.—Hieroi 1. 19 περιττὰ τῶν ικανῶν.—Antiphon Tetral 2. 4. 6 περισσὸν τούτων.

1460 a 1 κυνηγικά, as opposed to the hexameter, which has just been said to be στασιμῶστατον. The antithesis is like that in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b 9 οἱ μὲν γὰρ [scil. τῶν ὑθμῶν] ἕθος ἔχουσι στασιμότερον οἱ δὲ κυνηγικῶν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικοτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κυνηγεῖς οἱ δὲ ἐλενθερωτέρας.

οὐχησικῶν: see on 4, 1449 a 23.

πρακτικῶν. This is what Horace meant when speaking of the iambic as natum rebus agendis (A. P. 82). The word has the same sense in the classification of tunes in Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32: τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδημόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσι τινὲς τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἡθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέεται. For the meaning of πρακτικῶς in this connexion see on 4, 1449 a 23.

ἐτὶ δὲ ἀτοπώτερον carries on the idea of ἀπρεπές ἀν φαῦνοτο in 1459 b 34.

a 2 Χαἰρήμων: see on 1, 1447 b 21.

a 3 ὠποπερ εἰπόμεν: in 4, 1449 a 24.

a 4 σωτῆ = μακρὰ συντάσσει.

a 5 Ὄμηρος. In 5, 1449 b 11 and 6, 1449 b 26 the narrative form (ἀπαγγελία) was noted as one of differences between the Epic and Tragedy; and it has been also assumed in this discussion on the Epic, in 23, 1459 a 17. Aristotle now passes on to this, but without any formal introduction or hint as to the connexion in his statement. His aim apparently is to show that, although narrative is an element in every epic, it is reduced to a minimum in the best Epic, that of Homer; so that this point of difference is not so serious as might be supposed. The semi-dramatic character of Homer’s mode of statement is directly or indirectly recognized in 3, 1448 a 21, and in 4, 1448 b 37 (see note on the passage). In his reference to the practice of the ‘other poets’ (οἱ μὲν οὖν
24. 1459 b 36—1460 a 13

ἀλλ' a 8) Aristotle must be supposed to mean 'not only the more 1460 a 5 recent epic writers, like Antimachus and Choerilus, but also the immediate continuators of Homer, the Cyclic poets' (Bergk, Gr. Litt. i p. 830).

§ 8. δει τοιεῖν αὐτόν. αὐτόν is emphatic, as in Top. 8. 2, 157 a 29 a 6 περιστάτων ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων όνοματοποιεῶν αὐτόν.—Pol. 8. 5, 1339 a 42 ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοῖς:

ἀγωνίζονται: see on 6, 1450 b 18.

μιμοῦνται: see on 1, 1447 a 16.

δλίγα καὶ δλιγάκις: De gen. an. i. 19, 727 b 28 δλίγας καὶ δλιγάκις συμβαίνει.—3. 5, 756 a 17 δλίγα δὲ καὶ δλιγάκις.—Eth. N. 7. 11, 1151 b 30 εν δλίγοις καὶ δλιγάκις (v. Bon. Ind. 503 a 37).—Plato Rep. 491 b δλιγάκις εν ἀνθρώποις φύεςθαι καὶ δλίγας. For instances of other combinations of the same kind see on 24, 1459 b 13.

eἰσάγει: a metaphor from the stage, as may be seen from the a 10 Platonic use of the word (v. Ast. Lex. s.v.). In Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 b 7 and 3. 17, 1418 a 32 it denotes the introduction of a person into a speech.

ηδος: see on 15, 1454 a 23.

οὐδὲν' ἄθην ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἰδη: an instance of parallelismus antitheticus not unlike that in Plato Phaedr. 277 a καὶ οὐχὶ ἀκαρποὶ ἀλλ' ἔχοντες σπέρμα. With ἔχοντα the affirmative ἐκαστων has to be supplied (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. a 2. 2 p. 567). ἰδή, as used here in the plural of an individual, means 'points' or 'traits of character', as we say, 'characteristics'. It has the same sense in Plato Rep. 402 δ ὅτου ἄν ἐν μαρτύρη ἐν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἰδη ἐνότα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδε ὁμολογοῦστα ἔκεινοι ... τοῦτ' ἄν εἴη κάλλωστον σέαμα.

δεί μὲν οὐν. μὲν οὖν marks a transition to a new point (Bon. Ind. 540 b 58). A fourth difference in epic poetry as compared with Tragedy is its great tolerance of ἄλογα; it can admit improbabilities which on the stage, where everything is actually seen, would ruin the success of a tragedy. This gives it a distinct advantage over Tragedy, as the 'improbable' is an element in the 'marvellous' (τὸ θαυμαστῶν), and the marvellous is a cause of pleasure to us (ἡδη). It will be observed that pleasure is once more posited as the immediate end of poetry.

ἐν τοῖς τραγῳδίαις: as has been assumed in 9, 1452 a 4 and 14, 1454 a 4.

τὸ θαυμαστῶν: see on 9, 1452 a 4.

τὸ ἄλογον: see on 15, 1454 b 6.

a 9

a 10

a 11

a 12

a 13
COMMENTARY

1460 a 14 διά το μή δραν: comp. 17, 1455 a 27.
τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκτορος διώξειν is explained by the participial clause in apposition (comp. Bernhardy, Syntax p. 472); the reference is to the statement in II. 22, 205 λαύσαν δ' ἀνένεε καρίατι δώς Ἀχιλλέως, οὗ ἐα ἑρέφαν ἐπὶ ἔκτορι πικρὰ βέλεμα. Aristotle reverts to this incident in 25, 1460 b 26, where he suggests an explanation to save the credit of Homer. An echo of the criticism in the text survives in Schol. Ven. B on II. 22, 205, Μεγαλείδης [v. Schrader, Porphyry. Q. H. in II. p. 414] πλάσμα εἶναι φήσει τούτῳ τὸ μονομάχιον πῶς γὰρ τοσαίτως μυράδας νείματι Ἀχιλλέως ἀπέστρεφεν;

a 17 τὸ δὲ θαναμαστὸν ἡδύ: Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 10 διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον θαναμασταί γὰρ [scil. οἱ ἄνθρωποι] τῶν ἀποίκων εἰς τόδ', ἡδύ δὲ τὸ θαναμαστὸν. Α reason is given in Rhet. 1. 11, 1371 a 31: καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαναμαξεῖν ἡδύ όσ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαναμαξεῖν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖ μαθῶν ἔστων, όστε τὸ θαναμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μαθάνειν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθιστασθαι.

a 18 προσποθήνει, 'with additions'; the same absolute use of the word is found in 26, 1461 b 30 (προσθή).

δεδιδαχεῖν κτέ. Another of Homer's merits is said to be his mastery of the artistic lie—one that has something true super-added to make it seem credible. In illustration of this Aristotle points to the story in Od. 19. 164–248; where Ulysses astutely adds certain particulars (203–248), which Penelope knows to be true, and which beguile her into accepting the first part of his story as true. The connexion between this and the preceding section (a 11–18) is left unexplained, and it is certainly far from being obvious. If one may imagine the association of ideas in Aristotle's mind, it may perhaps have been something like this, that τὸ θαναμαστὸν is a truth with a πρώθεσις of falsehood, and the lie artistic (ψευδὴ λέγειν όσ δεῖ) a falsehood with a πρώθεσις of truth; so that the one is as it were the converse of the other.

a 20 ἔστι δὲ τούτῳ παραλογισµός, 'i.e. the use of paralogism.' παραλογισµός is like παραλογίζεσθαι (v. infra on a 25) an ambiguous term; it may mean either a fallacious argument (ψευδής συλλογισµός) or a deception caused by such an argument (ἀπάτη διὰ ψεύδους συλλογισµοῦ)—this latter being apparently its sense in the present passage, where it comes in to explain ψευδὴ λέγειν όσ δεῖ. The distinction, however, is probably clearer to us than it was to Aristotle himself. The general assumption in his logical writings is that an argument is addressed to some one—to a hearer who
has to be convinced or refuted; a fallacious argument is not only logically incorrect but also calculated to mislead the hearer who fails to see the fallacy in it.

οἶνονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι. The artifice depends for its success on a natural weakness of the human intellect, our readiness to infer the presence of the thing from the presence of a 'sign' of it, or the truth of the antecedent from the truth of the consequent. The 'fallacia consequentis' is considered at length in Soph. el. 5, 167 b 1: οὐ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἰεσθαί ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολούθησιν. ὅταν γὰρ τοίδε ὄντος εἰς ἀνάγκης τοῦ ἑ, καὶ τούτε ὄντος οἶνονται καὶ θάτερον εἶναι εἰς ἀνάγκης ὑδὲν καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπάται γίνονται. πολλάκις γὰρ τὴν χολὴν μέλι ὑπέλαβον διὰ τὸ ἐπεσθαί τὸ ἐκαθὼν χρόνα τῷ μέλιτι καὶ ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει τὴν γῆν ὑσαντος γίνεσθαι διάβροχος, κἂν ἦ διάβροχος, ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅσα τὸ δ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον. ἐν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σχεδίου ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων εἰσίν. βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχίας, τὸ ἐπόμενον ἐλαβον ὅτι καλλωπιστής ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὄραται πλανώμενος. πολλοὶ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ καταγγείρου- μενον οὖν ὑπάρχει. It is recognized as one of the arts of rhetoric in Rhet. 2. 19, 1392 b 16, and more fully in 2. 24, 1401 b 9, 20.

ἄνθρωποι or ὅιοι ἄνθρωποι seems to be required here; comp. the parallels in 1, 1447 b 13; Phys. 4. 6, 213 a 23, 27; Metaph. A 2, 982 b 12; Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 15, and 3. 2, 1404 b 9.

τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. τοῦτο has been taken to refer to τὸ πρότερον, the antecedent, which, though not true, we imagine to be true. But it probably refers rather to the mode of argument, which is 'false', i.e. logically incorrect; comp. An. pr. 1. 17, 37 a 2; 1. 46, 52 b 28; Rhet. 2. 23, 1400 b 2.

πρῶτον = πρότερον. Vahlen illustrates this from Top. 3. 5, 119 a 22. For instances in other writers see Sauppe's Lexil. Xenophon. p. 112 and HSt. s. v.

προσθείναι, scil. τοῦτο τῷ ψεύδει, i.e. to provide the lie with a πρόσθεσις of truth, in order to beguile the hearer into accepting it as true.

παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψευδή: i.e. we on our side are quite ready to draw the false inference, which a lie of this kind is calculated to suggest. παραλογίζεται has a noteworthy diversity of senses in Aristotle, sometimes meaning to draw a false inference, sometimes (with an acc. pers.) to deceive or beguile by a fallacy, and sometimes (as a passive) to be so deceived or beguiled (comp. Bon. Ind. 565 a 11); and it is not always easy to see the sense intended. In
1460 a 25 the present passage the word must have the first of these three senses, as the emphasis on the pronoun in ἣμων ἡ ψυχὴ points to something that we ourselves are supposed to do: we on our side, knowing the truth of the consequent (διὰ τὸ τούτο εἰδέναι ἄληθῆς ὄν), are ready enough, owing to a natural infirmity of the human mind, to infer the truth of the antecedent; which is what the skilful deceiver wants us to do.

a 26 παράδειγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων is a note more fitted for the rough draft of a lecture than for a book (see on 15, 1454 b 14 and 22, 1458 a 30). The quotation or explanation is left to be supplied afterwards. How it might have come in may be seen from the parallels in Rhet. 2. 23, 1399 a 7 παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Ἀκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου "εἰς τούς ἱερῶν ἱερέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν δὲν ἡ πάλις νομίζει;" and Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 29 παράδειγμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐκήδετο ἡ ἀνδρὸς ἡ τέκνων τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀν γενέσθαι ἀπολογέμενα, "μητρὸς δὲ ἐν "Ἀδοὺ καὶ πατρὸς βεβηκότων οὐκ ἦστ' ἀδελφὸς ὡστις ἄν βλάστοι ποτέ ".

ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων: Od. 19, 164—260 (see on 16, 1454 b 30). Penelope was the victim of a ‘fallacia consequentis’, as her only reason for accepting Ulysses’ statement in 164—200 as true was her recognition of the truth of that in 220—248.

προαιρείσθαι τε δὲ κτέ. Aristotle returns to τὸ ἀλογὸν (a 13—17) and its general inadmissibility in the Drama. The illustrations in a 30—32 show him to be now thinking only of Tragedy; the rule here laid down is a restatement of one already formulated for Tragedy (15, 1454 b 6); and the distinction between ἔξω τοῦ μεθυσμάτως and ἐν τῷ δράματι has no immediate relation to the technique of the Epic.

a 27 ἀδύνατα εἰκότα κτέ. According to 9, 1451 a 38 the subject of the poetic story should be something that is possible as being either probable or necessary, τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. In the present passage Aristotle considers two inferior kinds of subject, one that is εἰκός without being δυνατὸν (ἀδύνατα εἰκότα), and one that is δυνατὸν without being εἰκός (δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα). The former, he says, is poetically preferable to the latter; poetry demands not so much truth as a passable semblance of truth (comp. 25, 1461 b 11).

λόγους: i. e. the μῦθοι or stories embodied in the play or poem (see on 4, 1449 a 17). τοὺς λόγους, which is the subject of ἔξω in a 29, is apparently the subject of συνιστασθαί also. συνιστασθαί, though a middle in a 34 (comp. 6, 1450 a 37), must be a passive
here, as it certainly is in 26, 1462 a 16 (see on 1, 1447 a 9). The 1460 a 27
same rule has already appeared in a slightly different form in
15, 1454 b 6.
ξεω τοῦ μυθεύματος: see on 14, 1453 b 32.
Οἰδίπους. The article seems to have dropped out before the a 30
name (see on 4, 1448 b 38). ξειλ has to be supplied from the ξειν
in the preceding line.
τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, scil. τὸν Οἰδίπον, just as in 16, 1455 a 19 βούλεσθαι
means βούλεσθαι τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν, the names being understood from
the titles of the plays. In some instances, however (16, 1455 a 1, a 3, a 10), the personages referred to are not indicated even in this
indirect way. The fact of Oedipus remaining for years in ignorance
of the circumstances of the death of Laius is an improbability
in the O. T.; but in Aristotle’s view it is not so serious a fault as it
might seem, since it is all anterior to the action, and outside the
play itself.
ἐν Ἡλέκτρᾳ: Sophocles El. 660 sqq. The precise fault Aris-
totle saw in the story is not quite clear; as the stress, however,
seems to be on τὰ Πῦθωα, the probability is that it was the
anachronism in the reference to the Pythian games; the fault
is noted by the Scholiast on El. 682 (οὐπω ἧν ἐπὶ Ὅροστον ὁ
Πυθόως ἄγων: comp. Schol. on El. 47, 49), who may be assumed to
be reproducing a traditional criticism. The alternative is to
suppose the absurdity to consist in Clytaemnestra having to learn
the news for the first time from the παιδαγωγοῦς: ‘an credibile est
nullum Argivum hominem ludis interfuisse, qui spectare Orestae
exitium posset; cum ex universa Græcia eo fieret concursus?’
(Robortello).
ἐν Μυσοίς: probably in the Μυσοῖ of Aeschylus (Nauck, TGF. a 32
p. 47). The personage described as ἄψων ἐκ Τεγέας εἰς τὴν
Μυσίαν ἦκων was no doubt Telephus, a favourite subject for
Tragedy (comp. 13, 1453 a 21). His long-maintained silence, which
was an element of improbability in the play, passed into a proverb
in the later Comedy; Amphis fr. 30, 6 Kock ἐκνύψεν ὥσπερ Τύλεφο
πρῶτον σωπτῷ—καὶ δικαίως τοῦτο γε: ἀπαντες ἄνδροφόνοι γάρ ἐλιν
ἐνι λόγῳ.—Alexis fr. 178 K. δειπνεῖ δ’ ἄψων Τύλεφος, νεών
μόνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐπερωτῶντάς τι.
συνίστασαι, which seems to have the same subject as θῆ in ἀν δὲ a 34
θῆ, must be a middle here (see on a 27).
ἀν δὲ θῆ, scil. τουτῶν μῦθον ὁ ποιητῆς, or perhaps (as Bon. Ind.
754 a 25 suggests) τὸ ἄλογον ἐν τῇ συντάσει τὸν μῦθον. The usual
punctuation of this passage is ἰν ὥ δὲ θη, καὶ φαίνει ταῖς εἰλογοτέρως, εἰνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἀτοπον, which Tyrwhitt, with the old reading εἰλογώ-
τερον before him, supposes to mean 'sin constitut quis et rationi
consentaneum magis videatur, admittere etiam aliquid absurdi'
[scil. oportet]. Vahlen, who takes the same view, thinks that
εἰλογοτέρως may stand for εἰλογοτέρως ἔχειν (comp. Bon. Ind.
306 a 16), that δεὶ may be supplied with εἰνδέχεσθαι from the
context (a 34), and also that εἰνδέχεσθαι may mean 'admittere',
like δέχεσθαι or ἀποδέχεσθαι. With the amended punctuation the
following will be the general drift of the passage: having just
decided a certain procedure to be wrong (ἐξ ἄρχης ὥ δεὶ συνιστα-
σθαι τω ὁτους), Aristotle adds that in a certain case—ἀν δὲ θῆ καὶ
φαίνει ταῖς εἰλογοτέρως εἰνδέχεσθαι—it is not only wrong but also
absurd (καὶ ἀτοπον). With εἰνδέχεσθαι we may supply θεία, from
ἀν δὲ θῆ; comp. 25, 1461 a 34 τοσιχῶς εἰνδέχεσθαι (where σημαίνει
is understood from the preceding τοσιχῶς ἄν σημαίνοι), and An.
pr. 1. 15, 34 a 34 ὑπαρχεῖ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Π
εἰνδέχεσθαι (where εἰνδέχεσθω = εἰνδεχεσθω ὑπάρχειν). For the use
of ἀτοπον comp. De div. per somm. 1, 462 b 20 τὸ τῇ γαρ θεόν εἶναι
tὸν περμποντα [scil. τὰ ἐνύπνια], πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀλλογι, καὶ τὸ μὴ τοῖς
βελτίστοις καὶ φρονομονάτοις ἀλλὰ τοὺς τυχόντι περιπεν ἀτοπον.

35 ἐν Ὄδυσσεία. In Od. 13, 116 sqq. Ulysses is said to have slept
on even when the Phaeacians were setting him ashore. Porphyry
ad loc. (p. 115 Schrader) recognizes the difficulty in the story, and
quotes the explanation of Heraclides Ponticus: τὴν τῶν Φαιάκων
ἀτοπίαν, καθ' ἐν τῶν Ὅδυσσεία καθευδοντα μὴ διπνεύοντες εἰς τὴν γῆν
κατέθεντο, τοῦ τε Ὅδυσσείως τῶν ἄκαρον ὑπὸν διαλεύχει περὶμοιος
ὁ Ποιητικὸς Ἡρακλείδης φησίν ἀτόποι εἶναι τοὺς ἐξ ὥν εἰρήκεν ὁ ποιητής
μὴ στοχαζόμενος περὶ τοῦ παντὸς τρόπον τῶν Φαιάκων κτὲ.

2 ἀφανιζέ: see Bon. Ind. 127 a 1. The sense is that the attractiveness
of the accessories (ἡδύνων; see on 6, 1449 b 25) disguises the
inherent absurdity of the situation.

3 ἐν τοῖς ἄργοις μέρεσι. The meaning of these words has been
supposed to be explained by what follows, καὶ μήτε ἡθικῶς μήτε
dιανοητικώς; comp. Goulston's version of the clause, 'in partibus
fabulacae ignavis, iis scilicet quae neque moratae sunt neque senten-
tiis munitae'. The sense, however, may very well be, 'in the parts
in which there is no movement, and no ethical or rhetorical
interest,' i.e. in the purely descriptive parts. For the form of the
statement comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 2 σαφῆ ... καὶ μήτε ταπεινῆν μήτε
ὑπὲρ τὸ δέιομα.
Περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων κτῆ. On the matter in this chapter see 1460 b 6
M. Carrol, 'Aristotle's Poetics c. xxv. in the light of the Homeric Scholia' (Baltimore 1895). It is added as a sort of Appendix, in recognition of the fact that a poem, when once before the world, may be exposed to criticism. A 'Problem' was originally a question propounded for discussion, whether in schools or in social gatherings such as Plato supposes in his dialogues. The general logic of such discussions is examined and reduced to formula in the Topics; but Aristotle takes no account in the Topics of the particular kind of Problem with which he is now dealing, the literary or critical Problem. This kind of question turns on some difficulty in a poem, which an adverse critic will censure as a mistake. By an analysis of the postulates and conditions of poetry Aristotle is able to determine and classify not only the various possible grounds of censure (ἐπιτίμησις), but also the various possible lines of defence, by indicating the solution (λύσις) or solutions applicable to each kind of objection. In illustrating the methods of defence he takes his instances mainly from the Homeric poems. Homer had long been a mark for criticism. Every kind of defect had been discovered in his two poems, offences against morality, absurdities, contradictions and other faults of construction, and even errors of language; the result being that Aristotle's contemporary Zoilus, the 'Homeromastix', was able to write a regular treatise (of considerable magnitude, it would seem) κατὰ τῆς τοῦ 'Ομήρου ποιήσεως, on the manifold faults in Homer. The position of Aristotle himself in this controversy is clear: he is on the side of the apologists, and an opponent of the kind of criticism represented by Zoilus. He is ready to meet the critics on their own ground with an answer of some sort or description for almost every difficulty they can start. The fragments of his ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά, a systematic work on this subject (fr. 142–178 Teubn.), exhibit the same tendency, and reveal him as a master of all the arts of critical casuistry.

"ὅδε ἄν θεωροῦσι γένοιτ' ἄν φανερόν. For other Aristotelian in- b 7 stances of this repetition of ἄν see Bon. Ind. 41 a 60.

ἐπεί γάρ ἐστι κτῆ. Aristotle prepares us for the various kinds of b 8 λύσεως by laying down a series of postulates, which may supply the defence with arguments to meet the attacks of the critics. In the first place, he tells us, as the poet is an imitator in much the same way as a painter is that, one must remember that his imitation or picture of things may be either of things as they are (or were), or
of things as they should be, or of things as they are said or supposed to be. Secondly, as an imitator in language, the poet has by custom more liberty in the use of words than is allowed to a prose writer. Thirdly, if the technical correctness of his description of a thing is questioned, it is to be remembered that poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, and that the right in poetry is not the same thing as the right in other arts or sciences, in politics for instance. At the same time, as the matter of poetry brings it into relation with other arts and sciences, their standard of correctness cannot be ignored in poetry. An offence, however, against their rule of correctness may often be condoned; and in certain cases it even admits of justification (b 24), if it is seen to conduce to the poetical effect.

The term ἐἰκονοποιός comprises the sculptor as well as the painter of portraits.

In chap. 2 Aristotle was speaking of persons only. In the present passage he uses the neuter in order to include the poetic descriptions of things and acts. The order of the words ἣν ἡ ἐστιν is intentional, stories of the past being regarded as the normal subjects of both epic poetry and Tragedy (see on 2, 1448 a 18). It may be observed that in 1461 a 2 Aristotle avails himself of the distinction implied in οἷα ἤν ἡ ἐστιν, and suggests that a certain incident, which had been criticized in Homer, may have been probable enough in Homeric times.

οἷα φασὶν καὶ δοκεῖ, scil. εἶναι (which covers the ground of both ἢν and ἐστιν). The difference between the two things (οἷα φασὶν, οἷα δοκεῖ), so far as there is one, is like that between τὰ λεγόμενα and τὰ δοκούντα—‘what people usually say’, and ‘what people usually think, or suppose’.

λέει ἡ καὶ γλώττας κτέ. λέεις is properly a generic term, including the metaphor, the strange word, etc. Here, however, Aristotle adds ἡ καὶ γλώττας κτέ, in order to remind us of the fact that these various unusual forms of expression are a recognized part of the poetic vocabulary. The practical effect of the addition is to modify the sense of λέεις, and make it stand for κυρίως λέεις, just as in 1, 1447 a 29 (v. ad loc.) the addition of ἡ τοῖς μέτροις has a reflex influence on the preceding word λόγοις, limiting it for the moment to the sense of ‘prose’. The generic word ἐνομα likewise is occasionally used in a context which gives it the more
specific sense of κύριον ὄνομα (see on 22, 1458 a 28). It is hardly necessary, therefore, to restore 〈κυρία〉 λέξει with Heinsius, or λέξει 〈ἡ κύρια〉 with Twining, or λέξει 〈ἡ κυρίως ὄνομας〉 with Vahlen.

πάθη τῆς λέξεως: i.e. the modifications seen in the ἐπεκτεταμένον. the ὑφορμήν, and the ἐξηλαγμένον ὄνομα (21, 1458 a 1), which, though substantially identical with the ordinary words (22, 1458 b 4), are distinguished from them through some deviation of form. The term πάθος is used in this same sense by Theophrastus in a fragment of his Περὶ λέξεως (Rabe, De Theophrasti libris περὶ λέξεως p. 6): τίς ἡ κυρία λέξεις, τίς ἡ μεταφορική; καὶ τίνα τὰ πάθη αὐτῆς, ὅσον τί ἀποκοπή, τί συγκοπή, τί ἀφαίρεσις;

διδόμεν γὰρ ταῦτα: a recognition of what were afterwards known as poetic licences. Aristotle has already shown their use and legitimacy in poetry (22, 1458 a 34).

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτέ. The kind of criticism Aristotle has in mind is one sufficiently familiar to us moderns; we know that a picture, for instance, is often censured for errors of anatomy, and a novel for errors of history or archaeology. In Aristotle's view technical accuracy in such points, though desirable (b 27), is neither the one thing nor the first thing needful in a poem. Poetry, as a distinct art, has an end, a procedure, and a correctness of its own; and it is thus quite possible for a description in a poem to be poetically right, even though it may be wrong in some technical detail.

τῆς πολιτικῆς. Πολιτικῆ, as the art which deals with human life and conduct, might easily seem to stand in a very intimate relation to poetry, which has to depict human life and conduct (comp. 6, 1450 a 16 μέρης πράξεως καὶ βιῶν); and as a matter of history the connexion between the two arts was posited in the common notion of the older poets being authorities on all questions of πολιτικῆ, and the great teachers of moral and political wisdom (comp. Plato Rep. 598 d, 606 e; also Dümmler, Kl. Schriften i p. 30). It is not without reason, therefore, that Aristotle takes πολιτικῆ as his instance here, and emphasizes the distinction between the 'political' and the 'poetical' standard of right.

It may perhaps be thought that in affirming this distinction Aristotle anticipates the idea of 'Art for Art', and regards poetry as raised above the limitations imposed on all ordinary human activities by social or moral law. Such a notion would ill accord with what we read elsewhere in the Poetics. In Aristotle's view
a deviation in poetry from the ethically right is, just like one from probability or truth, an exceptional procedure, and to be condoned only when it is seen to be necessary for the ultimate poetical effect. The tragic hero, if one is to feel pity for him in his misfortunes, should be a good man—either better than, or at least as good as, the average of mankind. The secondary personages too should be each good in their way, unless the plot happens to require a character of a lower type; in which case his baseness should be no more than is wanted for the evolution of the story. Even Comedy, as Aristotle conceives it, has its ethical limitations: the comic personage, though by hypothesis worse than the average man, is worse only up to a certain point; his faults of character or conduct being such as may be laughed at, i.e. they do not excite anger or abhorrence in the normally minded spectator in the theatre. The tacit assumption throughout the Poetics is that the theatrical public is on the whole normal in its moral instincts and sympathies, and that the poet should never lose sight of the fact. Readers of the Nicomachean Ethics will remember that in the Aristotelian hierarchy of arts all the other arts are regarded as subordinate to πολιτική, the supreme art, which deals with the whole social and moral order of the State, and that there is no hint of the so-called ‘aesthetic’ arts being outside its purview and control.

The argument may be thus restated: There is always a twofold possibility of error in the poet’s μισθος or description of things. (1) Starting with a correct idea of the object to be described, he may fail to express his own meaning; in which case his art as a poet (or μηριτής) is at fault, and his faulty description is a sign of artistic or literary incapacity. (2) On the other hand the error may be simply due to his starting with an erroneous idea of the object; in which case it arises not from lack of descriptive power on his part, but from insufficient knowledge of something outside poetry, and it is thus in the accidents rather than the essentials of the poetic art. Vahlen quotes Soph. el. 33, 182b 33 ἄπορα δ’ ἐστὶ διττῇ, ἥ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ... ἥ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωστικοῖς, to show that an article is not wanted before ἄμαρτία.

ἄδυναμίαν: comp. 16, 1454b 21 δ’ ἄποριν. δ’ ἄδυναμίαν is practically equivalent to δ’ ἀτέχνων, through lack of artistic power—art being with Aristotle a kind of δύναμις or power (v. Bon. Ind. 207b 6).
25. 1460 b 14-18

ei de to proeleschai kte. I have not been able to follow Vahlen 1460 b 18
in his general view of this passage, which in his edition reads thus:—

ei de to proeleschai μη όρθος αλλα τον ιππον (ἀμ') ἀμφω τα δεξια
προβεβληκότα ἢ το καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην ἀμάρτημα οἰον το κατ'
ιατρικήν ἢ αλλην τέχνην [ἡ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται] ὑποικον, οὐ καθ'
ἐκατ'.

This reading requires us to take μη όρθος as standing for μη όρθας ἐχειν, and αλλα τον ιππουν κτε. as a short way of saying αλλα
προελετο μμυθεσθαι οἰον τον ιππον κτε. It is, however, much
simpler to suppose that μη όρθος = μη όρθας μμυθεσθαι, and to
take αλλα τον ιππουν κτε. (scil. μμυθεσθαι) as a concrete instance of
the opposite of όρθος μμυθεσθαι. The insertion also of άμα
before ἀμφω τα δεξια προβεβληκότα is unnecessary; these words
(as the tense of the participle is enough to show) suggest a
picture; and the fault in the picture consists in the horse in
motion being depicted with both right legs thrown forward, instead
of only one of them. As regards the clause ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται,
which Vahlen (after Düntzer) excises as a dittography of the
ἀδύνατα πεποίηται in b 23, it seems to me that the words are
wanted for two reasons, (1) to enable us to supply πεποίηται after
to καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην ἀμάρτημα, and (2) to give the statement the
requisite breadth. The error in the poet’s picture or description
(comp. πεποίηται) may be in matters which come under the cogniz-
ance of some special art or science (το καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην ἀμάρ-
tημα), but it may also be in matters of a less distinctly technical
nature. Aristotle adds ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται ὅποι' ἄν οἶν in order to
include this latter kind of error. The instance of it in the
context (b 26) is the absurdity (comp. 24, 1460 a 15), or rather the
offence against common sense, in the Pursuit of Hector in the
Iliad. That given in b 31 of the other form of error is a mistake
in natural history, i.e. in a matter of technical knowledge.
The distinction, therefore, between the two kinds of error is a very
real one, at any rate in controversy (v. on 25, 1461 b 24).

τον ιππον ἀμφω τα δεξια προβεβληκότα, scil. μμυθεσθαι. In
Aristotle’s view this is a mistake in natural history, and inconsistent
with the general law of the diagonal movement of the legs of
quadrupeds walking as laid down in the De incessu an. 14, 7 12 a 24:
kυνεται δε τα ὀπτάοια προς τα ἐμπροσθεν κατα διαμετρον' μετα γιάρ το
dεξιον των ἐμπροσθεν τον ἀριστερων των ὄπισθεν κυνονιν, ειτα το
ἀριστερων των ἐμπροσθεν, μετα δε τουτο το δεξιων των ὄπισθεν . . . ei
dε των δεξιων ἀμφοτερους πρωτους [scil. ἐποιουντο την κίνησιν], ἔω
1460 b 18 ἂν ἐγάμνοντο τῶν ἑρευμάτων καὶ ἐπιπτον ἂν. He was apparently unaware of the fact that the legs of the horse are actually in the position assumed to be impossible in certain stages of the amble and the rack. A horse with legs in this position is to be seen in modern art in Meissonier's 'Cavaliers en marche' (Exposition Meissonier, No. 114—Paris 1893). Illustrations from the life will be found in E. Muybridge's 'Animal Locomotion'—Philadelphia 1872—93.

b 21 ὅποι ἂν οὐ, scil. ἢ or πεπωιημένα ἢ. For the omission of the verb comp. Soph. el. 17, 175 b 27 ὀποτέρφῃ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.—Eth. N. 3. 10. 1115 b 19 ὅς ἂν ὁ λόγος.—Pol. 6. 3, 1318 a 22 ὃ τι ἂν οί δόλγοι (also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 255). We should expect simply ὅπωιαοῦν, the formula ordinarily used by Aristotle in passages like the present.

οὐ καθ' ἐκατὴν (scil. ἢ ἀμαρτία τῆς ποιητικῆς) is the apodosis, and the opposite of that in the preceding clause (b 17), αὐτῆς ἢ ἀμαρτία. The general sense of the passage (with the reading τῶ προελέσθαι) is briefly this: If it was through a mistake in his original conception of the thing that either the technical error, or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be, have got into his description, the error in that case does not belong to the art of the poet per se, but only per accidens.

ὡστε δέι τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα κτέ. A Problem in Aristotle's sense of the term is only a kind of question (v. on b 6); but the mere fact of a question being raised in reference to the poet's work involves the possibility of an answer unfavourable to him, i.e. of an ἐπιτιμήμα, a censure or condemnation of what he has said. We have had ἐπιτιμήμα in this technical sense in 19, 1456 b 14, and the verb ἐπιτιμᾶν in 17, 1455 a 26, in 19, 1456 b 16, and in 22, 1458 b 6. The criticisms to which a poem is exposed Aristotle examines under the three heads indicated in the preceding statement (b 7—21), but in reverse order: (1) the strictures passed on the poet's descriptions of things (b 22—32); (2) those relating to the kind of subject he has chosen to depict (b 32—1461 a 9); and (3) the faults found in his language (1461 a 9—31). After that he shows in what way or ways each kind of criticism has to be answered.

b 23 τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην, scil. τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐπιτιμήματα, the censures relating to the artistic execution in his imitations.

<εἰ> ἄδυνατα πεποίηται. Ueberweg suggests that the traditional ἄδυνατα πεποίηται (without the insertion of εἰ) may be a rhetorical
way of putting the supposition, such as might be used in an actual debate or discussion. In the course of this chapter Aristotle more than once writes as if he were simply reporting a possible debate (v. on b 33 ἀλλ’ ἵσως δεῖ, and on 1461 a 1 ἀλλ’ οὖν φασὶ).

ἡμαρτήσαται is the natural opposite of the ὀρθὸς ἕξει in the next line; comp. Eth. E. 2. II, 1227 b 21 ἐστι δὲ τῶν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτήσατα, τά δὲ πρὸς ἓκεινον περαίοντα ὀρθὸς ἕξειν.—Eth. N. 8. 12, 1160 b 30 αὕτη μὲν οὖν [scil. ἡ ἀρχή] ὁρθή φαίνεται, ἡ Περικλῆς ὁ ἡμαρτημένη.—Eth. N. 6. 10, 1142 b 10 ἑπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὖκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄμαρτα.—2. 2, 1104 b 32 περὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικὸς ἔστιν δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικὸς.

τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἶρηται: a reason for the statement that follows b 24 (see on 21, 1457 b 34). For the use of εἴρηται (which has been very unadvisedly questioned and altered into ἴσταται, αἰρέται, ἀλληται, or τηρεῖται) see on II, 1452 b II.

εἰ οὖν ἕκπληκτικῶτερον κτέ. is appositional to εἰ τυχάνει τοῦ b 25 τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς. Vahlen compares Metaph. E 3, 1027 a 30 εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, εὖ ἀνάγκης πάντ’ ἔσται, εἰ τοῦ γιγνομένου καὶ φθειρομένου μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῶν τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι.—Plato Gorg. 522 C εἰ ἐκεῖνο γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὁ σὺ πολλάκις ὁμολόγησας, εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἰς αὐτῷ κτέ.; and Hyperides Euxen. 23, 24, Lysias 3. 38. The clause only gives an illustration, not a complete account of the end of poetry. That surprise is one of the legitimate effects of poetry was definitely said, though the point is nowhere demonstrated, in 24, 1460 a 11; it has been assumed also in 9, 1452 a 4, in 14, 1454 a 4, and in 16, 1455 a 17. For the meaning of ἑκπληκτικῶτερον see on 14, 1454 a 4.


ἡμαρτήσαται here seems to be a dittothgraphia of the ἡμαρτήσαται b 28 in the next line (J. of Phil. 14, p. 52).

δεῖ γὰρ κτέ.: comp. the parallel statement as to the avoidance of ἀλογα in 24, 1460 a 28. The general rule is that the descriptions in poetry should be in accordance with the technical standard of correctness; but at the same time there are cases in which some sacrifice of technical accuracy may be requisite to produce the poetic effect (b 24; comp. 1461 b 11 πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν), and in these the end justifies the means. This is the only direct answer to an objection of this kind. But if such an answer is not possible, it may perhaps be urged, in mitigation of censure at
any rate, that the technical error is in a minor matter (b 31), and as such, a venial fault in an imitative art.

έτι ποτέρων ἔστι τὸ ἀμάρτημα κτέ. is not a λύσις proper, but an attempt to minimize the offence. In a λύσις proper the point to which the opponent has taken exception is shown to have another aspect, and to be right (ὄρθως ἔχει b 24) when viewed in that other aspect.

tῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην: in matters belonging to his art, i.e. the art of poetry, as distinct from matters outside poetry, and only accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) connected with it. Vahlen draws attention to the change of construction, κατ᾽ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός instead of τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. For the appositional clause after ποτέρων comp. Eth. N. 9. 1, 1164 ι 22, and Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 b 15.

ἄλαφος θῆλεα κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει: Η. Α. 4. II, 538 b 18 κέρατα ἄλαφος θῆλεα οὐκ ἔχει.—De part. an. 3. 1, 662 a 1 τῶν ἄλαφων οἱ μὲν ἄρρενες ἔχουσι κέρατα, αἱ δὲ θῆλεαι οὐκ ἔχουσιν. The hind seems to have often been represented as having horns not only by poets (v. Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. fr. p. 61), but also by artists; comp. the Scholiast on Pindar Ol. 3, 52: ἐπιμελῶς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὴν θῆλειαν ἄλαφον κέρατα ἔχουσαν εἰσάγουσαν, καθὐπερ καὶ τὴν θηλάξουσαν τῶν Τῆλεφον γράφουσι καὶ πλάττουσιν.

ἄμμητως is the opposite of μμητικός. In Probl. 29. 10, 951 a 6 (the only Aristotelian passage in which it recurs) ἄμμητος is the opposite of μμητός; but it is not uncommon with negative words of this type to have two senses, an active as well as a passive; ἀναύσθητος, for instance, is the opposite not only of αὐσθητός but also of αὐσθητικός. The negative idea in this and similar privative terms must not be pressed too far (see on ἄθεσις 6, 1450 ι 25); ἄμμητος ἔχασεν only means that the picture did not adequately express the artist’s meaning, i.e. did not express it in a way to be understood by others. A failure of this kind, which arises δὲ ἄδυσμαν, through lack of artistic capacity (see above on b 17), is inexcusable in a μμητής, whose work must be intelligible, if it is to give us the pleasure of a μέμημα (v. 4, 1448 b 15).

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτέ. Aristotle passes on to the ἐπιτιμήματα which come under the first of the three heads in the survey in b 8 sqq. The objector is supposed to urge either that the poetic picture is not true to fact (comp. οἶα ἐν ἡ ἔστιν, b 10), or that it is not better than the reality (comp. οἶα εἶναι δέα, b II), or that it is not in harmony with tradition or opinion (comp. οἶα φασίν καὶ δοκεῖ b 10). The answers to these criticisms may take the follow-
ing forms:—(1) If not true to fact, the picture is perhaps better than the reality; (2) if neither true to fact nor better than the reality, it is perhaps in accordance with opinion; (3) if not in accordance with opinion, it is perhaps true to fact. There are thus three λύσεις for this class of ἐπιτιμήματα. Aristotle omits to mention a fourth λύσις, the plea of poetic necessity (πρὸς τὴν ποιήσιν, I 461 b 9), which is, wherever possible, a valid answer to almost any criticism.

ἀλλ' ἵσως δεὶ = ἀλλ' ἵσως δεὶ εἶναι, just as in the next line οἴον δεὶ = οἴον δεὶ εἶναι (comp. Bon. Ind. 239 a 16). The answer is vividly introduced by ἀλλά, the word the defender himself might use in an actual discussion.

οἶον καὶ Σωφροκῆς: see on 6, I 450 a 37. A similar remark is attributed to the poet Philoxenus, Φιλόξενος ὁ ποιητὴς εἰπόντος τινός, διατί Σωφροκῆς ἠρωτάτας παρασκάγει τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτὸς δὲ φαινάς, εἶπεν, "Οτι Σωφροκῆς μὲν οὐς δεὶ εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας λέγει, ἐγὼ δὲ οἶαί εἰσαι (S. Maximus Conf. 2 p. 632 Combef).

ταύτη λυτέον. Having introduced an illustration (the saying of Sophocles), Aristotle adds ταύτη λυτέον, repeating the sense of the words preceding the illustration. This is an instance of what Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 209, terms the Binary structure with comparisons, when 'the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it.' For other Aristotelian instances see Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze 1 p. 6, and my Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 27.

οτὶ οὕτω φασίν = λυτέον ὅτι οὕτω φασίν εἶναι. The construction λύειν ὅτι (‘10 refute by saying that’) is found in Soph. el. 24, 179 b 34 ἀμαρτάνοντι καὶ οἱ λύνοντες ὅτι ἀπας ἀριθμὸς ὀλίγοι.—Rhet. 2. 25, 1402 b 34 οὕκουν ἰκανὸν ἄν λύγη ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεὶ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκόν.—Fr. 166 (Teubn.) ἔστι δὲ λύειν . . . ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἤν.

τὰ περὶ θεῶν: i.e. the poetic statements about Gods, though neither true nor better than the truth, may perhaps be said to be sanctioned by opinion, and to be what people are in the habit of repeating of the Gods.

ὡσπέρ ξενοφάνει, scil. ἐστῷ, ‘as they are in the view of Xenophanes’ (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr. a 2. 1, p. 421). Other Aristotelian instances of this use of the dative are De caelo 3. 8, 307 a 16 Δημοκρῆτῳ δὲ καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα ὡς γωνία τις οὐσα τέμνει ὡς εὐκάνητον.—De gen. et corr. 1. 8, 325 b 15 Ἐμπεδοκλῆι τίνα τρόπον ἔσται γένεσις καὶ φθορᾶ καὶ ἀλλοιωσις, οὐ δῆλον. Xenophanes, we must remember,
1461a 1 was the first to lift up his voice against Homer and Hesiod, as the great exponents of a false and immoral conception of the Gods (see fr. 10–12 Diels).

άλλα οὖν ὑπεύθυνα τις ἀληθεία 'but at any rate' (Kühner, Gr. Gr.² 2. 2 p. 160; comp. Bon. Ind. 33b 33).

a 2 ἐγγείωσε δὲ σφιν κτῆσιν; II. 10. 152 ἐγγείωσε δὲ σφιν ὅρθος ἐπὶ σαυρωτήρος ἐλήλατο. The difficulty here is thus stated in a fragment of the Ἀπορρήματα Ὀμηρικά (fr. 160 Teubn. = Porphyry in II. 1. c. p. 145 Schrader), where the same solution is suggested: φαίνει δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν δοράτων ἐπὶ σαυρωτήρας στάσις: καὶ ἐὰν πανταχοῦ ὀρφιό αὐτὸν πεποίηκε νῦκτωρ ἐν μόνον πεσών. λύει δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγων ὃτι τοιαύτα δὲ ποιεῖ Ὀμηρος οὐδὲ ἡν τότε. ἢν δὲ τοιαύτα τά παλαιά σιδέρα καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάρους πολλοὶ δὲ σκότω χρώνται τῶν βαρβάρων. A similar justification of Homer, by reference to a primitive custom still surviving among barbarians, is found in fr. 166 (=Porphyry in II. 24. 15. p. 267 Schr.): διὰ τὸ ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς τῶν ἐκτόσιο έλκε περί τὸν τάφον τοῦ Πατρόκλου παρὰ τὰ νεομαμένα ποιῶν εἰς τὸν νεκρόν; . . . ἐστὶ δὲ λέειν, φησίν Ἀριστοτέλης, καὶ εἰς τὰς ὑπάρχουσαν ἀνάγοντα ἐθνώμα, ὃτι τοιαύτα ἡν, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐν Ἑλλαδίᾳ περιέλλοντο περί τοὺς τάφους.

a 3 σαυρωτήρος. If the term in the quotation in the Ἀπορρήματα Ὀμηρικά is to be trusted, Aristotle's text of Homer would seem to have had σαυρωτήρας, the reading of Aristophanes.

a 4 καλῶς ἡ μὴ καλῶς = πότερον καλῶς ἡ μὴ καλῶς (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr.³ 2. 2 p. 532). The objection Aristotle is now considering is the moral objection, the criticism that something said or done by a personage in a poem was not morally right (όνομ εἶναι δὲ 1460b 11). His point is that, before admitting the validity of such an objection, it is proper to take the circumstances of the word or deed into account, e.g. (1) the person to whom it was said or done, (2) the moment, (3) the instrument used, and (4) the motive in the mind of the speaker or agent. Eth. N. 3. 1, 1111a 4 contains a fuller statement of the circumstances that may lead us to modify the severity of our moral judgements (comp. fr. 174 Teubn.).

a 7 πρὸς ὑπεύθυνα τις: i.e. πρὸς ὑπεύθυνα τις ἑσύχως ἡ ἐλευθέρων ὃ πράττων ς ἐλέγων.

a 8 ὁτε. Plutarch (De aud. poet. 26 b) defends the four lines in II. 9. 458–61, which Aristarchus is said to have excised, as being πρὸς τὸν καίρον; comp. Porphyry in II. 9. 203, p. 135 Schr. oί μεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως λύονται . . . oί δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ καίροῦ, ὃτι νῦν.
μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ: An. pr. 2. 22, 68a 35 αἱρετωτέρον δὲ τὸ μείζον 1461a 8 ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἠλπιτον κακῶν ἢ τὸ ἠλπιτον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μείζον κακῶν (comp. Rhet. I. 10, 1369b 25).—Porphyri. in Od. 13. 119, p. 117 Schr. τολλακίς γὰρ τῶν ἐν μιᾷ πράξει καὶ δυσχερές ύπάρχει τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν αἱρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν φευκτον' διότερ ὅπκ ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὰς τουαίτας πράξεις.

tὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν κτῆ. Aristotle’s examples show that the a 9 difficulties coming under this head are of every possible kind; the one point they have in common is that they turn on language, and may be met by the discovery or adoption of another interpretation of the language in the incriminated statement.

διαλύειν is simply a synonym for λύειν (Bon. Ind. 184a 43; a 10 HSt. s. v.).

γλώττη: i.e. by taking some word in the passage as a γλώττα (see 21, 1457b 4). For the instrumental dative, of which there are so many other instances in the context, comp. Soph. el. 24, 179b 38 ἐνοὶ δὲ καὶ τῷ διττῷ λῶσιν τοὺς συλλογισμούς.

οὐρήσας μὲν πρῶτον: II. 1. 50 οὐρήσας μὲν πρῶτον ἐπ' χείτι καὶ κίνας ἀργούς. The difficulty the ancients found here was to understand why the mules were made to suffer first (v. Porphyry. ad loc. p. 4 Schrader). Aristotle’s interpretation of οὐρήσας, which survives in Hesychius (s. v. οὐρεῖς and οὐρήσας), is condemned in Schol.Ven. A on II. 1. c. (presumably from Aristonicus): ὅτι οὐκ ὄρθως τινες οὐρήσας τοὺς φίλακας ἀντιδιαστέλλει γὰρ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, and again on II. 10. 84: ἀδετείται, ὅτι οὐρήσας βούλεται λέγειν τῶν φιλάκων, καὶ οὐκ ἐκράτησεν τῶν σχήματος οὐρὴν γὰρ λέγει ὡς κοῦρον τῶν φιλάκα, οὐρεὶ δὲ τὸν ἠμάνω.

ὅς β’ ἤ τοι έδίδο: II. 10. 316 δς ὅς τοι έδίδο μὲν εἰρ κακῶς, ἄλλα a 12 ποδάκης. The question raised was apparently this: How could Dolon, if ill-shaped, have been swift of foot? The answer of Aristotle is that έδίδο κακῶς may have meant in Homer not ‘ill-shaped’, but simply ‘ugly’ or ‘ill-looking’; he suggests that έδίδο may have been used not in its normal sense of ‘shape’, but in a strange sense (as a γλώττα) corresponding to that of the derivative εὐειδῆς in the Cretan dialect. His explanation of the word reappears in Schol. Bachm. on Il. 2. 58: έδίδο ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου, and in Hesychius (s. v. έδίδ): έδίδο ... ὄψις, πρόσωπων.

τὸ γὰρ εὐειδῆς κτῆ. The traditional reading τὸ γὰρ εὐειδῆς οἱ a 13 Κρήτες εὐπρόσωπων καλοῦντι is supposed to mean that the word εὐειδῆς is applied by the Cretans to that which is εὐπρόσωπων; comp. Tyrwhitt’s rendering, ‘Cretenses εὐειδῆς vocant quod facie
speciosum est’, and Vahlen’s ‘vocabulo quod est εὐείδες Cretes εὐπρόσωπον appellant’. The difficulty however is in the absence of the article with the subject, which produces an intolerable ambiguity. I have accordingly ventured to restore (τὸ) εὐπρόσωπον on the analogy of Aristotelian usage in the context (τὸ ἀκρατον ... τὸ θάττον) and in 6, 1449b29, as also elsewhere, e.g. in Metaph. Δ 29, 1025a11 τὸ χωλαίον τὸ μυείσθαι λέγων. Vahlen quotes a number of passages from other writers in defence of the vulgate, but as it seems to me, they are not all quite to the point; those from Plato (Theaet. 190λ and Crat. 41ον) at any rate may very well admit of another interpretation. The more important of his instances were discussed by W. Dindorf, Preface to Demosthenes p. lxii ed. Teubn. In two of them the anomaly may be removed at once by the same expedient, the insertion of a second article: Demosthenes 23, 33 τὰ γὰρ ἀπον (τὰ) χρήματα ὑνόμαζον οἱ παλαιοὶ.—Xenophon Mem. 3. I. 4. 7 ἐλεγε δὲ καὶ ὦς τὸ εὐνοεῖται ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων γλώττῃ (τὸ) ἐστίειν καλοῦτο.

ά14 ζωρότερον κτδ.: II. 9. 202 μείζονα δὴ κρητηρὰ, Μενιτίων νιέ, καθίστα, ζωρότερον δὲ κέρατε. Porphyry’s note on this is: οὔτε ἐπὶ κόμων ἤκουν κριτῶντες οἰκρατότερον διδόναι παρακελεύεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τὴς λεξίου λύνουν: τὸ γὰρ ζωρότερον εἶναι τάχιον κτδ. (p. 135 Schrader). Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, 677 f tells us that this was one of the many Homeric statements to which Zoilus took exception.

ά15 ἀκρατον. The comparative ἀκρατότερον is the usual equivalent for ζωρότερον in the Homeric Scholia, and in the lexicographers: Apollonius Lex. p. 81 Bekk. ζωρότερον ἀκρατότερον.—Hesychius ζωρότερον ἀκρατότερον. ένιοι δὲ τάχιον. The reading ἀκρατον, however, is sufficiently certified by Ath. 423 τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ ζωρότερον δὲ κέρατε οὐκ ἀκρατον σημαίνειν φασιν, ἀλλὰ θερμὸν ... ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ εὐκρατον ὀστερ τὸ δεξιόν ἀντὶ του δεξιοῦ (comp. Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, 677 d).

ός οἰνόφλους: comp. Probl. 3. 5, 871a27 διὰ τὸ οἱ οἰνόφλους τρέμουσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσοι ἂν ἀκρατοτοπώσον;

ά16 ἂλλοι μὲν ρα κτδ.: II. 10. 1 ἂλλοι μὲν παρὰ γνώσιν ἀριστῆς Παναχαῖοι εὖδον παννύχιοι must be the passage Aristotle had in mind; but he seems to have mixed it up with that in II. 2. I ἂλλοι μὲν ῥα θεοὶ τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἱπποκοροσταὶ εὖδον παννύχιοι. The difficulty in the passage was its inconsistency with II. 10. II-13 (on the revelry and other signs of life among the Trojans), ἥ του ὄσ'] ἐσ πεδίων τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσει, θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλὰ, τὰ καίτοι Ὡλθή
25. 1461 a 13-20

πάντες, αίλων συνέχών τ' ἐνστην ὤμαδόν τ' ἀνθρώπων. Aristotle's 1461 a 16 solution, it will be observed, consists in saying that πάντες may mean practically no more than 'many', and be an instance of the metaphorical substitution of a specific in lieu of a generic term (v. 21, 1457 b 8). The word πάντες, therefore, must have appeared somewhere or other in the text of the Aristotelian quotation (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.). Gräfenhan found a place for it by writing πάντες instead of ἄλλοι, and Tyrwhitt by restoring πάντες ὄμοι for παννύχιοι. A simpler expedient would perhaps be to suppose the passage, as Aristotle remembered it, to have run thus: ἄλλοι μὲν γὰρ θεοὶ τε καὶ ἀνέρες εἶναι ἄπαντες | παννύχιοι.

ἡ τοι ὐτ' ἐστιν πεδίον κτῆ.: II. 10. 11-13 (quoted above). The omission of the line θαυμάζειν πυρὰ τολλά, τὰ καίετο 'Ἱλιόθη θρός may very well be due to Aristotle himself; it is difficult, however, to hold him responsible for the form the next line has in the MS., αἰλῶν συνέχων τε ὁμαδόν—which the editors (following Syllburg) have made into αἰλῶν συνέχων θ' ὁμαδόν (or ὁμαδον); he must have known that the meaning thus given to ὁμαδος was not in accordance with Homeric usage. The accentuation too of the word in the manuscript (ὁμαδόν) is difficult to account for. I think that it may perhaps represent ὁμαδόν, i.e. ὁμαδον with an enclitic after it; so that the reading in the MS. may be the wreckage of an older reading, αἰλῶν συνέχων τ' ἐ(νστη) ὁμαδόν <τ' ἀνθρώ- πων>, in other words, of the line as it appears in the ordinary text of Homer.

tο γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ (τοῦ) πολλοῦ. Porphyry on Od. 12. 374 a 19
(p. 113 Schrader) records a similar interpretation of πάντα in II. 3.
277: ἐναντίων τοῦτο [scil. Od. 12. 374] τῷ 'Ἡλιόθος θ' δ' πάντες ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντες ἐπακούεις. ἄφι' ἐναντίων γὰρ ἔχρην ἐγκωκέναι τὸν πάντα ἐφορῶντα. λύσιτο δ' ἄν ἡ τῇ λέξει· τὸ γὰρ πάντα δηλοῖ τὰ πλεύστα κτῆ.

οἶ̄ δ' ἀμμορός: II. 18. 489 (= Od. 5. 275) οἶ̄ δ' ἀμμορός ἐστιν λεστρῶν Ὀκεανοῦ (said of the Great Bear). The astronomical difficulty in the line, which even led some of the Homeric critics of antiquity to alter the text (v. Strabo p. 3 Cas. and Apollonius Lex. p. 29 Bekk.), is thus stated by Porphyry ad loc. (p. 225 Schrader): άνωτέρωτον ἐστὶν τοῦτο· καταγγοροῦσι μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν περὶ τῆς Ἀρκτοῦ λόγον φάσκωντος οἶ̄ δ' ἀμμορός ἐστι λεστρῶν Ὀκεανοῦ· καθόλου γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἄρκτικῷ μὴ δύνεται. Aristotle's solution (which is not mentioned in the Scholia or elsewhere) is to take oἶ̄ as a generic in the place of a specific word, i.e. as an
instance of a kind of metaphor already recognized in 21, 1457 b 7 (ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἰδος).

Vahlen quotes Eth. N. 7. 14, 1153 b 35 διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμως εἶναι ταῦτας [scil. τὰς ἴδιονας] μόνας οὖνται εἶναι. For the substitution of μόνον, as a synonym for οὖν, compare the use of κωλυθήναι in a 34 to represent Homer's ἐσχετο.

κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν, scil. δει λύειν (or διαλύειν), understood from a 9 τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὀρῶντα δει διαλύειν. κατά means 'by reference to', as in κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως in a 27; it is the equivalent of the instrumental dative we find elsewhere in the context (see on a 10) with λύειν (or διαλύειν).

Προσῳδία with Aristotle comprises accent, breathing, and quantity—all the elements in the spoken word which in the ancient mode of writing were left to be supplied by the reader. For accent as a form of προσῳδία see Soph. el. 4, 166 b 1 (v. infra on a 23); 21, 177 b 35; and 23, 179 a 14. Breathing is distinctly said to come under this head in Soph. el. 20, 177 b 3 to ὁρος καὶ ὁρος τῇ προσῳδίᾳ λεγοντα σημαίνει ἑτερον. ἀλλ’ εν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ταύτων ὄνομα, δὴταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων γεγραμμένον ἢ καὶ ὁσαντώς, κάκει δ’ ἥδη παράσημα ποιοῦτα, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα οὐ ταῦτα. That quantity also was regarded by Aristotle as a part of προσῳδία may be inferred from the position of μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι in the enumeration in 20, 1456 b 32 (v. Schmidt, Beitr. zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 188). His idea of προσῳδία, therefore, agreed with that of Choeroboscus (Scholia in Dionys. Thracis art. gramm. p. 124 Hilgard), ἵστεν δὲ ὅτι εν ταῖς προσῳδίαις τρία ἐστὶν ἐνιού ἐστι γὰρ τόνως, χρόνος, πνεῦμα (comp. Egger, Apollonius Dyscole p. 29, and Schmidt, l. c. p. 185).

‘Ἂππιας. The view of Sengebusch (Hom. Diss. prior p. 206) is that he lived in the second half of the fifth century, and may perhaps be identified with the Hippias of Thasos mentioned by Lysias (13. 54 and 61) as one of the victims of the Thirty Tyrants. Schrader (Porphyri. in II. p. 413) doubts whether there is any sufficient evidence for this date.

δίδομεν δέ οὖ. The parallel in Soph. el. 4, 166 b 1 (v. on a 23) shows that δίδομεν δέ οὖ εὐεργέται was the reading in Aristotle's Homer in II. 2. 15, where our existing vulgate has Τρῶεσσι δὲ κηθὲ ἐφηπταί; the reference too in the parenthesis, ὦστερ Ἐπίπαι ἐλευν δ’ Θάσιος, shows that Hippias must have had the same reading before him. It is clear that we have in this instance at any rate
A real variant, and not one of Aristotle's misinterpretations. ZEUS A DECEIVES, occurs in II, 21, 207, but in a context very unlike that of II, 2, 15. The deceptive dream of Agamemnon in II, 2, 8 sqq. had been criticized by Plato, Rep. 382 E, as making Zeus a deceiver, and it was felt to be difficult by several of the grammarians (v. Porphyry, in II, t.e. F. 23 Scu.). As the half-line

"Zelia s e deceiver, but as Zelia, i.e. as an intermediate in the sense of an

o...o; as so far as the actual falsehood, that Zeus himself

impersonates the Deity-god (comp. Wolf, Prolegomena ad Hom. P. 128 ed.}

Peppermill).
1461 a 23 τὸ δ’ ἑτερον [scil. παράδειγμα] τὸ ἐπαγόμενον, τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνίπτυν τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὁ φησὶν τὸν Διὰ εἰπὲν τὸ "δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εἰχὸς ἀρέσθαι", οἴδαμον κέιται ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι . . . . εἰςιν οὖν τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ Δίος πρὸς τὸν ὄνειρον ὅτι βᾶς ταῦτα εἰπὲ τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὅτι δίδομεν αὐτῷ πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τὴν νίκην. φασιν οὖν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἀμαρτάνει ὁ ποιητὴς εἰςάγων τὸν Διὰ διαλεγόμενον ταῦτα τῷ ὄνειρῳ καὶ τρόπῳ τινὰ ψευδόμενον, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦστι θεοῦ. οἱ γοῦν ἐπιδιορθοῦμεν τοῦτον φασιν οὐ τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὁ Ζεὺς ἔλεγε τὸ εἰχὸς δοθῆναι ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄνειρῷ κατὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἀναγινώσκοι δι οὕτως, "δίδομεν δὲ οἱ", ἀντὶ τοῦ σοῦ, τῷ ὄνειρῳ. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ψεύδος· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς νοῦς ἦστι καὶ τὸ τόνος ἀναβιβασθείς καὶ περισταθείς ἡ ἀντωνιμία οὗ. τοῦ γοῦν [? οὖν] ἦστιν ἡ ἀμαρτία; ἢ οὐκ εἰς τὸ "δὲ οἱ" ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ "δίδομεν" . . . εἰ γοῦν [? μὲν οὖν] τὸ "δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εἰχὸς ἀρέσθαι" ἀναγινός τινὸν τοῦν θεῖ εἰς τὸ δὲ τὸν Διὰ ποιεῖ ψευδόμενον, ὡς ὑποσχοῦμεν διδόναι τὴν νίκην καὶ μὴ εἰς ἑρὸν ἐξάγοντα τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν· εἰ δὲ εἰς τὸ δὲ τὸν τόνον θεῖ ἀναγινός τὸ ἐξῆς καὶ τὸν Διὰ τοῦ ψευδεθεία απολύσει, καὶ τῷ Ὠμήρῳ περιποίησεται τὸ ἀνέγκλητον, ὡς τοῦ Δίος λέγοντος τῷ ὄνειρῳ καὶ ἐπιτάπτοντος διδόμεναι αὐτὸν τὸν ὄνειρον τὸ εἰχὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι καὶ μὴ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Δίος καὶ γοῦν ὁ ὄνειρος ὑποσχεῖται τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι τὸ εἰχὸς καὶ ψεύδεται καὶ οὕτως ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς.

It will be observed that in the explanation of II. 23. 328 in the Soph. el. the negative οὐ is said to be distinguished from the pronoun οὐ by being pronounced ὑτερον, i.e. ὑτυνώς. This takes us back to a time when οὐ was oyston wheresoever it occurs (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3 1. 1. p. 331), as it was held to be by more than one of the grammarians: Herodian 1 p. 504 Lentz τά εἷς οὖ περισπώνται, πανταχόντες αγχοῦ . . . καὶ τά λοιπά πλην τοῦ [7 τῷ] ιδοῦ τὸ δεικτικον, οὐ τὸ σχετικαστικον, καὶ οὐ τὸ ἀρνητικόν τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ συνεπεί δεύνεται.

τὰ δὲ διαίρεσις, scil. λυτέον. Διαίρεσις—a wider term than our ‘punctuation’—is the opposite of σύνθεσις (comp. Soph. el. 4 166 a 23), and includes every sort of break in reading, even one only just enough to keep words from being taken together in construction. The kind of difficulty to which this solution is applicable, may be seen from the instances in the Sophistici elench, ἡ γὰρ ὒποικα δοῦλον ὤν τέλειθεν (4, 166 a 36), and ἀρ' ἄκουν ἄγαθον ὄντα σκετέα μοχθηρόν εἶναι; (20, 177 b 14)—where the words are ambiguous and admit of being construed in two different ways. This may be compared what Aristotle says in the Rhetoric (3, 5, 1407 b 14) on the ambiguities in Hera-
'Εμπεδοκλῆς. The passage here quoted appears in the editions of Empedocles in a somewhat different form, αἵπα δὲ θηνη' ἐφύντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθων ἀθάνατ' εἶναι, Διόρα τὲ τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, διαλλάξαντα κελεύοντα (fr. 35, i4–15 Diels); and it is known that Theophrastus read it thus, as he adduced it to show that ἤωρότερον in Homer meant τὸ κεκραμένον: Athenaeus 423 f Θεόρατος ὁ ἐν τῷ περὶ μεθης ἤωρότερον φήσαι εἶναι τὸ κεκραμένον. This is not the place to consider either the reading recognized by Theophrastus or his interpretation of ἤωρότερον and ἤωρα. Aristotle has a different reading, ἤωρα τὲ πρὶν κέκρητο; and any difficulty that may have been found in it he meets by simply affirming the possibility of another διαφερόνν, another way of construing the words. He does not dispute the meaning which was assigned to ἤωρα; his assumption presumably was that ἤωρα = ἄκρατα (v. ά15). The positive ἤωρος no longer existed in Attic; but in Ionic the comparative ἤωρότερον was to be found in Herodotus and Hippocrates, in the sense of 'having but a small admixture of water': Herod. 6, 84 Κλεομένεα δὲ λέγουσι ηκόντων τῶν Σκυθῶν ... μαθεῖν τὴν ἄκρητοπο- σίν παρ' αὐτῶν ... ἐκ τὲ τόσον, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, ἔπειν ἤωρότερον βούλονται πιεῖν, "ἐπισκοπθήσων" λέγουσι (where ἤωρότερον πίνειν = ἄκρατοποσίν).—Hippocrates 2, 654 Κ. οἶνον, ἣν μὴ τὶ κωλῆν, πίνειν ἤωρότερον παλαιόν ἐπὶ τέσσαρας ἡμέρας. There is one instance of it in Attic prose, in Theophrastus Char. 4, 9 δεινὸς φαγεῖν καὶ ἤωρότερον πιεῖν ('ungemischten Wein zu trinken', R. Meister). Aristotle does not say what the question was that had been raised by the critics; it may be supposed, however (comp. Hermann ad loc.), to have turned on the πρὶν before κέκρητο, which owing to its ambiguous position may be construed with either ἤωρα or κέκρητο. If one construes it with κέκρητο, the clause will mean 'things pure had been before that mixed'; but in that case an objector might very well urge the inconsistency between this and the statement in the preceding line, in which Empedocles speaks of the 'mortal' forms as assumed by the elements only when mixed up together in the actual world (comp. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr,
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1461 a 24 15 p. 784). On the other hand, if the πρῶν be taken with ξυρά, the sense will be ‘things before that pure were found mixed up together’ (for the tense of κέκρητο v. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 3 1. 1 p. 152; Goodwin, Synt. of Gk. Moods and Tenses § 52); and the objection of the critic is answered. The integrity of the text of the present passage has been doubted in recent times by several scholars of distinction. Bergk (Kl. Schriften 2 p. 86) has suggested ξυρά τε πρῶν τὰ κέκρητο; Gomperz (Hermes 31 p. 469) ξυρά τε ἃ (i.e. θ’ ἃ) πρῶν κέκρητο; and Diels (on Emped. l. c.) ξυρά τε πρῶν κέκρητο (on the analogy of ἐπλησμον).  

a 25 ἀδάντα. As Aristotle is so apt to curtail his quotations, it is hardly necessary to restore ἀδάντα’ (εἶναι). For the omission of εἶναι see on 24, 1459 b 9.

τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολά, scil. δὲ διαλέειν. Aristotle now passes on to another kind of ambiguous statement, one capable of two interpretations through the presence of an ambiguous term. Such a term is said to be ἀμφιβολον (a 26: comp. Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 a 32); and its effect is ἀμφιβολία. ἀμφιβολία is here the same thing as what Aristotle often calls elsewhere ὁμονομία. It may be noted, as an instance of his variations in the use of technical language, that in Soph. el. 4, 165 b 26 ἀμφιβολία is distinguished from ὁμονομία, and used to describe the ambiguity arising from some ambiguous collocation of terms.

a 26 παρόχεκεν δὲ πλέω νῦξ: II. 10. 251 ἀλλ’ ἱομεν’ μάλα γὰρ νῦξ ἀνεται, ἐγνύθι δ’ ὡς, ἀστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε, παρόχοκεν δὲ πλέων νῦξ τῶν δύο μοιρῶν, τριτάτη δ’ ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται. The reading πλέω, which still survives in some of the MSS. of Homer, and was a recognized variant in antiquity, has a certain interest as showing the affinity of Aristotle’s Homer with that of Zenodotus, who is known to have admitted forms like ἀμεῖνοι for ἀμεῖνοιν, γλυκῶν for γλυκίων, and κρείσσων for κρείσσον (La Roche, Hom. Textkr. p. 302; Lobeck, Path. Elem. 2 p. 281).

The problem was to explain how, if more than two-thirds of the night had gone, a third could be still left. According to Porphyry ad loc. (p. 147 Schr.) this was one of the earliest difficulties found in Homer: τῶν πολλῶν ξητημάτων ἡμολογήται εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο, ἐν οἷς φησιν “ἀστρα... λέλειπται”. πῶς γάρ, εἰ αὐτὸ μοῦραι ἐξήκουσιν αὑτοὶ τε καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλέων, ἡ τριτάτη μοῖρα λέλειπται, ἀλλ’ οἰχὶ τῆς τρίτης μόριον; Among the many solutions he mentions is one from the Aristotelian Ἀπορίματα Ὀμηρικά (fr. 161 Teubn.), ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς αἰ δώδεκα μοῦραι εἰς δύο ἴσως μερίδας μερίζεσθαι δύναται,
25. I46I a 24–27

εἰς ξένης δὲ καὶ πλέον γεγονός βάτερον μέρος, ἀδηλον δὲ τὸ πόσας I46I a 26 ὁρας (καὶ γὰρ μᾶζ καὶ δύο καὶ τρισὶ καὶ πλεύσιν ἢ αὐξήσεις δύναται γίνεσθαι): ἀφορίζουν ὁ ποιητής τὸ ἀόρατον τοῦ πλεύνον πόσον ἦν καὶ Ὑ ὁρας νύξηθη, ἐπήγαγεν ὅτι τριτάτη μοῦρα λείπεται, ὡς ὅτι μὲν γενέσθαι τὸν παράρχηκας ὁρας, καταλείπεσθαι δὲ τέτοιας, αἴτε εἰς τοῦ διολον τρίτον. This highly artificial interpretation, which makes πλέω νυξ τῶν δύο μοιράων mean 'the greater part of two-thirds of the night', can hardly be what Aristotle has in mind, as he distinctly says that the solution of the difficulty may be found in recognizing πλέον as an amphibilous word, i.e. in giving it not its usual sense of 'more', but some different sense. This other sense was probably that of 'full', which is mentioned by Porphyry ad loc. (p. 147) as the suggestion of a certain Metrodorus: Μπρόδωρος μεν οὖ τὸ πλεύνον δύο σημαίνειν φησί παρ᾽ Ὀμήρῳ καὶ γὰρ τὸ σύνθες... καὶ τὸ πλήρες, ὡς ἐν τῷ σῶν δὲ πλέον δέπασ αἰεὶ ἐστικε, καὶ ἐν τῷ πλεύας τοις χαλκοῖς κλωσιν. νῦν οὖν τὸ πλέον ἀντὶ τοῦ πλήρες εἰρήσθαι. πλήρης γὰρ ἢ νυξ τῶν δύο μοιρῶν γεγονία παράρχηκε, τριτάτη δ᾽ ἐτί περιλείπεται. Aristonius seems to have accepted this interpretation of πλέω as ἀντὶ τοῦ πλήρες (Schol. Ven. A. ΙΙ. 9. 71); and it survives also in the gloss of Hesychius πλέον πλήρης.

to ξῆς λέξεως. Vahlen quotes Soph. el. 4, 166 a 14 εἰσὶ δὲ a 27 τρεῖς τρόποι τῶν παρὰ τήν ἐμονμίαν καὶ τήν ἀμφιβολίαν, εἰς μὲν ὅταν ἢ το λόγος ἢ το πνεύμα κυρίως σήμανη πλεύον, οἷον ἄετος καὶ κύων- εἰς δὲ ὅταν εἰσθήτες ὅμεν οὖν λέγειν.

τὸν κεκραμένον is to my mind a much more probable correction here than the others that have been suggested, τὸ κεκραμένον (Madius), πὼν κεκραμένον (Bursian), ὅσα τῶν κεκραμένων (Vahlen), τῶν κεκραμένων (Τucker). τὸν κεκραμένον, with οἷον in close proximity in the context, means τῶν κεκραμένων οἷον. There is the same ellipse in Aristoph. Eq. 187 πιεῖν κεκραμένον τρία καὶ δύο (comp. Gildersleeve, Syntax of Class. Gk. 32); and it is certainly not uncommon with ἀκρατος (comp. ἀκρατουσίᾳ, etc.). The general sense then of the whole passage will be this: In common parlance a mixture of wine and water is said to be 'wine'; and on the same principle Homer's 'tin' may be an amalgam of tin and another metal. Aristotle is apparently replying to some critic who took exception to the idea of the greaves being made of so soft a metal as tin, a point which modern archaeologists also have some difficulty in explaining (comp. Helbig, Das homerische Epos p. 196).
COMMENTARY

1461 a 27 οἶνον: Plutarch Coni. praec. 140 F τὸ κράμα καὶ τοῦ ἴδατος μετέχων πλεύονον οἶνον καλοῦμεν. The fact is recognized and explained in De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 321 a 35 τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν λέγεται ἐν τῇ μιᾷ, οἶνον ὅτι οἶνος· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ οἶνου ἔργον ἀλλ' οὖ τὸ τοῦ ἴδατος τὸ σύνολον μίγμα.

a 28 κηριμένος νεοτέυκτου κασσιτέρου: II. 21, 592.

a 29 χαλκείας. Aristotle adduces this use of χαλκείας, to justify the language in II. 20, 234, on the assumption that by a similar extension of meaning οἶνοχοεῖεν may be used for the serving out of nectar as well as that of wine. χαλκείας and its cognates are often found in this more general sense in the literature after Homer: Schol. Ven. B. II. 19. 283 παλαί ἡ χρύσις τοῦ χαλκοῦ νομομάζει τὸν σιδηρον. ἀμέλει καὶ χαλκείας λέγομεν τοις τῷ σιδηρον ἐργαζόμενοι.—Pollux 7. 106 χαλκείειν δὲ καὶ τὸ σιδηρεῖειν ἔλεγον, καὶ χαλκείας τοῖς τῶν σιδηρον ἐργαζόμενοι. The language in these two passages may be a distant reminiscence of Aristotle's words.

a 30 οἶνοχοεῖεν: II. 20. 234 τὸν καὶ ἀνηρείαντο θεῖο Διό οἶνοχοεῖεν. On the other hand, we are told elsewhere (II. 5. 341) that the gods do not drink wine, οὐ πάνων' αἰσθάνεται οἶνον. For the infinitive—actually found in the Homeric text—comp. An. post. 2. 30, 97 b 6 τοῦτο δὲ εἴρηται μὴ διαφέρειν.—Top. 2. 3, 110 a 33 οὔτ' εἰ παντὶ οὔτ' εἰ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται.

a 31 εἶ δ' ἄν τοῦτό γε κατὰ μεταφοράν. Aristotle apparently prefers to explain Homer's use of οἶνοχοεῖεν as a metaphor; referring, it would seem, to the μεταφορὰ κατὰ τὸ ἄναλογον considered in 21, 1457 b 16 sqq.

δεῖ δὲ κτέ. This is a general word of caution very like that in a 4. Just as we have to consider all the attendant circumstances before condemning an act as wrong or immoral, so too, when the question turns on a word, we should consider its context and its possible meanings in the context before pronouncing it to be improper; we must be quite sure of our interpretation before passing an adverse judgement on the poet.

a 33 οἶνον τῷ = οἶνον εἰ τῷ, the preposition being understood from the preceding εἰν τῷ εἴρημεν (see on 2, 1448 a 10).

τῇ β' ἐσχέτῳ χαλκεῖον ἐγχώς: II. 20. 267 οὐδὲ τότ' Αἷνεω διάφρονος ὅμοιον ἐγχώς φησεν σάκος· χρυσός γὰρ ἐρίκακε, δόρα θεοῦ· ἀλλ' δόω μὲν ἔλασον δὲ πτύχας, αἱ δ' ἀρ' ἐτί τρεῖς ἡσαν, ἐπεὶ πάντες πτύχας ἥλασε κυλλοσπόδιοι, τὰς δύο χαλκείας, δύο δ' εἴποδοι κασσιτέροι, τῷ δὲ μίαν χρυσένην· τῇ β' ἐσχέτῳ μείλινον ἐγχώς. The difficulty found here may be seen from the note of Porphyry (p. 244
25. 1461 a 27-35 343

Schr.): τις γὰρ χρυσῆς πτυχῆς δοκοῦσθη σπωτῆς εἶναι, εἰ γε κόσμου 1461 a 33 ἕνεκα τὴν χρυσῆν εἰς τὸ ἐξω καὶ ὀρφέμον πρώτην ἐνέθηκεν, ὥστε ἀντίν δὲ στερέωτος ἑνεκα τὰς δύο χαλκαῖς, μαλάγματος χάριν καὶ τελευταίας τὸς καστερίμας, πῶς δὲ τε διέκοψε πτύχας, καὶ ἐν τῇ χρυσῇ πτυχῆ ἐξε ὦνῃ καὶ διαμιθηθείς ἐνεσχέθη τὸ δόρῳ; The answer of Aristotle was perhaps this, that the plate of gold sufficed to stop the course of the spear, though the spear-point actually pierced it and indented the underlying plates of brass. This is practically the same as the solution quoted from Autochthon in Schol. Ven. B and Eustathius ad loc. Aristarchus also is said to have acknowledged its plausibility: Schol. Ven. A II. 20. 269 ἱνα δὲ μὴ δοκῆ λύσεως ἢπορηκέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἢθετκέναι, φησιν ὅτι τῆς χρυσῆς πτυχῆς πρώτης κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν κειμένης νοθεόν τὸ δόρυ τῆς πλείονος ὀρμίς ἢγκοπτὶν εἰληφέναι [=Aristotle's καυθήμα], διακοκφία μέντοι τὸ σάκος ἐως τῆς τράτης πτυχῆς, ὧν τράπων ἐπὶ τῆς πτυχῆς Μενελαοῦ λέγει "ἡ οἱ πλεῖοντον ἐμιτο, διὰ πρὸ δὲ εἰσατο καὶ τῆς". καυθήμα: Metaph. Δ 23, 1023 a 17 ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ 34 ὀρμίς τε κινοῦσθαὶ ἡ πρᾶτειν ἦχεν λέγεται τοῦτο αὐτό, οἷον καὶ οἱ κώνες τὰ ἐπικείμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιητὶ ὁ τῶν Ἀπελαντα ποιήσει τὸν οὐρανὸν ἦχεν ὡς συμπεσοῦν ἀν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν.

ἐνδέχεται, scil. σημαίνει (see on 24, 1460 a 34).

ὁδὶ ἡ ὅδὶ = πότερον ὅδὶ ἡ ὅδι (see on a 4). The clause, with the punctuation given in the text, is appositional to πόσας ὡς αὐτὸν σημαίνοι (see on 25, 1460 b 25). For ὅδι ἡ ὅδι comp. An. pr. 31, 46 b 28 ἀγνοεῖται τὸ πότερον ὅδε ἡ ὅδε ἦχει.—Soph. el. 18, 177 a 5 ἀναρωτίστε ἡ ὅδε ἡ ὅδε.—Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 10 διαφέρει γὰρ τι πρὸ τοῦ δηλώσαι ὅδι ἡ ὅδι εἴπειν.

μᾶλιστ' ἂν τὸς υπολάβου. The comma (or colon) which recent a 35 editors place after this I have removed in order that μᾶλιστα may be taken with κατὰ τὴν καταντικρῆ; comp. Metaph. A 8, 989 a 30 μᾶλιστ' ἂν υπολάβου κατὰ λόγον δὴ εἴκειον μὲν εἰ δύθρωσεν κτῆτε. (also Phys. 7. 3, 245 b 6; Metaph. Z 16, 1040 b 10).

κατὰ τὴν καταντικρῆ = ἐξ ἐναντίας οἰ ἐναντίως. The ἡ ὃς which follows Vahlen illustrates from 22, 1458 b 3 ἄλλως ἦχεν ἡ ὃς τὸ κύριον.—An. post. 1. 17, 80 b 35 ληπτεῖα ἐναντίως ἡ ὃς ἔχουσιν αἱ προτάσεις.—De caelo 2. 2, 285 b 25 ἐναντίως ἡ ὃς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν.—Meteor. 1. 12, 348 b 12 τούναντιν ἡ ὃς 'Αναζαγόρας λέγει. A similar construction is found after a comparative adverb in Eth. N. 3. 13, 1118 b 23 μάλλον ἡ ὃς οἱ πολλοὶ. The clause οὕτω εἶναι κτῆτε is explanatory of ὃς Γλαύκων λέγει, 'the way described by Glaucon', and apparently a quotation.
**COMMENTARY**

**1461 b 1** 
Γλαύκων. Aristotle is probably referring to the Glaucus mentioned as an authority in Homeric matters in Plato's Ion 530 d, where the rhapsodist says of himself: καὶ οἴμαι κάλλιστος ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ 'Ομήρου, ὡς οὔτε Μητρόδωρος ὃ Δαμφακήνος οὔτε Στριμβρότος ὃ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἄλλος οίδεις τῶν πῶς τε γενομένοι ἐσχέν εἰτεὶν οὔτω πολλᾶς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ 'Ομήρου ὡσας ἐγώ. The absence of a local appellative here seems to imply that the Glaucus in question was an Athenian. If this inference is right, we cannot identify him with the Γλαύκων ὁ Τήμος of Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 26 or with Glaucus of Rhegium (comp. Hiller, Rh. Mus. 41 p. 398); he may perhaps be the same as the Glaucus or Glacon (v. Dünzter, Rettung der aristot. Poetik p. 227) mentioned by Porphyry on Il. 11. 636 (p. 168 Schr.) along with other early interpreters of Homer.

**b 2** 
αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι resumes the idea of ἔνα ἀλόγως προτολαμβάνοντα, and anticipates that in τῇ αὐτῶν οὖσα. The common rendering, 'postquam ipsi condemnationis sententiam tulerint' (Tyrwhitt), gives καταψηφισάμενοι a sense too near to that of the ἐπιτιμῶσιν in the following line. The probability is, as Vahlen has seen (comp. Bon. Ind. 376 a 56), that it means in the present instance to 'decide', or to 'affirm' or 'accept' something. As a term of politics καταψηφιζέσθαι is the opposite of ἀποψηφιζέσθαι (to reject a proposal): Pol. 4. 14, 1298 b 36 ἀποψηφιζόμενοι μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, καταψηφιζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλ' ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἔπι τοὺς ἀρχοντας. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀντισταραμένοι ποιοῦσιν οἱ γὰρ ἰόλγοι ἀποψηφισάμενοι μὲν κύριοι, καταψηφισάμενοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ἐπανάγεσθαι εἰς τοὺς πλείστους αἰεί.

eἰρήκότος, scil. τοῦ ποιητοῦ (see on 6, 1449 b 26).

**b 3** 
τὸ τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε: De anima 1. 5, 410 b 27 τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὄρφικοῖς ἔπειρα καλομένους λόγος.

**b 4** 
τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον. The question which Aristotle regards as based on a mere assumption, survives in Porphyry on Od. 4. 1 (p. 40 Schr.) διὰ τὶ ὁ Τηλέμαχος εἰς Δακεδαίμονα ἐθάν ὡς ἐνέτυχε τῷ Ἰκαρίῳ; καὶ τοῦ ἰόλγον ἐλθόντα τῷ ταρτὶ τῆς μητρὸς μη ἐντυχεῖν, and in Schol. Od. 1. 285 (comp. Schol. Od. 2. 52) τῶς εἰς Σπάρτην ἐθάνον ὡς συντυχάω τῷ Ἰκαρίῳ; The assumption of the critics, that the father of Penelope (called in Homer Icarus) was a Lacedaemonian, Aristotle meets by quoting on the other side the Cephalenian tradition which made him a Cephallenian. This same solution of the difficulty reappears incidentally in Schol. Od. 15. 16 ὅτι Ἰθακήτως ὁ Ἰκάριος, ὡς Σπαρτιάτης, ἀδελφὸς Τυνδάρεω ... ὁ δὲ
The document is a page from a text discussing the form of a word in ancient Greek. It references works by Aristotle and other scholars, and includes specific references to Plato's Polit. and Isocrates. The text is discussing the preposition 'παρ' and its usage in relation to the question of whether it should be translated as 'par' or 'with' in English. The text also refers to the word 'διά' and its use in various grammatical contexts. Overall, the text is analyzing linguistic issues and their implications in translation and interpretation.
it seems to exclude the solution given in 25, 1460 b 24, where poetical necessity is said to justify even 'impossibilities'. The reason that follows, το γαρ την τοίχην κτέ., adds a very necessary qualification, viz. that the impossibility has to be disguised and made credible (πιθανόν) by arts of expression; comp. 24, 1460 a 27 ἄδυνατα εἰκότα, and 24, 1460 b 2 ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἀτοπον. A second solution is by reference πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον—

a point which Aristotle illustrates here from painting, and not as in 25, 1460 b 33 from poetry. A third is by reference πρὸς τὴν δόξαιν, i.e. by showing that the impossibility has been accepted and sanctioned by opinion (comp. 25, 1460 b 10 οἶδα φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, and 1460 b 35 οὖτω φασίν).

πρὸς την ποίησιν: Meteor. 2. 3, 357 a. 26 πρὸς ποίησιν μὲν γὰρ οὖτως εἶπον [scil. Empedocles] ἵσως εἰρήκεν ικανῶς (ὥ γαρ μεταφορὰ ποιητικῶν), πρὸς δὲ τὸ γνῶναι τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἰκανῶς.—Fr. 147 (Teubn.) οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν πρὸ ἐργού ην η τοῦτων μνήμη.  

ιό ἀνάγειν, to explain by reference to something (comp. Bon. Ind. 42 a 37).  

ιι αἰρετῶτερον πιθανὸν ἄδυνατον: 24, 1460 a 26 προαιρεῖσθαι τε δὲ ἄδυνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα.  

ιίι οἴους Ζεῦξις ἐγραφέν. In 25, 1460 b 18 also the allusion is apparently to a picture. We have been told in an earlier chapter (6, 1450 a 27) that the personages of Zeuxis lacked character, i.e. that he sacrificed expression to beauty. The criticism implied in the present passage is that they are 'impossibilities', in other words, of an impossible beauty, not like real men and women (i.e. not οἶα γὰρ ἢ ἢ ἢ ἢ ἢ ἢ, 25, 1460 b 10). The answer to this is that they are, like the characters in Sophocles (25, 1460 b 33), better than the reality, what men and women ought to be. This justification of Zeuxis, which recalls what has been said elsewhere of Polygnotus (2, 1448 a 5), and of Homer (15, 1454 b 14), may very well represent Aristotle's own view of him and his work. It was certainly a common view of him in antiquity (comp. Maximus Tyrius Diss. 32. 5).  

ιη αλλὰ βέλτιον (scil. τοιούτους ἐναι) is a vivid way of putting the respondent's answer to the objection (see on 25, 1460 b 33).  

to γαρ παράδειγμα δεὶ ὑπερέχειν. As Aristotle says in 15, 1454 b 9, a true artist, instead of keeping too closely to his model, will make his portrait more beautiful than the real man.  

ιη Πρὸς ἢ φασιν τάλογα, scil. δεὶ ἀνάγειν. It will be seen that a δε is wanting, and also that the next clause (οὖτω τε καὶ οτι ποτὲ οὐκ


25. 1461 b 9–15  

ἀλογόν ἐστιν) comes in without a conjunction. This may perhaps be taken as another sign of the Poetics being in places only the rough draft of a book (see on 22, 1458 a 30). It would have been easy on revision to make the text read thus: πρὸς δὲ ἂ φασι τάλωγα ἀνάγωντας οὗτω τε λυτέον καὶ ὅτε ποτὲ οὐκ ἀλογόν ἐστιν. For the ellipse comp. 25, 1460 b 35 ὅτι οὗτο φασὶν, scil. λυτέον.

τάλωγα. The first appearance of the word in this chapter, though it has been used more than once in chap. 24. τὸ ἀλογόν, said of a fact or statement, means that which we cannot account for, and thus find a difficulty in accepting as either true or possible (see on 15, 1454 b 6). There is an obvious distinction between it and τὸ ἀδύνατον, that which is not and cannot be true, the one being only 'improbable', and the other 'impossible'. The charge of improbability according to Aristotle may be met in two ways: one may urge (1) that the statement criticized has the sanction of opinion (ἀ φασιν), or (2) that the incident was not so improbable, if one remembers the time (ποτὲ) when it is supposed to have occurred. These two solutions have already appeared in the main discussion in 1460 b 35–1461 a 4, but in answer to a somewhat different allegation, that of untruth (ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὴς 1460 b 33). A third answer, the plea of poetical necessity, is indirectly suggested in b 19.

ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἀλογόν: comp. fr. 164 (Teubn.) λύων οὐν ὃ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ τάλωγον οὔτε ἔστω φησὶ τότε καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἄφωρημένῳ χρῆσαι σταθμῷ, and the passages quoted above on 25, 1461 a 2. For the emphatic ποτὲ comp. Top. 3. 2, 117 a 36 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰδίω ἢ δὲ ποτὲ χρησίμη (also Top. 5. 1, 128 b 20).

eἰκὸς γὰρ κτῆ. See on 18, 1456 a 23 (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο εἰκῶς). b 15

The maxim being Agathon's, it might be quoted for controversial purposes when better arguments were not to be had.

τὰ ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα covers the ground of the group of difficulties considered in 1461 a 9–31. The common point in these is that they turn primarily on the language rather than the matter of the poem, and may be met by finding another interpretation for the word or phrase to which the critic has taken exception. The difficulties themselves are very far from being all of one kind. In the second (εἰδὸς κακῶς a 12), fourth (ἀλλοι μὲν a 16), eighth (ἀφα ἢ ἐ a 24), and eleventh (οἰνοχοτεύειν a 30) the supposed fault is clearly some inconsistency or self-contradiction; in the third (εὐφρότερον a 14) and sixth (δίδομεν a 22), however, it is an offence against morals; in the fifth (οἶνος a 20), seventh (οὖ a 23), and ninth
1461 b 15 (πλέον a 26) one against scientific or other truth; and in the first (οὐρής a 10) and tenth (κασπιτέρω a 28) one against general probability. The formula, therefore, ὑπεναντίως εἰριμένα, instead of being restricted to logical incompatibilities, seems to include words and phrases which in the view of the critic are at variance with other standards of judgement. That it was meant to bear this wider sense is shown by the fuller formula in the context, ὡστε καὶ αὐτὸν [sicl. ἐναντίως εἰρηκέναι] ἢ πρὸς ἄ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ἦ ἄν φρόνιμος ὑποθηταί (b 18).

b 16 ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλεγχοί. The sense shows that a passive verb (σκεπτέοι?) has to be understood. The same sort of ellipse may be the explanation of the nominative ὡσπερ σφαίρα in De anima 3. 11, 434 a 13, where κανέται is probably to be supplied from the κανεῖ which precedes the comparison (see J. of Phil. 17 p. 67). The converse of this, an active understood from a passive, is found in Metaph. I 2, 1053 b 14 πῶς δὲ γνωριμισθέρως λεξθήγοι καὶ μᾶλλον ὡσπερ οἱ περὶ φύσεως (sicl. λέγοντειν). The statement in the text is a word of caution not unlike those we have already had in a 4 and a 31. Aristotle reminds us that the difficulties of language pointed out by the critics are not always real ones, and that, before they are admitted to be real, they should be scrutinized and tested in just the same way as in a dialectical discussion one tests the contradiction or confutation of one’s opponent—which is sometimes a genuine confutation (ἐλεγχος ἄληθινος), and sometimes only the semblance of one (ἐλεγχος φανόμενος: v. Bon. Ind. 235 b 42). The main points to be considered are briefly indicated in the context, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὀσκατὸς. A fuller enumeration of the marks of a genuine ἐλεγχος is found in Soph. el. 5, 167 a 23 ἐλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἄντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνός, μὴ ὄνοματος ἄλλα πράγματος, καὶ ὄνοματος μὴ συνωνύμου ἄλλα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοσάντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ συναπτικομένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταύτη καὶ πρὸς ταύτα καὶ ὀσκατίως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρώψ.—26, 181 a 1 τοὺς δὲ παρὰ τῶν ὀραμάτων γνωρίσκεις τοῦ ἐλεγχοῦ . . . ἀπαντητέον σκοπούσθη τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἄντίφασιν, ὅπως ἐσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὀσκατίως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρώψ.

b 18 ὡστε καὶ αὐτὸν κτ. = ὡστε καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ὑπεναντίως εἰρηκέναι ἢ πρὸς ἄ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ πρὸς ἦ ἄν φρόνιμος ὑποθηται (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 4 p. 384). The sense is: The word or phrase in question must be first ascertained to be really inconsistent either with some actual statement in the poem itself, in the context or elsewhere,
or with what may be reasonably assumed as true or probable. In saying οὖν φρόνιμος ὑποθέται Aristotle sets aside the hasty or arbitrary assumptions which underlay a good deal of the current poetical criticism (see b 3 sqq.). The statement in the text may be compared with the rule laid down for dialectic in Soph. el. 15, 174 b 19 έτι καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεγχικοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἣ πρὸς τὰ ψφ' ἐαυτοῦ λεγόμενα ἢ πρὸς οὐς ὁμολογεῖ καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν. In the note on this passage in his edition Vahlen supposes the clause to mean ὡστε καὶ αὐτῶν, scil. κοπτεῖν δεῖ τὸν ποιητήν—as though Aristotle were now offering a word of advice to the poets. It seems to me that he is still thinking of the critics and apologists of poetry, and that he is merely telling them to examine the supposed ἐπεναντία and make quite sure they are real ones. These, to be real, must be like the ἐναντιώματα in a genuine confusion, and capable of standing the same logical tests. The whole point in fact is that the incongruities found in the language of a poem may turn out on examination to be imaginary, just as a confusion in argument may be only a sham confusion.

ἀλογία καὶ μοχθηρία. For the datives see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61, b 19 281 b 24, and 875 a 53.

μη ἀνάγκης ὀός: 15, 1454 a 28 παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἂθους μη ἀναγκαῖον οἶον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὄρεστῃ. The plea of poetic necessity was indirectly recognized as a valid answer to certain criticisms in 25, 1460 b 24, and before that in 15, 1454 a 28; comp. also 24, 1460 a 12.

Αἰγεί: Eurip. Med. 663. The appearance of Aegeus is in Aristotle's view (1) αλογον, because no sufficient reason can be given for it, and (2) unnecessary, because no use is made of it in the after-part of the play. The explanations of certain of the editors of Euripides are hardly an adequate answer to Aristotle's criticism.

ἐν Ὅρεστη: see on 15, 1454 a 29 (μη ἀναγκαίον).

ἐκ πάντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν. The various heads under which the faults in poetry have been classified are termed εἰδη, because they represent distinct 'kinds' of faults. It is one thing to say of something that it is ἀνυπνατον, another that it is ἀλογον, and another that it is βλαβερόν (etc.). For this use of φέρειν comp. 19, 1456 b 14 ἐπιτύμημα φέρεται.—An. pr. 2. 26, 69 b 1 φέρεται ἤ ἐνστασις.—An. post. 1. 14, 70 a 19 φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις.—Rhet. 2. 18, 1391 b 24 δόξαι καὶ προσάγεις εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ τὰς πίστεις φέρουσιν.
COMMENTARY

1461 b 23 ὃς ἄδύνατα, scil. οὕτα τὰ εἰρημένα.

βλαβερα: the opposite of the οἷα εἶναι δεῖ in 25, 1460 b 11. The word may be a reminiscence of Plato's condemnation of certain legends in Rep. 391 D oὐθ' ὅσια ταῦτα οὐτ' ἀληθῆ . . . καὶ μὴν τοὺς γε ἀκούοντι βλαβερὰ. τὸς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἔγγυντομὲν ἐξει κακῷ ὄντι, πειθοῖς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττοντι τε καὶ ἐπραττον καὶ "οἱ θεῶν ἀγχόστοροι".

ὑπεναντία: the ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα of b 15.

b 24 παρὰ τὴν ὁρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην must refer, as Twining has seen, to the technical inaccuracies of description considered in 25, 1460 b 16 sqq. It is to be observed that the present statement clearly recognizes two kinds of error, only incidentally distin-guished in the early part of the chapter (25, 1460 b 20), the fault of impossibility and the fault of technical inaccuracy. The distinction is a very real one in controversy; to say of a picture, for instance, that it is not scientifically or historically correct is not quite the same thing as saying that it represents an impossibility. κατὰ τέχνην is apparently used as an equivalent for the καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην in 25, 1460 b 19. The older interpreters understand the passage differently. Goulston makes it mean 'tanquam ea quae a poeticae vel alterius artis norma ac veritate disobedunt', thus giving κατὰ τέχνην a sense wide enough to include poetry as well as λατρεία, πολιτική, etc. Heinsius (after Victorius) renders it by 'ut quae cum ipsa artis poeticae pugnant natura'—just as though the text had either κατὰ τὴν τέχνην (which Hermann wished to restore) or κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην. The objection to such interpretations is sufficiently obvious. The criticism that something is poetically wrong is not one of the ἐπιτιμήματα considered in this chapter; and it cannot be met by any of the counter-arguments which Aristotle has suggested for the use of the apologist.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν. The precise meaning of this is far from clear. Goulston's paraphrase1 is 'ex antedictis formarum numeris, seu specialibus differentiis'; and Vahlen's 'aus den genannten Zahlen oder Stücken' (Beitr. 4, 389). To illustrate the sense of ἀριθμῶν Tyrwhitt quotes Isocrates 224 D ἀπαντᾷ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦς περιλαβοῦν ἐξ ὅν ἁρματ' ἀν τις τὰ κοινὰ διοικήσειν.—Plutarch De aud. 45 c τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐκ πολλῶν ὧν ἀριθμῶν εἶς ἐνα καιρὸν ἥκοντων ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῶν καὶ ἀρμονίας ἐπιστελεῖται;

1 Goulston may possibly have remembered the expression τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἐκάστου τῶν νοσημάτων in Hippocrates 2 p. 27 K. as interpreted by Foes, Oec. Hippocr. p. 92.
comparing also the similar use of numeri in Latin. Another of 1461 b 24
Tyrwhitt's quotations is perhaps more directly to the purpose, Eurip. Ion 1014. ὁ δεύτερος δ' ἄριθμος δὲ [ὅν L. Dindorf] λέγεις τί δρά;—to which may be added Eurip. Heracl. 997 εἴδως μὲν ὁίκ ἄριθμων ἀλλ' ἐτητύμως ἀνδρὶ δοῦτα τὸν σὸν παῖδα, and the passage in Aristotle (cited by Teichmüller) in De gen. an. 3. 10, 760 a 33 aυτοῖ μὲν γὰρ γίγνονται, ἀλλὸ δ' ὦθεν γενόσων, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ ἄριθμῷ πέρας ἔσχεν ἢ γένεσις. It would seem from these instances that ἄριθμος may sometimes have the sense of an item or term in a series, and that ἄριθμων in the present passage may thus stand for 'points enumerated' 1. If this interpretation is possible, the reference in ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἄριθμῶν is to the list of assumptions in the opening of this chapter. Twining draws attention to the parallelism between the language in the text, αἱ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἄριθμῶν σκεπτέαι, and that in 1460 b 21 ὡστε δὲ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα ... ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκόπουντα λύειν. The advantage of this view of the reference in ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἄριθμῶν is that it simplifies the explanation of the next clause, εἰςι δὲ δώδεκα (scil. οἱ ἄριθμοί). It is usual to explain the number by adding up the various λύσεις actually found and described in the preceding discussion (1460 b 21—1461 b 21), and counting in statements like those in 1460 b 29 and 1461 a 4, 31 (v. ad loc.), though they are hardly λύσεις in the present sense of the term (see on 1460 b 29). If we look back, however, to the opening paragraph in the chapter, it will be seen that Aristotle begins by laying down a series of postulates concerning poetry. The first is that, as the poet is an imitator, the poetic picture may represent either οἷα ἢν ἢ ἔστων or οἷα φασί καὶ δοκεῖ or οἷα ἐίναι δεί. There are thus, if we separate the alternatives (as Aristotle himself has done in the course of the discussion), five possibilities, οἷα ἢν, οἷα ἔστων, οἷα φασίν (ἐίναι), οἷα δοκεῖ (ἐίναι), οἷα ἐίναι δεῖ; and they are each of them available in reply to criticism; if the critic, for instance, says that the picture is not of things οἷα ἐίναι δεί, it is a valid answer to reply that it represents οἷα ἢν (v. 1461 a 2) or οἷα ἔστων, etc. The second postulate is that, as poetic language is not quite the same as ordinary speech, it may have to be explained by certain arts of interpretation. This point is merely indicated in 1460 b 11—13; the statement there has to be supplemented from

1 The word seems to bear the same sense in [Dion. Hal.] Ars Rhet. p. 414 R.

γίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ἄριθμοι οἷς εἴπομεν, τοῖς ἐπτά—where ἄριθμοι represents the τοῦτο of p. 400.
that in 1461 a 9-31, where we are told that six modes of interpretation of the written letter of poetry (γλώττια, κατὰ μεταφορὰν, κατὰ προσφῳδίαν, διαμετάβολη, ὀμφοδιοῖς, κατὰ τὸ ὥθος τῆς λέξεως) are available, and may be legitimately assumed, whenever a λύσις of difficulties arising from the poet's language is wanted. The third postulate is that poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, apart from that of every other art or science—which implies, as the next section (1460 b 23-29) explains, that a description may be poetically right, even though it involves some impossibility, or offends against some technical standard of correctness. The various assumptions, therefore, in this series of postulates may serve as major premises for the apologist; and as a matter of fact every one of them appears in some form or other in the specimen λύσις in this chapter. It will be seen, too, that they are just 12 (5 + 6 + 1) in number.

Пότερον δὲ βελτίων κτέ. The interpretation of this chapter has been considered at length by Gomperz in Eranos Vindobonensis p. 71 sqq. Aristotle rounds off his theory of Tragedy and epic poetry with an appendix on a question which was, no doubt, often discussed in his time, that of the comparative value of the two forms of art. In the view of certain critics Tragedy was artistically inferior to epic poetry (comp. Plato Laws 658 d). The reasons for this view are stated (1461 b 27-1462 a 4), and then shown to be inconclusive (1462 a 4-14); after which four positive arguments are adduced as turning the scale in favour of Tragedy. The case against Tragedy may be put into the form of an enthymeme ἐκ στιμέων: The inferior art is one that addresses an inferior public; Tragedy addresses an inferior public; it must, therefore, be the inferior art. The truth of the minor premise is shown by the evidence, or rather the practice, of actors and other public performers, who may be presumed to know their public and to have taken the measure of its intelligence.

Φορτικὴ, 'common' or 'vulgar' (comp. Twining ad loc.), as in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b 9 τούτων [i.e. τῶν ἱδίως κυνητικῶν ἐχόντων ὠθημῶν] οἱ μὲν φορτικοτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κυνήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθερωτέρας.—Pol. 8. 6, 1341 b 11 οἱ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἄρετής, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκούντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς. διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητικοτέραν. καὶ βαπαίοντος δὴ συμβαίνει γέγονεντον πονηρός γάρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὅν ποιούμεν τὸ τέλος. ο γὰρ θεατὴς φορτικὸς ὃν μεταβάλλειν εἰσεθε τὴν μουσικήν. Comp. also Aristophanes Vesp. 66 καυμαθώς δὲ φορτικῆς σοφότερον,
and the Platonic passages in Ast, Lex. s. v. The word is some-
times taken here in the sense of 'extravagant' or 'overdone'

τοιεύη, i.e. ἤτοιν φορτικὴ: comp. An. post. I. 24, 85 a 29 ei δὴ
βελτίων μὲν ἣ καθ᾽ αὐτό [scill. ἀπόδειξις], τοιεύη δ᾽ ἣ κατὰ μέρος . .
καὶ βελτίων ἄν ἣ κατὰ μέρος ἀπόδειξις εἰ—where τοιεύη recalls the
idea of the καθ᾽ αὐτό which precedes. The form of argument in
this chapter of the Posterior Analytics is very similar to that in the
present section of the Poetics.

Theatás. The term is sometimes used even of the audience of a purely musical performance (Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 16; Plato Gorg. 502 λ).

ἀεί. For the position of the word comp. Eth. N. I. 5, 1097 b 19
ἀγαθὸν τὸ μείζον αἰρετῶτερον ἀεί.—Pol. 4. 14, 1298 b 40 ἐπαυγέται
εἰς τοὺς πλείστους ἀεί.

λαόν qualifies the following φορτικὴ (Bon. Ind. 430 b 15). For the

(πρὸς) ἀπαντα. The traditional reading, ἣ ἀπαντα μμομμηνη, b 29
which is explained as meaning 'the imitation which extends to
every circumstance' (Twining), or 'quaes motu et gestibus omnia
similat' (Vahlen), does not fit into the argument in this passage,
though it may perhaps seem to be confirmed by Plato Rep. 397 λ.
The logic of the present argument requires not ἀπαντα but πρὸς
ἀπαντα (v. J. of Phil. 5 p. 121). The sense is that Tragedy is
φορτικὴ because, instead of appealing to a select public (πρὸς
θεατας ἐπιεικῆ, 1462 a 2), it is πρὸς ἀπαντα, or as we are told
a little further on, πρὸς φαύλους (1462 a 3). For this use of
ἀπαντα ('any one and every one') comp. Top. 8. 14, 164 b 8 οὐχ
ἀπαντα δὲ διαλεκτέων οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν τυχόντα γυμναστέον.—Soph.
el. 5, 167 a 10 παντὶ θεωρήσαι ῥᾴδιον. Aristotle's estimate of the
average θεατὴς in the theatres may be seen from 13, 453 a
34, and from the distinction in Pol. 8. 7, 1342 a 18 ὁ θεατὴς διττὸς,
ἰ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεταίδευμενος, ὁ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναινῶν
καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιουτών συγκείμενος. Plato had an equally
mean opinion of the theatrical public of his day: Gorg. 502 c
ψούν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δήμον οἴτου λέγονται οἱ λόγοι [i.e. those
of the tragedians]; . . . νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς δὴρηκαμεν ῥητορικῆν τινα πρὸς
ήμον τοιουταν οίον παιδων τε ὀμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἄνδρων, καὶ
όλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων (comp. Laws 658 b).

οὐκ αἰσθανομένων, scil. τῶν θεατῶν, understood from πρὸς ἀπαντα
see on 6, 1449 b 26).
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COMMENTSARY

1461\textsuperscript{b}  30  προσθη: used absolutely in the sense of ‘adds something’ (comp. 24, 1460\textsuperscript{a} 18).

κινούνται: for the change of number see on λέγει in 21, 1457\textsuperscript{b}  19.

οἱ φαύλοι αὐληταί: i.e. indifferent flute-players, in their anxiety to make the music intelligible, accompany it by a sort of pantomimic movement of the body. According to Theophrastus (fr. 92 Wimmer) this combination of music and pantomime originated in Sicily: Θεόφραστος πρώτοις φησιν Ἀνδρώνα τῶν Καταναίων αὐλητὴν κινήσεις καὶ ἰμβοῦς ποιήσας τῷ σώματι αὐλοῦντα (ὅθεν συκελίζειν τὸ όρχεσθαι παρὰ τοὺς παλαιοῖς), μεθ’ ὤν Κλεώλαν τὸν Ἡθβαίον. Other references to it will be found in Sittl, Die Gebäude der Gr. u. Röm. p. 244.

b 31  διόσκον μιμεῖσθαι seems to mean ‘to imitate the art of throwing a quoit’.

b 32  Σκύλλαν αὐλώσιν, ‘play music descriptive of Scylla.’ Aristotle may be referring to the dithyramb mentioned in 15, 1454\textsuperscript{a} 31; but the probability is that he is thinking rather of a purely instrumental piece of music (see on 1, 1447\textsuperscript{a} 15) on the same subject. In the Greek αἰλέων τινα = δι’ αἰλήσεως μιμεῖσθαι τινα, in the same way as ὀρχεσθαι τινα = δι’ ὀρχήσεως μιμεῖσθαι τινα.

b 34  Μυννίσκος. On Mynniscus of Chalcis (the protagonist in some of the later plays of Aeschylus) and his younger contemporary, Callipides, see Völker, Diss. Halens. 4 pp. 153, 177. In calling Callipides an ‘ape’ Mynniscus may have meant no more than this, that his acting was so exaggerated as to be ridiculous and a mere caricature, the ape being a sort of caricature of humanity (comp. Top. 3. 2, 117\textsuperscript{b} 17 σκοτεν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἔπ’ τὸ γελουστον εἰς ὅμοιον, καθάπερ ὁ πίθηκος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ).

b 35  Πυθάρου. Nothing further is known of this actor (Völker l.c. p. 155).

1462\textsuperscript{a}  3  σχημάτων: the attitudes or postures assumed by the dancer. In the dance, which, it is to be remembered, was a species of acting (see on 1, 1447\textsuperscript{a} 27), σχῆμα had the technical sense explained by Plutarch, Qu. conv. 9. 15, 747 C-E ἡ γάρ ὀρχήσεις εκ τε κινήσεων καὶ σχέσεων συνέστηκεν, ὡς τὸ μέλος τῶν φύσεων καὶ τῶν διαστημάτων ἐνταῦθα δ’ αἱ μοναὶ πέρατα τῶν κινήσεων εἰσὶ. φοράς μὲν σιν τὰς κινήσεις ὀνομαζόμεναι, σχῆματα δὲ σχέσεις καὶ διαθέσεις, εἰς δὲ φερόμεναι τελευτῶσιν αἱ κινήσεις, ὅταν Ἀπόλλωνος ἢ Πανός ἢ τῶν Βάκχως σχῆμα διαθέτει ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γραφικῶς τὸ τις εἶδεν.
26. 1461 \textsuperscript{b} 30—1462 \textsuperscript{a} 12

\textit{επιμένοις . . . ειν ὁρχύσει τὸ μὲν σχῆμα μμητικὸν ἔστι μορφῆς καὶ 1462 \textsuperscript{a} 3 ἱδέας, καὶ πάλιν ἡ φορὰ τάθους τῶν ἐμφαντικῶν ἡ πράξεως ἡ δυνάμεως (comp. Sommerbrodt, Scænica p. 216).

\textit{ὑποκριτικῆς: see on 19, 1456 \textsuperscript{b} 10.}

\textit{σμεῖοις: i.e. the significant movements, of hand or head for a 6 instance, by which the spoken word may be accompanied (comp. Aristoxenus p. 411, i3 Marquard, and Ath. 628 d; see also Sommerbrodt l. c. p. 213).}

\textit{ῥαψῳδιώτης. The ῥαψῳδὸς is tacitly assumed to be a kind of ὑποκριτής (see on 5, 1449 \textsuperscript{a} 15).}

\textit{Σωσίστρατος . . . Μνασίθεος. Nothing further is known of either.}

It is evident that the one was a rhapsodist and the other a professional singer.

\textit{διάδοτα. As Tyrwhitt (quoting Theocritus 5. 22) points out, διάδωεν is 'certatim sive in certamine canere'; it implies that Mnasitheus sang, no doubt as a κεβαρῳδός, in an ἀγών, i.e. in a public performance in the theatre. The word is explained in the Lexicon in Bekker's Anecdota 37, διάσωσθαι τὸ διαμιλλήσωσθαι εν φόντι τιν. The same idea of competition is found in διαδών, διακαλείσθαι, διαπίνειν, etc. Gomperz aptly compares the saying ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic (Stob. Fl. 4. 112), Διωγένης ἔλεγε διαπαλαίνοντας μὲν πολλοίς ὁρᾶν καὶ διατρέχοντας, διακαλοκαγα-}

\textit{θιζομένοις δὲ οὖ.}

\textit{ἀποδοκμαστέα. ἀποδοκμάζειν, 'to reject as inadmissible', is the \textsuperscript{a} 8 opposite of δοκιμάζειν, 'to approve, or sanction' (Pol. 8. 7, 1342 \textsuperscript{a} 34; comp. Bon. Ind. 86 \textsuperscript{b} 48).}

\textit{φαυλων, 'turpium personarum' (Victorius)—not as Pacchius \textsuperscript{a} 9 renders it, 'ineptorum', as we hardly need to be told that bad acting is to be rejected. What Aristotle means is clear from his instance: Callipides in his impersonations of the heroines of Greek Tragedy, did not make them move and deport themselves like ladies. The assumption here is that character comes out in movement, and that some sorts of movement are naturally noble and others ignoble; comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340 \textsuperscript{b} 7 τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰθὸς ἔχουσι στασιμότερον οἱ δὲ κωνικῶν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθερωτέρας.}

\textit{διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγνώσκειν φανερὰ ὅποια τὶς ἔστιν: comp. infra \textsuperscript{a} 17 \textsuperscript{a} 12 τὸ ἐναργῆς ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώσει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, and 6, 1450 \textsuperscript{b} 18 ἡ γὰρ τῆς πραγματικῆς δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγώνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἔστιν. But though Aristotle draws a line between a tragedy \textit{A a 2}}
as literature and its stage presentation (comp. 14, 1453 b 2), he
has no idea of a reading as distinct from an acting tragedy;
a tragedy with him is essentially something to be acted. The
notion of a reading play has been found in Rhet. 3. 12, 1413 b 12,
in the use of the word ἀναγνωστικοί of Chaeremon and others.
The term, however, merely denotes a fact of style; these writers
were ἀναγνωστικοί because their language could be read by any
one, not requiring any special arts of elocution to bring out the
meaning (comp. Demetrius De eloc. 193).

επειτα corresponds with the πρῶτον μὲν in a 5. There is
the same or an even greater interval between the words in Metaph.
N. 2, 1089 a 15, in Pol. 5. 11, 1314 b 14, in Aeschines in Tim. 161,
in Isocrates 197 a, and in Alcidamas De Soph. 3. The answer to
the opponents of Tragedy is twofold: (1) that their reasoning is
not quite conclusive; and (2) that they ignore a whole series of
facts which tell in favour of Tragedy. The series begins with διότι
πῶς ἔχει οὕσπερ ἡ ἐποποιία, and ends with ἐπὶ ὑπόν μία ἢ μέγερων
ἡ τῶν ἐποποιῶν (b 3); all that follows as far as μέγερων in b 11 is
a justification of this last proposition. To this, however, is added
a further point, ἔτι τῷ τῆς τεχνῆς ἔργῳ (scil. διαφέρει), in the short
formula which summarizes this part of the argument in b 12, εἶ ὦν
tούτως διαφέρει πάσιν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ τῆς τεχνῆς ἔργῳ.

τῷ μέτρῳ: as for instance in Soph. Trach. 1009, Phil. 840, and
Eurip. Troad. 590 (Tyrwhitt).

οὐ μικρὸν μέρος, scil. ἔχει.

di' ἦς refers to τῶν μονοικῶν, which is the more important of
the two things (comp. 6, 1450 b 16). The neglect of καὶ τὰς δόσεις
in the construction is not unlike that of καὶ περιπέτεια in 11, 1452 a 38.
Other instances to be explained on the same principle are Soph. el.
16, 175 a 21 ἰδεῖν καὶ λύσαι τῶν μοιχθήριαν (i.e. ἰδεῖν . . . τῶν μοιχθή-
ρίαν), and De anima 3. 7, 431 b 7 λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλ-
λοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα (i.e. λογίζεται . . . τὰ μέλλοντα κτέ.).

tὸ ἐν ἐλάττονι . . . εἶναι, scil. ἔχει; comp. 24, 1460 a 30 ᾧ
Οἰδίπους (scil. ἔχει) τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι. The same construction is
found after λομβάνων in Isocrates 225 λ τὸ μιθέα τῶν μαχών ἀνεν τῆς
tῶν ἄρχόντων γνώμης ἀποδημεῖν . . . ἐτί δὲ τοῦ μηδένος τῶν ἁναγκαίων
ἀποροῦντας τῶν κοινῶν προσταγμάτων ἀμελεῖ, μηδ' ἐτί ταῖς ἄλλαις
tέχναις διατρίβεσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ ταῖς στρατεύμασι προσέχειν τῶν
νοών, ἐκείθεν ἀπαντὰ ταύτ' εἰλήφασιν.

πολλῷ κεκραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ: Plato Critias 121 a πολλῷ τῷ θυγατρί
καὶ πολλάκις ἀνακεφαλανμένη. The lengthiness of the statement is
said to dilute the pleasure of the story and make it thin and watery 1462 b 1
(b 7 ὑδαρή). The clause which follows (λέγω δ' οὖν κρι.) is an
illustration of this: if the matter of the Oedipus Tyrannus (see on
11, 1452 a 24) were treated at great length, in a poem as long as
the Iliad, for instance, it would be only a thin and diluted pleasure
that we should derive from it in its amplified form.

Η ἤλιας, scil. κείται, understood from the preceding θεία.

πλείους πραγμάτων: comp. 23, 1459 b 2.

ἐὰν μὲν ἐνα μῦθον ποιοῦσιν, scil. οἱ ἐποποιοῖ; another instance of
μὲν solitary (see on 6, 1450 a 3 τῆς μὲν πράξεως). In order to
provide an antithesis, the old editors, with certain of the apographs
(e.g. Par. 2038), re-write the text after ὑδαρή (b 7) thus: 〈ἐὰν δὲ
πλείους,〉 λέγω δὲ οὖν ἐὰν ἐκ πλείων πράξεων ἡ συγκεκριμένη,
〈οὐ μία〉, ὠστερ κτέ.; and both Vahlen and Gomperz assume
a lacuna after ὑδαρή. All that Aristotle has to show, however,
is that the epic μύρσις is in the nature of things ἡττον μία; and he
does this by an indirect argument, by insisting that an epic is
always a failure, if the dramatic rule of Unity of action is too
strictly observed in it.

μείονορ. Although μύονον is the spelling both here and else-
where in the principal MSS. of Aristotle, the evidence (v. HSt. s. v.)
is on the whole in favour of the alternative form μείονορ—that
in use in the writers on metre. 1 Both spellings are found in
the existing text of Galen, but his explanations (8 p. 524 and
9 p. 509 K.) show that he connected the first syllable with μεισῶν;
so that μείονορ must have been the form he had before him. The
proper sense of the word is said to be 'contracted, or thinning
away, at the end': Etym. Magn. μύονορ τὸ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς λεπτύνο-
μεν. In Greek medicine σφυγμὸς μείονορ (or μύονορ) meant
a tapering-off pulse: Galen 8 p. 524 K. ἐστὼ τοίσιν ὁ μὲν ἐντερῶς
σφυγμὸς τοῦ πρῶτον βραχῦ μικρότερος: ὁ δὲ τρίτος τοῦ δευτέρου
τοιοῦτῳ πάλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τέταρτος τοῦ τρίτον τῷ ἵσῳ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀχρὶ
πλείωνος ἐφεξῆς γενέσθω. τοὺς τοιούτους σφυγμοὺς μειονιζόντας τε
καὶ μείονορς καλοῦσιν, ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς ἐξ τελευτῶντων σχημάτων
τούνομα μεταφέροντες. In metre an hexameter which 'halts'
through a metrical deficiency at the end, like the Homeric Ἕρως

1 Eustathius on II. 12. 208 recognizes both forms: Ἐν δὲ τῷ Ἡρρήγησαν... ὁφυν μεσχρόν εἴτε πάθος, δ' λέγεται καὶ μνορία διὰ δικρόν τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ μειορία διὰ τῆς ἐς διερήγου, ὡς ἐν τῷ τελεί παραφράγματος τοῦ στιχοῦ καὶ αναστολήν παθότος κατὰ μυσὶ οὖραν, ἡ κατὰ μείωσιν οὖραλον ἢτοί τέλους ἄσφασθε.
COMMENTARY

I462 b 6 δ᾽ ἐφρήγγεισαν, ὡτες ἵδου αἰόλον ὅφιν (II. 12. 208), was termed a στύχος μείονρος (Athenaeus 632 e; comp. Schol. Hephaest. 194-6 Gaisf.). The Latin rendering of it in this sense is ecaudis. Aristotle has the word in a physical sense in two places of the De Partibus, 3. 1, 662 a 24 and 4. 13, 696 b 34, where the carnivorous fishes are said to have an ἀνέρρηγος, and the non-carnivorous, a μύονρον στόμα. In both passages μύονρον στόμα denotes a mouth with a narrow orifice, i.e. one with an opening small by comparison with the interior cavity, just as ἀνέρρηγος στόμα means one with a wide orifice. In the Rhetoric, where it is a term of literary criticism, μείονρος is applied to a clause or period which seems too short and to end abruptly: Rhet. 3. 9, 1409 b 17 δεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ κόλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μυούρους εἶναι μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν (=τὸ μύονρον) προσπατεῖν πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατήν· ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὅταν ἐτι ὄρμον ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὐ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅρου, ἀντιπασχῆ πανσαμένου, οὗ προσπατεῖν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν. This is apparently the sense of μείονρος in the present passage also—where it is usually rendered by 'curtus' (Tyrwhitt), 'truncatus' (Hermann), 'in extremo imminutus' (Victorius), or the like. The general meaning is clear enough: If the epic poet takes a story that is one in the strict dramatic sense of the term, and tells it with befitting rapidity and without diffuseness, the result will be that it will seem to end up too soon. The assumption is that an epic is naturally, and is always expected to be, a work of considerable length (comp. 5. 1449 b 12; 24. 1459 b 17; 24. 1460 a 3).

In lieu of this Bernays suggested τῷ συμ-μέτρῳ μῆκει. As the hexameter, however, has been said to be the only metre fit for a long poem (24. 1460 a 3), it is possible that τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μῆκει may be meant to stand for τῷ τοῦ μέτρου οἰκεώ μῆκει, the length one ordinarily associates with this description of verse. The rendering of Gomperz, 'wenn er der Länge des epischen Versmasses entspricht', has met with the approval of Zeller (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 9 p. 539).

ὕδαρη: Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 659 R. ὑδαρῆς τε γὰρ καὶ ἀσθενῆς καὶ ψυχρος ἄστων (scil. ὅ λόγος). Similarly in Pol. 2. 4, 1262 b 15 Aristotle describes affection as becoming a ὑδαρῆς φιλία when spread over too large a circle of friends or relations.

λέγω δὲ οἶνον ἐὰν ἐκ πλείουν επάξεν ἡ συγκειμένη illustrates the principal statement, ἵττον μία ἡ μύκηραι ἡ τῶν ἐποιων (b 3); for the position of the illustration see on 6. 1450 a 34. The main
point is proved by showing that even the best epics, those of Homer, are made up of a plurality of actions, each of them of some magnitude and importance by itself.

τοιαύτα μέρη: i.e. sections embodying so many distinguishable πράξεις or stories.

καὶ καθ' εὐνατὰ ἐχεῖ. It is usual to write here (ἀ) καὶ καθ' εὐνατὰ ἐχεῖ with certain of the apographs; but a subject (τὰ μέρη) may easily be supplied from the preceding τοιαύτα μέρη (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2, 1 p. 35, and Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 234).

καίτοι ταῦτα τὰ ποιήματα. The error here in Ας, καὶ τοιαύτα ἄττα is a 10 ποιήματα, is fellow to that in it in Rhet. 1. 2, 1358 16 καὶ τοϊς αὐτα (sic) for καίτοι ταῦτα.

εἰ οὖν τοῦτοι κτέ. In summing up the series of reasons introduced by διότι in a 14 Aristotle changes his construction, treating them as a series of assumptions. Here also, at the last moment as it were, he recognizes another and an even more important point of superiority, the superior emotional effect of Tragedy (τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ). An additional argument is introduced in the same way in De caelo 2. 14, 297 17, and 3. 5, 304 19, and in De part. an. 2. 10, 656 a 9.

τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ. In Aristotle's view epic poetry has the same end as Tragedy; and its immediate effect (ἔργων) is the same in kind, the pleasurable excitement of the emotions of pity and fear. The affinity of the Homeric Epic and Tragedy in this respect was acknowledged in antiquity by the ancient commentators on Homer (Adam, Die aristotelische Theorie vom Epos p. 33 sqq.) as well as by Plato (Rep. 605 c). Aristotle's view is that the difference between them is mainly one of manner; so that apart from that they are fundamentally alike—with the same literary elements, the same canons of procedure, the same emotional effect, and the same ultimate end and justification.

τὴν τυχόουσαν ἡδονήν: Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 32 ἐχεῖ γὰρ ἵσως ἡδονήν b 13 τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχόουσαν.

αιτάσ: i.e. Tragedy and epic poetry. The pleasure they give is essentially the same (see above on b 12), though Tragedy gives it in a finer and more concentrated form.

τὴν εἰρημένην: i. 1452 b 32 and i. 14, 1453 b 10.

περὶ μὲν οὖν κτέ. This list of points in the preceding theory of Tragedy and epic poetry is preparatory to a discussion on another matter, no doubt the theory of Comedy (see 6, 1449 b 22). Summaries of the same type are constantly introduced by Aristotle.
as connecting links between one discussion and another; see more especially De gen. et corr. 2. 1, 328 b 26; Meteor. 1. 14, 353 a 25; De mem. 2, 453 b 8; H. A. 3. 1, 509 a 26; Eth. N. 7. 15, 1154 b 32; Pol. 6. 1, 1316 b 31; Rhet. 2. 1, 1377 b 15. To judge from these parallels, the next paragraph must have opened with \( \pi\epsilon\rho\iota \delta\varepsilon \kappa\omicron\mu\omicron\varphi\delta\iota\varsigma \lambda\omicron\iota\pi\tau\omicron\upsilon \varepsilon\lambda\tau\epsilon\upsilon\nu \) or some equivalent formula.
APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL NOTE ON 6. 1449 b 27

The following synopsis of versions and paraphrases of the clause δὲ ἔλεον καὶ φόβου περαινοντα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν may give some idea of the variations of opinion at different times in regard to this much-debated passage. The extracts without references are to be understood to come from commentaries or translations.

1527. l'acciuc: 'per misericordiam ... atque terrorem perturbationes huiusmodi purgans.'

1549. Segni: 'conducendo l' espurgatione degli affetti ... per via di misericordia et di timore.'

1559. Minturnus (De Poet. p. 63): 'tragica poesis id sibi potissimum proponit, ut misericordia captanda incutiendoque terrore animum a perturbationibus expiet.' Comp. his Arte Poetica (1564) p. 77.

1560. Victorius: 'per misericordiam et metum conficiens huiuscemodi perturbationum purgationem.'

1570. Castelvetro: 'induca per misericordia et per ispavento purgazione di così fatte passioni.' In his commentary he explains this as meaning that: 'la tragedia con le predette passioni, spavento e misericordia, purga e scaccia dal cuore degli uomini quelle predette medesime passioni.'

1572. Piccolomini: 'a fine che ... col mezo della compassione e del timore, si purghino gli animi da così fatte lor passioni & perturbazioni.'

1587. Riccobonus: 'per misericordiam et metum inducens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1588. Denores (Poetica f. 6r): 'per purgar gli spettatori col diletto che nasce dalla imitazione, & dalla representatione dal terrore, & alla misericordia.'

1590. Rossi (Discorsi f. 21r): 'per purgare gli animi, con la compassione, & con lo spavento da simili affetti.'

1596. Pinciano (Philosophia antiqua poetica p. 332): 'Tragedia dixera yo que es imitacion activa de accion grave, hecha para limpiar los animos de perturbationes, por medio de misericordia y miedo.'

1610. Heinsius: 'ut ... per misericordiam et metum inducat
similium perturbationum expiationem.' Comp. his De Tragoediae constitutione p. 29 ed. 1611.

1613. Benius: 'per misericordiam et metum peragens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1621. Gallutius (Virgilianae Vindicationes p. 252): 'Id igitur ait Aristoteles Tragoediam agere ac veluti finem intueri: ut sicut affecta corpora purgatis atque abstersis curantur humoribus, ita animum sanet ipsa, duobus affectibus nominatim, commiserationem ac metu purgatis, hoc est, ab ea liberatis exsuperantia, a qua animi quaedam aegrotatio promanabat.'

1623 Goulston: 'per misericordiam metumque factis expressum eiusmodi vehementes animorum perturbationes undequaque purgans expiansque.'

1626. Ordoñez: 'conduciendo la expurgacion de los afectos ... por via de misericordia y terror.'

1633. González de Salas (Nueva Idea de la Tragedia antigua p. 11): 'de modo sea imitada la Accion [p. 17: 'de modo sea su Representacion'], que nueva a Lastima, y a Miedo, para que el animo se purgue de los afectos semejantes.'

1640. Mesnardière (Poétique p. 8): 'qui produit par elle same la terreur et la pitié, et qui sert à modérer ces deux mouvements de l'âme.'

1671. Milton (Pref. to Samson Agonistes): 'Tragedy ... said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of those and such-like passions.' But his Latin version of the words is: 'per misericordiam et metum perficiens talium affectuum lustrationem.'

1692. Dacier: 'qui ... par le moyen de la compassion et de la terreur, achève de purger en nous ces sortes de passions et toutes les autres semblables.'

1705. Anon.: 'which ... by means of Compassion and Terror perfectly refines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever else is like them.'


1763. Moor (On the End of Tragedy p. 42): 'And thus, says Aristotle, Tragedy, by calling in Musick to its aid in exciting Pity and Terror, proposes to CHARM away, out of human life, such calamities as are exhibited in the Drama.'

1768. Lessing (Hamburgische Dramaturgie St. 77): 'Die Tragödie ist die Nachahmung einer Handlung, die ... vermittelst des Mitleids und der Furcht die Reinigung dieser und dergleichen Leidenschaften bewirkt.'

1771. Batteux: 'pour opérer ... par la terreur et par la pitié la purgation de ces mêmes passions.' Comp. his paraphrase in the Mém.
de l'Académie des Inscriptions for 1771: 'qui se fait... par un spectacle de terreur et de pitié, pour nous faire ressentir ces deux passions purgées de ce qui les rend désagréables.'

1775. Anon.: 'with Terror and Pity, effectually purifying such like Passions.'

1789. Twining: 'effecting through pity and terror the correction and refinement of such passions.'

1792. Pye: 'effecting through the means of pity and terror the purgation of such passions.'

1794. Tyrwhitt: 'per misericordiam et metum hujusmodi affectuum purgationem efficiens.' In his note he explains the meaning to be that 'affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragoedii vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo nutriti et validiores effici, quod Plato crimina-batur, sed contra levari et exauriri' (comp. Matthiae, Misc. Phil. 2. 1, p. 24).

1798. Buhle: 'um durch Mitleid und Furcht die Veredlung gewisser Leidenschaften zu bewirken.'

1802. Hermann: 'miseratione et terrore harum et similibum perturbationum purgationem perficiens.'

— Sahl: 'ut per misericordiam metumque velut lustrationem quandam talium calamitatum perficiat.'

1811. Taylor: 'through pity and fear effecting a purification from such like passions.' In the Introd. to the ed. of 1818 the meaning is said to be that 'the terror and pity excited by tragedy purify the spectator from those perturbations which form the catastrophe of the tragedy.'

1821. Gräfenhan: 'durchgehends durch Mitleid und Furcht, die im Zuschauer erregt werden, die Reinigung eben solcher unwill-kürlich entstehenden Gefühle bewirkend.'

1824. Weise: 'welche durch Mitleid und Furcht eine Reinigung dieser Gemüthsbewegungen bewirkt.'


1839. Ritter: 'miseratione ac metu perficiens talium perturbationum purgationem.'

1848. Weil (Verb. der zehnten Versammlung deutscher Philologen zu Basel p. 140): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Mitleid und Furcht die solchen Affecten eigenthümliche Reinigung.' In 1889 (Études sur le drame antique p. 162) thus in French: 'La tragédie est l'image d'une action... qui, par la pitié et la crainte, accomplit la catharsis propre aux émotions de cette nature.'

1849. Egger (La Critique chez les Grecs p. 321): 'employant la terreur et la pitié pour purger les passions de ce genre.'

1857. Bernays (Zwei Abhandlungen p. 21): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt
APPENDIX

durch (Erregung von) Mitleid und Furcht die erleichternde Entladung solcher (mitleidigen und furchtsamen) Gemüthsaffectionen.

1858. Saint-Hilaire: 'arrivant, tout en excitant la pitié et la terreur, à purifier en nous ces deux sentiments.'

1859. Stahr (Aristoteles und die Wirkung der Tragödie p. 32): 'welche... durch Mitleid und Furcht (die beiden nothwendigen Elemente jeder solchen Handlung, welche keiner tragischen Dichtung fehlen dürfen) die reinigende Erleichterung von solchen Erleidnissen zu Wege bringt.'

1865. Susemühl: 'und dies Alles in einer Weise, dass diese Darstellung durch Furcht und Mitleid eine Reinigung eben dieser Affecte erzielt.' In his ed. of 1874: 'eine Reinigung von eben dieser Art von Affecten erzielt.'

1869. Ueberweg: 'welche durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht die (zeitweilige) Befreiung von derartigen Gefühlen zum Enderfolg hat.'

1875. M. Schmitz: 'so angelegt, dass sie durch Furcht und Mitleid eine von derartigen Affecten reinigende Wirkung übt.'

1876. Barco: 'la quale per via della pietà e del terrore libera l'animo da siffatti sentimenti.'

— Doering (Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 254): 'Durch Mitleid und Furcht, d. h. durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht, vollbringt die Tragödie die Katharsis der jenen gleichartigen Affecte.'

— Manns (Emmerich Progr. p. 5): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Mitleid und Furcht die solchen Affecten (oder... die solchen Mitteln) eigenthümliche Reinigung' (comp. his Lehre des Aristoteles von der tragischen Katharsis und Hamartia p. 25).

1878. Reinkens (Aristoteles über Kunst p. 158): 'welche durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung von solchen Affecten bewirkt.'

1883. Ruelle: 'opérant par la pitié et la terreur la purgation des passions de la même nature.'

1885. Günther (Grundzüge der tragischen Kunst p. 258): 'Die Tragödie bewirkt durch Rührung und Erschütterung die gerade auf derartige Seeenzustände sich erstreckende Gemüthsklärung.'

1887. Baumgarten (Handbuch der Poetik p. 424): 'welche die Kraft besitzt, durch die Empfindungen des Mitleids und der Furcht die Läuterung der entsprechenden Gemüthsbewegungen zu vollenden.'

1891. Wecklein (Über die Stoffe und die Wirkung der griechischen Tragödie p. 35): 'die Tragödie ist eine Nachahmung, welche durch Mitleid und Furcht die Erleichterung von dieser Art von Gemüthsregungen erzielt.'

1892. Bosanquet (History of Aesthetic p. 64); 'producing by (the stimulation of) pity and fear the alleviating discharge of emotions of that nature.'

1894. Bernardakis (Mon édition d'Euripide p. 60): 'qui par la pitié et la crainte mène à sa fin l'expiation des faits de mal qui causent cette pitié et cette crainte.'
1895. Butcher: 'through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.'

1896. Laehr (Wirkung der Tragödie nach Aristoteles p. 65): 'Eine Nachahmung, welche durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung derartiger Gefühle ... vollbringt.' Explained in p. 69 as meaning: 'die Tragödie vollbringt durch Mitleid und Furcht die Reinigung aller derartigen Gefühle.'

1897. Gomperz: 'eine Darstellung, welche durch Erregung von Mitleid und Furcht die Entladung dieser Affecte herbeiführt.'

1899. Hatzfeld et Dufour: 'opérant par la pitié et la crainte (au théâtre) la purification des passions de ce genre (dans la réalité).'

APPENDIX 365
INDEX OF GREEK WORDS

The references are to Bekker's pages and lines as given in the margin of this edition of the text. The first two figures are omitted; so that Bekker's 1456 b 36, for instance, becomes here 56 b 36.

A + after a reference means that the word recurs more than once in the context.

A 56b36; 58a12
άγαθος 50a28; 54b9; 56a6 — opp. αφθονίας 51b37; 56a6; 59b29; 60b2
2 άγαθον 56a6; 59b29; 60b2 — opp. κακῶς 51a8
'Αγάθων 51b21; 54b14; 56a18, 24, 30
άγγελα 54b5
άγνωστός 50a9; 54b17 — άγνωστος 50a17 — άγνωστης 55b9
άγνωστα 50b13; 53b36
άγνωστοι 50b18; 51a6; 53b27
άγνωστοις 51a8; 50a9 — κακῶς 56a18
άγνωστομα 51b37
άδειεν 56a20, 31 — δείε 56b16
άδέμενα 56b28
άδελφος 54b7; 55b8, b11
άδελφος 53b20; 54b7; 55b6
άδηλος 55b4
άδιαπέφυ 56b22, 24
άδινος 56b23
έν δοῦ 56b3
άδυνάμη 56b17
τὸ ἀδύνατον 51a9 — ἄθων 51b18; 60b20, 23; 61b23 — ἑλεῖ 60a27
ἀδυνάτα 58a27
άδείπτης 58b27
άδεικτον 58b29
άδεικτος 58b25
ἀδηθη 60b11 — ἀδηθέω τραγῳδία: 50a25
ἀδίκατα 61b25
'Αθηωτικός 48a36, b1
'Αθηωτικόν 49b7
ἀθρησκείον 61b18
ἀθρησκεύον 62a1
Ἀμαντές 56a1
Αγείας (Eurip.) 61b21

Αγισσός 53a37
Αἵμων (Soph.) 54a2
άιγιμα 58b24 +
αἱρεσίας 60a5
αἱρέσωτερον 61b11
αἰσθανομένων 61b29 — αἰσθήσεις 54b37
αἰσθήσεις 51a7 — αἰσθήσεις 54b16
αἰσχώρος 49a35
αἰσχρό 49a36; 61a13 — τὸ αἰσχρὸν 49a34
Αἰσχὺλος 49a16; 56a17; 58b20, 22
αἴτια 48b4; 19; 55b7; 62b18
αἰτίας 55b31
αἰτίας 55a8 — αἴτιον 50a1; 51b16
— διστ. αἴτειν 48b12
αἱδη 61b21
ἀκολουθεῖν 49a3; 49a10; 52a28; 53a34; 62b7 — ἔξανάγης 54b16
ἀκοῦειν 55a2; 59b30 — opp. ὅραν 55b5, 6
ἀκουστὸς 55b27 +
ἀκρατον 56a15
ἀκριβοῦν 48b11; 50a36
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